Sal Artiaga
Irregular warfare (IW) is vital in today’s military planning. It’s complex and constantly changing, using methods that aren’t typical and adapting strategies as needed. Conventional warfare aims to fight and beat enemy forces. IW, however, works in messy political and social situations where standard rules of engagement don’t always fit. Because IW covers so many areas, the armed forces need to improve how they handle it. This means updating their policies, battle plans, teaching, and practice to meet IW’s demands. Policy needs to address new challenges like threat networks, information operations, terrorism, and cyber-attacks within a greater strategic framework. It must be flexible to match military actions with national goals and the changing nature of irregular conflicts. The weaponization of transnational criminal organizations, the interference in countries’ elections via operations in the information environment (OIE), and other emerging threats require a policy that can adapt and respond effectively. Doctrine guides military operations; it needs to grow by taking concepts from different areas, like fighting cyber insurgents and intricate OIE, and focusing on a complete approach that mixes direct and indirect methods to handle IW. Education and training matter just as much. Military training centers must emphasize the social, political, and cultural parts of irregular activities. Training needs to go beyond the usual conventional combat. It should include live runs that look like IW to help people think fast and make good decisions. We train and educate our IW practitioners to enhance their cognitive dominance over adversaries. Combining these elements gives practitioners, academics, and policymakers an intelligent way to handle IW. This approach is critical to winning missions and keeping the country safe in today’s and tomorrow’s fights. DoD can achieve this by improving education, doctrine, and policy related to IW.
IW is an inherently political, often violent struggle that supports a political, social, or cultural change using or relying on established and evolving unconventional concepts, doctrine, and capabilities. Unlike conventional warfare, IW does not emphasize destroying the opposing armed forces or controlling territory. Instead, the focus is on gaining and maintaining the support of a population to influence and effect protracted political change. IW often occurs in complex operational environments, which involve combating irregular threats and potential or active-state adversaries who seek to deter, threaten, or initiate armed conflict. The concept of IW is not new; its roots can be traced through various forms, such as guerrilla warfare, insurgency, and other asymmetric combat methods. Historical figures like T.E. Lawrence and Mao Zedong conceptualized frameworks that underpin modern irregular tactics. Lawrence’s involvement in the Arab Revolt and Mao’s guerrilla strategies during the Chinese Civil War highlights how leveraging socio-political contexts, terrain, and civilian populations can offset the strengths of more conventionally powerful opponents. These early frameworks laid the foundation for understanding how IW can disrupt traditional military advantages and achieve strategic objectives through unconventional means.
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