Harsh V. Pant and Yogesh Joshi
As a direct response to the 22 April terror attack in Pahalgam, which claimed the lives of 26 civilians, India launched its most extensive cross-border strikes since Balakot, targeting nine terrorist facilities in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). Codenamed ‘Operation Sindoor’, the rapid and coordinated 25-minute operation eliminated over 80 terrorists affiliated with the banned groups Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and Hizbul Mujahideen in precision strikes. Following the strikes, India underscored the non-escalatory nature of the action even as it made it clear that it remains ready to retaliate resolutely should Pakistan decide to escalate. The ball is now in Pakistan’s court regarding how far it wants to climb the escalation ladder.
The unfolding crisis has once again forced the Indian leadership to confront a recurring strategic nightmare: How should India respond to Pakistan’s continued support for terrorism in Kashmir? And haow can India establish deterrence against Pakistan’s proxy war?
Deterrence is difficult even in the best times, as it hinges on the adversary’s cost-benefit calculations. Despite asymmetries in power, a determined opponent may still opt for using force. Whether through proxy means or conventional war, with or without nuclear weapons, Pakistan’s revisionist goals, ideological mindset, high-risk tolerance, and the dominant role of its military make it especially hard to deter. Pakistan is not a normal state—it does not perceive the consequences of using force in the manner that other states do.
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