NORTH KOREA – DAVID OF THE CYBER WORLD?

In 2004 I went to deliver a talk and chair a session on Cyber War at College of Defence Management, Secunderabad. After the session one of the participant officers of Higher Defence Management Course who was doing his dissertation on a relevant topic engaged me in a discussion that North Korea has no internet connection and how do they do business. My answer that in today’s world no country can afford to have complete disconnect seemed not to satisfy him. Of course Sony happened later. Now Russia is providing them with internet connectivity when others have blocked. 

Here is a take on North Korea’s Cyber capabilities. 

NORTH KOREA – DAVID OF THE CYBER WORLD? 

                                                                    - Maj Gen P K Mallick,VSM (Retd) 

Frequently, senior political leaders, cyber security professionals, and diplomats describe North Korean leaders or their respective actions as “crazy,” “erratic,” or “not rational.” This is not the case. When examined through the lens of North Korean military strategy, national goals, and security perceptions, cyber activities correspond to their larger approach. North Korean cyber actors are not crazy or irrational: they just have a wider operational scope than most other intelligence services. 

And just as Western analysts once scoffed at the potential of the North’s nuclear program, so did experts dismiss its cyber potential — only to now acknowledge that hacking is an almost perfect weapon for a Pyongyang that is isolated and has little to lose. The country’s primitive infrastructure is far less vulnerable to cyber retaliation. North Korean hackers operate outside the country, anyway. Sanctions offer no useful response, since a raft of sanctions are already imposed. And Mr. Kim’s advisers are betting that no one will respond to a cyberattack with a military attack, for fear of a catastrophic escalation between North and South Korea.

North Korea is emerging as a significant actor in cyberspace with both its clandestine and military organizations gaining the ability to conduct cyber operations. Cyber attacks in South Korea and the United States have recently been associated with North Korea. The U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) governments attribute recent incidents, including the November 2014 attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment and the March 2013 attacks against South Korean banks and media agencies, respectively, to North Korea. These attacks have shown that the country is capable of conducting damaging and disruptive cyber attacks during peacetime. North Korea seems heavily invested in growing and developing its cyber capabilities for both political and military purposes. 

Aa per the 2016 University of Washington study succinctly summarizes North Korea’s asymmetric military strategy: Since the end of the Korean War, North Korea has developed an asymmetric military strategy, weapons, and strength because its conventional military power is far weaker than that of the U.S. and South Korea. Thus, North Korea has developed three military strategic pillars: surprise attack; quick decisive war; mixed tactics. First, its surprise attack strategy refers to attacking the enemy at an unexpected time and place. Second, its quick decisive war strategy is to defeat the South Korean military before the U.S. military or international community could intervene. Lastly, its mixed tactics strategy is to use multiple tactics at the same time to achieve its strategic goal. 

Despite their near constant tirade of bellicose rhetoric and professions of strength, North Korea fundamentally views the world from a position of weakness and has developed a national strategy that utilizes its comparative strengths — complete control over a population of 25 million people and unflinching devotion to the Kim hereditary dynasty. 

In this context, criminality, terrorism, and destructive cyber attacks all fit within the North Korean asymmetric military strategy which emphasizes surprise attacks and mixed tactics. The criminality and cyber attacks also have the added bonus of enabling North Korea to undermine the very international economic and political systems that constrain and punish it. 

North Korea has relied on various asymmetric and irregular means to sidestep the conventional military deadlock on the peninsula while also preparing these means for use should a war break out. Cyber capabilities provide another means of exploiting U.S. and ROK vulnerabilities at relatively low intensity  while minimizing risk of retaliation or escalation. In this context, cyber capabilities are logical extensions of both North Korea’s peacetime and wartime operations 

Cyber Capabilities and Asymmetric Strategy. North Korea sees cyber operations as a relatively low-cost and low risk means of targeting the vulnerabilities of a state that relies heavily on cyberspace for national and military activity. Disruptive or destructive cyber attacks allow for direct power projection against a distant adversary without physical infiltration or attack. Cyber capabilities are also an effective means to severely disrupt or neutralize the benefits of having a networked military. Issues of attribution and the lack of firmly established norms make it hard for the defender to communicate red lines and threats. 

North Korea’s Cyber Strategy. Cyber operations should be thought of as an extension of North Korea’s broader national strategy. During peacetime, cyber capabilities allow the DPRK to upset the status quo with little risk of retaliation or immediate operational risk. During wartime, the DPRK would target U.S. and ROK command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) in support of the DPRK’s “quick war, quick end” strategy. North Korean cyber doctrine, if one exists, may be premised on the idea that an extensively networked military is vulnerable to cyber capabilities. 

North Korea began identifying promising students at an early age for special training, sending many to China’s top computer science programs. In the late 1990s, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s counterintelligence division noticed that North Koreans assigned to work at the United Nations were also quietly enrolling in university computer programming courses in New York. 

“Cyber is a tailor-made instrument of power for them,” said Chris Inglis, a former deputy director of the National Security Agency, who now teaches about security at the United States Naval Academy. “There’s a low cost of entry, it’s largely asymmetrical, there’s some degree of anonymity and stealth in its use. It can hold large swaths of nation state infrastructure and private-sector infrastructure at risk. It’s a source of income.” Mr. Inglis, speaking at the Cambridge Cyber Summit added: “You could argue that they have one of the most successful cyber programs on the planet, not because it’s technically sophisticated, but because it has achieved all of their aims at very low cost.” 

From Minor Leaguers to Serious Hackers 

Kim Jong-il, the father of the current dictator and the initiator of North Korea’s cyber operations, was a movie lover who became an internet enthusiast, a luxury reserved for the country’s elite. When Mr. Kim died in 2011, the country was estimated to have 1,024 IP addresses, fewer than on most New York City blocks. Mr. Kim, like the Chinese, initially saw the internet as a threat to his regime’s ironclad control over information. But his attitude began to change in the early 1990s, after a group of North Korean computer scientists returned from travel abroad proposing to use the web to spy on and attack enemies like the United States and South Korea, according to defectors. 

North Korea began identifying promising students at an early age for special training, sending many to China’s top computer science programs. “The North’s cyberwarfare unit gained priority after the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States. After watching the American “shock and awe” campaign on CNN, Kim Jong-il issued a warning to his military: “If warfare was about bullets and oil until now,” he told top commanders, warfare in the 21st century is about information.” 

When Kim Jong-un succeeded his father, in 2011, he expanded the cyber mission beyond serving as just a weapon of war, focusing also on theft, harassment and political-score settling. “Cyberwarfare, along with nuclear weapons and missiles, is an ‘all-purpose sword’ that guarantees our military’s capability to strike relentlessly,” Kim Jong-un reportedly declared 

“We’re already sanctioning anything and everything we can,” said Robert P. Silvers, the former assistant secretary for cyberpolicy at the Department of Homeland Security during the Obama administration. “They’re already the most isolated nation in the world.” By 2012, government officials and private researchers say North Korea had dispersed its hacking teams abroad, relying principally on China’s internet infrastructure. This allowed the North to exploit largely nonsecure internet connections and maintain a degree of plausible deniability. 

The Organization of DPRK’s Cyber Operations 

North Korea’s cyber operations are not ad hoc, isolated incidents. They are the result of deliberate and organized efforts under the direction of preexisting organizations with established goals and missions that directly support the country’s national strategy. Knowing which North Korean organizations plan and execute cyber operations is important because North Korea does not publish its own cyber strategy or doctrine. Examining an organization’s historic goals and missions as well as analyzing their known patterns of behavior are the next best option for predicting how North Korea will operationalize cyber capabilities. A top-down perspective on North Korea’s cyber operations shows which organizations conduct cyber operations and how strongly they influence operational purposes. The Reconnaissance General Bureau and the General Staff Department of the KPA generally control most of North Korea’s known cyber capabilities. These two organizations are responsible for peacetime provocations and wartime disruptive operations, respectively. 

1. The Reconnaissance General Bureau: The RGB is the primary intelligence and clandestine operations organ known within the North Korean government and is historically associated with peacetime commando raids, infiltrations, disruptions and other clandestine operations, including the 2014 Sony Pictures Entertainment attack. The RGB controls the bulk of known DPRK cyber capabilities, mainly under Bureau 121 or its potential successor, the Cyber Warfare Guidance Bureau. There may be a recent or ongoing reorganization within the RGB that promoted Bureau 121 to a higher rank or even established it as the centralized entity for cyber operations. RGB cyber capabilities are likely to be in direct support of the RGB’s aforementioned missions. In peacetime, it is also likely to be the more important or active of the two main organizations with cyber capabilities in the DPRK. 

2. The General Staff Department (GSD): The General Staff Department of the KPA oversees military operations and units, including the DPRK’s growing conventional military cyber capabilities. It is tasked with operational planning and ensuring the readiness of the KPA should war break out on the Korean peninsula. It is not currently associated with direct cyber provocations in the same way that the RGB is, but its cyber units may be tasked with preparing disruptive attacks and cyber operations in support of conventional military operations. North Korea’s emphasis on combined arms and mixed operations suggests that cyber units will coordinate with or be incorporated as elements within larger conventional military formations. 

3. North Korea’s Technology Base: The DPRK maintains an information technology base that can serve as a general research and development foundation for computer technology and programming. The existence of a software and computer industry means the DPRK’s technical industries are not as primitive as many think. 

The Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), also known as “Unit 586,” was formed in 2009 after a large restructure of several state, military, and party intelligence elements. It has since emerged as not just the dominant North Korean foreign intelligence service, but also the center for clandestine operations. 

As North Korea’s lead for clandestine operations, the RGB is also likely the primary cyber operations organization as well. As described by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 2015 report: 

For the RGB to be in control of cyber assets indicates that the DPRK intends to use these assets for provocative purposes. The RGB probably consists of seven bureaus; six original bureaus and a new seventh (Bureau 121) that was likely added sometime after 2013. 

RGB organizational chart, compiled with information from The Korea Herald, 38 North, and CSIS. 

Bureau 121 is probably North Korea’s primary cyber operations unit, but there are other units within the KPA and KWP that may also conduct cyber operations. 

Lazarus Group, now known to be North Korean state-sponsored actors, have been conducting operations since at least 2009, with a DDoS attack on U.S. and South Korean websites using the MYDOOM worm. Until late 2015, Lazarus Group cyber activities primarily focused on South Korean and U.S. government and financial organizations, including destructive attacks on South Korean banking and media sectors in 2013 and highly publicized attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment in 2014. 

North Korean Cyber Activities 

Sony Cyber Attack. North Korea’s most famous cyberattack came in 2014, against Sony Pictures Entertainment, in a largely successful effort to block the release of a movie that satirized Mr. Kim. In August 2014, North Korean hackers went after a British broadcaster, Channel Four, which had announced plans for a television series about a British nuclear scientist kidnapped in Pyongyang. 

First, the North Koreans protested to the British government. “A scandalous farce,” North Korea called the series. When that was ignored, British authorities found that the North had hacked into the television network’s computer system. The attack was stopped before inflicting any damage, and David Abraham, the chief executive of Channel Four, initially vowed to continue the production. 

That attack, however, was just a prelude. When Sony Pictures Entertainment released a trailer for “The Interview,” Pyongyang wrote a letter of complaint to the secretary general of the United Nations to stop the production. Then came threats to Sony. In September 2014, while still attempting to crack Channel 4, North Korean hackers buried deep into Sony’s networks, lurking patiently for the next three months, as both Sony and American intelligence completely missed their presence. On Nov. 24, the attack on Sony began: Employees arriving at work that day found their computer screens taken over by a picture of a red skeleton with a message signed “GOP,” for “Guardians of Peace.” 

“We’ve obtained all your internal data including your secrets and top secrets,” the message said. “If you don’t obey us, we’ll release data shown below to the world.” That was actually a diversion: The code destroyed 70 percent of Sony Pictures’ laptops and computers. Sony employees were reduced to communicating via pen, paper and phone. 

Sony struggled to distribute the film as theaters were intimidated. In London, outside investors in Channel Four’s North Korea project suddenly dried up, and the project effectively died. The Obama White House responded to the Sony hack with sanctions that the North barely noticed, but with no other retaliation. 

Stealing of Operational Plan of South Korea. 

North Korean hackers stole a huge trove of classified U.S. and South Korean military documents last year, including a plan to “decapitate” the leadership in Pyongyang in the event of war. North Korean hackers broke into the Defense Integrated Data Center in September last year to steal secret files, including American and South Korean “operational plans” for wartime action. The data center is the main headquarters of South Korea’s defense network. The stolen documents included OPLAN 5015, a plan drafted two years ago for dealing with full-blown war with North Korea and said to include procedures to “decapitate” the North Korean leadership. The cache also included OPLAN 3100, outlining the military response to infiltration by North Korean commandos or another local provocation, as well as a contingency plan in case of a sudden change in North Korea. Yonhap News Agency reported that the hackers took 235 gigabytes of military documents and that almost 80 percent of the stolen documents have not yet been identified. The documents also included reports on key South Korean and U.S. military personnel, the minutes of meetings about South Korean-U.S. military drills, and data on military installations and power plants in South Korea, reported the Chosun Ilbo, South Korea’s largest newspaper. In May, the Defense Ministry disclosed that the South Korean military’s intranet had been hacked by people “presumed to be North Koreans.” But the military said that only 53 gigabytes of information were stolen, and it did not reveal what was included. The previous month, reports emerged that North Korean hackers had broken into the Defense Ministry network and infected more than 3,000 computers, including the defense minister’s, with malware. At the time, South Korean newspapers, quoting unnamed government officials, reported that parts of one operational plan, OPLAN 5027, which outlines troop deployment plans and key North Korean targets, were stolen. 

Information War 

North Korea was potentially behind phony evacuation messages sent via cellphones and social media to military families and defense personnel in South Korea last month. That incident opens the possibility that last year’s breach may have led to the harvest of personal information used for the notifications. 

This is hardly the first time that Kim’s regime has been accused of cyberattacks. The country’s spy agency, the Reconnaissance General Bureau, is thought to have assembled a large cyber army, assumed to be based in China, to launch such hacks.

To be continued....

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INTERNET GOVERNANCE

I have some interest in matter cyber. When I attend seminar/discussions on cyber related issues I often hear of Internet Governance Multi Stake Holder Approach, UNGGE, Net Mundial etc.

Being a GD person most of these go over my head.

I decided to understand what is these all about.

My first take on Internet Governance is given below.

Watch this space for some more including some controversial observation ! 

INTERNET GOVERNANCE

                                                                           - Maj Gen P K Mallick,VSM (Retd)

The Internet is often described as a “network of networks” because it is not a single physical entity, but hundreds of thousands of interconnected networks linking hundreds of millions of computers around the world. As such, the Internet is international, decentralized, and comprised of networks and infrastructure largely owned and operated by private sector entities. Computers connected to the Internet are identified by a unique Internet Protocol (IP) number that designates their specific location, thereby making it possible to send and receive messages and to access information from computers anywhere on the Internet. Domain names were created to provide users with a simple location name, rather than requiring them to use a long list of numbers. The domain name system (DNS) is the distributed set of databases residing in computers around the world that contain the address numbers, mapped to corresponding domain names. Those computers, called root servers, must be coordinated to ensure connectivity across the Internet.

The Internet is often described as a “network of networks” because it is not a single physical entity, but hundreds of thousands of interconnected networks linking hundreds of millions of computers around the world. As such, the Internet is international, decentralized, and comprised of networks and infrastructure largely owned and operated by private sector entities. As the Internet grows and becomes more pervasive in all aspects of modern society, the question of how it should be governed becomes more pressing.

Currently, an important aspect of the Internet is governed by a private sector, international organization based in California called the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). ICANN manages and oversees some of the critical technical underpinnings of the Internet such as the domain name system and Internet Protocol (IP) addressing. ICANN makes its policy decisions using a multistakeholder model of governance, in which a “bottom-up” collaborative process is open to all constituencies of Internet stakeholders.

National governments have recognized an increasing stake in ICANN policy decisions, specially in cases where Internet policy intersects with national laws addressing such issues as intellectual property, privacy, law enforcement, and cybersecurity. Some governments around the world are advocating increased intergovernmental influence over the way the Internet is governed. For example, specific proposals have been advanced that would create an Internet governance entity within the United Nations (U.N.). Other governments (including the United States), as well as many other Internet stakeholders, oppose these proposals and argue that ICANN’s multistakeholder model is the most appropriate way to govern the Internet.

One working definition was developed at the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in 2005: Internet governance is the development and application by governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet

The U.S. government has no statutory authority over the DNS. However, because the Internet evolved from a network infrastructure created by the Department of Defense, the U.S. government originally funded and operated (primarily through private contractors) many of the key components of the network architecture that enabled the domain name system to function.2 In 1998, with the Internet expanding beyond the academic and governmental spheres, the U.S. government transitioned the management of the DNS to a newly created not-for-profit international organization based in California called the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).3 ICANN employed (and continues to employ) a multistakeholder system of governance whereby policy decisions are made by a Board of Directors with input from the various stakeholder groups that comprise the Internet and the domain name system. These stakeholders include owners and operators of servers and networks around the world, domain name registrars and registries, regional IP address allocation organizations, standards organizations, Internet service providers, local and national governments, noncommercial stakeholders, business users, intellectual property interests, and others.

On March 14, 2014, NTIA announced its intention to transition its stewardship role and procedural authority over key domain name functions to the global Internet multistakeholder community.11 NTIA’s stated intention was that it would let its IANA functions contract with ICANN expire on September 30, 2015, if a satisfactory transition could be achieved. Role of Congress in the IANA Transition Concerns have arisen in Congress over the proposed transition. Some Members have argued that the transition requires additional scrutiny by Congress, while others have questioned whether the transition should take place at all. While the U.S. government has no statutory authority over ICANN or the DNS, Congress does have legislative and budgetary authority over NTIA, which is seeking to relinquish its contractual authority over the IANA functions. As such, Congress has keenly monitored the progress of the transition, primarily through congressional committees with jurisdiction over NTIA. These include the House Energy and Commerce Committee and the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee. Additionally, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees—which determine and control NTIA’s annual budget—could impact NTIA’s ability to relinquish its existing authority over the IANA functions.

Debate over Future Models of Internet Governance

Given its complexity, diversity, and international nature, how should the Internet be governed?

Some assert that a multistakeholder model of governance is appropriate, where all stakeholders (both public and private sectors) arrive at consensus through a transparent bottom-up process. Others argue that a greater role for national governments is necessary, either through increased influence through the multistake holder model, or under the auspices of an international body exerting intergovernmental control.

As part of the debate over an appropriate model of Internet governance, criticisms of ICANN have arisen on two fronts. One criticism reflects the tension between national governments and the current performance and governance processes of ICANN, whereby governments feel they lack adequate influence over ICANN decisions that affect a range of Internet policy issues. The other criticism has been fueled by concerns of many nations that the U.S. government has held undue legacy influence and control over ICANN and the domain name system.

The debate over multistakeholderism vs. intergovernmental control initially manifested itself in 2005 at the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), which was a conference organized by the United Nations. More recently, this debate has been rekindled in various international for a.

NETmundial

The day after the Montevideo Statement was released, the President of ICANN met with the President of Brazil, who announced plans to hold an international Internet governance summit in

April 2014 that would include representatives from government, industry, civil society, and academia. NETmundial, which was described as a “global multistakeholder meeting on the future of Internet governance,” was held on April 23-24, 2014, in Sao Paulo, Brazil.38 The meeting was open to all interested stakeholders, and was intended to “focus on crafting Internet governance 

NETmundial

The day after the Montevideo Statement was released, the President of ICANN met with the President of Brazil, who announced plans to hold an international Internet governance summit in

April 2014 that would include representatives from government, industry, civil society, and academia. NETmundial, which was described as a “global multistakeholder meeting on the future of Internet governance,” was held on April 23-24, 2014, in Sao Paulo, Brazil.38 The meeting was open to all interested stakeholders, and was intended to “focus on crafting Internet governance.

Internet Governance and Terrorism

With ongoing concern over the use of the Internet by terrorist organizations, the question has arisen whether Internet governance mechanisms could be used to combat the use of the internet by terrorist entities. Traditionally, nation-states can govern the use and content of the Internet within their national boundaries and many have the authority, pursuant to their respective national laws, to monitor, block, and/or shut down websites within their borders.49 In some instances, these powers and actions have been controversial when, for example, antiterrorism concerns may be used to justify censorship or the suppression of free speech on the Internet.50 On an international level, governance of the Internet with respect to its content and use is problematic. As discussed earlier in this report, the Internet is decentralized and its functioning relies on the cooperation and participation by mostly private sector stakeholders around the world. As such, there is no international governance entity that currently has authority to remove global Internet content used to promote terrorism. While there have been proposals to establish some level of authority over the Internet by the United Nations, these proposals have originated, for the most part, from regimes such as China, Russia, and Iran, and have been consistently opposed by the United States and other Western nations who fear that increased United Nations authority over the Internet would ultimately support censorship and suppression of free speech.51

Could ICANN—a functioning model of nongovernmental multistakeholder Internet governance—be deployed to restrict or limit the use of the global Internet by terrorist groups? Currently, ICANN administers the technological infrastructure of the Internet (domain names, Internet protocol numbers and standards) and explicitly does not regulate Internet content. Any attempt to change ICANN policy toward regulating Internet content would likely be strongly opposed by most of the Internet stakeholders who administer and set policy for ICANN through a consensus process.

Finally, the ongoing debate over Internet governance will likely have a significant impact on how other aspects of the Internet may be governed in the future, especially in such areas as intellectual property, privacy, law enforcement, Internet free speech, and cybersecurity. Looking forward, the institutional nature of Internet governance could have far-reaching implications on important policy decisions that will likely shape the future evolution of the Internet. 

One of the important ways that the Internet differs from other telecommunications technologies is in how much it depends on voluntary co-operation. The Internet is a network of networks (of networks, and so on), and each network operates more or less independently. The networks cooperate with one another, without a lot of central co-ordination, because it is in their independent interests to do so. In this way, the Internet is something like a market economy: people trade (goods in the economy, “packets” on the Internet) because they each get something out of it. In my view, it is the very alignment of each operator’s interests with the outcomes that has allowed the Internet to grow and flourish, such that it is a dominant communications technology of our time. In a centrally-organized and centrally-operated system, controls over how people configure systems would be imposed by the center. Centrally-managed systems tend to be expensive or hard to operate (or both) when they get very large. But the Internet is distributed, because in a network of networks there is no center. In a distributed environment, it’s often easier if one has clues about how to get started interoperating with others. Those clues are the IANA registries. They fall into three broad categories, which I describe below

under the U.S. Constitution, freedom of speech is an extremely broad right, but in many other countries, there are significant constraints on freedom of speech in the interests of preventing, for instance, hate speech. If ICANN adopts the more common and limited interpretation of free speech in its human rights commitment, it could create means for governments or businesses to use ICANN to moderate content.

It does not engender great confidence in ICANN that, at the same time it is seeking greater independence from governmental authorities, it turns to those same authorities for assistance in resolving controversial matters within its remit. As the transition moves forward, ICANN will need to develop the institutional maturity to deal with controversies of this sort independently.

Nearly half of the world’s population, including almost everyone in the United States, uses the Internet for business or personal purposes and pursuits, and it has become a critical vehicle for research, discourse, and commerce. ICANN plays an important role in maintaining the safety, security, reliability, and openness of the Internet, and it is necessary that it remain accountable and transparent.

The proposed changes to ICANN provide numerous improvements and tools for enhanced accountability, but there are also uncertainties. The proposal is a blueprint for an accountable institution, but it is unclear whether the result will be sound or whether the ICANN community can or will act responsibly and in a timely manner to hold ICANN accountable. no multistakeholder system that can be devised will ever be as effective at protecting a free and open Internet as the current United States government oversight system.

Daniel Sepulveda, 3 the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and U.S. Coordinator for International Communications and Information Policy in the State Department’s Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (EB) 4 and Lawrence E. Strickling, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information and Administrator, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, is that the Internet is already being fractured by China which has developed an alternate root zone system as well as a separate naming convention. Sepulveda and Strickling write, “The digital economy has become one of the most powerful engines for global economic growth. If left unchanged, China’s regulations would undermine some of the most fundamental aspects of the Internet –- openness, reliability, and interoperability –- within China. By creating its own rules for domain name management, China is threatening to fragment the Internet, which would limit the Internet’s ability to operate as a global platform for human communication, commerce, and creativity.”

And those who believe that the IANA functions transition would temporarily stem China’s threat to fracture the Internet, need only look at China’s attempted censorship demands on the .XYZ top level domain name where the government of China demanded last year that the owner not allow 12,000 different words be accepted as domain names including “liberty” and “democracy” as revealing the terrible potential cost of maintaining the Internet’s “interoperability.” 

Cruz, Lee and Lankford continue writing, “However any provision, such as human rights, that is included in ICANN’s bylaws automatically becomes an integral part of ICANN’s core mission and, in this case, could provide a gateway to content regulation.”

The United States government stands as the protector of freedom on the Internet. Vendors like ICANN help bring specific expertise to manage the day to day operations of the Internet, and the system functions well when the United States government plays its oversight role to prevent abuse. Absent the U.S. government’s light handed oversight, the idea of a free and open Internet will certainly become a thing of the past.

The Internet as we know it depends on there being a single, authoritative source for the names and numbers in order to work. For, while the government-overseen contracts and agreements are in place to establish the rules of the road, ICANN, Verisign, the regional registries, etc. are all shielded from antitrust scrutiny. Such pitfalls of collusion, monopoly power and price gouging might have arisen otherwise if the Internet had been brought up singularly in the private sector. Instead today’s single, usable and affordable Internet, again, is a virtue of U.S. oversight. It is a monopoly, yes, but a regulated one that can be pulled back if needs be, where claims of U.S. government property over the IANA functions act simply as a failsafe — just in case anything goes wrong. We must consider whether trading the current system for a single, unaccountable monopoly beyond law or competition, or one that could be subject to antitrust suits the moment it engages in anticompetitive activities, splintering the Internet, could actually be a far worse outcome. Antitrust law challenges to the IANA functions were fully anticipated in the 1998 statement of policy: “Applicable antitrust law will provide accountability to and protection for the international Internet community. Legal challenges and lawsuits can be expected within the normal course of business for any enterprise and the new corporation should anticipate this

Some governments have expressed concerns that the transition proposal limits governments’ ability to participate in the ICANN community on equal terms with other stakeholders. This is because, post-transition, government participation in ICANN policy development will be limited to a purely advisory role within the Governmental Advisory Committee (“GAC”). The new ICANN bylaws confine the GAC in two important ways. First, GAC “advice” to the ICANN Board requires “consensus,” defined as general agreement in the absence of any formal objection by any government, including the United States. Second, GAC advice can be rejected by a 60 percent vote of the Board, and government representatives cannot serve on the Board. Thus, in order for governments to dictate Board action, they would first need to obtain consensus (unanimous agreement) within the GAC, an organization in which the United States and other like-minded countries take an active role. Thereafter, any advisory decision still could be rejected by a 60 percent vote of the Board. The consequence of these developments is that governments that failed to capture ICANN during the transition process now are refocusing their efforts on other venues, including the United Nation’s International Telecommunication Union (“ITU”). In June, the presidents of China and Russia issued a joint statement supporting a multilateral global Internet governance system and “maintain[ing] [the] UN’s important role in setting up global Internet governance mechanisms.” Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, and others also are focusing on the ITU’s upcoming World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (“WTSA”), which will address several important Internet public policy issues. The ITU will be an important setting for post-ICANN debates about the appropriate role for governments in Internet policy. Governments that failed to gain influence over ICANN are turning their attention back to the ITU. In June, the presidents of China and Russia issued a joint statement supporting a multilateral global Internet governance system and “maintain[ing] [the] UN’s important role in setting up global Internet governance mechanisms.” In October, the ITU’s World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (“WTSA”) will convene, with an agenda likely to include a wide range of Internet-related issues. Governments like Russia, Saudi Arabia, China, and others are trying to expand the ITU’s activities at WTSA further into Internet public policy-related issues. As a result, I do not believe that governments will discontinue their efforts to expand government authority over the Internet—rather, those efforts are shifting to the ITU and other venues. Promoting and protecting a thriving Internet will require continued engagement in the global debate and ensuring that Internet governance mechanisms remain open, transparent, and representative of all relevant stakeholders. The transition will ensure that non-governmental stakeholders, including U.S. industry, will have front row seats in discussions about the Internet’s future – making it easier, though no less challenging, to keep it free and open for future generations.

Supporters of the transition45 argue that by transferring its remaining authority over ICANN and the DNS to the global Internet community, the U.S. government will bolster its continuing support for the multistakeholder model of Internet governance, and that this will enable the United States to more effectively argue and work against proposals for intergovernmental control over the Internet.

Those opposed, skeptical, or highly cautious about the transition48 point out that NTIA’s role has served as a necessary “backstop” to ICANN, which has given Internet stakeholders confidence that the integrity and stability of the DNS is being sufficiently overseen. Critics assert that in the wake of the Edward Snowden NSA revelations, foreign governments might gain more support internationally in their continuing attempts to exert intergovernmental control over the Internet, and that any added intergovernmental influence over the Internet and the DNS would be that much more detrimental to the interests of the United States if NTIA’s authority over ICANN and the DNS were to no longer exist.

Another concern regards the development of the transition plan and a new international multistakeholder entity that would provide some level of stewardship over the DNS. Critics are concerned about the risks of foreign governments—particularly repressive regimes that favor censorship of the Internet—gaining influence over the DNS through the transition to a new Internet governance mechanism that no longer is subject to U.S. government oversight The future of how ICANN and the DNS will be governed is highly relevant to the broader question of how the Internet should be governed. While it is true that ICANN’s jurisdiction is limited to the technical underpinnings of the Internet (unique Internet identifiers such as domain names and addresses), it is also true that ICANN policy decisions (such as new gTLDs) can affect other areas of Internet policy such as intellectual property, cybersecurity, privacy, and Internet freedom.

As the Internet expands and becomes more pervasive throughout the world in all aspects of modern society, the question of how it should be governed becomes more pressing, with national governments recognizing an increasing stake in ICANN policy decisions, especially in cases where Internet DNS policy intersects with national laws and interests. ICANN is viewed by many as a ground-breaking example of multistakeholder governance. While ICANN does not “control” the Internet, how it is ultimately governed may set an important precedent in future policy debates—both domestically and internationally—over how the Internet might be governed, and what role governments and intergovernmental organizations should play.

Who should attend? ICANN meetings are all about participation, collaboration, and finding solutions to the small – and large – problems that the Internet constantly faces. As a meeting attendee you could be from almost any profession and from any corner of the planet. ICANN is setup to allow everyone affected by its work – and that is pretty much everyone – to have a say in its processes. To ensure that the organization stays flexible and changes to meet the needs and demands of a rapidly changing Internet, not only do the SOs, ACs, and the Board go through regular reviews, but ICANN also maintains a strong culture of general public participation. Typical attendees include government representatives, business managers, IT managers and consultants, DNS industry managers and experts, intellectual property managers, academics, and others invested in the continuing stable, secure and resilient operation of the Internet. End users are also well represented. If you prefer to participate remotely, there are a wide range of mechanisms that make that possible.

*** Catalonia Takes the Independence Leap

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The standoff over Catalan independence has entered a new phase of political fragility, economic uncertainty and social unrest. On Oct. 27, the Catalan parliament approved to unilaterally declare independence from Spain. Shortly after, the Spanish Senate authorized a series of measures against the rebellious region, dismissing members of the Catalan government and seizing several Catalan institutions, including the treasury, the interior ministry and the regional police. The central Spanish government in Madrid has no intention of permanently controlling Catalonia. It wants instead to hold regional elections Dec. 21 to elect a new Catalan government, though it will struggle in the meantime to actually enforce its punitive actions.

Up to this point, the Catalan conflict has been characterized by delay tactics, threats and ambiguity from both sides. Catalonia's Oct. 27 declaration of independence makes the conflict more concrete, but no less convoluted. This is the first time since the end of the Spanish Civil War that a region has openly challenged Madrid; it is the first time since Spain's return to democracy in the late 1970s that Madrid has decided to take direct control of an autonomous region's institutions. Whatever happens next, it will be unprecedented.

Sino-Indian Space Race Rivalry Lifts Off

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China and India are using satellites in space to win influence and secure their geo-political and economic interests, and while China's program is better funded and more ambitious, India's Indian Space Research Organization is catching up. 

On May 5, India began a new diplomatic push in South Asia by launching the “South Asia satellite” into space. Built and launched by the government-run Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), the satellite will provide communications and meteorological data to India’s South Asian neighbors. 

The Twists and Turns along China’s Belt and Road

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By Michael Kovrig

“The project of the century” is how Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi touted the Belt and Road Initiative to the world when addressing the UN General Assembly on 21 September. It was only the latest in a series of pronouncements and events, including a Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in May and the ninth BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) summit in Xiamen in early September, choreographed to position China at the vanguard of a new stage of globalisation. Step by step, China is demonstrating that the Belt and Road is now the guiding framework for its international economic statecraft.

How Taliban are evolving to compete in Afghanistan

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OCTOBER 26, 2017 KABUL, AFGHANISTAN—The final Taliban threat was the most chilling, the culmination of months of pressure built against a single Afghan policeman – and it worked.

Introducing himself as “the scholar,” the Taliban operative warned that it would be the last phone call, the last threat to convince Ahmad, a veteran of frequent battles with the Taliban with calluses on his shooting hand, to leave the police force.

How a State Department Study Prevented Nuclear War With China

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By Franz-Stefan Gady

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) under Mao Zedong was the nuclear “rogue state” of the 1960s in the eyes of the United States. The PRC was viewed by officials in two consecutive U.S. administrations — John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson — as both extremist and irrational, a country where the prevailing U.S. Cold War strategies of containment and deterrence would not apply. President Kennedy reportedly saw a nuclear China as “the great menace in the future to humanity, the free world, and freedom on earth.” Lyndon B. Johnson told a reporter in 1964 during the ongoing presidential campaign that “we can’t let [Barry] Goldwater [Johnson’s opponent] and Red China both get the bomb at the same time. Then the shit would really hit the fan.”

China Has New Leaders. What Now?

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By Jonathan Brookfield

Well, it’s official. The Chinese Communist Party’s new Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) will consist of seven individuals. Listed in order of seniority, they are: Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, Li Zhanshu, Wang Yang, Wang Huning, Zhao Leji, and Han Zheng.

With President Xi Jinping (now 64 years old) and Premier Li Keqiang (62 years old) continuing on from the previous PSC, the new line up brings five new faces into China’s highest policy making body.