Thomas J. Shattuck
Would the United States come to the defense of Taiwan if the People’s Republic of China (PRC) invaded? Would the U.S. Navy break a PRC blockade of Taiwan? How would the U.S. military respond to a limited missile strike against military facilities in Taiwan? What would the United States do if the PRC seized one of Taiwan’s offshore islands? Would the U.S. president trade an American city for Taipei in a nuclear tit-for-tat to defend Taiwan?
These questions and related contingencies are at the heart of America’s Taiwan policy. There are endless possibilities for what Beijing may decide to do with Taiwan, and each possibility has plenty of response options.
Despite a growing consensus around Beijing’s desire to take Taiwan by force in the coming years, Washington has maintained its long-term policy of strategic ambiguity on all Taiwan contingencies. That policy is quite simple: the U.S. government will not commit to a specific action in response to a PRC action on Taiwan.
This policy has existed since 1979, when the United States severed its diplomatic relations with the Republic of China for the PRC. President Jimmy Carter abrogated the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of China after severing official diplomatic relations, so the United States has not provided Taiwan with a security guarantee for forty-five years. In response to breaking formal ties, the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which has vague language regarding the possible U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan.
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