16 May 2021

Lies on Social Media Inflame Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

By Sheera Frenkel

In a 28-second video, which was posted to Twitter this week by a spokesman for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip appeared to launch rocket attacks at Israelis from densely populated civilian areas.

At least that is what Mr. Netanyahu’s spokesman, Ofir Gendelman, said the video portrayed. But his tweet with the footage, which was shared hundreds of times as the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis escalated, was not from Gaza. It was not even from this week.

Instead, the video that he shared, which can be found on many YouTube channels and other video-hosting sites, was from 2018. And according to captions on older versions of the video, it showed militants firing rockets not from Gaza but from Syria or Libya.

The video was just one piece of misinformation that has circulated on Twitter, TikTok, Facebook, WhatsApp and other social media this week about the rising violence between Israelis and Palestinians, as Israeli military ground forces attacked Gaza early on Friday. The false information has included videos, photos and clips of text purported to be from government officials in the region, with posts baselessly claiming early this week that Israeli soldiers had invaded Gaza, or that Palestinian mobs were about to rampage through sleepy Israeli suburbs.

From Crisis to Crisis: Turkey-US Relations at a Low Point

Gallia Lindenstrauss, Eldad Shavit

On April 24, Biden dropped a bombshell, in the form of recognition of the Armenian genocide – which led to a new low in relations between Washington and Ankara. The changed attitude in the White House toward an ally that has assumed a new stance and acted in opposition to American interests and values demands attention by other US allies in the region, including Israel

Relations between Turkey and the United States, which have been at crisis level for some time, sustained a further shock with the explicit use by US President Joe Biden of the term “Armenian genocide” on April 24, Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day. Already during the administrations of Barack Obama and Donald Trump the image of Turkey in Washington changed from a valued ally to a state with barely any supporters in the US capital, and opposition to the policy of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is bi-partisan. Decisions that are clearly against Turkey’s interests, including its official removal from the F-35 project and recognition of the Armenian genocide, are received with little or no criticism in Washington. Notwithstanding the singular nature of Turkey-US relations, the factors underlying the erosion of the United States view of Turkey as a strategic ally demand attention in other countries as well, including Israel.

The Nuclear Talks in Vienna are a Sham–And Iran is Winning Them

by Fred Fleitz

According to the Biden administration, significant progress is being made at nuclear talks in Vienna to bring the United States back into the 2015 nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA). Biden officials claim there will be a “compliance for compliance” agreement under which the United States will rejoin the deal and drop sanctions imposed by the Trump administration. In exchange, Iran will fully meet its obligations under the JCPOA.

It may seem that Biden is on the brink of a major achievement, but when diplomatic agreements are the goal—rather than a tool to address a threat—it is not necessarily a victory. Here’s why.

Let’s start with the diplomatic process in Vienna. These are “indirect” talks because Iran refuses to allow its diplomats to meet personally with American diplomats. Under this process, Iranian and American diplomats are in different hotels and European diplomats carry proposals between the two delegations.

The Iranians refused to directly negotiate with the United States. This was an enormous snub that gave Tehran a clear advantage in the nuclear talks since it proves Biden wants a deal more than Iranian leaders do. They can now leverage the talks themselves as a mechanism to highlight American weakness and supposed despair, and to project their own strength.

U.S. Bases in Central Asia: Where Will They Go?

By James Durso

The U.S. is attempting to evacuate its troops and contractors from Afghanistan by 11 September 2021, the 20th anniversary of the al-Qaeda attacks.

American officials say they will keep the ability to collect intelligence and strike against terrorist threats to the U.S. by locating facilities and equipment in nearby countries.

Negotiations to locate American military and intelligence units in Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbors will be difficult.

The neighbors will have to live with an Afghanistan in which the Taliban assume a larger role, probably within the country’s governing institutions, and hosting foreign forces will complicate bilateral relations.

So, what’s in it for them?

Of the five Central Asian countries only two are likely fits for U.S. designs, so let’s eliminate the outliers.

Washington's opportunity to treat Saudi Arabia as neither friend nor pariah

by Blaise Malley

During a primary debate in November 2019, candidate Biden pledged to turn Saudi Arabia into "the pariah that they are." Fast forward, Biden announced in March that his administration would not sanction Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman. This is because the United States has not "when we have an alliance with a country, gone to the acting head of state and punished that person and ostracized him." Beyond the fact that Saudi Arabia has never been a U.S. treaty ally, the rhetorical transition from "pariah" to "ally" was a striking one.

The White House’s policy approach to the Saudi kingdom has been similarly inconsistent. Early indications were that the president would push back against the crown prince and stand up for American interests when necessary. One of the administration’s first foreign policy moves was to announce an end to supporting Saudi "offensive operations" in Yemen. The White House later released a report affirming the crown prince's role in the October 2018 assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

The Syrian Civil War’s Never-Ending Endgame



The Syrian civil war that has decimated the country for 10 years now, provoking a regional humanitarian crisis and drawing in actors ranging from the United States to Russia, appears to be drawing inexorably to a conclusion. President Bashar al-Assad, with the backing of Iran and Russia, seems to have emerged militarily victorious from the conflict, which began after his government violently repressed civilian protests in 2011. The armed insurgency that followed soon morphed into a regional and global proxy war that, at the height of the fighting, saw radical Islamist groups seize control over vast swathes of the country, only to lose it in the face of sustained counteroffensives by pro-government forces as well as a U.S.-led coalition of Western militaries.

The fighting is not yet fully over, though, with the northwestern Idlib region remaining outside of government control. In early 2020, the Syrian army’s Russian-backed campaign to retake Idlib from the last remaining armed opposition groups concentrated there resulted in clashes with Turkish forces deployed to protect Ankara’s client militias. The skirmishes were a reminder that the conflict, though seemingly in its final stages, could still flare back up and escalate. The situation in the northeast also remains volatile following the removal of U.S. forces from the border with Turkey, with Turkish, Syrian and Russian forces all now deployed in the region, alongside proxies and Syrian Kurdish militias.

Russia Turns to China to Make Sputnik Shots to Meet Demand

By Huizhong Wu and Daria Litvinova

Russia is turning to multiple Chinese firms to manufacture the Sputnik V coronavirus vaccine in an effort to speed up production as demand soars for its shot.

Russia has announced three deals totaling 260 million doses with Chinese vaccine companies in recent weeks. It’s a decision that could mean quicker access to a shot for countries in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa that have ordered Russia’s vaccine, as the U.S. and the European Union focus mainly on domestic vaccination needs.

Earlier criticism about Russia’s vaccine have been largely quieted by data published in the British medical journal The Lancet that said large-scale testing showed it to be safe, with an efficacy rate of 91 percent.

Yet, experts have questioned whether Russia can fulfill its pledge to countries across the world. While pledging hundreds of millions of doses, it has only delivered a fraction.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has said demand for Sputnik V significantly exceeds Russia’s domestic production capacity.

To boost production, the Russian Direct Investment Fund, which bankrolled Sputnik V, has signed agreements with multiple drug makers in other countries, such as India, South Korea, Brazil, Serbia, Turkey, Italy, and others. There are few indications, however, that manufacturers abroad, except for those in Belarus and Kazakhstan, have made any large amounts of the vaccine so far.

How Mongolia Made the Most of Vaccine Diplomacy

By Bolor Lkhaajav

Prime Minister of Mongolia Oyun-Erdene Luvsannamsrai received the first dose of the COVID-19 vaccine in Mongolia, Feb. 23, 2021.Credit: Government of Mongolia

Mongolia is ranking high in the global effort to vaccinate populations against COVID-19. As of May 5, 181 countries had started vaccinating their people against the virus, and Mongolia is one of them. According to the Foreign Ministry of Mongolia, 42.2 percent of the population has been vaccinated and 1,398,592 doses have been administered. Mongolia’s multi-pillar foreign policy translated into extremely valuable vaccination diplomacy during a challenging time.

After COVID-19 emerged to become a global pandemic, Mongolia went an astounding 10 months with no local transmission of the virus. But there was a worrying spike this spring, and the country now stands at over 41,000 total cases. According to E-Mongolia, the COVID-19 related death toll has now risen to 134. The increase in infections and the arrival of Mongolians from abroad fostered skepticism of the government’s handling of the overall pandemic.

The Mongolian government’s response has been focused on vaccinating the population while slowly receiving Mongolian citizens from abroad with the assistance of its global partners such as Japan, South Korea, and the United States. But with an array of vaccination options and persistent anti-vaccination sentiments, Mongolians were divided on the issue.

PRC INVESTMENTS IN GLOBAL MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE: IMPLICATIONS FOR PORT ACCESS

By John Bradford

Introduction

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has embarked on a massive investment spree and established a meaningful stake in the control of global maritime infrastructure. These investments include the construction of new ports, the expansion and modernization of cargo handling facilities, the purchase of port management rights, and the establishment of control over the operations of petroleum storage and transshipment depots. Much of the capital is formally sourced from the PRC’s One Belt One Road Initiative, but major investments are also being made directly by state-owned, PLA-linked, and other Chinese enterprises. The scope of control over global maritime infrastructure has become sufficiently large to be of concern. The U.S. Navy’s 2021 Chief of Navy Operations NAVPLAN warns that China is, “extending their infrastructure across the globe to control access to critical waterways.“1

There is growing concern that the PRC has, or could, use its investments to deny infrastructure access to its rivals. To date, PRC enterprises have not overtly denied access to others, but they are creating business models that advantage their partners over their commercial competitors. These advantages could have acute impacts for rivals should colluding PRC enterprises be able to establish themselves as a maritime infrastructure cartel or monopolize a specific market segment. However, PRC investment will have to grow considerably more before either of these options available. In contrast, infrastructure investments are already an important element of the PRC’s growing geo-economic influence over its partners. What deserves greater attention is the implications of PRC investments in global maritime infrastructure by specifically focusing on questions involving the potential denial of competitors’ infrastructure access.

Germany, May 8, 1945

By George Friedman

On May 8, 1945, Germany formally declared defeat in World War II. As others have said, there was one war in Europe that began in 1914 and ended in 1945, with a 20-year truce in between. Both wars pitted Germany against France, Russia and Britain with increasing involvement of the United States. It is not an overstatement to say that it was a war of Germany against the rest of Europe, with lesser European powers scattered in minor coalitions with one side or another. The wars began in the deep structure of Europe, but they were initiated on a broader scale by Germany and ended when Germany surrendered. The two wars might collectively be called the German War, laying the groundwork for asking how much of the Germany that was crushed in 1945 remains today. It’s therefore safe to say that 76 years ago, the Germans collapsed and, with that, the European war that began in 1914.

Germany did not unite as a country until 1871. The unifying principle was not religion or culture, as there were significant variations, but a common language that enveloped a common myth of the German past, a myth quite at odds with its reality. Emerging from this complex mix was a single powerful reality. Germany created an extraordinary economy. It passed France quickly and then surged past Great Britain, becoming the economic powerhouse of Europe.

The economic surge threatened to exhaust German raw materials, turning the country into a hostage of its suppliers. It was also exhausting the appetite for German goods in Europe. There were scant markets in play, but Germany was forced to both look beyond Europe and box European competitors out of Europe’s markets. That problem was not economic but political, and the political problem was ultimately military.

Cybersecurity is too big a job for governments or business to handle alone

Paul Mee, Chaitra Chandrasekhar

The recent hack of network management company SolarWinds, which enabled bad actors to compromise a range of US government agencies and major corporations, has revealed a troubling truth: Business and government expose each other to significant cyber-risks because they are interconnected and rely on the same network of software vendors. That’s why the strategic response must involve more intense collaboration. Simply put, the threat of cyberattacks is too big a job for either government or business to tackle alone.

Cybersecurity complaints to the US Federal Bureau of Investigation more than tripled during the pandemic last year, while the average payment by victims of ransomware jumped 43% in the first quarter of 2021 from the preceding quarter. Attacks on the software supply chain are growing exponentially, and the burgeoning Internet of Things (IoT) and 5G wireless technology offer more vulnerabilities to exploit.

Governments have a broad view of potential threats through law enforcement and intelligence capabilities, but they tend to see things through a national security lens rather than commercial risk. Companies have firm- and sector-specific risk information and often enjoy better access to cybersecurity talent, but they can’t easily take an economy-wide view and may find themselves overwhelmed by state-sponsored attackers.

Busting Big Tech


The European Commission’s recent decision to charge Apple with antitrust violations is further evidence that regulators around the world are seeking to curtail the market power of Big Tech. But official motives differ considerably across countries, and breaking up today’s internet behemoths might not produce the desired result.

In this Big Picture, Columbia Law School’s Anu Bradford shows how America’s laissez-faire approach to governing the digital economy has enabled the European Union to emerge as the leading global rule-maker, but notes that US regulators are starting to wake up to Big Tech’s excesses.

But Eric Posner of the University of Chicago cautions that targeting market-dominant tech firms will require transforming public opinion as well as overcoming legal obstacles. And MIT’s Daron Acemoglu warns that antitrust enforcement alone will not be enough to push technological change in the direction of empowering workers, consumers, and citizens, rather than toward the creation of a surveillance state and an economy bereft of good jobs.

Big Tech is being targeted in China, too, where Angela Huyue Zhang of the University of Hong Kong argues that the authorities’ sudden and aggressive antitrust action against the e-commerce giant Alibaba risks undermining investor confidence. Likewise, Minxin Pei of Claremont McKenna College thinks that reining in China’s private sector will probably strengthen the Communist Party of China’s grip on power for now, but could undermine it in the longer term.

Nation-state cyber attacks could lead to cyber conflict

by Allen Bernard
 
A new report from HP released Thursday, Nation States, Cyberconflict and the Web of Profit, found that nation-state cyber attacks are "moving us closer to a point of advanced cyber conflict."

"Nation-state conflict doesn't take place in a vacuum; as evidenced by the fact enterprise is the most common victim within those attacks analyzed," Ian Pratt, global head of Security for Personal Systems at HP, said in a statement. "Whether they are a direct target or a stepping-stone to gain access to bigger targets, as we have seen with the upstream supply chain attack against SolarWinds, organizations of all sizes need to be cognizant of this risk."

The research, which was sponsored by HP and conducted by Mike McGuire, senior lecturer in criminology at the University of Surrey, found a 100% rise in "significant" nation-state incidents between 2017-2020. McGuire, who looked at over 200 cybersecurity incidents associated with nation-states since 2009, found that enterprise-class organizations are now the most common target (35%), followed by cyber defense (25%), media and communications (14%), government bodies and regulators (12%) and critical infrastructure (10%).

"Nation-states are devoting significant time and resources to achieving strategic cyber advantage to advance their national interests, intelligence gathering capabilities, and military strength through espionage, disruption and theft," McGuire said in a statement. "Attempts to obtain IP data on vaccines and attacks against software supply chains demonstrate the lengths to which nation-states are prepared to go to achieve their strategic goals."

The Technology Behind How the Air Force and Army Are Preparing for the Next War

by Kris Osborn

The U.S. military has big, high-tech plans to network its forces so that they can win any war. The Air Force calls this program the “Advanced Battle Management System” and the Army calls it “Project Convergence.” Both of those systems are now defining terms that refer to the U.S. military’s massive and high-speed warzone transformation to real-time, multi-node connectivity, data sharing, sensor-to-shooter pairing, manned-unmanned teaming, air-sea-ground-undersea networking and artificial intelligence-enabled computer processing. All of these upgrades and changes are in service of one objective: speed.

Attacking faster than the enemy by exponentially reducing sensor-to-shooter timelines and optimizing methods of attack in real-time, are objectives each of the respective military services hopes to achieve.

It might not be an exaggeration to say that the U.S. military is now beginning to achieve, actualize and bring to life a decades-long vision of highly-networked, multi-domain, joint warfare operations, given the pace of emerging technical leaps forward in the areas of AI, sensing and communications technologies. Integrated joint-warfare operations enabled by inter-service air-land-sea information sharing and secure connectivity, has for years been on the Pentagon’s radar as essential for winning a future war. However, while there was great progress in many areas, the vision has never really come to life—arguably—until now.

15 May 2021

China’s Nuclear and Missile Capabilities: An Overview

   Maj Gen PK Mallick, VSM (Retd)  

Since China first conducted a nuclear weapon test in 1964, its nuclear doctrine has remained unchanged and is underpinned by two principles: a minimum deterrent doctrine and a No First Use (NFU) policy. China’s 2019 defence white paper states, “China is always committed to a nuclear policy of NFU of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones unconditionally.”

However, a recent U.S. Department of Defence (DoD) report claims that the scope of China’s nuclear modernisation and its lack of transparency “raise concern that China is not only shifting its requirements for what constitutes a minimal deterrence but that it could shift away from its longstanding minimalist force posture.” The data available show that China is modernising and expanding virtually every element of its nuclear forces, including each aspect of its nuclear weapons and missile, sea, and air delivery systems. What is not clear are China’s current and planned holdings of nuclear weapons, China’s future plans for deploying additional delivery systems, its commitment to some form of NFU, first preemption, or launch on warning, and the extent to which it will accept what might be called a form of ‘minimum assured destruction.


The End of Modi’s Global Dreams


By Sushant Singh

In December 2004, when an earthquake and tsunami struck Asia, then-Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh decided it was high time for India to stop accepting aid from other countries to deal with disasters and rely on itself instead. “We feel that we can cope with the situation on our own,” he said, “and we will take their help if needed.” It was a pointed political statement about India’s growing economic heft, and it wasn’t the last. Singh’s government offered aid to the United States in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and to China after the 2008 Sichuan earthquake. Seen as a matter of national pride, an indicator of self-sufficiency, and a snub to nosy aid givers, the practice continued under Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi despite pressure to change course during floods in the southern state of Kerala in 2018.

Modi, who has consistently campaigned on virulent nationalism captured by the slogan “Atmanirbhar Bharat” (or self-reliant India), has been forced to abruptly change policy. Last week, with images of people dying on roads without oxygen and crematoriums for pet dogs being used for humans’ last rites as the second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic overwhelmed the country, his government accepted offers of help from nearly 40 other nations. Its diplomats have lobbied with foreign governments for oxygen plants and tankers, the arrival of medicines, and other supplies hailed on social media. “We have given assistance; we are getting assistance,” said Harsh Vardhan Shringla, the country’s top diplomat, to justify the embarrassing U-turn. “It shows an interdependent world. It shows a world that is working with each other.”

Why Afghanistan is critical to the struggle against China, Russia and Iran

Rep. Michael Waltz

Last month, President Biden shocked the world by announcing all U.S. forces will withdraw from Afghanistan by Sept. 11 this year.

As a veteran of the war in Afghanistan, I found this news heartbreaking knowing the American bloodshed that had been spilled in combating terrorism and for the millions who are likely to return to life under Taliban rule.

Set aside for a moment that most observers correctly point out an Afghanistan withdrawal will set the stage for similar events that unfolded following then-President Obama’s withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 that provided a path for the Islamic State Group to launch its reign of terror across the Middle East, Europe, and inspire attacks in America.

What gives me even more concern is the strategic foothold we are giving up in the back yard of America’s greatest rivals.

By abandoning Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan, we will no longer have a U.S. airfield in a country that borders China. Many analysts believe that should the United States and China come to blows in the Pacific, a second front will be critical given China’s ability to concentrate its naval and missile assets around Taiwan. Further, the thing the Chinese Communist Party fears the most is an uprising amongst its own people.

How American Politics Got Troops Stuck—and Killed—in Afghanistan

By ERIK EDSTROM

Erik Edstrom graduated from West Point and deployed to combat in Afghanistan as an infantry officer. He is the author of Un-American: A Soldier’s Reckoning of our Longest War and a senior fellow at the Eisenhower Media Network, an organization of independent military and national security veteran experts. He holds an MBA and MSc from the University of Oxford where he studied finance and climate change.

Maybe it was the ketamine talking. Or maybe A.J. Nelson, an 18-year-old private, possessed a type of bravery that I did not. Whatever it was, lying on his back, bones broken, blood rivering from his lacerated lips, he said something that I can’t forget.

“I want to come back.” Flecks of blood sprayed in the air with each word, speckling his uniform. “I want to come back to the platoon, sir.”

Two years earlier, in the spring of 2007, I had commissioned from West Point as an infantry officer. Now I was leading roughly 30 men in Maywand and Zhari—poverty-stricken, hard-scrabble districts within Kandahar Province. These districts had developed a sort of infamy, called the “Heart of Darkness.” This was our first week in Afghanistan, and a roadside bomb had just obliterated one of my platoon’s hulking armored vehicles.

The desert around us was a yard sale of twisted metal and vehicle parts. The wreck of their vehicle—it’s engine block sheered completely off—looked like poachers had gotten it. As the Blackhawk helicopter hovered to land, we attempted to shield the four wounded men from the sandblasting rotor wash. At that moment, I knelt, looked at A.J., and proceeded to lie directly to his face.

“You’re going to be OK.”

China Is a Paper Dragon

David Frum

China was mentioned only four times in Joe Biden’s first address to a joint session of Congress, but it shadowed almost every line of the speech. “We’re in a competition with China and other countries to win the 21st Century,” Biden said. His aides describe the president as preoccupied with the challenge from China. “It informs his approach to most major topics and the president regularly raises it in meetings, whether he is discussing foreign policy or electric bus batteries,” CNN’s Jeremy Diamond reported. “And aides say Biden believes it is a key test by which historians will judge his presidency.”

As Biden said to the nation from the well of the House of Representatives, the authoritarian President Xi Jinping is “deadly earnest” about China “becoming the most significant, consequential nation in the world. He and others—autocrats—think that democracy can’t compete in the 21st century with autocracies.”

So this might be a useful moment to hear a contrary voice. In 2018, the Tufts University professor Michael Beckley published a richly detailed study of Chinese military and economic weaknesses. The book is titled Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower.

ODNI quiet on '36-star' info war memo

By Bill Gertz 

Sixteen months after nine combatant commanders asked the director of national intelligence to help them counter Chinese and Russian disinformation, intelligence agencies have done little to respond.

The request was made in an unprecedented “36-star letter” signed by the commanders of the Indo-Pacific Command, European Command, Strategic Command, Special Operations Command, Africa Command, Space Command, Transportation Command, and Northern and Southern Commands on Jan. 15, 2020.

The six generals and three admirals, all wearing four stars on their shoulders, said China and Russia are using all instruments of power to wage political warfare and manipulate information to violate national sovereignty, coopt world bodies, weaken international institutions and splinter U.S. alliances.

“Their efforts to reshape the world in their image, proliferate authoritarianism and advance their ambitions are provocative, dangerous and destabilizing,” the commanders said in the letter to then-acting Director of National Intelligence Joseph Maguire. A copy of the unclassified letter was obtained by Inside the Ring.

The letter urged the DNI to use intelligence to counter enemy coercion and subversion and help the American military “win without fighting” by engaging in similar gray zone warfare against China and Russia.

Opinion: China's New Silk Road is full of potholes


There are cracks appearing in the New Silk Road, otherwise known as the Belt and Road Initiative. Launched in 2015 as Chinese President Xi Jinping's signature foreign policy project, it received a warm welcome from countries keen to benefit from Chinese globalization.

Since then, the attitude to China has hardened, especially in many democratic countries. Revelations about 1 million Uyghurs held in reeducation camps and reports of forced labor in Xinjiang, serious questions about China's handling of the coronavirus and its origins, and Beijing's dismantling of democracy in Hong Kong have cooled international enthusiasm for Xi's pet project.

Western countries have been emboldened by a reset of relations under US President Joe Biden, following the chaos and division of the Donald Trump era. The Biden administration is pointing to growing Chinese aggression and looking to forge an alliance with Europe and its other traditional allies.

Leading the way on pushback is Australia, whose prime minister, Scott Morrison, said he did not think the New Silk Road was "consistent with Australia's national interest."

Relations between Canberra and its largest trading partner have nosedived since Morrison's calls for Beijing to allow independent investigators into Wuhan to probe the origins of the coronavirus. Despite a free trade agreement and a slew of other free trade deals, China piled trade sanctions on Australian goods like coal, wine and barley.

China–Iran deal: much ado about nothing?


The establishment of a new Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between China and Iran has made headlines, but as Camille Lons and Meia Nouwens explain, Middle Eastern leaders are by no means naïve. While they shake hands with the East, all eyes remain on the West.

The signing of the long-awaited China–Iran 25-year cooperation programme was the crowning achievement of a tour of the Middle East by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, which included visits to Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, the UAE, Bahrain and Oman, and saw Wang lay out a five-point initiative for the Middle East and propose to host an Israel–Palestine dialogue, as well as a multilateral Gulf security dialogue.

Under discussion since it was first proposed in 2016, the deal had already made headlines in 2020 when the New York Times reported on a draft version of the agreement. This deal would reportedly expand China’s presence across a wide range of sectors, spanning from energy, banking, to telecommunications and infrastructure. It would also offer military cooperation, including joint training, as well as research and cooperation in their defence industries. In return, China would reportedly receive a heavy discount on its supply of Iranian oil for the next 25 years.

China in Lebanon: A Mirage of Help

By Sakshi Jain

Chinese aid in Lebanon should be conditional or else it will fragment the society even more.

China accounts for 40% of Lebanon’s imports, amounting to $2 billion per year. The economy, which once grew at 9%, has now reached a standstill. The country’s elites are indifferent, and political parties are self-centred that focus on short-term gains. Lebanon used to be a friendly Gulf country that enjoyed political and economic autonomy from the United States.

However, with time, the remittances were cut off, and the Gulf Cooperation Council placed travel bans on Lebanon. Saudi Arabia also cancelled a $4 billion investment programme aimed at bolstering Lebanese national security.

The management of the Beirut port by Hezbollah is another factor impeding tax collection and duty charges. It neither pays any taxes nor gives the government access to them. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah was seen threatening the United States over its continued political pressure on IMF loans. He went on to say that Lebanon is happy to have China as a new investor who is not looking for a return on their investment.

Crash In Iraq Helps Unmask Secretive Ultra-Quiet Special Operations Drone Program

BY JOSEPH TREVITHICK 

The U.S. military has confirmed that the secretive Joint Special Operations Command, or other U.S. government entities operating in cooperation with it, has been flying a new type of drone in the Middle East that is designed to be extremely quiet and have an innocuous outward appearance. The new details about the Long Endurance Aircraft Program have come to light after one of these unmanned planes, derived from the Pipistrel Sinus powered glider, crashed at Erbil International Airport in Iraq last year.

The Long Endurance Aircraft Program (LEAP) drone in question, identified only as AV009, crashed at Erbil on July 24, 2020, according to a heavily redacted copy of the official accident report that The War Zone obtained via the Freedom of Information Act. The unmanned aircraft suddenly and unexpectedly pitched nose down while coming in to land at the airport after a sortie. The drone hit the ground, bounced back up into the air, and then came back down, eventually coming to rest alongside the runway. The mishap resulted in the front-mounted propeller striking ground and the landing gear collapsing. It also caused significant enough damage to the right wing that fuel leaked onto the ground.

France’s Double Standard on Democracy in Africa


Judah Grunstein 

It all started in late April with an open letter written by a group of 20 retired French generals and published in a right-wing weekly news magazine, Valeurs Actuelles, known for its inflammatory provocations. Describing France as teetering on the edge of civil war, the letter called on France’s civilian leadership to take action so the military wouldn’t have to.

With its reference to the threats posed by “Islamism and the hordes from the banlieues”—France’s peri-urban ghettos—and a form of anti-racism that “despises our country, its traditions, its culture,” the letter was more foghorn than dog whistle when it comes to the culture wars that have wracked France over the past year. And though the retired generals did not explicitly call for a military coup, the significance of the date their letter was published was lost on no one: April 21, the 60th anniversary of the failed 1961 putsch against then-President Charles de Gaulle in response to his decision to end the war, and with it French colonial rule, in Algeria.

Saudi-Iranian Dialogue: Toward a Strategic Change?


Yoel Guzansky, Sima Shine

Five years after Riyadh broke off relations with Tehran, there are increasing reports of direct political contacts between the two states. What are the respective interests of the sides in easing the tension, and should Israel be concerned about this?

The meetings reported in recent weeks between Iran and Saudi Arabia are a new development in the relations between the two countries, which were severed in 2016. The immediate context is the change of administration in the United States. The Biden administration has begun a dialogue with Tehran about a return to the nuclear agreement, and has also severely criticized Saudi Arabia. The changed stance in the White House has led to adjustments in Saudi foreign policy, including a reconciliation with Qatar in January 2021, the offer of a ceasefire agreement to the Houthis in Yemen in March, and most recently, the beginning of a dialogue with Iran. The direct talks with Riyadh serve Iran's stated policy of excluding the regional issue from the current dialogue with Washington. This is also the background to the round of talks with Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman conducted by the Iranian foreign minister. For its part, Saudi Arabia seeks a solution that will end the war in Yemen, and is aware of the regional changes that are likely to occur if Washington and Tehran return to the nuclear agreement. For Israel, the existence of a Saudi-Iranian dialogue should not constitute a change in principle toward improved relations with the Gulf states, some of which have official and unofficial relations with Israel along with their ties with Iran. At the same time, a concrete Iranian-Saudi rapprochement will be a significant crack in the anti-Iran front that Israel has tried to present. More importantly, it will eliminate a key element in the opposition to the US return to the nuclear agreement.

Globalization’s Coming Golden Age

By Harold James

The thought that trade and globalization might make a comeback in the 2020s, picking up renewed vigor after the pandemic, may seem far-fetched. After all, COVID-19 is fragmenting the world, destroying multilateralism, and disrupting complex cross-border supply chains. The virus looks like it is completing the work of the 2008 financial crisis: the Great Recession produced more trade protectionism, forced governments to question globalization, increased hostility to migration, and, for the first time in over four decades, ushered in a sustained period in which global trade grew more slowly than global production. Even then, however, there was no complete reversal or deglobalization; rather, there was an uncertain, sputtering “slobalization.” In contrast, today’s vaccine nationalism is rapidly driving China, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States into open confrontation and sowing bitter conflict within the EU. It is all too easy to extrapolate and see a future of “nobalization”—globalization vanishing in a viral haze.

Over the past two centuries, the course of trade and globalization has been shaped by how governments and people have responded to such crises. Globalization comes in cycles: periods of increasing integration are followed by shocks, crises, and destructive backlashes. After the Great Depression, the world slid into autarky, nationalism, authoritarianism, zero-sum thinking, and, ultimately, war—a series of events often presented as a grim parable of the consequences of globalization’s reversal. Yet history shows that many crises produce more, rather than less, globalization. Challenges can generate new creative energy, better communication, and a greater willingness to learn from effective solutions adopted elsewhere. Governments often realize that their ability to competently deliver the services their populations demand requires answers found abroad.

Congressional testimony: How the Pentagon can fight information warfare

By Matt Field 

 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Science and Security Board member Herb Lin testifies at a Congressional hearing on information warfare.

Herb Lin, a cybersecurity expert and a member of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ Science and Security Board, told a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee last week that foreign disinformation campaigns are one form of what he characterized as an existential threat to US society and democracy: cyber-enabled information warfare. The Pentagon, however, is, Lin suggested, poorly positioned to protect the public from the threat.

“Our information warfare adversaries have weaponized our constitutional protections, our minds, and our technologies against us,” Lin told the subcommittee. “Cyber-enabled information warfare has the potential to destroy reason and reality as the basis for societal discourse and to replace them with rage and fantasy.”

At a broad level, Lin said, the Pentagon isn’t set up to implement a necessary whole-of-government or whole-of-society response to information warfare. For a host of legal and regulatory reasons, Lin said, the Pentagon couldn’t effectively take on campaigns like the Kremlin-backed effort to promote disinformation about the 2020 presidential election on social media and on US television. The distinction between foreign and domestic information is less clear now, he said, and “effective efforts against the Russian activities will inevitably have collateral effects against American activities.”

#Reviewing Power on the Precipice: The Six Choices America Faces in a Turbulent World

Frank Hoffman

“Growltiger’s Last Stand” is one of T.S. Eliot’s best poems, ripe with allusions. It is also a possible allegory for today’s strategists.[1] Growltiger was a large and fearsome cat who became complacent and shabby, ultimately losing his edge and his friends. Eventually, the once feared predator was overwhelmed on his barge by a swarm of foreign rivals while his allies were gone. Growltiger’s opponents ganged up on him and dispatched him. Eliot wrote the poem in the 1930s while Great Britain faced serious overstretch, and the poem’s central character could be interpreted as an aging Imperial Lion or, in modern terms, a declining America.

Power on the Precipice offers a less poetic, but equally vivid, evaluation of a United States in decline.[2] The theme of the rise and fall of great powers goes back to Edward Gibbon’s classic study of the Roman Empire, and Paul Kennedy broadened our understanding in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, with an emphasis on finance and economics.[3] More recently Michael Beckley explored the interaction between a rising China and the United States and found more cause for optimism in his Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World's Sole Superpower.[4]

FAILING TO TRAIN: CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN IRREGULAR WARFARE

James W. Derleth 

A recent election saw a nationalist Estonian party take control of the government. Frustrated by the election outcome and lack of citizenship, the ethnic Russian minority, 20 percent of the population, demonstrated against the outcome. The Russian government released statements of support and launched a covert campaign to shape perceptions with more than two hundred thousand Twitter accounts sending 3.6 million tweets using #protectRussiansinEstonia. It also initiated snap exercises by ground, naval, and air forces in the region.

A week later, a group of demonstrators gathered in the town square of Narva, a town in eastern Estonia on the border with Russia. Protesting that their human rights had been violated, the demonstrators demanded autonomy for Narva, official status for the Russian language, and Estonian citizenship. When Estonian police moved in to break up the demonstration, they were confronted by an armed group of Russian-speaking, military-age men. Fearing the loss of innocent lives, the police left the area. At the same time, a group of armed demonstrators attacked the Estonian border post, forcing it to be abandoned. A third group of demonstrators took over the local telecommunications center, cutting internet, radio, and telephone links to and from Narva. They then stormed the town hall, forcing the mayor to resign. A spokesman for the demonstrators declared the establishment of the Narva People’s Republic. He asked Russia for assistance “to ensure peace and public order against nationalists and fascists.” These actions were supported by cyberattacks that took Estonian government, media, telecommunication, and military networks offline throughout the country.

Opinion: The Pentagon must prepare for a much bigger theater of war

by Lloyd J. Austin III

Lloyd J. Austin III is the secretary of defense. This essay is adapted from his April 30 speech at the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii.

The cornerstone of America’s defense is deterrence, ensuring that our adversaries understand the folly of outright conflict. “Only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt,” said President John F. Kennedy in 1961, “can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed.”

The COVID-19 Pandemic Puts the Spotlight on Global Health Governance



The novel coronavirus caught many world leaders unprepared, despite consistent warnings that a global pandemic was inevitable. And it has revealed the flaws in a global health architecture headed by the World Health Organization, which had already been faulted for its response to the 2014 Ebola pandemic in West Africa. Will there be an overhaul of the WHO when the pandemic is over?

After the novel coronavirus first emerged in late 2019 in Wuhan, China, its combination of transmissibility and lethality brought the world to a virtual standstill. Governments restricted movement, closed borders and froze economic activity in a desperate attempt to curb the spread of the virus. At best, they partially succeeded at slowing down the first wave, with the second and in some cases third waves that experts warned about now upon us. According to official records so far, more than 152 million people worldwide have been infected, and more than 3.2 million have died from COVID-19, the disease caused by the coronavirus. The actual toll of the virus is far worse and will continue to climb.

Tough Conditions and Contested Communication Are Forcing the US Military To Reinvent AI

BY PATRICK TUCKER

The era of artificial intelligence presents new opportunities for elite troops like the Army Rangers or Navy SEALs, but those opportunities are conscribed by some hard limits: for example, the power and connectivity of computers behind enemy lines, or the span of human attention in dangerous, stressful environments.

U.S. Special Operations Command, or SOCOM, is working with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or DARPA, on new projects and experiments to bring artificial intelligence to operators working in the sorts of environments where the computing power and data to run commercial AI applications aren’t present. Lisa Sanders, SOCOM’s director of science and technology for special operations forces, acquisition, technology, and logistics, told Defense One that in many cases that means re-inventing artificial intelligence from the ground up and developing completely new insights into how humans use it.

Much of the artificial intelligence that regular consumers use every day work by connecting the device to large cloud computing capabilities elsewhere. Perhaps the most prominent are digital assistants such as Siri and Alexa that derive their power from natural language processing, a fast-growing subset of AI that applies machine learning to spoken language. But there are hundreds of other AI tools that consumers use without even realizing it. When the map on your phone suggests re-routing to avoid a traffic jam, that’s AI at work. Most of the recommendation engines you come across on streaming video or music services can be considered artificial intelligence with narrow application. But most developers in this burgeoning field rely on being able to reach back through a network to huge databases and powerful cloud computing centers.

“The commercial world is used to being able to walk into a restaurant anywhere in the world, take a picture of the menu and hit ‘translate.’ But that presumes that you have access to a common set of readily available information about that language and ready access back to the cloud, because that’s not really processed in your handheld phone,” said Sanders.

Any reduction in Energy Department's cybersecurity resources a mistake

BY RETIRED REAR ADM. MARK MONTGOMERY

In March, a bipartisan group of senators led by Jim Risch (R-Idaho) and Angus King (I-Maine) sent a letter to Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm expressing support for the department’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER). Joined by the chair and ranking member of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the letter highlighted the vital role CESER plays “in protecting the nation’s critical energy infrastructure from cyber threats, physical attacks, and other disruptive events.” More than a month later, the Biden administration has still not nominated an assistant secretary to lead the office.

The letter reflects the senators’ concerns that the Biden administration is considering downgrading the CESER billet from the assistant secretary level to make space for new assistant secretary assignments for justice and jobs. Coming on the heels of a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report highlighting the Department of Energy’s (DOE) unfinished work to secure the nation’s electric grid and supply chains, Secretary Granholm would be making a mistake if she were to reduce the seniority of cybersecurity leadership at the department.

Cyber Command shifts counterterrorism task force to focus on higher-priority threats

Mark Pomerleau

WASHINGTON — U.S. Cyber Command is shifting the majority of its special task force aimed at targeting the Islamic State group to focus more on nation-state actors, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, which the command and the Department of Defense are prioritizing.

Joint Task Force-Ares was created in 2016 to combat the militant organization online as a compliment to the global coalition fighting against the group’s grip on power in Iraq and Syria. The task force has since undergone several changes. The Army’s cyber component was originally tasked to lead the joint cyber effort, but in 2018, responsibility shifted to Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command, which allowed the team to focus not just on the Islamic State group, but more broadly on counterterrorism efforts globally.

“Counterterrorism operations in cyberspace are continuous, helping to protect the force and prosecute targets in Afghanistan and other regions on behalf of USCENTCOM [Central Command] and USSOCOM [Special Operations Command],” Gen. Paul Nakasone, commander of Cyber Command, said in written testimony to Congress in March. “We are also shifting JTF-Ares’ focus (though not all of its missions) from counterterrorism toward heightened support to great power competition, particularly in USINDOPACOM’s [Indo-Pacific Command’s] area of responsibility.”

Broadly speaking, Cyber Command does not plan to change command-and-control relationships or organizational cyber mission force elements as Joint Task Force-Ares transitions to focus more on nation-state actors, according to a command spokesperson.