Indian Strategic Studies: 09/09/25

9 September 2025

US Special Forces Officer Dies In Dhaka; India Perks Up Ears

OB Bureau

New Delhi: India has started maintaining closer watch on the goings-on in Bangladesh after the recovery of the body of a US citizen in a room of the Westin Hotel in Dhaka on August 31.

Terrence Arvelle Jackson, whose body was found, was no American tourist or businessman. He was the Command Inspector General for the 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne).

The 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) or 1SFC (A) is a division-level operations forces unit under the United States Army Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The mission of 1SFC (A) is to organise, equip, train and validate forces to conduct full-spectrum special operations in support of USSOCOM, Geographic Combatant Commanders, American ambassadors and other government agencies.

USSOCOM has the ability to rapidly deploy a high-level headquarters to run sustained, unconventional campaigns in foreign theatres.

Jackson’s body has been handed over to the US embassy in Dhaka by the local police without an autopsy. While the US has remained tight-lipped, questions are being raised within intelligence circles regarding his presence in Bangladesh. Authorities in Dhaka have confirmed that he was in Bangladesh ‘on a business trip’ for the last few months.

Whether a serving US Army officer can engage in ‘business’, that too in a foreign country, for months, is not known, but Jackson’s LinkedIn profile reveals that he had no plans to leave the Army for two more years.

The US’ interest in the Rakhine Corridor is well known. In May this year, even as Operation Sindoor was underway along India’s western theatre, an US Air Force team of specialists had reached Dhaka ahead of the landing of a ‘large and sensitive cargo’ by air.

The team was headed by Tara Lynn Alexzandria Stryder, who is the director of logistics, Supply Chain and Planning. She is said to have the US’ highest security clearance, ‘TS/SCI’, or Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmentalized Intelligence. Stryder is known to be a “Combat mission support commander”.

Indus Waters Treaty: From Cooperative Vision to Calculated Confrontation

Medha Bisht

The Indus Waters Treaty, once described as a treaty that withstood three wars between India and Pakistan, is receiving much flak after being framed as “Nehru’s betrayal of Independent India.”

While the 1960 treaty was neither a celebrated success nor a complete failure, it was nevertheless an example of thin mediation where the Indus Basin was partitioned. It was an institutional mechanism set up to stabilize the competing water claims of India and Pakistan.

Beyond simple allocations, the treaty contained components of a broader transboundary water governance framework.

While much ink has been spilled on the negotiated outcomes of the treaty, less attention has been given to Articles 4, 6, 7 and 8, which offer insights into the treaty from a governance perspective.

For instance, Articles 4 and 6 offer possibilities of an iterative engagement to address interconnected issues related to river erosion, promoting river protection, and treating sewage and industrial water at the source point.

Article 7 alludes to integrated development of the river for optimal use through overseeing drainage works and data sharing. And Article 8 suggests a gradual adaptive response, opening the way for a graded dispute resolution mechanism.

However, the governance potential of the Eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej) was never realized. Instead there was an overwhelming focus on the Western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab). The treaty soon became hostage to the emerging political tensions between India and Pakistan.

Instead of evolving into a flexible framework of cooperation, a post-facto assessment of the 1960 treaty reveals that it hardened into a rigid legal framework, failing to address emerging water challenges. This came at the cost of ecological degradation of the Eastern rivers, and domestic water mismanagement in both countries, particularly concerning water quality and groundwater over-extraction.

Can ASEAN Truly Remain Neutral Between the US and China?

Siau Lim Chong

As the 2025 ASEAN Chair, Malaysian Prime Minister Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim affirmed his commitment to safeguarding ASEAN’s centrality while advancing a policy of nonalignment. At the same time, this year China’s President Xi Jinping has undertaken an intensive round of visits to several Southeast Asian nations, concluding over 30 strategic cooperation agreements with multiple ASEAN member states in areas such as artificial intelligence, energy, port development, and railway infrastructure. While these initiatives are framed as measures to deepen bilateral and regional ties, they have also drawn international attention to the potential long-term implications for ASEAN’s strategic orientation.

In April 2025, Xi embarked on state visits to Malaysia, Vietnam, and Cambodia, underscoring economic and trade cooperation and emphasizing the importance of ASEAN unity in the face of U.S. trade protectionism – particularly the high “reciprocal tariffs” introduced under President Donald Trump. To look at Malaysia specifically, just before Xi’s arrival, the United States had announced an increase in tariffs on Malaysian goods to 24 percent.

Following negotiations, Washington subsequently reduced the rate to 19 percent on the condition that Malaysia commit to purchasing more than $240 billion worth of American exports, including Boeing aircraft, coal, and telecommunications equipment – an arrangement aimed at narrowing the U.S. trade deficit with Malaysia.

ASEAN is currently China’s largest economic partner, yet the region has also been among the most affected by the tariff regime under Trump. The United States now levies import duties of 19 percent on goods from Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Cambodia, 20 percent on Vietnam, and 25 percent on Brunei. Laos and Myanmar face the highest rates in Southeast Asia – 40 percent – second only to Syria’s global peak of 41 percent.

What do these developments tell us about whether Anwar’s proclaimed “policy of nonalignment” for ASEAN has indeed become a firmly established principle, or remains, in practice, a matter of diplomatic rhetoric?

China’s Parade of Power

Joe Varner

China’s latest military parade , which took place in Beijing on September 3, was never simply a commemoration of wartime sacrifice against Japan and the Axis powers. It was a carefully choreographed show of force directed at Washington, America’s Asian allies, and India, as well as Chinese audiences at home and abroad.

With Chinese President Xi Jinping flanked by Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, the optics were blunt: China intends to be treated as a global military peer, to set the foundations of a new world order, and it wants the Western world to take note.

The parade’s centrepiece was the public unveiling of China’s maturing nuclear triad. New intercontinental ballistic missiles – the DF-61 and DF-31BJ – rolled down Chang’an Avenue alongside the JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile and the smaller air-launched JL-1. This sent the message that China can now credibly claim a land, sea, and air second-strike capability. For the United States, the surprise appearance of the DF-61 – unknown until this event – raises questions about what else Beijing is holding back and complicates strategic planning. Washington must now assume that China’s deterrent is more survivable and diverse than previously acknowledged.

At the regional level, the display was dominated by hypersonic weapons. Variants of the DF-26 intermediate-range missile, already nicknamed the “Guam killer,” were joined by a family of anti-ship systems, from the ramjet-powered YJ-15, to the hypersonic YJ-17, YJ-19, YJ-20, and YJ-21. The DF-17, carrying a maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicle, rounded out the picture.

These weapons are designed to target U.S. carrier strike groups, regional bases, and allied fleets across the western Pacific. What this means for U.S. allies such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia is that the cost of intervention in any Taiwan or South China Sea contingency has gone up, and warning times have gone down.

China’s Massive Missile Forces: A Paper Tiger?

Rebecca Grant

Is China’s Mighty Rocket Force Secretly a ‘Paper Tiger’?

Key Points and Summary – Despite its massive size and impressive parades, China’s People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) may be a “paper tiger” in a real conflict.

The PLARF’s effectiveness is severely undermined by deep-rooted corruption, a complete lack of modern combat experience, and finite missile stockpiles.

While China boasts of “carrier-killer” missiles like the DF-21D, the immense difficulty of targeting and hitting a moving, well-defended U.S. aircraft carrier is a major operational challenge.

Meanwhile, the U.S. is deploying advanced counter-hypersonic defenses, stretching China’s limited resources and diminishing the PLARF’s perceived threat.

The PLARF May Be A “Paper Tiger”

Painted with white English-letter designators, the canisters of China’s DF-5C rolled down the streets of Beijing, alongside other missiles, to showcase the power of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF).

The PLARF is now the largest ground-based missile force in the world, with about 2,500 ballistic missiles of all types, nuclear and conventional. The PLARF became a separate branch of China’s military in 2015, making it equivalent to the Navy, Army and Air Force. It owns and operates most of China’s newer missiles and reports directly to the Central Military Commission headed by Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Top U.S. military commanders said they were not concerned.

“The takeaway for this is we are not deterred,” said Air Force Gen. Kevin Schneider, the commander of U.S. Air Forces Pacific. According to Schneider, the future B-21 stealth bomber, F-47 fighter, Collaborative Combat Aircraft, and other systems will allow the U.S. to “adapt ahead of what a potential adversary is doing.”

Analysis-Diplomatic tour de force: China's Xi shows he's 'totally in charge'

James Pomfret, Laurie Chen, Mei Mei Chu and Antoni Slodkowski

When Chinese leader Xi Jinping organised his first parade to mark the anniversary of the end of World War Two, in 2015, he placed his two predecessors by his side in a show of respect and continuity of leadership.

Ten years on and having eliminated domestic opposition as he serves an unprecedented third term as president, Xi was flanked on Wednesday at the 80th anniversary parade by Russia's Vladimir Putin and North Korea's Kim Jong Un.

Chinese Communist Party leaders were interspersed among overseas guests.

The parade followed Xi's high-profile summit with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at a weekend meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Tianjin, and the Chinese leader's rare visit to Tibet last month.

This display of diplomatic clout, stamina and geopolitical ambition has helped quell concerns among some China observers about the 72-year-old president's vitality, linked to sporadic absences and - so far unknown - succession plans. It has also helped divert domestic attention from slowing growth, experts say.

Longevity was on the leaders' minds as they walked up to the rostrum at Beijing's Tiananmen Square - Xi and Putin were caught in a hot mic moment discussing organ transplants and the possibility that humans could live to 150 years old.

"This week of triumphant diplomacy for Xi shows that he remains totally in charge of the elite politics of the Communist Party," said Neil Thomas of the Asia Society, a New York-based think tank. Unable to get the same legitimacy from economic growth as his predecessors, Xi has turned toward nationalism "to try and make up for it", Thomas said.

"It's a way to divert attention from economic challenges and to make his citizens proud to be Chinese, even if it's harder to feel that from the day-to-day experiences of unemployment, falling house prices and stagnant wages."

It would now be wise to assume China’s Xi is going to move against Taiwan – this is how it will happen

Make no mistake, Wednesday’s “victory” parade in Beijing was the most significant event since Xi Jinping came to power in China in 2013. It was both a triumph and a prelude; the triumph of military might and the prelude to using it.

The Chinese leader did not don a uniform. Instead, he favoured a plain Mao-style outfit (of distinctive martial cut), in contrast to most of his suited guests overlooking Tiananmen Square.

This was the new China at its most militant. Nuclear missiles, drones, advanced weapons of all kinds, thousands of regimented troops marching in tight precision. Much has been written about it as a display of pride. It is now time to consider intention.

The honoured guests were the Russian president Vladimir Putin and the North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un. With Xi, they made a trio of autocrats, unmistakably identified as the key players of the day by the Chinese media.

All three are hardened survivors. Two of them, Putin and Kim, are steeped in blood. In the Chinese system, there is no longer any need to eliminate opponents physically. But Xi did not hesitate to decimate the military, purging defence ministers, generals and staff officers. The dismissal of his foreign minister in a spy scandal seemed a mere afterthought by contrast.

One wonders whether, over their cups of tea, the Chinese and Russian leaders exchanged ideas about the necessity of purges. For Putin, the spectre of Yevgeny Prigozhin, rebel leader of the Wagner Group, who died in a mid-air explosion, has vanished from his calculations.

As for the ever-smiling Kim Jong Un, he lives with the knowledge that he executed his own uncle, Jang Song Thaek, after a reported tip-off from China that Jang was plotting against him. Kim’s unfortunate relative was tied to a scaffold in front of an audience of cadres and shredded by an anti-aircraft gun.

Nothing in Xi’s biography suggests that he enjoys cruelty or is personally ruthless. But he does wield power in a way that rivals Stalin in purpose. It would now be wise to assume that he is, in fact, going to move against Taiwan.

‘Unrestrained’ Chinese Cyberattackers May Have Stolen Data From Almost Every American

Adam Goldman

China has hacked into American power grids and companies for decades, stealing sensitive files and intellectual property such as chip designs as it seeks to gain an edge over the United States.

But a sweeping cyberattack by a group known as Salt Typhoon is China’s most ambitious yet, experts and officials have concluded after a year of investigating it. It targeted more than 80 countries and may have stolen information from nearly every American, officials said. They see it as evidence that China’s capabilities rival those of the United States and its allies.

The Salt Typhoon attack was a yearslong, coordinated assault that infiltrated major telecommunications companies and others, investigators said in a highly unusual joint statement last week. The range of the attack was far greater than originally understood, and security officials warned that the stolen data could allow Chinese intelligence services to exploit global communication networks to track targets including politicians, spies and activists.

Hackers sponsored by the Chinese government “are targeting networks globally, including, but not limited to, telecommunications, government, transportation, lodging, and military infrastructure networks,” the statement said.

British and American officials have described the attack as “unrestrained” and “indiscriminate.” Canada, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan and Spain were also signatories to the statement, which was part of a name-and-shame effort directed at the Chinese government.

“I can’t imagine any American was spared given the breadth of the campaign,” said Cynthia Kaiser, a former top official in the F.B.I.’s cyber division, who oversaw investigations into the hacking.

HQ-29: China’s New “Satellite-Killer” Missiles Threaten To End U.S. Space Dominance, Cripple American Military

Sumit Ahlawat

China showcased a series of offensive weapons systems during the Victory Day military parade in Beijing on September 3 to mark the 80th anniversary of the victory over Japan in the Second World War.

China’s hypersonic weapons, anti-ship ballistic missiles, submarine-launched missiles, nuclear-tipped torpedoes, and laser weapon systems all gathered worldwide attention.

During the parade, China also demonstrated its layered state-of-the-art air defense and antiballistic missile systems.

To demonstrate its multi-stage, multi-layer air and missile defense network, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) brought six types of advanced AD systems to the parade.

The HQ-11, HQ-20, HQ-22A, HQ-9C, HQ-19, and HQ-29 – Six types of air defense systems were showcased during the parade.

Among them, the event marked the public debut of the HQ-20 and HQ-22A anti-aircraft missile systems. China also unveiled its long-speculated HQ-29 air and missile defense system for the first time.

The other three AD systems — HQ-11, HQ-9C, and HQ-19 — have been part of Chinese defense shows in recent years. The HQ-11 and HQ-19 were showcased at the 15th Airshow in Zhuhai, China, in November 2024.

Chinese AD Systems

Together, the six Chinese AD systems can carry out long-range, medium-range, and short-range air defense missions and multiple-course, multi-layer antiballistic missile interception, building a solid barrier for air and aerospace defense.

The HQ-11 has been described as a terminal defense weapon, mainly used to intercept air-to-surface missiles, guided bombs, cruise missiles, as well as fixed-wing combat aircraft, helicopters, and other air strike weapons, providing mid to low-altitude and short-range terminal defense for high-value targets.

China’s Military Display and Its Indo-Pacific Message

Mick Ryan

In his speech to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting this week, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that “we should contribute to safeguarding world peace and stability. . . . We should set an example in championing the common values of humanity.” Two days later, Xi had played host to a crowd of foreign leaders at a military parade in Beijing, which, according to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), was to commemorate “the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War.”

The reality is that the parade had three more vital objectives for Xi. The first was to reshape narratives about the role of Russia and China in winning World War II, and to downplay to very significant role played by allied fighting forces and industry. The second was to act as a mega–arms bazaar, demonstrating China’s latest advanced weaponry to potential buyers, particularly those who no longer wish to rely on Russian equipment or want cut-price versions of the latest generation U.S. weapons. Finally, and most importantly, the parade sought to project China’s strength and its inevitable and unstoppable rise through a demonstration of large-scale and high-technology military power.

The parade, along with the recent three-way handshake between the leaders of China, India, and Russia, was a rebuke with Chinese characteristics to current U.S. economic and security policy objectives in the Indo-Pacific, and potentially heralds a very different political, economic, and security environment for all of us who live and work in this dynamic region of the world.

This commentary aims to assess the implications for Australian politics and national security affairs in the wake of the events of the past 48 hours in China. But first, what was unveiled during the parade, and what might it mean for military affairs in the Pacific theatre?

Deciphering the Military Signals of China’s Victory Day Parade

Michael Clarke

Much attention has been paid to the symbolism of China’s September 3 parade in Beijing to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the end of the “War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression.” Some see the parade as evidence of the solidification of an “axis of upheaval” given the attendance of the leaders of Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Others have highlighted the parade’s role in the Chinese Communist Party’s ongoing efforts to appropriate the history of China’s World War II experience to both burnish both its nationalist credentials and its agenda to de-center the United States’ role in the waging of the war and the settlement that followed.

What has not received as much attention, however, is what the display of military hardware in Tiananmen Square may tell us not only about the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the types of missions and conflicts that Beijing expects it to fight, but also its current threat perceptions.

In the first instance, as the Science of Military Strategy (SMS) – a compendium of the “views of many of the PLA’s leading strategists” on military strategy and doctrine – noted, such a “general display of military power” is a means of deterrence signaling as it demonstrates to potential adversaries that “we have advanced defense and counterattack methods” with which to retaliate.

More specifically, the hardware displayed and the official commentary around it suggest three areas of emphasis for the PLA: a continuing focus on development of capabilities to mount multidomain joint operations, adaptation to the age of drones and autonomous systems, and enhancement of conventional and nuclear deterrence.

It has been apparent for some time that the PLA envisions future conflict to encompass “multiple battlespace domains” characterized by “information-centric warfare.” The PLA’s current operational construct of “informationized warfare” thus entails the development of the PLA into a “force enabled by the widespread and streamlined use of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, data analysis, and robotics.” This was underscored by appearance at the parade of contingents of the PLA’s Space Force, Cyber Force, Information Support Force, and Logistics Support Force. These contingents displayed a range of capabilities including “electronic countermeasure equipment” capable of “disconnecting enemy networks and breaking digital chains” and “vehicles of cloud computing, digital intelligence, air-ground networks, and integrated information” that “can quickly establish new types of cyber systems to support joint operations.”

The United States Isn’t Competing With China on Technology

Derek M. Scissors

Despite headlines about a US-China technology race, America isn’t competing—corporate profits and weak policy undermine long-term strategy.

The US-China technology competition receives a great deal of attention. It’s certainly an important issue, on paper. One problem: America is not genuinely competing now, and never has. Moreover, the second Trump administration has moved the United States further away from genuine competition, apparently for the sake of short-term financial gains at home.

The Chinese Side

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is competing. The first goal of the Communist Party is, of course, to preserve its own rule. A serious risk to that rule is foreign, particularly American, coercion. There are a variety of ways the PRC might be coerced, but foreign technological capability is usually at the heart of the threat. A blockade of the commodities imports that the economy requires, for instance, is far more feasible if foreign militaries are technologically superior. The extraordinary income Chinese firms earn overseas does not rely on technological superiority, but it is vulnerable to foreign breakthroughs. Possibly most worrisome to General Secretary Xi Jinping is foreign technology that can expose internal Party records and communication or undermine authority in a crisis.

That the PRC has been attempting to climb the technological ladder is old news. Its capacity to compete in advanced technology with the United States (and others) has emerged more recently. The basic Chinese model remains the same: the state belatedly identifies important technology, usually prompted by the private sector, then commands development of that technology while providing various kinds of support. The identification stage has become more difficult as the PRC gets closer to the technology frontier, but the resources available for state support have expanded tremendously. It’s worth noting that the Party is unlikely to voluntarily permit deployment of technology at the frontier, due to potential threats to its authority. China is competing for political stability and commercial advantage, not to induce risk.

America Must Cut Its Reliance on China—Now

David Sauer

China dominates the rare earth industry—and has shown it is willing to weaponize its market power to wring concessions from its competitors. America needs a way to fight back.

This week, Xi Jinping will host Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un at a major military parade in Beijing, highlighting a growing axis between China, Russia and North Korea—and reminding American strategists that even as America’s strategic rivals are coming together abroad, the United States remains dangerously dependent on them for its supply chains at home.

There is no question that China, now emboldened by visible shows of geopolitical unity with Russia and North Korea, represents the most significant national security threat to the United States. America must therefore rapidly become strategically independent from the Chinese in critical technologies and commodities, as well as offer alternative products to compete against China. Washington needs to ensure that it has secure and unfettered access to important equipment and materials—especially in the realm of telecommunications, semiconductors, rare earth minerals, and pharmaceuticals—to ensure it does not rely at all on the Chinese Communist Party.

America Needs Domestic Competitors to Huawei

Recognizing the strategic importance of cutting-edge technologies, the Chinese have sought to dominate the telecommunications and networking equipment sector. Through the Chinese state-owned firm Huawei, the Chinese government has maintained artifically low prices, among other tactics, with an eye towards infiltrating Huawei-made equipment into 5G and networking infrastructure throughout the globe.

The first Trump administration wisely banned the use of Huawei equipment in the United States, designated Huawei as a Chinese military company, and spent considerable time and resources to persuade US allies and partners of the intelligence threat posed by using Huawei equipment in their networks. The United States rightly highlighted the potential for back doors that Huawei and China by extension would be poised to exploit to steal data and secrets.

The North Korean Way of Proliferation

Vipin Narang and Pranay Vaddi

In the months since Israel and the United States’ 12-day war with Iran in June, analysts and intelligence agencies have widely debated the extent of the damage to the Iranian nuclear program and regime. It is still unclear how much of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure has survived and how quickly, if at all, it can be reconstituted. On a strategic level, however, the effect of the war is indisputable: it marks the eclipse of a nuclear strategy that the Islamic Republic had pursued, often successfully, since the 1980s.

For decades, Iran was the quintessential nuclear hedger. It sought the

Turkey Eyes Breakthrough in Eastern Mediterranean Standoff

Libya’s eastern parliament is preparing to vote on ratifying a maritime deal that its rivals in western Libya signed with Turkey in 2019. Legal challenges in both eastern and western Libya initially blocked the agreement, while Greece and Egypt countered in 2020 with their own pact. Cyprus, Egypt and Greece reject the deal, saying it ignores Greek islands. But eastern Libyan lawmakers are now reconsidering, putting the deal back in play.

Approval would strengthen Turkey’s attempt to break what it calls a Greek island blockade, give Ankara political cover to survey and drill for gas in a contested corridor and justify a long-term Turkish naval presence in the central Mediterranean. For eastern Libya, the deal promises investment and political leverage.

If passed, the deal would allow Turkey to claim rights in waters south of Crete, overlapping with the 2020 Greece-Egypt EEZ accord. Since Turkey is not a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, no neutral arbitration exists. The dispute will instead play out through naval patrols and diplomatic pushback. Ratification would not settle boundaries but harden them, raising Turkey’s profile in eastern Mediterranean energy politics while increasing the risk of confrontation.

Russia-Ukraine War – 800 Years in the Making

Dennis S. Nelson

Russia’s current “Special Military Operation” against Ukraine is just part of an 800 year long struggle with the West. During those hundreds of years, Russia has experienced cycles of expansion and contraction, the most recent contraction being the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union in 1991. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its assault on the Donbass in 2014, and its all-out attack on Ukraine in 2022, started the latest new cycle of Russian expansion to the West.

Geographic/Geopolitical Considerations

Russia has no significant geographic features to protect it from invasion from Europe, and since its very inception has been vulnerable to conquest. The traditional invasion route to Russia is from the North European plane, whose narrowest part is the 300 miles between the Baltic Sea and Carpathian Mountains, in Poland. This invasion route was taken by the Teutonic Knights (1242), the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1610), Sweden (1700), France (1812), Germany (1914), Poland (1920), and Germany (1941). According to the Russians, NATO was/is a threat to the Soviet Union in the Cold War, and to Russia today, by that same route.

It has been a top priority for historic Russia to control these narrow Polish flatlands, which Imperial Russia (1795-1914) and the Soviet Union (1945-1991) were able to accomplish. With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the loss of its satellite Poland, Russia seeks a back-up buffer zone in Belarus and Ukraine.[1]

Russia’s Cycles of Expansion and Contraction

For hundreds of years, Russia’s geopolitical objective has been to expand from its core borders toward Central Europe. There have been five historic waves of Russian expansion, and Russia has begun its sixth wave. Several of these waves began from a line to where Russia had previously contracted, as a result being pushed back by Western forces. This historic starting line corresponds roughly with the 1991 border of the Russian Federation.

Britain is in the eye of the financial storm Investors are losing confidence

John Rapley

Amid weak growth and a worsening budget outlook, British gilt yields are now higher than they have been in nearly 30 years, rising steadily for months and nearly 1% since last year. With national debt of nearly £3 trillion, every percentage point increase in interest drains billions from the government’s budget. Nor is there much hope this will change anytime soon.

Britain’s inflation is proving even harder to dislodge than that of other developed economies, adding a premium to its bonds. To a greater extent than other countries, too, it depends on external creditors for its lending — with 30% of gilts held abroad compared to an average of 18% for other Western countries. Surprisingly, though, investors seem to trust the Chancellor, Rachel Reeves, to keep the books in balance. When there was a hint she might be fired in the spring, the brief bond rebellion showed that investors don’t want her replaced. But they seem to have less faith that she will succeed in getting the economy going again, as evidenced by the fact yields keep rising nonetheless. This means that, as Britain continues to face upward pressure on interest costs, investors are looking to park their money elsewhere.

That certainly seems to be the signal we’re getting from the gold market, where the surging price shows the money is rushing into the one port that, throughout history, has been the safest in a storm. Priced in dollars, gold is up nearly 40% since the start of the year, its surge driven in large measure by central banks shifting out of dollar-based assets as they anticipate a debasement of the US currency.

The chickens of two decades of cheap money are coming home to roost. The World Bank estimates that, over the past 15 years, the global economy has expanded about 67%. At the same time, the world money supply has risen by more than double that, some 145% and rising, at last count. Most of that rise, in turn, was driven by a handful of big central banks — the US Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the People’s Bank of China and the Bank of Japan — and the ultra-loose monetary policies which were rolled out following the 2008 financial crisis.

US and Taiwanese defence officials held secret talks in Alaska

US and Taiwanese defence officials held secret talks in Alaska on linkedin (opens in a new window) Save current progress 0% Demetri Sevastopulo in Washington and Kathrin Hille in Taipei PublishedSEP 5 2025 119 Print this page Unlock the White House Watch newsletter for free Your guide to what Trump’s second term means for Washington, business and the world US and Taiwanese defence officials held secret talks in Alaska last week, days before President Xi Jinping flaunted China’s military might to the world at a parade attended by fellow strongmen. Jed Royal, the Pentagon’s top Indo-Pacific official, met Hsu Szu-chien, then-Taiwan’s deputy national security adviser, in Anchorage, according to several people familiar with the matter. The talks came months after a Washington meeting between more senior American and Taiwanese officials was cancelled, partly over concerns that it could derail a potential bilateral meeting between President Donald Trump and the Chinese president. News of the meeting in Alaska comes amid questions about how far Trump is willing to support Taiwan as he seeks a summit with Xi and the two countries hold talks to end their trade war. “The Trump administration may be trying to thread the needle between assuring Taiwan and keeping the possibility of a trade deal and summit with China alive,” said Amanda Hsiao.

China director at Eurasia Group. But Hsiao noted that China would have protested more had the defence meeting taken place at the ministerial level in the greater Washington area. Royal is serving in an acting capacity while the Trump administration waits for its nominee, John Noh, to be confirmed by the Senate. Hsu last week was elevated to a more senior role advising Joseph Wu, Taiwan’s national security adviser. He is viewed as the leading contender to become the next Taiwanese ambassador to Washington. Left to right: Taiwan’s National Security Council Secretary-General Joseph Wu, Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te and Taiwan’s defence minister Wellington Koo in Taipei © I-Hwa Cheng/AFP/Getty Images The US delegation for the meeting planned for June was due to be led by Elbridge Colby, the top defence policy official. Wellington Koo, Taiwan’s defence minister, had been expected to lead the Taiwanese delegation. The Trump administration cancelled the meeting at the last minute, telling Taipei the move was related to its military strikes on Iran. But some US officials had argued that allowing a serving Taiwanese defence minister to visit Washington for the first time could jeopardise a Trump-Xi summit.

How a Top Secret SEAL Team 6 Mission Into North Korea Fell Apart

Dave Philipps and Matthew Cole

A group of Navy SEALs emerged from the ink-black ocean on a winter night in early 2019 and crept to a rocky shore in North Korea. They were on a top secret mission so complex and consequential that everything had to go exactly right.

The objective was to plant an electronic device that would let the United States intercept the communications of North Korea’s reclusive leader, Kim Jong-un, amid high-level nuclear talks with President Trump.

The mission had the potential to provide the United States with a stream of valuable intelligence. But it meant putting American commandos on North Korean soil — a move that, if detected, not only could sink negotiations but also could lead to a hostage crisis or an escalating conflict with a nuclear-armed foe.

It was so risky that it required the president’s direct approval.

For the operation, the military chose SEAL Team 6’s Red Squadron — the same unit that killed Osama bin Laden. The SEALs rehearsed for months, aware that every move needed to be perfect. But when they reached what they thought was a deserted shore that night, wearing black wet suits and night-vision goggles, the mission swiftly unraveled.

A North Korean boat appeared out of the dark. Flashlights from the bow swept over the water. Fearing that they had been spotted, the SEALs opened fire. Within seconds, everyone on the North Korean boat was dead.

The SEALs retreated into the sea without planting the listening device.

The 2019 operation has never been publicly acknowledged, or even hinted at, by the United States or North Korea. The details remain classified and are being reported here for the first time. The Trump administration did not notify key members of Congress who oversee intelligence operations, before or after the mission. The lack of notification may have violated the law.

Ungoverning America

Russell Muirhead and Nancy L. Rosenblum

In the first seven months of his second term, U.S. President Donald Trump has made unprecedented changes to the way the American government operates. He has launched an extraordinary and erratic tariff scheme, eliminated U.S. foreign aid programs, upended U.S. alliances, and waged war on the administrative state. He has detained and deported scores of foreign students and scholars for their political views; strong-armed universities, law firms, corporations, and media outlets into doing his bidding; and emasculated the government’s regulatory agencies. He has deployed the U.S. National Guard to Los Angeles and Washington, D.C.,

Nuclear Fuel: The Art And Science Of The Nuclear Renaissance

Rashmi Singh

If artificial intelligence (AI) and data centers are the engines driving the revival of nuclear energy, nuclear fuel is its centerpiece. The United States requires—but does not have—an adequate and stable supply of nuclear fuel, both to support its existing fleet of reactors—which provide nearly 20 percent of the country’s electricity—and to power the advanced reactors expected to quadruple US nuclear capacity by mid-century, meeting the demand of data centers. Today, nuclear energy offers dense, clean, baseload power, relying on low-enriched uranium in current-generation reactors.

The Evolution and Potential of Nuclear Fuel

Uranium, a relatively abundant element, contains about 0.7 percent of uranium-235, the fissile isotope required for nuclear reactions. When enriched to levels between three percent and five percent, this uranium serves as low-enriched uranium fuel (LEU) used in most existing reactors. Further enrichment, up to 10 percent, powers certain advanced reactors and small modular reactors (SMRs). High-assayed low-enriched uranium (HALEU), enriched up to the maximum civilian use limit of 19.75 percent, can fuel certain small modular reactors and micro-reactors that are not yet commercial.

Higher enrichment levels have several advantages. They allow for longer fuel cycles, i.e., reactors can run longer than the current 18-24-month cycle, and they improve fuel utilization when paired with fast neutron reactors, resulting in reduced waste volume. Advanced forms of nuclear fuel, such as Tri-Structural Isotropic Particle Fuel (TRISO), have also undergone significant refinement since their initial conceptualization in the 1980s in national labs in the United States and the United Kingdom (UK). These small uranium kernels, encased in layers of carbon and ceramic with extremely high melting points, are considered “accident resistant.” Such innovative fuel designs are compatible with high-temperature gas reactors and molten salt reactors, which makes them a perfect substitute for coal power plants catering to heat-intensive industries such as steel and cement. Despite a higher level of enrichment, the fuel particles are designed in a way to make unwanted proliferation difficult, if not impossible. Expensive and still under refinement, they are provided by the Department of Energy and are far from being available on a commercial scale.

America Needs Better Anti-Drone Defenses, Hegseth Says

Stavros Atlamazoglou

Although the US military has been using unmanned aerial systems for intelligence and kinetic missions for decades, the Pentagon rightly recognizes that drone technology continues to evolve.

The US Army is creating a new joint interagency unit to counter the threat of small Russian, Iranian, and Chinese drones.

The move comes after global military events have highlighted the acute threat of small unmanned aerial systems.

The Pentagon Just Set Up a New Counter-Drone Unit

Last week, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced in a memorandum the establishment of a new interagency task force to lead the quest for counter-drone capabilities.

Joint Interagency Task Force 401 (JIATF 401) will serve as the Pentagon’s point organization for testing, developing, and introducing technologies for countering small unmanned aerial systems.

“The Department has maintained pace with its adversaries in conventional warfighting capabilities. However, the small UAS threat continues to grow exponentially and is becoming increasingly sophisticated,” the Secretary of Defense noted in his memorandum.

Hegseth referred to issues resulting from the number of Pentagon counter-drone organizations that have increased since 2020. More does not necessarily mean better, the Secretary of Defense suggested, highlighting that the different units “often are unconnected to each other … DoD needs a single focal point to centralize, coordinate, and lead these efforts.”

Per Hegseth’ memorandum, the Secretary of the Army has until the end of the month to provide an implementation plan that includes the necessary resources, structure, and authorities to enable the new counter-drone unit to commence operations.

Exclusive: Trump to reinterpret 1987 missile treaty to sell heavy attack drones abroad

Mike Stone

The change would allow the potential sale of 100 MQ-9 drones to Saudi Arabia

U.S. drone makers face competition from Israeli, Chinese, and Turkish rivals

The change to benefit startups building a new generation of heavy attack drones

WASHINGTON, Sept 5 (Reuters) - President Donald Trump is expected to unilaterally reinterpret a 38-year-old arms control treaty to sell sophisticated "Reaper" style and other advanced military drones abroad, according to a U.S. official and four people familiar with the plan.

The new interpretation would unlock the sale of more than 100 MQ-9 drones to Saudi Arabia, which the kingdom requested in the spring of this year and could be part of a $142 billion arms deal announced in May. U.S. allies in the Pacific and Europe have also expressed interest.

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By designating drones as aircraft like the F-16 rather than missile systems, the United States will sidestep the 35-nation Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) agreement it signed in 1987, propelling drone sales to countries like UAE and in Eastern European nations that have struggled to get their hands on America's best unmanned aerial vehicles.

The new policy will allow General Atomics, Kratos (KTOS.O), opens new tab, and Anduril, which manufacture large drones, to have their products treated as "Foreign Military Sales" by the State Department, allowing them to be easily sold internationally, according to a U.S. official speaking to Reuters on condition of anonymity.

This effort is the first part of a planned "major" review of the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program, the official said.

A U.S. Department of State spokesperson declined to comment.

Where Do You Get Your Information?*

If you think you’re using AI to do your “original” research into how Basuki Tjahaja Purnama blasphemed the Quran during his Jakarta gubernatorial race, or that the Philippines had 6 million drug addicts when Rodrigo Duterte was running for president, or whether vaccines cause autism, or if Ivermectin works better in treating Covid, likely you aren’t.

AI Will Change What It Is to Be Human. Are We Ready?

Tyler Cowen and Avital Balwit

Are we helping create the tools of our own obsolescence?

If that sounds like a question only a depressive or a stoner would ask, let us assure you: We are neither. We are early AI adopters.

We stand at the threshold of perhaps the most profound identity crisis humanity has ever faced. As AI systems increasingly match or exceed our cognitive abilities, we’re witnessing the twilight of human intellectual supremacy—a position we’ve held unchallenged for our entire existence. This transformation won’t arrive in some distant future; it’s unfolding now, reshaping not just our economy but our very understanding of what it means to be human beings.

We are not doomers; quite the opposite. One of us, Tyler, is a heavy user of this technology, and the other, Avital, is working at Anthropic (the company that makes Claude) to usher it into the world.

Both of us have an intense conviction that this technology can usher in an age of human flourishing the likes of which we have never seen before. But we are equally convinced that progress will usher in a crisis about what it is to be human at all.

Our children and grandchildren will face a profound challenge: how to live meaningful lives in a world where they are no longer the smartest and most capable entities in it. To put it another way, they will have to figure out how to prevent AI from demoralizing them. But it is not just our descendants who will face the issue, it is increasingly obvious that we do, too.

OpenAI CEO Sam Altman asserted in a recent talk that GPT-5 will be smarter than all of us. Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei described the powerful AI systems to come as “a country of geniuses in a data center.” These are not radical predictions. They are nearly here.

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