David Maxwell
In the 21st century strategic landscape, unconventional warfare (UW) is not a relic of Cold War shadow conflicts. It is a vital instrument of national power: a disciplined, sophisticated, and intellectually demanding capability required to solve the most complex political-military problems (or assist in solving them alongside the Joint Force or Intelligence Community). In addition to solving problems, UW creates dilemmas for adversaries operating in the gray zone between peace and war. It is also a necessary capability before, during, and after large scale combat operations. It is, as many have long argued, a foundational component of the Special Forces identity and one of the three legs of what I call the “two SOF trinities.”
The Strategic Value of Unconventional Warfare
At its core, UW is about solving irregular problems with irregular solutions. When statecraft and conventional deterrence fall short, when kinetic strikes are too blunt an instrument, and when allies and partners are struggling under pressure from revisionist or rogue regimes, UW offers the United States the ability to enable local resistance, disrupt adversary plans, and seize the initiative.
The Department of Defense defines UW as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area.” But I have always argued that UW is far more than that sterile definition. It is an entire philosophy of warfare that blends the strategic with the operational and tactical; that synchronizes influence, legitimacy, governance, and indigenous partnership into a coherent campaign. It is the heart of Special Warfare, and without it, our understanding of irregular warfare is incomplete.
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