Democracy is a threat to peace in Europe

By Janet Daley Politics Last updated: February 4th, 2014

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Janet Daley was born in America where she began her political life on the Left as an undergraduate at Berkeley. She moved to Britain (and to the Right) in 1965 where she spent nearly twenty years in academic life before becoming a political commentator: all factors that inform her writing on British and American policy and politicians.

The German Foreign Minister has declared that political parties within European countries which hamper the cooperation between EU member states are a threat to peace. He means you, Ukip. Never mind that you are a perfectly legal party with every right to contest parliamentary, local council and European legislative elections. Ignore the fact that you have a larger proportion of popular support than the LibDems who are currently in government, and that you are not breaking any existing regulation in your public behaviour.

No, none of that is relevant to the matter. You express views which are – according to Frank-Walter Steinmeier, a minister of government in another country – not just contentious but unacceptable by the prevailing moral standards of the greater European consensus. So I'm afraid you can expect to become a banned organisation if Mr Steinmeier's views are at all representative of EU official opinion. He has, after all, lumped you in with the French National Front and various neo-fascist parties which threaten to revive what he calls "the nationalisms which could no longer be [tamed] by reason" thus giving rise to the First World War.

"We have got Eurosceptics getting together in parties", he warns apocalyptically. Presumably, this can only mean one thing: imminent armed conflict. Because, any sort of national pride or concern about sovereignty must, of course, be identical with the ugliest forms of nationalist aggression, mustn't it? God save us.

I wonder if the tactless motor mouths of the EU establishment have any idea how much anger and resentment they incur with their refusal to address the doubts and anxieties of the populations of their member countries – thus driving them into the arms of extreme anti-European groups? If anything is likely to provoke aggression in modern Europe, it is the suppression of dissident opinion and legitimate protest. Just ask the Greeks.

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Evolution, Not Revolution, at the FBI

Published on The National Interest (http://nationalinterest.org)

Source URL (retrieved on Feb 4, 2014): http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/evolution-not-revolution-the-fbi-9816

February 4, 2014

Charles E. Berger 

Earlier this month, Foreign Policy reported [3] the FBI quietly dropped law enforcement as its primary mission and ominously replaced it with “national security.” This monumental change of mission for such a well-known and powerful agency was not announced by the Director of the FBI, the Attorney General nor the President. It was not even posed on the FBI’s public webpage. According to the article, this significant event was announced this summer in the form of coversheets on documents requested by individuals under the Freedom of Information Act.

While the mission of the FBI has evolved since its inception in 1908, the Bureau has always been an agency with both law enforcement and intelligence authorities. Since 2011, the official mission statement of the FBI has read: “As an intelligence-driven and a threat-focused national security organization with both intelligence and law enforcement responsibilities, the mission of the FBI is to protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats, to uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and to provide leadership and criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, and international agencies and partners.”

With some minor wording changes, this was the same mission statement in effect on September 11, 2001. Those attacks clearly demonstrated that international terrorists had evolved into the most significant threat in the FBI’s mandate. Later that same year, the Bureau listed terrorism and foreign-intelligence threats first, followed by the enforcement of criminal laws. This reordering of priorities accurately reflected the massive shift in resources and organization that was then occurring within the FBI.

Even in its earliest days, the FBI arrested racketeers and bank robbers while also investigating act of espionage and sabotage. The FBI first assumed its role in national security in 1916 after German saboteurs bombed an ammunition depot on Black Tom’s Island in New York Harbor. The explosion measured at least 5.0 of the Richter scale, killed as many as seven people, wounded hundreds, and damaged the Statue of Liberty. Congress passed statutes giving the Bureau of Investigation (as the FBI was then known) jurisdiction to investigate acts of sabotage and espionage. In World War II, the FBI began stationing agents in embassies overseas to counter German intelligence networks. Today, there are FBI employees operating out of over 66 embassies overseas. During World War II, the FBI famously captured Nazi saboteurs infiltrating the United States. The FBI’s early mission to prevent sabotage evolved over the decades into the counterterrorism mission of today. In 1980, the FBI and NYPD had established the first Joint Terrorism Task Force. Today, there are over one hundred.

The FBI’s mandate includes the enforcement of over two hundred categories of violations of federal law. The Bureau must counter a range of bad actors, including foreign intelligence officers, terrorists and criminals, in both the physical world and the cyber environment. At any given time, about half the FBI field agents are working counterintelligence, counterterrorism or cyberintrusion matters. The Bureau uses intelligence analysis to identify the most significant current and emerging threats to the local communities and aligns the Bureau’s resources accordingly. Using these methods, the FBI prioritizes investigative resources at the most serious violent, economic and civil-rights violators, as well as interstate and transnational criminal organizations. While the Bureau cannot investigate every reported violation of federal law, as a national-security agency it investigates every credible terrorism tip it receives.

Can Mongolia Keep Going?

Published on The National Interest (http://nationalinterest.org)

Source URL (retrieved on Feb 4, 2014): http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-mongolia-keep-going-9811

February 4, 2014

J. Berkshire Miller

Is the Mongolian economy poised for a comeback, or will it continue to cool down from the recent years of soaring profits?

According to the latest [3]economic update report [3] from the World Bank, Mongolia’s real gross domestic product (GDP) growth is expected to continue to descend in 2014 but remain in double-digit growth at just over 10 percent. Those are growth numbers that most countries can only dream of, and they will likely keep Mongolia amongst the top ten fastest-growing economies in the world. Moreover, Ulaanbaatar’s growth will still be larger than any other country in Asia with the possible exceptions of Turkmenistan and Afghanistan. The country also benefits from leadership stability–in a transparent manner–with last year’s reelection of President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj.

But, while Mongolia remains a successful model in many ways for its abilities to reform politically and economically, there are still some questions on its ability to sustain its economic success and court foreign direct investment. For example, FDI inflows, as a percentage of GDP, have plummeted over the past three years from nearly 60 percent to less than 20 percent. Moreover, Mongolia’s fiscal deficit has nearly tripled and inflation has been volatile. All of this has impacted Mongolia’s bottom line, as its exports have consistently fallen for three consecutive years.

What is behind the economic decline in Ulaanbaatar? One of the simplest–and partly accurate–explanations is the continued uncertainty in the global economy which has also served to cool down the minerals market, which Mongolia relies on heavily. But this does not complete the story or fully explain why FDI has fallen off a cliff since 2011. Due to Mongolia’s dependence on its minerals industry, its ability to attract foreign investment has ebbed and flowed along with the status of its key investment projects. Most notable of these is the multi-billion dollar development of the Oyu Tolgoi cooper-gold mine led by Australian mining company Rio Tinto. While some point to snags in Mongolia’s strict mining investment laws as the culprit for curtailed growth, Mongolian authorities have alternative explanations. In a wide-ranging [4]interview [4] with the Diplomat last year, the head of Mongolia’s new Investment Agency remarked that the real reason for the drop in FDI was because the Oyu Tolgoi project finished its phase one after 2012. In other words, the FDI was artificially inflated during 2011-12 due to the Rio Tinto project.

China Can Make Nuclear Power Work

Published on The National Interest (http://nationalinterest.org)

Source URL (retrieved on Feb 4, 2014): http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/china-can-make-nuclear-power-work-9815

February 4, 2014

John Quiggin

The idea that nuclear power represents the clean energy solution to problems of pollution and climate change has supporters from across the political spectrum, ranging from Sarah Palin on the right to leftists like George Monbiot of the UK Guardian. Hedging its bets as usual, the Obama administration includes nuclear in its ‘all of the above’ strategy for responding to climate change.

Yet nuclear power has repeatedly failed the market test. Even before the Three Mile Island meltdown in 1979, the US nuclear power boom was close to its end. Though early advocates had promised electricity ‘too cheap to meter’, the reality was one of delays and cost overruns. Nor was the US unusual in this respect. Canada, the UK and most other developed countries had similar experiences, with the result that construction of nuclear power plants ground to a halt after 1980. In the US case, there were no new projects commissioned after 1977, except a handful that were abandoned before completion.

There was, however, one exception to this dismal pattern, which still looms large in the thinking of many nuclear advocates. In the wake of the 1973 oil crisis, the French government, led by PM Pierre Messmer, announced a plan for a complete shift towards nuclear power. And, at least in technical terms, the plan worked.

In the space of twenty-five years, France went from a standing start to a predominantly nuclear electricity-generating system, based on a small set of standard models, mostly designed by US firm Westinghouse. Unlike most other countries with large-scale programs, there were neither major disasters nor obvious cost blowouts. French electricity costs remain broadly competitive with those elsewhere in Europe, and would be more so if there were an explicit carbon price.

Does China’s New State Secret Regulation Mean Anything?

http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/does-chinas-new-state-secret-regulation-mean-anything/

China’s new rules regarding state secrets are meant to boost government transparency. But will they?

By Shannon Tiezzi

February 04, 2014

China’s state media reported over the weekend that the State Council has released new guidance on the handling of state secrets, a notoriously vague concept that has been used as a catch-all for any information that could paint the Party in a negative light. A Chinese-language version of the official document ran in the People’s Daily. A Xinhua report, reprinted in the English-language publication China Daily, noted that the changes were “an effort to boost government transparency.” The new rules, signed by Premier Li Keqiang, are set to go into effect on March 1.

Certainly, China’s definition of state secrets has vexed outside observers for year. A 2007 report by Human Rights in China called state secret laws “a complex, opaque system that controls the classification of—and criminalizes the disclosure or possession of—state secrets.” The report noted that the uncertainty regarding state secret laws contributed to a critical delay in reporting on the SARS outbreak in 2003 and the 2005 explosion of a petrochemical plant in Jilin, which polluted the Songhun River. Environmental activists, reporters, and businesspeople (with one of the most famous cases involving the 2009 arrest of an Australian executive for the mining firm Rio Tinto) have all been prosecuted for leaking state secrets.

Like China’s censorship laws, the beauty of its state secret regulations lies precisely in their vagueness. There are no clear rules about what is or isn’t a state secret, which encourages actors (whether journalists, executives, or activists) to err on the side of caution and not reveal any potentially sensitive information. Unfortunately, the State Council’s new rules don’t do anything to address this vagueness.

The new order told government agencies not to “define as a state secret information which by law ought to be public.” Yet, despite its length, the rules didn’t clarify what types of information “ought to be public,” providing little extra guidance. Further, the rules said that “the scope of what is secret should be adjusted in a timely manner according to changes in the situation,” which could obviously mean either loosening or restricting the flow of information at the government’s will.

Japan-China tension has U.S. walking a fine line

Washington wants good relations with Japan and China, as well as South Korea. But war wounds keep animosity burning among the three.

By Julie Makinen

February 2, 2014

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HARBIN, China — Visitors to the newest museum in this frigid northeastern Chinese city enter through a quaint facade affixed to the modern shell of the main train station. No bigger than a 7-Eleven, the museum could easily be mistaken for a restaurant and hardly looks like a place connected to an international incident — or two.

But when the memorial to Ahn Jung-geun, a Korean, opened last month, Japan's government lashed out. The chief Cabinet secretary called Ahn, who gunned down a Japanese official at the station in 1909, just before Japan formally colonized Korea, "a terrorist."

China, which was also occupied by Japan in the years leading up to World War II, struck back, praising Ahn as "high-minded." Modern-day South Korea, which reportedly suggested the memorial, chimed in, hailing Ahn as a hero. A top leader of South Korea's ruling party declared, "If Ahn Jung-geun was a terrorist, then Japan was a terrorist state for having mercilessly invaded and plundered countries around it."

The museum opening came just weeks after Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited the Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo, which memorializes the nation's military dead, including hundreds of World War II figures convicted by Allied war tribunals and either imprisoned or executed. The move prompted denunciations from China and South Korea, and even American diplomats described it as "disappointing."

Nearly 70 years after the end of the Second World War, relations between Japan and China (and, to a lesser extent, South Korea) remain deeply colored by wartime wounds. Though the countries have strong economic ties, the urge to periodically pick at historical scabs seems irresistible — and even useful in the short term.

Analysts say the tension could stifle dialogue and cooperation on contemporary issues, such as disputed islands and the denuclearization of North Korea. Some even worry that it could inadvertently lead to conflict.

The strain has put the United States, which has a military alliance with Japan and South Korea but also wants cooperative ties with China, in a particularly awkward position.

"In both countries, there's an underlying story about World War II that creates foreign policy difficulties," said Boston College political science professor Robert Ross.

"On the Chinese side, it's a story of massacres and violence and so forth. On the Japanese side, it's a story of 'We really didn't lose that war,'" Ross said. "They lost the war against the United States — they acknowledge that — but in their hearts … many Japanese don't feel they lost the war against China. And these underlying psychologies contribute to how you deal with foreign policy."

An anti-Japan narrative has been cultivated for years by Chinese authorities in textbooks, film and TV. The nationalism has fueled anti-Japan protests that at times have turned violent, such as in the fall of 2012, when crowds took to the streets after Japan nationalized a set of uninhabited islands also claimed by China.

"There's a Chinese expression that says, 'On the first day, the people oppose Japan; on the second day, they oppose Chinese policy toward Japan; and on the third day, they oppose the Chinese government,'" Ross said. "I think [Beijing worries] about that. So to prevent it from getting that extreme, you have to let some out. They're between a rock and a hard place."

Old Malaysian Issues Are New, Again

Controversy over the use of “Allah” by non-Muslims has religious – and political – underpinnings.

By Luke Hunt

February 04, 2014

Malaysia’s inability to settle longstanding issues that go to the core of the country’s make-up, following last year’s controversial election, is leading to a fresh crisis within a government found badly wanting over its ability to deal with race and creed, the economy and leadership of the country.

Central to the latest bout of unrest is former autocratic Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad. His persistent dabbling in politics and his own United Malays National Organization (UMNO) through firebrand Islamic nationalists has sullied relations within his own ranks.

As chief patron of Perkasa – a non-government Malay supremacy organization – Mahathir has also won his country unwanted comparisons with Pakistan and apartheid-era South Africa.

Perkasa, with its preference for Sharia law, has also been touted as a potential political party to contest the next election. An electoral challenge would pit Perkasa in direct competition with UMNO.

Perkasa claims 420,000 paid up members and about 60 percent of these are also thought to be members of UMNO. Lim Guan Eng, of the Democratic Action Party (DAP), describes Perkasa – which also wants a ban on Malay-language bibles – as UMNO’s alter-ego.

But Mahathir’s strategy has been two-pronged. He has focused his attacks on UMNO, which leads the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition in government, while backing Perkasa and its long running push to ban the use of the word “Allah” by non-Muslims.

His motives are as racially charged as they are politically motivated. Underpinning Mahathir’s remaining political ambitions are the guiding of his son Mukhriz into the top job and shoring up his own legacy and that of his family, which profited handsomely from his 22 years in office.

His target audience is Muslim hardliners who have relished a court ruling in October banning Christian use of the word “Allah.”

Why al-Qaeda Kicked Out Its Deadly Syria Franchise

After a protracted turf battle, the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria finds itself on the outs. That will likely make things even more dangerous

By Aryn Baker / Beirut @arynebaker

Feb. 03, 2014

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A still image from video obtained on Oct. 26, 2012 shows al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri speaking from an undisclosed location

Early Monday morning the leadership of al-Qaeda disowned Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS), the most effective of its two franchises fighting in Syria, in a maneuver that could alter the trajectory of the fight against President Bashar Assad. In a message posted on jihadi websites, the al-Qaeda general command stated that its former affiliate “is not a branch of the al-Qaeda group [and al-Qaeda] does not have an organizational relationship with it and is not the group responsible for their actions.”

The move had been a long time in the making. Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has grown increasingly frustrated with ISIS, ever since Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, head of al-Qaeda in Iraq, expanded into the Syrian conflict in April and attempted to bring the local al-Qaeda franchise, the Nusra Front, under his control. Al-Zawahiri intervened in May, admonishing al-Baghdadi to go back to Iraq, but al-Baghdadi refused, snapping back in a terse audio recording. “I have to choose between the rule of God and the rule of al-Zawahiri, and I choose the rule of God.” It was a rare demonstration of defiance in an organization that demands absolute loyalty. Nonetheless, al-Zawahiri seemed prepared to let the matter lie, apparently in recognition of al-Baghdadi’s growing strength; by that time, ISIS, recently strengthened by an influx of foreign fighters, had taken control of the Syrian city of Raqqa. That brought al-Qaeda the closest it had ever been to achieving a long-term goal — establishing an Islamic state.

But ISIS’s savagery and draconian interpretations of Islamic law alienated many Syrians and drove a wedge between rebel groups. On Jan. 3, fighting broke out between ISIS and a new alliance that included the Nusra Front. ISIS has managed to stand its ground, but this most recent al-Qaeda announcement could lead to a greater conflagration. Al-Qaeda central may not have been able to stop al-Baghdadi outright, but the threat of excommunication seemed to have reined in his worst tendencies — his deadly campaign of suicide-bomb attacks in Iraq has not yet been replicated in Syria to the same degree. ISIS is now likely to lash out with increased attacks as it tries to prove its efficacy in spite of losing its valuable al-Qaeda designation.

More: “Syria’s Lost Generation: The Plight of the Youngest Refugees”

Read more: Al-Qaeda Disowns Syria Franchise ISIS | TIME.com http://world.time.com/2014/02/03/why-al-qaeda-kicked-out-its-deadly-syria-franchise/#ixzz2sPyasnOp

A COMMON AGENDA- Coalition politics in Europe and in India

Krishnan Srinivasan

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Angela Merkel (right) with SDP leaders

Indian political speculation currently revolves around the possible contours of coalition formation after the forthcoming general elections because it is regarded as unlikely that any party will gain an absolute majority. Coalition governments at the federal level in India have become the norm and are commonplace in democracies elsewhere, especially in countries where the system of proportionate representation is practised. The latest example of coalition formation has been seen in Germany, the most economically powerful country in Europe, whose policies are a critical determinant for the future of the European Union and the Eurozone. Angela Merkel has become chancellor for the third consecutive time, and leads a ‘Grand Coalition’ between her party and her main Opposition, the Social Democrats.

The predominant role played by Germany in Europe is not without its critics. In a recent poll, a large majority of Spaniards, Portuguese, Italians and Greeks rejected Merkel’s policies of tough love, that is, belt-tightening, austerity, balancing budgets, reducing debt, dismissing civil servants, cutting social services and privatizing State assets. The German-inspired reform package for indebted states in the Eurozone is strenuously monitored by the European Union, the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank, all of whom are commonly believed to be acting at Merkel’s bidding, and is a precondition for further disbursement of loans. In the case of Greece, the second tranche of the existing loan comes to an end this year, and the recession will still leave a fiscal gap of around five billion euros by 2016. A third loan, accompanied by further austerity measures, is under discussion.

Merkel is quite unfazed by criticism from the Eurozone’s indebted south, the ‘olive belt’ from Cyprus to Portugal. Referring to how Germany acquired its deep pockets by reducing labour costs and strengthening competitiveness, she has declared, “what we have done, everyone can do…we cannot drop the pressure on the south to reform”. Germany leads the European Union of 28 nations and the Eurozone of 18 with no heavyweight support or opposition; France has its economic problems and Britain is famously Eurosceptic and threatens, in an act of wishful thinking, to renegotiate the terms of its membership of the Union.

Europe’s coalitions, like those in India, are fabricated after elections and not before. But unlike India, coalition-building there is a process of long and detailed negotiation, where consensus on every foreseeable eventuality is hammered out on paper. The aim is centrist and the accommodation of incremental differences. In Holland, this document is called a regeerakkoord and is arrived at through the mediation of a respected veteran politician called an informateur, who may or may not become a member of the future government. In Berlin’s case, this procedure took three months and resulted in a 185-page agreement between Merkel’s conservative Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democratic Party, which was subsequently approved by the SDP’s members numbering about half a million. Under the accord, the SDP secures a minimum wage and lower retirement age; the CDU that taxes will not rise, there will be no new federal debt from 2015, and 40-45 per cent of power generation will be from renewable sources from 2025.

India has failed to cash in on its relationship with America

Manoj Joshi

04 February 2014

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Why has no leader of the United States of America ever been the chief guest at India's Republic Day parade? 

After all, we have had presidents, prime ministers and kings from all over the world, and, horror of horrors, even leaders from China and Pakistan. But the US seems to be a strange absence in our guest list. 

The choice for a chief guest for the Republic Day is fraught with many meanings. It can be a signal for the strategic direction the country intends to take, such as the one sent by having Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan as the chief guest for the 2014 celebration. 

Likewise, we have had Iran in 2003, Brazil in 2004, Saudi Arabia in 2006, or Indonesia in 2011. 

Another perennial has been the Russian/Soviet president who has come thrice, with President Putin attending most recently in 2007. 

In other cases we celebrated our closeness to another country such as Bhutan, whose king was the chief guest in 2013 for the fourth time. 

Some choices, though, are simply baffling - for example Peru (1987), Argentina (1985) or Bulgaria (1969). 

Symbolism 

In 1958, we had a People's Liberation Marshal, Ye Jianying. 

Even Pakistani leaders have been welcome, notably Governor General Ghulam Mohammed in 1955 and agriculture minister Rana Abdul Hamid in 1965. 

Other leaders of the Western world, the prime ministers and presidents of Britain, Australia, Germany and France have come, but not the Americans. 

Some would say that these are mere symbols and do not mean much. But symbols, too, have their own purpose. 

They are a code that reveals the texture of a relationship. And as symbols go, notice that no American president, even the sainted Lincoln has been graced with a road, leave alone a statue in New Delhi. 

We have an Archbishop Makarios Marg, named after the first president of Cyprus, an Olof Palme road, and roads named after Kwame Nkrumah, Nasser and Mandela, Ataturk, Alexander Dubcek, but none for, say, John Kennedy who came to India's assistance in our dark hour of defeat in 1962. 

In many ways, our relationship with the United States is the most important external relationship we have. 

As the global hegemon since the end of World War II, a friendly US has much to offer - aid, investment, expertise, political heft. 

By the same measure, an unfriendly US can and does cause a great deal of trouble. India has seen both sides of this coin. 

American aid was the key in preventing mass starvation in the 1960s, its expertise revamped our higher education and triggered the green revolution. 

Most crucially, its political blessings ensured that India remained a favoured destination of World Bank assistance, and, more recently, in removing India from the global civil nuclear blacklist. 

In the Trenches of Cyber Warfare

By June L. Kim

Associate Editor

Many fail to appreciate the threats lurking in the cyber realm.

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The most dangerous threat to the United States may no longer come from a physical attack, but a cyber one. Terrorist organizations, criminal masterminds, enemy nation-states, and lone anarchists alike could cripple the United States if they gain access to networks that control power grids, gas and oil pipelines, transportation, banking, and financial systems. They could cause blackouts, flood towns, collapse the US economy, reroute gas and oil away from towns, and plenty more. So said James V. Christy II, until recently the director of futures exploration at the Defense Cyber Crime Center.

America’s critical infrastructure is automated and controlled by supervisory controller and data acquisition, or SCADA, systems. Each SCADA system is a centralized computer that monitors, gathers, and processes data and determines what to do next. “It’s not done by a little guy sitting in a room,” said Christy during a November interview.

Imagine the Internet as the highway system, he said. The highway can lead anywhere and there are on-ramps and off-ramps that lead to smaller roads, or networks, that lead to homes, or different infrastructures. The SCADA system would be like the security system for one’s home, he said.

“If you can get past the lock on the door, you can break into anybody’s house,” said Christy, and with the Internet “the highway system got you there. … You could break into the system from anywhere in the world.”

The Defense Cyber Crime Center, or DC3, operates under the executive agency of the Secretary of the Air Force with program oversight by the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. Among other functions, DC3 supports the defense industrial base through the defense collaborative information sharing environment, or DCISE, and supports law enforcement and counterintelligence organizations through the DC3 Analytic Group.

Private companies and defense contractors can send potential threats they find on their networks to DC3. The center then analyzes the threat, “sanitizes it to just the technology portion,” and then shares it with the rest of the members of DCISE, said Christy. “People don’t need to know who did it or why did they it. They just need to know the technology” so they’ll know what happened and how to prevent it, he said.

Evolving Threats

Roughly one-third of the center deals with intrusions and national security matters, said the DC3 director, Steven D. Shirley, while two-thirds supports law enforcement and criminal investigations.

“When we receive evidentiary media from [an agency], we track it … by assigning it an exam number,” Shirley explained. DC3 then identifies and retrieves relevant information through “a reliable, valid, and repeatable empirical process.” Basically, “others conduct investigations [and] we conduct digital forensic examinations in support of their investigations,” he said.

The Man Who Would Be King of Cyber

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Zachary Fryer-Biggs 

His eyes are set deep, shrouded in heavy bags that betray the sleepless nights he’s spent at his desk without complaint, according to those who have worked with him. He likes to quote movies, a tic that’s common among Navy officers, and has a penchant for stuffing conversations with film references and an easy laugh, but is driven by what he views as a mission to advance the operational use of cyber.

Vice Adm. Michael Rogers is slated to be the most powerful man in the world, at least as far as the cyber domain is concerned, in March when he talks the reins from Gen. Keith Alexander and becomes the man in charge at the National Security Agency (NSA) and US Cyber Command (CYBERCOM). The dual-hatted job rules both the intelligence and military world of cyber, responsible for protecting critical national security interests from the constant barrage of attacks and incursions emanating from all over the world (but mostly China), and for attacking when the president sees fit. The role is also thoroughly under the microscope of Congress following disclosures by Edward Snowden about how and when the US intelligence community tracks communications.

Rogers, likely knowing that he was in the process of being groomed for continued advancement, has kept out of the spotlight in recent years, despite taking over as head of the Navy’s Fleet Cyber Command in 2011. He rarely talks to reporters, gives speeches, or otherwise postures in public.

He’s fairly good at it though, coming across as personable and knowledgeable, maybe harkening back to his high school days when he “enjoyed participating in the performing arts and broadcasting,” according to the program for a 2012 ceremony where he was honored by his high school. The same program, likely a bit tongue-in-cheek, notes that during his tenure “he managed to avoid significant notice or accomplishment.”

On his strolls through the halls of his school located on the north side of Chicago, he likely would have bumped into his fellow class of ’77 graduate and another future power broker, Rahm Emanuel. There’s no obvious indication that the two are close, but Emanuel, former White House chief of staff and Obama administration power broker, would have been a useful ally during Rogers’ rise to command over the last couple of years.

But regardless of whether he had White House patronage, Rogers has emerged as a favorite of Alexander’s in recent years (along with Rear Adm. Jan Tighe, who’s someone to watch). While the announcement last week that he was being named NSA head and nominated to run CYBERCOM couldn’t have been a surprise, it’s almost certain that he celebrated with his wife of nearly 30 years Dana nonetheless. Dana, although not a cyber expert herself, has an interesting tie to the scandal that will likely shape Rogers’ tenure.

The U.S. remains vulnerable to EMP attacks.

Fatal Inaction

By Richard Harrison

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If all your friends jumped off a bridge, would you jump too? The answer clearly depends on how high the bridge is, but what the question really asks is if carelessly following others is in fact sensible.

The question comes to mind when debating whether to protect critical national infrastructure against large scale electromagnetic pulse, or EMP, events. Although EMP is a well-documented security issue, and one of the very few things that experts believe can dramatically alter our modern way of life, the U.S. government has sadly followed the lead of too many others and done little. This inaction could well prove fatal.

An EMP event can originate naturally from a large solar flare, or artificially as the product of a manmade nuclear detonation occurring high in the Earth's atmosphere. If high energy particles are sent streaming toward Earth from a nuclear explosion (particularly an explosion at an altitude between 25 and 250 miles above the surface) or from a solar flare, the particles will interact with the Earth's magnetic field and wreak havoc on any unhardened electrical infrastructure below.

RoboCop 3D and the Battle over Bigger Big Screens in China

http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/robocop-3d-and-the-battle-over-bigger-big-screens-in-china/

Imax claims that low-cost “China Film Giant Screen” copied its technology.

By J.T. Quigley

February 03, 2014

Imax Corporation, the Canadian company responsible for introducing giant movie theater screens, has become embroiled in a legal battle with a Chinese competitor that offers similar (perhaps too similar) technology at a fraction of the cost. The outcome could affect the relationship between film production companies and long-time business partner Imax – as well as international distribution of Hollywood movies and prices at the ticket window.

Montreal-based Imax claims that former employee Gary Tsui stole trade secrets that led to the creation of China Film Giant Screen (CFGS), an emerging player in the large-format screen industry that Imax dominates. CFGS entered the playing field in 2012, showing off its products at the Cannes Film Festival and promising to disrupt the Imax “monopoly” by offering bigger big screen technology on a budget.

Further infuriating Imax executives is another entity, Beijing Cubic Pictures Technology, which converts large-format video to 3D by allegedly copying Imax’s 2D to 3D conversion methods. The company filed suit against Tsui last August.

The chief engineer at CFGS, Tsui is also the founder of Cubic Pictures.

“Tsui worked as a software engineer for Imax in Mississauga, Ontario from 1999 until 2009,” wrote The New York Times. “That year, he gave notice of intent to quit, but was immediately fired after it was learned that he had started Jiangsu Sunway Digital, a company that was bidding for giant-screen business in China at a price cheaper than that offered by Imax.”

The Times added, “A search of Tsui’s computer revealed his ‘rampant use’ of its trade secrets in starting Sunway, which Imax said eventually ‘morphed’ into CFGS.”

Despite the ongoing legal battle, CFGS and Cubic Pictures have attracted the attention of Hollywood production companies and international film distributors. The upcoming remake of cult sci-fi action movie RoboCop, made by MGM and distributed by Sony, will be shown on CFGS screens in China. A 3D version of the film will also be exclusive to China – courtesy of Cubic Pictures.

Lessons Observed on Lessons Observed: IEDs, Advising, and Armor

Jason Fritz

February 3, 2014 

http://warontherocks.com/2014/02/lessons-observed-on-lessons-observed-ieds-advising-and-armor/

In the late winter of 2007, while serving as a brigade planner of a unit slated for a deployment to Iraq, I received a phone call from the division headquarters. An operations staffer there told me to call my brigade’s designated representative at the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) to get lessons learned from units that had recently been to Iraq. I did as I was instructed, reaching an amiable civil servant who was eager to help.

“We have all kinds of info. What do you need?”

“I have no idea. What do you have?”

“Everything. Where are you going?”

“We don’t know. Maybe MND-North? There’s no plan yet.”

“Oh, we have lots of stuff on MND-North. What do you need to know about it?”

“I don’t know – we’re about to link in with the division staff this week to get the intel picture. What else should we know?”

“Well, we have 4 years of data and logs on the division’s area of operations and some recent brigade AARs [after action reviews]. We could send you that.”

A little over a week later I received a package with the aforementioned information. The after action reviews were fairly generic, obviously put together by officers who had other duties to perform. The data was either too granular or too high-level to be of use. In the end we deployed to the Multi-National Division – Center on the southern edge of Baghdad and not the northern division closer to Kirkuk; these areas might as well have been in different countries. Most all of the “lessons learned” were useless in the area of operations we were eventually assigned. My experience with CALL in 2007 reinforced the Army adage that there are no lessons learned, only lessons observed.

More recent work by CALL has acknowledged the important difference between lessons observed (recognizing something that ought to be learned) and lessons learned (an observation fully analyzed and used to change military equipment, doctrine, or organization). A handbook on the Center specifies the difference between observations, insights, lessons and “lessons learned:” “Observations, insights, and lessons are not lessons learned because they have not been validated by the Army’s assigned proponents, and there is no assurance an actual change in behavior will occur.” I cannot speak to CALL’s utility today; certainly through 2007 they were very adept at collecting observations and insights, but had some difficulty in actually changing behaviors. This isn’t to pick on CALL, though it was of little value to me in 2007 (I am hoping that they have improved in the interim). In fact, the U.S. Army wasn’t very good at lessons learned before the Center was founded in 1985.

I was reminded of the above conversation after finishing General Donn Starry’s book Armored Combat in Vietnam. Starry, later the prime author ofAirLand Battle, paints In this book a unique picture of the Vietnam War by focusing on the use of armored cavalry, air cavalry, and tanks. The slim volume, published in 1980 but based on research conducted in the mid-1970s, counters the strong narrative that Vietnam was an infantry war and that Vietnamese geography precluded the effective employment of armored forces. Starry is a gripping story-teller and makes free use of engaging anecdotes. And yet, it is only in the final chapter of his observations that the recurring failure of the Army to actually learn becomes readily apparent. Starry presents six major lessons that he observed in Vietnam. Three of these are lessons that the Army merely observed and did not learn. Two decades elapsed between Starry’s public observation of these lessons and the beginning of our more recent years. Yet the Army failed to internalize the lessons of Vietnam, and soldiers have paid the price for it on the battlefields of the last 13 years.

China Thinks It Can Defeat America in Battle

But Beijing doesn’t seem to take into account U.S. submarines

David Axe in War is Boring

https://medium.com/war-is-boring/874bffe1b1b9

The bad news first. The People’s Republic of China now believes it can successfully prevent the United States from intervening in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or some other military assault by Beijing.

Now the good news. China is wrong—and for one major reason. It apparently disregards the decisive power of America’s nuclear-powered submarines.

Moreover, for economic and demographic reasons Beijing has a narrow historical window in which to use its military to alter the world’s power structure. If China doesn’t make a major military move in the next couple decades, it probably never will.

The U.S. Navy’s submarines—the unsung main defenders of the current world order—must hold the line against China for another 20 years. After that, America can declare a sort of quiet victory in the increasingly chilly Cold War with China.

A 

Chinese Type 071 amphibious assault ship. Via Chinese Internet

How China wins

The bad news came from Lee Fuell, from the U.S. Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center, during Fuell’s testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in Washington, D.C. on Jan. 30.

For years, Chinese military planning assumed that any attack by the People’s Liberation Army on Taiwan or a disputed island would have to begin with a Pearl Harbor-style preemptive missile strike by China against U.S. forces in Japan and Guam. The PLA was so afraid of overwhelming American intervention that it genuinely believed it could not win unless the Americans were removed from the battlefield before the main campaign even began.

A preemptive strike was, needless to say, a highly risky proposition. If it worked, the PLA just might secure enough space and time to defeat defending troops, seize territory and position itself for a favorable post-war settlement.

But if China failed to disable American forces with a surprise attack, Beijing could find itself fighting a full-scale war on at least two fronts: against the country it was invading plus the full might of U.S. Pacific Command, fully mobilized and probably strongly backed by the rest of the world.

That was then. But after two decades of sustained military modernization, the Chinese military has fundamentally changed its strategy in just the last year or so. According to Fuell, recent writings by PLA officers indicate “a growing confidence within the PLA that they can more-readily withstand U.S. involvement.”

The preemptive strike is off the table—and with it, the risk of a full-scale American counterattack. Instead, Beijing believes it can attack Taiwan or another neighbor while also bloodlessly deterring U.S. intervention. It would do so by deploying such overwhelmingly strong military forces—ballistic missiles, aircraft carriers, jet fighters and the like—that Washington dare not get involved.

The knock-on effects of deterring America could be world-changing. “Backing away from our commitments to protect Taiwan, Japan or the Philippines would be tantamount to ceding East Asia to China’s domination,” Roger Cliff, a fellow at the Atlantic Council, said at the same U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission hearing on Jan. 30.

Worse, the world’s liberal economic order—and indeed, the whole notion of democracy—could suffer irreparable harm. “The United States has both a moral and a material interest in a world in which democratic nations can survive and thrive,” Cliff asserted.

Run up to the Defence Budget 2014-15: Challenges to Modernisation

By Laxman K Behera

February 4, 2014

Source Link

In mid-February, the Finance Minister would present the Interim Budget 2014-15 to the Parliament in which he would seek Vote-On-Account (VOA) to enable the government to meet the essential expenditure till such time that a new government assumes power and present a regular budget. Although the VOA is of short-term relevance, the interim budget would nonetheless contain the estimates of both revenue receipts and expenditure for the full financial year. It is the prerogative of the next government to revise the estimates and present a regular budget as per its priorities it perceives. Defence being a major charge on the Union Budget, it is worthwhile to analyse the likely impact on it by the unfolding scenario. Some of the likely challenges that the defence ministry would likely to face are discussed as under.

The first and foremost challenge that the defence ministry would face is the impending general election and its likely impact on the union budget as a whole, and the defence budget in particular. It is commonly viewed that in an election year, the incumbent government is tempted to present a populist budget. In that scenario, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) would have reasons to be unhappy, particularly so when the modernisation requirement of the Indian armed forces has reached a stage which is now contingent upon substantial additional resources to remain on course. Nothing would perhaps describe the grave situation better than the overwhelming share of committed liability (arising out of contracts already singed) in the MoD’s total modernisation budget. By 2013-14, the committed liability has reached 96 per cent (in comparison to 92 per cent in the preceding year), meaning that only four per cent (or Rs 2,956 crore) of MoD’s total capital modernisation budget (of Rs 70,489 crore) is available for signing new contracts. Any further tightening on the modernisation budget in the coming financial year would definitely affect the on-going modernisation process.

Assuming that the government defies the common logic and provides ample resources to the defence ministry, there is still very little one can expect on the modernisation front. Since the number of days before a new government comes into power is limited, the incumbent government would unlikely to take decision on major armament programmes which have reached fairly a high stage of contract negotiation. Rather the responsibility to take decision on major acquisition proposals would be shifted to the new government which would also find it difficult to expedite the process given the various oversight concerns that often surround the defence procurement. Given this scenario, the year 2014-15 may well be a year of inaction, as far as modernisation of the Indian armed forces is concerned. Some of the modernisation programmes which are likely to be subjected to this inaction are: the ultra-light howitzers and javelin programmes of the Indian Army; and the medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA), heavy lift and attack helicopters, and tanker aircraft of the Indian air force.

The second challenge that the defence establishment would likely to face is related to the growth prospect of the Indian economy. It is noteworthy to mention that the GDP growth for 2013-14 is expected to be around five per cent, which is lower than 6.1-6.7 per cent estimated by the government initially. The economic slowdown, combined with the tight fiscal situation has already led to tightening of the government purse. What is of more relevance is that the growth prospect in the coming years would also remain subdued although some improvement is expected. According to a recent UN report, the World Economic Situation and Prospects 2014, the Indian economy is likely to grow by 5.3 per cent and 5.7 per cent in 2014 and 2015, respectively. This is in stark contrast with the high annual growth rate of 8-9 per cent registered few years ago.

The Navy’s Getting a Big, Secretive Special Operations ‘Mothership’

Converted cargo vessel to carry copters, commandos

David Axe in War is Boring

https://medium.com/war-is-boring/12801da6f353

The U.S. Navy is quietly converting a 633-foot-long cargo ship into a secretive helicopter carrier with facilities for supporting a large contingent of Special Operations Forces and all their gear, including jet skis.

Yes, jet skis.

And here’s the really weird thing: almost nobody is talking about the new “mothership” vessel, even though it could significantly expand America’s at-sea commando footprint.

In November, Military Sealift Command—America’s quasi-civilian fleet of more than 100 specialized but lightly armed vessels—awarded an initial $73-million contract to shipping giant Maersk to convert one of its cargo ships to a so-called “Maritime Support Vessel” standard.

Maersk tapped the 30,000-ton displacement M/V Cragside, built in 2011. After enduring a legal protest by rival Crowley, in January Maersk sent Cragside to the Gulf of Mexico for military modifications, most likely at the BAE shipyard upriver in Alabama.

The contract, extendable for up to four years, could be worth up to $143 million. The militarized Cragside could deploy as early as November this year.

MSC is adding a bunch of new hardware to Cragside to allow the vessel to function as a floating base for up to 200 troops and their weapons plus small boats, helicopters and the aforementioned jet skis, which the Navy and Air Force have begun buying and which Navy SEALs could use to sneak along enemy coastlines.

Cragside should be able to sail 8,000 miles at a time at speeds up to 20 knots and in 20-foot seas, needing resupply only every 45 days. The shipyard is adding a highly-secure communications room, a gym and weapons lockers. After all, you can’t house all those Army Delta Force troopers and SEALs without ample weapons lockers and gyms.

The sleek, capacious ship—already fitted with a rear ramp for loading vehicles—is also getting a flight deck big enough for the largest, heaviest U.S. military helicopter, the Navy’s MH-53E. Cragside will also be able to support Army Apache gunships, Navy patrol helicopters, Special Operations Command Little Bird attack copters and even Marine and Air Force V-22 tiltrotors.

Cragside’s hangar must be big enough to hold two Navy helicopters at the same time for maintenance—and has to have the special, subtle lighting that allows crews to use night-vision goggles.