Irene Mia
The ongoing unrest in Haiti is unique in contemporary Latin America for the dramatic extent of its institutional collapse, escalating armed violence and lawlessness. It is also the result – and culmination – of the country’s very specific internal dynamics. Since the overthrow of the almost three-decade-long Duvalier dictatorship in 1986, the country has been grappling with political instability and insecurity, widespread corruption, and criminal infiltration and capture of state institutions. The assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021 served as a pivotal moment in Haiti’s recent history, bringing these enduring institutional, economic and security challenges to the fore.
The rise of criminal governance amid corrupt or absent state institutions is a growing trend across the region. Over the past few decades, non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have significantly expanded their influence, wealth and reach across Latin America. Fuelled by the large profits generated by various illicit activities, they have increasingly challenged the state’s monopoly of force and governance. The International Committee of the Red Cross counts close to 70 armed groups operating in Latin America, with just over 33 million people living under their full or partial control. Most of these groups provide some essential public services such as security, healthcare and education, and some collect taxes from the population in their areas of influence.
Irrespective of the specific characteristics of the various groups and countries in which they operate, these organisations have shared a common trajectory: the imperative to secure their strategic goals has transformed them from predominantly criminal entities into quasi-political actors. This has entailed infiltrating state institutions, influencing elections – using votes and political violence as bargaining chips – and direct military confrontation with the state. Recent examples of these varied strategies abound across the region, ranging from the assassination of electoral candidates in Ecuador and Mexico, to the pervasive, large-scale armed violence unleashed by criminal groups in Central America and Ecuador, which has resulted in repeated and prolonged states of exception. The declaration in January by Ecuadorian president, Daniel Noboa, that the state was now engaged in an ‘internal armed conflict’ against criminal groups signifies the severity of the situation.
As NSAGs develop into quasi-political actors, they expand their (criminal) governance over the population, frequently filling the void left by the state’s inability to meet basic socio-economic, political and security needs. Their governance – whether hybrid or complete – across swathes of Latin American countries has often led to a degree of societal acceptance and heightened political influence. This fragmentation of governance, against a backdrop of weakening states and declining democracy, raises complex questions about the rules of the game and the parameters for interacting and engaging with NSAGs. While Nayib Bukele’s iron-fist approach in El Salvador has appeared successful in breaking down criminal mara (gang) groups and reclaiming control over territory, it has also curtailed human rights and democratic principles, casting doubt on its long-term viability. Such an approach may also prove impractical in larger countries or when NSAGs appear to hold the upper hand over the state, as illustrated starkly by the Haiti case. Moreover, whenever these groups are an influential part of a country’s ‘elite bargain’, they have the potential – and the ability – to undermine state policies or strategies they oppose. The protracted process of forming a transitional presidential council, tasked with governing Haiti and organising elections, exemplifies these inherent risks.
In numerous countries in the region, the increasing activism of these groups in pursuing their political agendas exacerbates, and is exacerbated by, institutional deficiencies and sub-par governance standards at various levels of government. Weak institutions are more susceptible to infiltration or complete ‘capture’ by criminal groups with seemingly limitless economic resources. Criminal capture, in turn, further undermines the rule of law while diminishing the ability of the state to perform its basic functions and uphold its legitimacy as the sole source of governance.
The trifecta of corruption, institutional erosion and governance fragmentation is mounting an urgent challenge to stability and security in Latin America to which domestic and international attention must now turn. The crisis in Haiti serves as a warning against leaving current regional trends unchecked.
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