China’s Covid protests could go anywhere from here

DAVID S G GOODMAN

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Public protests in China related to the government’s Covid-19 restrictions have hit the news worldwide over the weekend, following a fatal apartment fire in Urumqi, Xinjiang last week which killed ten people.

Many internet users claimed some residents could not escape because the apartment building was partially locked down, though authorities denied this.

There have been reports some demonstrators have called for President Xi Jinping, the newly re-elected General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, to stand down. Others have criticized the rule of the party itself.

China’s Covid measures are among the strictest in the world, as it continues to pursue lockdowns to suppress the virus – what it calls a “dynamic zero Covid” policy.

At the heart of China’s protests against zero-Covid, young people cry for freedom

Nectar Gan and Selina Wang

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CNN —For the first time in decades, thousands of people have defied Chinese authorities to protest at universities and on the streets of major cities, demanding to be freed not only from incessant Covid tests and lockdowns, but strict censorship and the Communist Party’s tightening grip over all aspects of life.

Across the country, “want freedom” has become a rallying cry for a groundswell of protests mainly led by the younger generation, some too young to have taken part in previous acts of open dissent against the government.

“Give me liberty or give me death!” crowds by the hundreds shouted in several cities, according to videos circulating online, as vigils to mark the deaths of at least 10 people in a fire in Xinjiang spiraled into political rallies.

Videos circulating online seem to suggest China’s strict zero-Covid policy initially prevented emergency workers from accessing the scene, angering residents across the country who have endured three years of varying Covid controls.

U.S. and NATO Scramble to Arm Ukraine and Refill Their Own Arsenals

Steven Erlanger and Lara Jakes

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BRUSSELS — When the Soviet Union collapsed, European nations grabbed the “peace dividend,” drastically shrinking their defense budgets, their armies and their arsenals.

With the rise of Al Qaeda nearly a decade later, terrorism became the target, requiring different military investments and lighter, more expeditionary forces. Even NATO’s long engagement in Afghanistan bore little resemblance to a land war in Europe, heavy on artillery and tanks, that nearly all defense ministries thought would never recur.

But it has.

In Ukraine, the kind of European war thought inconceivable is chewing up the modest stockpiles of artillery, ammunition and air defenses of what some in NATO call Europe’s “bonsai armies,” after the tiny Japanese trees. Even the mighty United States has only limited stocks of the weapons the Ukrainians want and need, and Washington is unwilling to divert key weapons from delicate regions like Taiwan and Korea, where China and North Korea are constantly testing the limits.

The Perpetually Irrational Ukraine Debate

Stephen M. Walt

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Because war is uncertain and reliable information is sparse, no one knows how the war in Ukraine will play out. Nor can any of us be completely certain what the optimal course of action is. We all have our own theories, hunches, beliefs, and hopes, but nobody’s crystal ball is 100 percent reliable in the middle of a war.

You might think that this situation would encourage observers to approach the whole issue with a certain humility and give alternative perspectives a fair hearing even when they disagree with one’s own. Instead, debates about responsibility for the war and the proper course of action to follow have been unusually nasty and intolerant, even by modern standards of social media vituperation. I’ve been trying to figure out why this is the case.

Is China heading toward another Tiananmen Square moment?

Lili Pike and Tom Nagorski

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In October, a man unfurled banners from a Beijing bridge calling for people to rise up against China’s restrictive covid policies and the Communist Party itself. He was alone that day and quickly arrested; the nationwide protests he hoped for did not materialize. But now they have. And they started because of a fire in an apartment building.

When word spread of the fire, the 10 fatalities and reports that rescue efforts may have been slowed by a covid lockdown, the apartment building tragedy turned into a national rallying cry.

It happened this past Thursday in Urumqi, in western China’s Xinjiang region. By the weekend, protests had spread from Urumqi to Shanghai, Nanjing and many other large cities — including Wuhan, where the world’s first major outbreak of covid-19 struck three years ago. The anger was expressed on Chinese social media platforms as well. At first, the protests appeared to take direct aim at the government’s “zero-covid” approach, under which even small outbreaks are met with severe measures — often including the confining of millions of people to their homes. “Lift the lockdown” was among the rallying cries. But in some instances, demonstrators went further — calling for broader freedoms and even an end to Communist Party rule.

Three scenarios for how war in Ukraine could play out

Shashank Joshi

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ANY SEASONED intelligence analyst might have scoffed had they been told in March 2022 that Ukraine would still be an independent state eight months later; that Ukraine’s army would have killed or wounded 80,000 Russians; that the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet would be at the bottom of that sea; and that Ukraine’s air force would still be flying. Ukraine has defied expectations. It is winning the war. But winter is coming and Russia is mobilising. Consider three scenarios for the year ahead.

In the first, Russia snatches victory from the jaws of defeat. Russia’s army stabilises the front lines over the winter months, while building new battalions with freshly mobilised recruits. Meanwhile, Republicans in America block new arms packages for Ukraine, as supplies from Europe run out. Russia’s defence industry is starved of semiconductors and specialised equipment, but churns out enough basic armour and artillery to equip the new forces.

By the spring, the new Russian units go on the attack, forcing back a Ukrainian force that is weary from months of offensive action. Russian drones continue to hammer Ukraine’s energy and water infrastructure. As summer arrives, Ukraine is on the back foot. Russia captures Kryvyi Rih, a key industrial town north of Kherson, and Slovyansk and Kramatorsk in Donetsk. Western countries urge Ukraine to accept a Russian offer of a ceasefire. Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, has little choice but to accept. In the months, perhaps years, that follow, Russia assiduously rearms for another attempt on Kyiv.

No ‘bright-line rule’ shines on targeting commercial satellites

ZHANNA L. MALEKOS SMITH

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Cyber counterspace weapons can target both space satellites and ground-based systems by intercepting and monitoring data, corrupting data with malware, or even wresting control of the space system from the space operator. During the United Nations General Assembly’s First Committee session in October, Russian foreign ministry official Konstantin Vorontsov announced that “quasi-civil infrastructure may be a legitimate target for a retaliation strike.”

In some ways, Vorontsov’s comments could be interpreted as a harbinger of increased disruption and denial methods against commercial space satellites in Ukraine, especially considering Russia’s cyberattack against Viasat Inc’s KA-SAT commercial satellites and interference with the approximately 25,000 Starlink internet terminals serving Ukraine.

Why The Next Chairman Of The Joint Chiefs Should Be From The Air Force

Loren Thompson

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General Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will retire next year. The nation’s top military officer by law can only serve a single, non-renewable term of four years, and thus a successor will need to be nominated by Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin.

Secretary Austin should nominate an Air Force officer, current Chief of Staff General Charles Brown, to lead the Joint Chiefs. If he does, media coverage will undoubtedly focus on the fact that Brown is the first African American to lead a branch of the armed forces.

However, that is not the reason why Brown should be the next Joint Chiefs Chairman. The logic of his appointment resides in other institutional, strategic and operational considerations. The fact that he is temperamentally and experientially suited to the job is icing on the cake.

Xi’s Costly Obsession With Security How a Quest for Control Threatens China’s Economic Growth

Stephen Roach

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China’s growth problem just got worse. That is the unmistakable conclusion that can be drawn from the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

For President Xi Jinping, the congress was a stunning success: he secured an unprecedented third term as CCP leader and eliminated any semblance of political competition. But that does not bode well for Chinese prosperity. Increasing autocracy is colliding with a dynamic economy, and something has to give.

That something is likely to be economic growth, which is now at risk. Between 1980 and 2020, the Chinese economy enjoyed an annual average growth rate of nine percent in real GDP. In 2022–23, however, the International Monetary Fund expects the Chinese economy to grow less than four percent. Although China’s growth should remain positive, the magnitude of such a sharp slowdown from the earlier hypergrowth trajectory is the Chinese equivalent of a recession.

Tech Regulation Can Harm National Security

James Andrew Lewis

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A nineteenth-century British song about war with Russia contains a line that is worth bearing in mind as Congress contemplates regulating big tech: “We don't want to fight but by Jingo if we do, we've got the ships, we've got the men, we've got the money too.”

That final phrase deserves attention. Not having "the money" makes it hard to provide for defense. European countries, after decades of slow growth, are discovering this as they confront Russian aggression. Thanks to its economic growth, the United States has the resources it needs for national security but proposed antitrust legislation could change that.

National security depends on more than an ability to field advanced weapons or large forces. It is based on economic strength. Economic strength creates international influence and power. Economic strength now requires a strong technology sector that includes strong tech companies. This conclusion may be uncomfortable for some, but the alternative, a weak tech sector, and weak companies, is indefensible on its face (despite appeals to pro-competition rhetoric).

Another Seminal Call to Action: Strengthening Innovation and Protecting the U.S. Technological Advantage

Daniel Pereira

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As OODA CEO Matt Devost mentioned at OODAcon 2022, Razor’s Edge Ventures recently made a commitment to national security investment to enhance American competitiveness by closing on a fund dedicated to “current technology areas of interest for the firm, which are informed by strategic U.S. national security priorities, [such as] autonomous systems, space technologies, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence/machine learning, digital signal processing, and other aerospace and defense technologies.” (1)

Razor’s Edge efforts are very similar to that of America’s Frontier Fund and the Quad Investor Network. The venture capital community is focusing its efforts on this sector, which has been formatively dubbed the “defense-related technologies” or “defense capabilities” sector. Others are calling it “Hacking for Defense“.

On one level, the VC community’s pivot of its attention towards national security and innovation is the “dollars and cents” of it all. But what about the “sense” of it all – i.e. the creative ideas, strategic vision, and program management structure to succeed? It all falls under the umbrella phrase used by the USG (especially within DoD and DARPA) and what the OODA Network frames as “Deep Tech” – with the historic record of the strategic challenges of innovation in this space characterized as the Valley of Death.

It’s Finally Here: Pentagon Releases Plan To Keep Hackers Out Of Its Networks

LAUREN C. WILLIAMS

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Defense agencies have until 2027 to convert their networks to architectures that continually check to make sure no one’s accessing data they shouldn’t.

This shift to zero trust principles is at the core of the Pentagon’s new five-year plan to harden its information systems against cyberattacks. The strategy and roadmap were released on Tuesday.

To get there, agencies can improve their existing environments, adopt a commercial cloud that already meets DOD’s zero trust specifications, or copy a prototype of a private cloud, David McKeown, the Pentagon’s acting principal deputy chief information officer, told reporters. And to help enforce it, the DOD chief information office will track their spending.

The Menace of a Deepening China-Russia Axis

Chels Michta

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As Vladimir Putin’s military’s fortunes wax and wane, China has emerged as Russia’s key supporter. The existence of a Sino-Russian axis was evident as early as the Putin-Xi summit in the lead-up to the 2022 Winter Olympics, after which the leaders issued a joint declaration underscoring their countries’ opposition to further NATO enlargement.

At the time, Xi stated plainly that China and Russia would support each other’s interests and sovereignty as part of “deepening back-to-back strategic coordination.” He lashed out against “certain countries” that he alleged were trying to impose their standards on other countries — a thinly veiled swipe against the United States — confirming once more the adage that the enemy of my enemy is my friend.

Climate migration is about to explode. Cities will bear the brunt.

Dave Levitan

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SHARM EL-SHEIKH, EGYPT — Over the next 30 years, climate change is likely to uproot hundreds of millions of people around the world from their homes.

Regardless of where they started, most of these climate refugees will end up in a city — drawn by the promise of more resources or a fresh start. “Most of this movement is actually internal to countries,” said Vittoria Zanuso, the executive director of a group called the Mayors Migration Council (MMC), in an interview here during the United Nations climate talks known as COP27. “It’s short-distance, and it’s rural to urban, which means that in one way or another, these people will move to, from or through cities.”

This will pose enormous challenges for urban areas across the world. Beyond the political and economic challenges of absorbing waves of refugees, cities are themselves likely to be dealing with climate impacts like heat waves, droughts or stronger storms. But Zanuso and the MMC want to see it as an opportunity to improve peoples’ lives and raise their standard of living by providing cities the funding needed to make that happen. “Our mayors really think that while climate is a crisis, migration doesn’t need to be,” she said.

Sri Lankan Parliament Green Lights High Defense Expenditure – Analysis

P. K. Balachandran

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Despite criticisms both inside and outside the House, the Sri Lankan parliament on Thursday passed a high defense and national security budget amounting to US$ 1.46 billion for 2023. It was passed by a majority of 81 votes, with 91 MPs voting in favor and 10 voting against.

President Wickremesinghe, who is also Finance and Defense Minister, had allocated 539 billion rupees (US$ 1.46 billion) for both defense and public security while allocating 322 billion rupees (US$ 868 million) for health and 232 billion (US$ 629 million) for education.

Justifying the high allocation for defense and national security (police) he told parliament: “We might have to increase our naval force by around 2030. The army numbers may come down, but more requirements might come from the air force. We may need drones by 2030-40.”

Bhutan’s Foreign Policy Balancing Act – Analysis

Nitasha Kaul

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Throughout its history, Bhutan has often found itself caught between various imperial forces. It has consistently navigated a fraught geopolitical environment, and it has survived and flourished as the most peaceful nation in South Asia. But Bhutan now faces new challenges in a world with growing political tensions that affect trade and economic interdependence.

Bhutan finds itself ‘asymmetrically inbetween’ two large and resource-hungry neighbours — China and India — who maintain a significant trade relationship with each other in spite of their geopolitical differences. Bhutan has historically been aligned more towards India as a consequence of British imperial policy in the region. Due to the rivalry between India and China, Bhutan cannot take advantage of its location to benefit from both neighbours.

Analysis of Bhutan’s foreign relations has typically focussed on three determinants — economic factors, bilateral relations with India and threats from China. But this analysis overemphasises the mutual perceptions and perspectives of China and India, and largely overlooks Bhutan’s own foreign policy initiative.

The Geo-Politics Of Natural Gas To Europe – Analysis

James Durso

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In January 2022, as Russian troops were massing on Ukraine’s border, the U.S. government withdrew support for the EastMed natural gas pipeline, claiming the project conflicted with the environmental goals of the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden, and created tensions in the region.

The pipeline, set to be completed by 2025, was a €6 billion project by Israel, Cyprus, and Greece, that would have sent 10 billion cubic meters (BCM) per year of gas from fields offshore Israel and Cyprus to Europe via a 1,900-kilometer pipeline.

EastMed avoided Turkey, which has been an irritant to the U.S., NATO, and the European Union (EU), and which wants to become the regional energy hub as it hosts the TurkStream natural gas line that supplies up to 31.5 BCM of gas to Turkey, and South and Southeast Europe annually. Turkey currently has two crude oil import pipelines: the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline from Azerbaijan and a pipeline from northern Iraq to Ceyhan, Turkey. And significant volumes of crude oil and petroleum products from Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan transit the Turkish Straits for Europe.

The United States doubles down on its tech war with export and IP controls that target China but also hit Taiwan and South Korea

June Park, Schmidt Futures

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The United States has unleashed its arsenal to go ‘full throttle’ in the chip war against China regardless of the potential consequences, including the impact on its allies. On 7 October 2022, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the US Department of Commerce laid out high level export controls on supercomputers and semiconductors to China.

The market was shaken in September 2022 by restrictions on the sale of graphic processing units by Nvidia and Advanced Micro Devices to China. Companies had already begun to pull their staff out of China in response to new controls prohibiting US citizens from supporting the development and production of chips in Chinese firms.

The new license requirements for items destined to a chip fabrication facility in China are blocked subject to a number of thresholds. The new measures are meant to halt Chinese chip companies at their current levels of progression. Ten days after the BIS announced the reinforced export controls, the US International Trade Commission announced a Section 337 investigation into semiconductors in response to two cases filed by the non-practicing entity Daedalus Prime LLC, which holds intellectual property of US chipmaker Intel against Qualcomm, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company and Samsung.

Is China heading toward another Tiananmen Square moment?

Lili Pike and Tom Nagorski

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In October, a man unfurled banners from a Beijing bridge calling for people to rise up against China’s restrictive covid policies and the Communist Party itself. He was alone that day and quickly arrested; the nationwide protests he hoped for did not materialize. But now they have. And they started because of a fire in an apartment building.

When word spread of the fire, the 10 fatalities and reports that rescue efforts may have been slowed by a covid lockdown, the apartment building tragedy turned into a national rallying cry.

It happened this past Thursday in Urumqi, in western China’s Xinjiang region. By the weekend, protests had spread from Urumqi to Shanghai, Nanjing and many other large cities — including Wuhan, where the world’s first major outbreak of covid-19 struck three years ago. The anger was expressed on Chinese social media platforms as well. At first, the protests appeared to take direct aim at the government’s “zero-covid” approach, under which even small outbreaks are met with severe measures — often including the confining of millions of people to their homes. “Lift the lockdown” was among the rallying cries. But in some instances, demonstrators went further — calling for broader freedoms and even an end to Communist Party rule.

The 10 Best Books of 2022

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The Candy House, by Jennifer Egan

You don’t need to have read Egan’s Pulitzer-winning “A Visit From the Goon Squad” to jump feet first into this much-anticipated sequel. But for lovers of the 2010 book’s prematurely nostalgic New Yorkers, cerebral beauty and laser-sharp take on modernity, “The Candy House” is like coming home — albeit to dystopia. This time around, Egan’s characters are variously the creators and prisoners of a universe in which, through the wonders of technology, people can access their entire memory banks and use the contents as social media currency. The result is a glorious, hideous fun house that feels more familiar than sci-fi, all rendered with Egan’s signature inventive confidence and — perhaps most impressive of all — heart. “The Candy House” is of its moment, with all that implies.

What is China’s Joint Operations Command Centre and who’s in charge?

Liu Zhen

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Earlier this month, Chinese President Xi Jinping, who is also the chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), told the country’s armed forces to be ready for war.

Xi made the remarks during an inspection of the CMC’s Joint Operations Command Centre (JOCC) on November 8 – his first visit to the base since the Communist Party’s national congress last month, when he secured a third term as head of the party and the restructured CMC.

During the inspection, he reaffirmed the importance of the JOCC in the Chinese military.

Cyber Operations During Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine in 2022

Nurlan Aliyev

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Russia has been known as a capable actor in conducting a wide range of cyber espionage and sabotage operations since the 1990s. Russia also conducted several cyber-attacks on Ukraine before the invasion in 2022. One of the most sophisticated operations was blacking out Kyiv in 2016. At midnight, a week before Christmas, hackers struck an electric transmission station north of the city of Kyiv, blacking out a portion of the Ukrainian capital equivalent to a fifth of its total power capacity. According to experts, it was the first real-world malware that attacked physical infrastructure since Stuxnet.

However, although Russia has conducted several cyber-attacks on Ukraine since the start of the invasion in 2022, it has not flagged up any strikingly successful Russian CW operations up to now. In this respect, a question is whether Russia has not used its sophisticated cyber capabilities in the war yet, or the cyber defence quality of Ukraine and its allies has helped blunt them. This commentary aims to explore these problems.

Is Germany Sick Again?

HANS-WERNER SINN

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MUNICH – Say what you will about Russian President Vladimir Putin, but his war on Ukraine did open European eyes to some long-underrated truths. One is that even after more than 70 years of relative peace on the continent, neglecting military security poses grave dangers. Another is that the “green dream” of modern economies powered exclusively by renewable energies remains out of reach – and reliable access to cheap energy supplies remains essential.

While the first truth became starkly apparent as soon as Russian troops crossed into Ukraine on February 24, the second has only gradually penetrated public awareness. In fact, many have called for an embargo on European imports of Russian gas, arguing that this would not only undermine Russia’s ability to wage its war, but also accelerate progress toward green Nirvana – all at minimal cost to Europe in terms of lost GDP.

The Flawed Discourse Over the War in Ukraine

Paul R. Pillar

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Questions surrounding U.S. policy toward the Russo-Ukrainian War provide ample grounds for debate. The war has presented Washington and its Western allies with difficult decisions and unavoidable tradeoffs. The commendable urge to support Ukraine's courageous resistance against a ruthless invasion must be coupled with recognition that Ukraine’s national interests are not identical to those of its supporters. The principle of not letting naked aggression be rewarded needs to be balanced against the risk of escalation into a wider war. Additionally, aid to Ukraine involves resource tradeoffs, and keeping states in an anti-Russian posse may conflict with other things the United States wants from the countries concerned.

Although any policy on the subject will give commentators something to object to, a policy is most likely to be sound if it is based on a public debate that employs clear and correct conceptions of how military operations and diplomacy relate to each other in war. In this respect, the debate in the United States has displayed several recurrent deficiencies as it has developed over the past nine months.

How Houthi Drone Attacks Boosted Russia’s War in Ukraine

Michael Horowitz

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The first sign that Russia was using Iranian-made drones in Ukraine emerged this September. Ukrainian soldiers reported that a Shahed-136 “suicide drone” was employed for the first time to target military positions in an area recently recaptured from Russia near the northeastern city of Kupyansk. Weeks later, Russia used those drones to carry out several waves of attacks against Ukrainian cities, including Kyiv, materializing fears that Iran’s drones were on their way to Russia for use in the war.

The use of Iranian-made drones against a European capital came as a shock to the West, but it is the direct consequence of a lenient approach to Iran’s drone and ballistic missile programs, both of which have been honed through years of attacks, particularly in Yemen. By targeting countries throughout the Gulf, the Houthis, Iran’s local proxy in Yemen, have provided the Islamic Republic with a battlefield to test new weapons against relatively sophisticated air defenses. Now, those same weapons are being used to hammer the Ukrainian homefront, thousands of kilometers away from Iran and Yemen.

Will China Seek to Exploit Its Rare-Earth Dominance?

Marina Yue Zhan

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At a recent Advancing AUKUS Plus conference in Canberra, Australia’s former defense minister Kim Beazley noted that “3,400 American weapons systems have Chinese rare earth components, and it is imperative to break the dependence of Western democracies on China.” In addition to weapons, China’s rare earths are critical elements not only in smartphones and aircraft engines, but also in electric vehicles, wind turbines, and other new energy machinery.

What are these rare earths? They are a group of seventeen metallic elements that are abundant in nature and are essential to future technologies. However, extracting, smelting, separating, and processing these elements is a capital- and labor-intensive industry. At the moment, China dominates the supply chain. In 2021, it accounted for about 60 percent of global production of final rare earth compounds, and held about 37 percent of the known natural reserves. Since 2018, it has become the largest rare earth importer, mainly of intermediate rare earth compounds for further processing.

Ukraine’s Lessons for the Future of Hybrid Warfare

Weilong Kong

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Anew decision-analysis approach is necessary to capture the use of disinformation in the context of hybrid warfare. The war in Ukraine features two different types of competing societies: open and closed. However, the critical characteristics of this competition cannot be captured using a single analysis framework. Instead, multiple tools must be integrated to help generate a robust policy response to modern hybrid threats.

Russian aggression in Ukraine entails a hybrid war, which is defined by NATO as “an interplay or fusion of conventional as well as unconventional instruments of power and tools of subversion … blended in a synchronized manner to exploit vulnerabilities of an antagonist and achieve synergistic effects.” To be sure, hybrid methods of warfare have been used in the past but “what is new about attacks seen in recent years is their speed, scale, and intensity, facilitated by rapid technological change and global interconnectivity.” Other terms, such as gray zone and information warfare, may be used in this context but, regardless, key characteristics must be modeled and integrated to inform effective policy.

What Does ‘Victory’ Mean for Ukraine and Russia?

Alexander E. Gale

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As events in Ukraine continue to develop in often unexpected ways, policymakers in Kyiv and Moscow are reassessing what parameters would define an acceptable victory (or defeat).

When Russia launched its “special military operation” in February, the forecasts for Kyiv were grim. The CIA predicted that Russian forces would rapidly cut through Ukrainian defenses and seize Kyiv in a matter of weeks. Likewise, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley allegedly predicted that the Ukrainian government would not last longer than seventy-two hours.

During the first months of the war, Ukraine shared a similar outlook. Kyiv’s main objective was to ensure the survival of a viable Ukrainian state, likely governing a greatly diminished territory. Due to the high probability of suffering a military defeat, Ukrainian diplomats even made arrangements with the West to set up a government in exile. The government would relocate to the safety of another European capital while the remnants of the Ukrainian military would shift to asymmetrical warfare against occupying Russian forces.

Time to Get the Measure of China’s Global Security Initiative

Andrew Cainey

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Global. Security. Initiative. By placing together these three simple words at this April’s Boao Forum conference, Xi Jinping announced China’s further global engagement. At a time when many talk of China turning inwards, here was another sign of China’s continued ambitions on the global stage. Six months later, reports hit the news of unauthorised overseas ‘police service stations’ in the UK, Ireland and elsewhere. Was this an early sign of China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI) or something else entirely?

Within the GSI, China’s foreign minister Wang Yi has described six ‘core commitments’. As often with such declarations, the wording is laudable and hard to disagree with. Who would argue, for example, with the ‘vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security’, or ‘respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries’? Of the six commitments, that to uphold ‘indivisible security’ has attracted the most discussion. Russia has used the phrase to justify its war on Ukraine. Yet the term originates in Cold War dialogue and was agreed to by NATO partners in the 1975 Helsinki Act. It states that the security of each state in a region is inextricably linked with the security of every other state. When many fear that the world is in or close to a new Cold War, this formulation may be all too relevant.

Building the Capacity to Conduct Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO)

Dr Justin Bronk and Sam Cranny-Evans

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The Ministry of Defence has made ‘multidomain integration’ (MDI) a conceptual cornerstone of UK military doctrine. In 2020 it released a Joint Concept Note (JCN 1/20) which set out an ambitious vision wherein the full capabilities of each service across all five domains would be able to function ‘as a seamlessly integrated force [that] must also be fused across government and interoperable with principal allies’. JCN 1/20 sets out multiple different areas where seamless integration will apparently be necessary across the joint force and wider government in order to be competitive in future conflicts. However, the same document admits that ‘there is no fixed route to a known MDI destination, so this concept provides a headmark to allow us to explore and develop our MDI ambition’. In other words, the UK currently has a conceptual aim, but no concrete plan for how to transform the force structure and processes that it currently has into ones that can undertake MDI.

Europe’s energy crisis and the pace of transition

Nicholas Crawford

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Europe’s energy crisis – precipitated both by the disruption to energy markets caused by the war in Ukraine and European sanctions on Russia – has upended many of the assumptions used in forecasts for the region’s transition to clean energy.

Before the crisis, Europe had planned to raise carbon prices and introduce a border-adjustment mechanism for carbon that would encourage firms to use clean energy. Natural gas was expected to replace coal in many applications, and though total gas consumption was forecast to decrease by around 5% by the end of 2030, the assumption was that pipeline imports of gas from Russia would account for a growing share of this consumption. Instead, due to the crisis, Europe’s pipeline imports of gas will decline dramatically and the region will import more liquefied natural gas. Furthermore, given the increased price of gas, the transition away from coal has slowed and the push for higher carbon pricing has waned.

However, Europe is moving faster towards renewables, despite tightening government budgets and the growing costs of some green technologies. Examined sector by sector, it appears that the net effect of the crisis may, in fact, be an accelerated move towards cleaner energy.

Exploiting the Fast-Follower Advantage: Making 5G the Ultimate Parts Bin and Adopting a Commercial-First Approach to Military Acquisition

Bryan Clark & Dan Patt

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Executive Summary

While frustrating for consumers, the slow maturation of commercial 5G networks in the United States could be a boon for the US Department of Defense (DoD), which can harvest, adapt, and influence 5G-related technologies as they emerge from commercial product pipelines for a variety of applications that extend well beyond cellular communications. By reversing its traditional role as a developer of new technology and instead becoming a customer, the DoD could better exploit the potential of 5G and leverage the private sector’s trillion-dollar investment in mobile connectivity.

Under the Joint Warfighting Concept’s approach of “expanded maneuver,” US military forces would disaggregate, reaggregate, and recompose to increase their adaptability and impose uncertainty on the opponent, enabled by interoperability and decision support tools from the DoD’s Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) initiative. Implementing expanded maneuver will require that JADC2 use computing to integrate a changing array of radios, radars, jammers, and RF detectors to deliver sensing and effects at scale as part of a fast-paced campaign. Mission systems like these have traditionally been the purview of specialized military contractors with the infrastructure and domain expertise to produce and deliver them as part of integrated solutions, like those of traditional commercial telecommunications providers. However, the modularity of commercial 5G’s building blocks could be harnessed to produce highly recomposable and adaptable military mission systems more cheaply than their highly integrated predecessors.

The Maldives’ Tug of War Over India and National Security

RASHEEDA M. DIDI

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Like many island nations in Asia, the Maldives is busy grappling with the best way to advance its economic and national security interests in a region where geopolitical tensions between larger Asia-Pacific nations like China, India, and the United States continue to rise.

Unsurprisingly, views among the country’s political leaders on the best course of action differ. The political debate playing out in the capital of Malé offers a vantage point on the tradeoffs and constraints that policymakers in the Maldives and other similar countries must account for as they strive to protect their national sovereignty.

The Maldives’ current government led by President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih has unapologetically oriented the country’s foreign policy toward India as a provider of economic benefits and security. Meanwhile, the country’s political opposition under former president Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayoom has urged the president to reconsider the closeness of the relationship ostensibly to protect the Maldives’ sovereignty.

Programmable Biology Puts Biotech on the Geopolitical Agenda

Ryan Morhard

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In September, Jake Sullivan—President Biden’s national security adviser—announced that the U.S. government expects biotechnology to play an “outsized importance over the coming decade” in the context of geopolitical competition, because of the ability to “read, write, and edit genetic code, which has rendered biology programmable.”

Sullivan’s remarks came just days after senior security, economic, and science and technology officials gathered at the White House for a summit on biotechnology and biomanufacturing. The summit marked the release of an ambitious strategy that recognizes new abilities to “program biology” and featured commitments to grow the domestic bioeconomy and strengthen the biotech-related defense industrial base, including by using biology to manufacture products for the defense supply chain.

Biotech was also featured in the recent CHIPS and Science Act—a law that aims to bolster U.S. manufacturing competitiveness—which includes a section on strengthening the bioeconomy. The Biden administration also signaled a focus on biotech more recently in October, when it added a leading Chinese genomics company to its periodically updated list of Chinese military-affiliated companies, which is used to indicate companies that appear private but are effectively state actors. And, in the near future, the new National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology will kick off, which is intended to help “advance and secure the development of biotechnology, biomanufacturing, and associated technologies by the United States to comprehensively address the national security and defense needs.”

How Greek Companies and Ghost Ships Are Helping Russia

Elisabeth Braw

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The United States banned Russian crude oil imports months ago, and Russian ships are banned from U.S., British, and EU ports. On Dec. 5, the European Union’s sanctions on Russian crude come into effect. But Greek and other European shipping companies are currently—and legally—helping Russian exporters get their oil to the desired destination.

What’s more, a growing ghost fleet of ships that officially don’t exist and cannot, as a result, be traced or investigated is transporting sanctioned Russian goods around the world, just as it was already transporting banned Iranian, Venezuelan, and North Korean commodities. The ghost fleet is likely to grow as the EU’s oil sanctions kick in. That seriously undermines the sanctions—and creates risks on the high seas.