Can Obama Keep His Generals in Check in the War Against ISIS?

BYEli LakeJosh Rogin

09.17.14 

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The president promised no combat troops to fight ISIS, but his top general says he may recommend them. Why Obama and his commanders are not on the same page for the new war. 

In his major address explaining America’s new war against ISIS, President Obama pledged that there would be no U.S. combat troops. On Tuesday, Gen. Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said he may recommend ground forces in the future. 

The White House is seeking to gloss over the rift between the president and his top general, but it is clear that just below the waterline Obama is not on the same page as the commanders who will be leading the new fight. U.S. military officials and members of Congress have complained privately for weeks that Obama appears unwilling to commit the resources necessary to achieve his aim of defeating ISIS. 

The Washington Post reported this week that Gen. Lloyd Austin, the general in charge of the military command that includes Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan, recommended a war strategy with a small contingent of special operations forces fighting alongside Iraqi and Kurdish security forces. But Obama rejected that advice. Obama travels to Tampa Wednesday to meet with Austin about the ISIS strategy on his own turf. 

Then there was the Dempsey episode. After Dempsey acknowledged that he may recommend some ground forces in the future, the Pentagon issued a rare correction. In an email forwarded to reporters from the National Security Council as well as the Pentagon’s press office, a spokesman said Dempsey “believes the current strategy to counter ISIL is appropriate,” using the administration’s preferred acronym for ISIS. The statement added, “The context of this discussion was focused on how our forces best and most appropriately advise the Iraqis and was not a broader discussion of employing US ground combat units in Iraq.” 

The internal dissent is likely to intensify with Obama’s choice of John Allen to lead the international campaign to persuade U.S. allies to pony up troops, money, and arms for his new war. Allen, a retired general beloved by Washington’s neoconservatives, has called for a robust U.S. war against ISIS since June. Obama and Allen sat down together Tuesday at the White House. 

Soon after he retired in 2013, Allen took a veiled shot at his old and now new boss, observing that in the wake of Obama’s withdrawal from Iraq, “the body count is going up, the bloodletting is going up.” 

As the details of the president’s new war plan leak out this week, many of Allen’s former colleagues and lawmakers wonder whether the president’s new special envoy will be able to convince Arab and European states to get behind a strategy they see as amounting to a half-measure. 

“The administration’s strategy to me seems to be putting the United States on a path to disrupt or degrade ISIS, not to defeat or destroy it.” 

Obama “has said ‘degrade and destroy,’ which makes it seem like he is more on the same page as Gen. Allen,” said Sen. John Cornyn, the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “But I wish he would listen more to his generals and less to his political advisers, because he seems to be trying to figure out how to triangulate. You can’t triangulate this. You have to destroy ISIS by all means necessary, and I hope the president comes around to that point of view.”

Sen. Bill Nelson, a Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee who has offered a resolution to authorize airstrikes in Syria, said Obama and Allen have the same goal even if Obama is prioritizing attacking ISIS in Iraq before attacking the group in Syria. But when asked if Obama’s Syria strategy would be enough to destroy ISIS, Nelson said, “We’ll find out.”

ISIS Cannot Be Destroyed Through Military Operations, Terror Will Only Cease With the Collapse of Its Ideology

By Harun Yahya

16 September, 2014

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From initially talking of bringing ‘democracy’ to the region, the USA - which has been fighting radical Islamist organizations ever since the September 11 attacks - is now talking about ‘eradicating’ ISIS. It is of course impossible to ignore the contribution that America has made to the building of peace in various parts of the world, such as Kosovo. The sensitivity it displays on the subject of supplying humanitarian aid to almost everywhere in the world, despite its own economic problems, is also praiseworthy. There is also no doubt that democracy needs to come to Islamic lands and that the violence of ISIS needs to cease to exist for the sake of world peace. The important thing, however, is how this is to be done.

One concrete fact stands after 13 years of military operations, from Afghanistan to Libya and from Nigeria to Iraq, radical terrorist groups have not ceased to exist through military force, violence and oppression, on the contrary, they grow even stronger.

Statistics reveal that the USA has spent some $7 trillion in Afghanistan and Iraq. Again according to the figures, $10 million of US taxpayers’ money goes to the fight against terror every hour. The lives that have been lost are, of course, beyond any material measurement. The picture emerging from all this expenditure and effort is one of ISIS controlling an area larger than Great Britain, Boko Haram kidnapping young schoolgirls in Nigeria, al-Shabaab causing terrible devastation in Somalia and radical organizations turning Libya into a sea of blood.

That picture can be changed. This is what needs to be done:

All kinds of military operation, including air strikes, just further anti-Americanism. Such strikes lead to civilian deaths, damage cities and destroy infrastructure, causing, increasing fury in the countries concerned and that fury mostly benefits radical organizations. Spending billions of dollars on producing people opposing it, and thus providing human resources for terror organizations, is a most undesirable state of affairs for the USA.

Although killing off the leaders of terror organizations is presented as an effective technique by some military analysts, looked at from a wider perspective, no results are actually obtained from it at all. The killing of Osama bin Laden obviously did not spell the end of al-Qaeda. In the most recent incident, 25 people lost their lives in a suicide attack on a UN convoy in the immediate wake of the killing of the leader of al-Shabaab. Violence grows in proportion to the scale of the destruction, resulting in a vicious circle of violence.

In order to break the spiral of terror, socioeconomic improvements need to be made and policies such as ensuring the implementation of democratic processes clearly need to be brought to the fore in regions where there is intense terrorist activities. In order for all these things to happen, however, it is essential to see the factors affecting people in the region and to assess them accurately. The most influential of these factors is without doubt Islam. 

Islamic State Issues Video Challenge to Obama

By MICHAEL S. SCHMIDT

SEPT. 17, 2014

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WASHINGTON — In one of the Islamic State’s first responses to President Obama’s declaration that he would “degrade and ultimately destroy” it, the group released a short video late Tuesday in which it appeared to say that its militants would kill American ground forces should President Obama deploy them.

The timing of the video’s release was curious. Just hours earlier, President Obama’s top military adviser had told Congress that he would recommend calling out American troops against the Islamic State if the current airstrike campaign was not sufficient — even though Mr. Obama has ruled out that option.

The clip is only 52 seconds long and is billed as a preview for a longer video. With slow-motion replay, quick edits and high-quality video images, it looks like a Hollywood trailer.

It begins with American tanks and troops under attack by fire and American soldiers carrying a wounded comrade into an armored vehicle. The images flick by, including a shot of the “Mission Accomplished” banner that served as a backdrop on the day President George W. Bush landed on an aircraft carrier six weeks after the United States invaded Iraq in 2003. That is followed by shots of Mr. Obama and the White House at night.

In the background, Mr. Obama is heard saying, “American combat troops will not be returning to fight in Iraq.” The screen goes dark, followed by a clip of what appears to be a militant for the group who is preparing to kill men on their knees.

The words “Flames of War” appear, with the phrase “Fighting has just begun” below. It ends: “Coming Soon.”

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Tuesday, Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the United States and a coalition of nations would defeat the Islamic State, also known by the acronyms ISIS and ISIL, which has seized territory across Syria and northern Iraq. But he would not rule out asking Mr. Obama to send American troops to fight the militants on the ground.

In an attempt to quell fears of another Iraq war, President Obama promised in his address to the nation last Wednesday that American ground troops would not be involved in the fighting.

General Dempsey said the “coalition is the appropriate way forward.”

Send US troops: Beating ISIS requires Americans in combat

By John R. Bolton

September 15, 2014 

http://nypost.com/2014/09/15/send-us-troops-beating-isis-requires-americans-in-combat/

Kurdish Peshmerga fighters holding a frontline position during heavy clashes with ISIS fighters in Yangije.Photo: AFP/Getty Images

The third brutal beheading of a Westerner by the terrorists of the “Islamic State” (a k a ISIS a k a ISIL) tells us one thing unmistakably: They’re not deterred by President Obama’s rhetoric or threats of future action against them.

Their barbarism is exceeded only by their contempt for the United States and its allies, in the Middle East and globally.

It’s time to confront the unambiguous reality that destroying ISIS — which even Obama says is (ultimately) his goal — urgently requires American combat troops on the ground in Iraq and Syria. And the time is right now, not years from now.

No amount of wishful thinking or political cowardice can change the fact we are at war, a one-syllable word even the White House now uses.

As unattractive as this conclusion is, failure to accept it leads directly to the near-certainty that a new, decidedly terrorist state is being born in the Middle East, a magnet for jihadis worldwide.

The three beheadings sadly represent only a tiny fraction of the innocents murdered to date. Other ISIS videos show mass murders of Sunni militia fighters and civilian Christians, Yazidis and Muslims slaughtered in as-yet-unknown numbers.

More is undoubtedly to come. Every passing day allows ISIS to consolidate its control over a territory roughly the size of Great Britain. New estimates of Islamic State fighters have risen to over 30,000. While ISIS’ Iraq offensive has been blunted, it is hardly retreating.

Despite this mountain of evidence and atrocities, the administration displays neither a sense of urgency nor determination.

Although the president’s performance has been appalling in many respects, one error is particularly important. Obama has said emphatically that America’s military response will not include US combat troops fighting where ISIS holds sway in Iraq or Syria.

Equally troubling, most politicians of both parties have also run from the issue. In campaign season, candor is hard to find.

How Iran Could Become Our Shadow Enemy in the Syria ISIS War

Jacob Siegel

09.16.14

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In Iraq, Tehran was our silent partner, working to break an ISIS siege and edging out Maliki. But it’s not in Obama’s new coalition—and may try to destabilize U.S.-led efforts in Syria.

At the big table in Paris where 24 world leaders met Monday to discuss a war plan against ISIS, one nation was notably left out. But Iran claims it didn’t want to be there anyway, with supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei calling American pronouncements about ISIS “absurd, hollow and biased.”

Behind the tough talk, however, is a fear that American aims in Syria will threaten Iran’s regional power while strengthening its adversaries. In the fight against ISIS, what’s at stake for the U.S. is the risk that an area of strategic interest will be further destabilized and that American lives will be put in danger. For Iran, the enemy is already on the doorstep. Iran sees ISIS as a threat not only because of its extreme violence and targeting of Shia but because defeating the group could expand the power of its Sunni rivals and challenge Tehran’s claim for dominance of the region.

The U.S. and Iran have been dancing around ISIS since American airstrikes began in Iraq more than a month ago. In the latest series of steps, the U.S. excluded Iran from its burgeoning anti-ISIS coalition, Iran said it had already rejected an earlier invitation to cooperate, and finally, the U.S. said it would consider coordinating with Iran in the future. But if the rift with Iran widens, it could become a shadow enemy in Syria as the U.S. begins its war there.

Before the latest break, Iran had been acting as America’s silent partner in Iraq. American airpower was critical in breaking the ISIS siege of Amerli, a Shia town in the Sunni region of central Iraq, but it supported ground forces led by by Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, an Iranian-funded militia group. And shortly after American aircraft carried out their part of the mission and left the scene, Iranian Gen. Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force, posed for a photo-op with his proxy forces, who claimed their victory owed nothing to the U.S.

In Syria, where Shia are a minority, a post-ISIS future threatens to freeze Iran out.

In addition to American airstrikes supporting Iranian militia forces, Tehran was likely instrumental in pressuring the sectarian prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, to step down and allow a new government to be formed. Without an official alliance and despite rhetoric and PR moves distancing Iran from the U.S., the two countries had avoided jeopardizing the momentum generated by their convergent interests.

Iran and the U.S. Are Allies Against ISIS but Aren’t Ready to Admit It Yet

By Joshua Keating

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Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, right, uses his clean hands to promote an officer.

We are in an era of unacknowledged invasions. In military operations ranging from Russia’s incursion into eastern Ukraine to the activities of Iranian military advisers in Iraq, governments refuse to admit what they’re up to even when those engagements are widely reported in the international media.

Joshua Keating is a staff writer atSlate focusing on international affairs and writes the World blog. 

As the U.S. begins carrying out its first airstrikes against ISIS under the new strategy announced by President Obama last week, we’ve seen the rise of another related phenomenon: the unacknowledged alliance.

Last week there were media reports that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei hadapproved cooperation with the United States in the name of fighting ISIS. If those reports are true, the supreme leader doesn’t appear willing to acknowledge them publicly. Shortly after Secretary of State John Kerry said Monday that the U.S. would be open to talkswith Iran about the crisis in Iraq, Khamenei personally rebuffed the offer, telling the state news agency IRNA, “I saw no point in cooperating with a country whose hands are dirty and intentions murky." He went on to suggest that the U.S. was using the crisis as a "pretext to do in Iraq and Syria what it already does in Pakistan—bomb anywhere without authorization.”

The U.S. side has been sending some mixed signals. Last week Kerry had ruled out cooperation with Iran due to its “engagement in Syria and elsewhere.” Iran, after all, is a major backer of Bashar al-Assad’s government, which, in addition to its many other crimes, the U.S. accuses of facilitating the rise of ISIS. (Syria has since executed a rapid about-face and is now trying to sell itself internationally as an enthusiastic member of the anti-terror coalition.)

Iran was not among the more than 20 nations represented at a conference in Paris this week devoted to assisting the Iraqi government in its efforts against ISIS, a snublamented by the Iraqi foreign minister.

Iran (and to a less clear extent Syria) is already a de facto ally of the U.S. and Europe in this mission. The efforts of Iran and the U.S. have been complementary, even if they weren’t coordinated. For instance, when Iraqi Shiite militiamen and Kurdish peshmerga fighters retook the northern Iraqi town of Amerli earlier this month, it was made possible by both Iranian military advisers and American airstrikes.

Washington and Tehran are on the same team in Iraq—things are a bit more complicated in Syria—but neither government seems ready to admit it yet. At a certain point, the military forces battling the same enemy in the field might start to wonder how long it will take the politicians giving them orders to get on the same page.

THE “NO BOOTS ON THE GROUND” MANTRA IS STRATEGIC FOOLISHNESS

Richard Russell

September 17, 2014

http://warontherocks.com/2014/09/the-no-boots-on-the-ground-mantra-is-strategic-foolishness/

President Barack Obama is fond of publicly declaring that there will be “no boots on the ground” when commenting on the Syria, Iraq, and Islamic State crises. Key national security lieutenants in his administration have loyally followed suit. Vice President Joe Biden has opined that the Islamic State, “can be routed by local forces without U.S. boots on the ground.” And Secretary of State John Kerry remarked at the NATO summit in Wales in regard to Iraq that “I think that’s a red line for everybody here: no boots on the ground.”

One would have thought that given the administration’s strategic blunder in not enforcing its “red line” over the Syrian regime’s use of chemical weapons, officials would be gun-shy about publicly using the term. Hold aside too, for the moment, the difficulty in reconciling the incremental dispatch of special operations forces to shore up Iraq’s rump Shia state with the administration’s “no boots on the ground” mantra. The number of special operations forces now in Iraq tally more than 1,000 soldiers by public accounts, and they presumably are wearing boots, not wingtips.

President Obama is falling back on his playbook from the Libya intervention, in which his administration famously “led from behind.” Obama in 2011 told the American people that “no boots were to be on the ground” in Libya. Coalition airpower proved enough to tip Qaddafi out of the halls of power and into the streets to be killed by a mob. Tragically, the coalition intervention in Libya was insufficient to stem the breakdown of civil order, the birth and expansion of Islamist militias, and the killing of Americans in the Benghazi consulate.

The Obama administration is following in the footsteps of President Bill Clinton who proclaimed the “no boots” mantra during the 1998-99 Kosovo war. Clinton, notorious for following the whims of public opinion, worried that American military intervention in the Balkans would not be popular. President Obama is doing the same today as Iraq breaks into three de facto states, the death toll in Syria hurtles toward 200,000, Christian minorities are threatened with extinction, and jihadists create a nation-state as a base of operations for global jihad in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.

President Obama, despite being praised for his charisma and eloquence, has never mastered the power of Teddy Roosevelt’s bully pulpit. Roosevelt, like Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, exercised presidential leadership to pull public opinion toward national interests. President Richard Nixon did not conduct polling to find out if the opening of China was brilliant statecraft, nor did President George W. Bush defer to public opinion in making his courageous decision to surge forces into Iraq when things looked bleak in Baghdad. President Obama, in contrast, hides behind popular sentiment to escape the responsibilities and heavy burdens of the presidency. In fact, however, American public opinion is already shifting away from Obama’s isolation tendencies on its own. An August poll by the highly regarded Pew Research Center found that more than half of Americans judge that President Obama is not tough enough on foreign affairs and national security.

IT’S TIME FOR A NATIONAL BORDER SECURITY STRATEGY

Tom Leonard and Joshua Katz

September 17, 2014

http://warontherocks.com/2014/09/its-time-for-a-national-border-security-strategy/

Texas Governor Perry’s recent comments regarding ISIS penetrating the United States’ porous southern border should give the ongoing immigration and border security debate a much-needed reinvigoration. The simple fact is that we do not know who and/or what is crossing the border. The growing threat from terrorist groups, as well as the continued nefarious actions of transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), requires the U.S. government to revisit its strategic goals on the border and reshape its current approach based on those goals.

Currently, there is no singular national strategy for border security, a fundamental flaw in the effort to manage this enduring national security problem. Without the benefit of such a strategy, federal departments and agencies are rudderless, lacking strategic direction from the Executive Branch with respect to securing the nation’s borders. A clear border security strategy, nested within the objectives laid out in the National Security Strategy, would provide a means of rectifying these shortcomings.

Understanding the Threat

The 2010 National Security Strategy, in addressing threats, notes:

Transnational criminal threats and illicit trafficking networks continue to expand dramatically in size, scope, and influence – posing significant national security challenges for the United States and our partner countries.

And yet, none of the legislative or administrative border security solutions proposed thus far will counter these threats without first understanding the scope of the threats. The threats from terrorists and TCOs are evolving in complexity. As the administration and Congress continue the policy of delayed leadership, these complexities mount, making solutions even more challenging and ultimately impact the national security of the United States.

The threats facing the United States within the international border environment are real, dynamic, and multi-dimensional; those who wish us harm – terrorists, criminal organizations, and nation states – remain flexible and act without regard to our laws. These adversaries are not only able to exploit the gaps in our laws, border security infrastructure, and response capabilities, but also in our policies and our own failure to implement existing law. In short, our adversaries are quicker to adapt to the changing border security environment than we are at identifying and correcting our own security shortfalls.

Although there are potential threats present at each border, the danger posed by the accumulation of those threats (TCOs, terrorists, adversarial nation states) is particularly acute along the Southwest border. Competing drug cartels are engaged in an unprecedented inter-organizational conflict over smuggling routes into the United States. Furthermore, with billions of dollars in operating capital, TCOs are capable of buying, corrupting, building, and/or coercing the necessary freedom of action to counter and respond to law enforcement efforts to curtail their activities. TCOs have spent decades refining the transportation routes to bring illicit material (drugs) into the country and to engage in human trafficking.

THE ISLAMIC STATE’S VULNERABILITY

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

September 17, 2014

http://warontherocks.com/2014/09/the-islamic-states-vulnerability/

As the U.S. military joins with its allies and temporarily-aligned enemies to fulfill President Obama’s promise to “degrade and ultimately destroy” the self-proclaimed caliphate that spans portions of Iraq and Syria, it’s worth understanding the vulnerability of that foe. Understanding the Islamic State’s position should help the United States calibrate its policies to fulfill its strategic objectives without losing sight of the broader strategic picture—a risk attached to Obama’s extraordinarily ambitious goal.

Fortunes can change quickly in the world of jihadism, and there is no better example than the Islamic State’s predecessor, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). As is the case with the Islamic State today, in 2005-06 many observers believed that AQI and its emir, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, had eclipsed al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden as the leaders of global jihadism. AQI and Zarqawi make for a striking, yet somewhat imperfect, analogy to the Islamic State today.

Zarqawi was extraordinarily popular with young jihadists, just like the Islamic State is now. He reveled in his own brutality, becoming infamous—and among his target audience, celebrated—for slaughtering Shia Muslims and releasing videos of his victims being beheaded. Like the Islamic State, Zarqawi controlled territory in one of the region’s critical countries. The Islamic State is, however, far more powerful than Zarqawi’s AQI was at its height: controlling more territory, mustering more financial resources, and drawing oaths of loyalty from some transnational jihadists who had previously been loyal to al-Qaeda.

Although Zarqawi appeared ascendant from 2005 until his death in June 2006, the weaknesses in his strategy soon became apparent, and they ultimately wrecked—though didn’t completely destroy—his organization. These weaknesses were apparent to al-Qaeda’s senior leadership, as evidenced by a 2005 letter that current al-Qaeda emir Ayman al-Zawahiri sent to Zarqawi. The elder jihadist leader warned Zarqawi not to “be deceived by the praise of some of the zealous young men and their description of you as the sheikh of the slaughterers,” since young zealots “do not express the general view of the admirer and the supporter of the resistance in Iraq.” AQI’s excesses provoked a tribal uprising (the Sahwa, or Awakening) against it, which—along with a few other factors—reversed its gains. The Islamic State’s “caliph,” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, later had to essentially rebuild the organization from scratch. Though it took some time for AQI’s mistakes to catch up with it, those mistakes had always been made in the open. And so too are those of the Islamic State.

The Islamic State’s Vulnerabilities

DEFEATING IS: WILL THE OBAMA STRATEGY SUCCEED? – ANALYSIS

By Ahmed Salah Hashim

SEPTEMBER 17, 2014

http://www.eurasiareview.com/17092014-defeating-will-obama-strategy-succeed-analysis/

President Obama delivers statement on ISIL. Screenshot from White House video. 

Obama’s six-point plan for the defeat of the Islamic State (IS) promises more than it can achieve. It is a recipe for continued disaster. Can the strategy be reinforced?

On September 10 President Obama laid out his strategy for dealing with IS. First, it called for significant expansion of the aerial bombing campaign in Iraq. Since mid-August airpower has succeeded in blunting the forward momentum of the IS lightning advance. It has even allowed the dispirited Iraqi Army and the vastly overrated Kurdish Peshmerga, to push back IS from some of the territories it had previously conquered. However, in places like Tikrit the Iraqi Army’s Special Forces have been unable to budge IS from its gains.

Problems with airpower

There are problems with overreliance on airpower as a solution to the militants. IS members have learned the lessons of airpower against concentrated ground forces. They have begun to disperse, to tunnel, to camouflage and to go to ground in the cities. Airpower can degrade. Degradation of IS is no substitute for its extirpation and the uprooting of its entire system of control over territory, people and infrastructure. If IS transforms into a ‘subterranean animal,’ it will regress from mobile lightning war back to pure terrorism, a tactic in which it is thoroughly adept.

Second, the strategy calls for the training and equipping of the Iraqi army and the Kurdish Peshmerga. Training and equipping host nation forces by an external power has had its successes and failures. In Iraq the United States looks set to throw more good money after bad as evidenced by the disgraceful failures of the Iraqi Army – on which the U.S. had already spent $24billion – in June and July 2014. Two IS battalions with a total of 800 men took Mosul in June from two Iraqi divisions with a combined strength of 30,000 men.

The Campaign Against the Islamic State:

By Anthony H. Cordesman

SEP 16, 2014 

http://csis.org/publication/campaign-against-islamic-state

If there is any one lesson of the Afghan and Iraq Wars, it is that it is far easier to begin a conflict than to manage it well and achieve a meaningful form of victory. The President’s announcement of a strategy for seeking to degrade and destroy the Islamic State — and de facto Congressional acceptance of the need to fight a new conflict — has now committed the United States to a high risk, low-level war of indefinite duration.

Winning that war will require persistence, resources, effective planning and management, and sustained domestic and international political support. The Obama Administration now needs to show that it will both commit the necessary resources, and manage them effectively. It needs to show that it is doing its best to address the key risks it has accepted in going to war. It needs to provide an honest picture of the course of the fighting and its impact on the stability and security of the region.

This means that the Administration must show that it recognizes the problems in dealing with the threat, in dealing with an extremely uncertain “host country” partner like Iraq, and in coping with lasting instability in Syria. It must show that it has a coherent policy for dealing with Iran, and that it has done its best create an effective alliance with other regional powers. It also needs to show that it has recognized some of the key failings in the way the United States conducted the Afghan and Iraq Wars, and minimize the extent to which the United States is a threat to itself.

The U.S. Congress, too, needs to be far more competent and responsible than it has been in dealing the Afghan and Iraq Wars. It needs to do far more than provide some form of formal support and funding for the President’s strategy in dealing with the Islamic State. It needs to regularly address whether that strategy is effectively resourced and assess its level of success. Congress needs to examine the quality and effectiveness of civil-military plans and programs, and how the Administration adapts to risks and problems it confronts. It needs to ensure that the Administration provides an effective accounting of the cost of the war.

To do this, the Congress must demand both full transparency in the Executive Branch’s reporting to Congress and as much transparency as possible on reporting on progress in the war, to the media and to the American people.

The Need for Transparency, Accountability, and Integrity

One of the grim lessons of Vietnam, the Afghan War, and the previous conflict in Iraq is the extent to which various elements of the U.S. government can lose sight of the realities of war, and “spin” the real course of the war. It is a warning of the extent to which very different Administrations could omit key data and trends from reporting to Congress and the public, create false images of host nation allied cooperation, disguise a critical lack of effective resources, and disguise an equally critical lack of coordination between civil and military efforts and key elements of U.S. intelligence.

There is a need for operational security and to avoid public disclosures that threaten success and U.S. and allied forces. There is a need for diplomatic secrecy in dealing with host countries and other states. These needs, however, must be fully justified and this time, the Congress should insist that we keep over-classification, puff and spin, and lies by omission to a minimum.

Our wars from Vietnam on have shown that security and over-classification have been systematically used to disguise, in both military and civil efforts, a lack of coordination with the U.S. effort and with allies, problems, overspending and waste, a lack of effective plans, and a lack of meaningful measures of effectiveness.

Obama vs. the generals

Pity poor Gen. Lloyd Austin, top commander of U.S. forces in the Middle East. 

September 15

Rarely has a U.S. general given his commander in chief better military advice, only to see it repeatedly rejected. 

In 2010, Gen. Austin advised President Obama against withdrawing all U.S. forces from Iraq, recommending that the president instead leave 24,000 U.S. troops (down from 45,000) to secure the military gains made in the surge and prevent a terrorist resurgence. Had Obama listened to Austin’s counsel, the rise of the Islamic State could have been stopped. 

But Obama rejected Austin’s advice and enthusiastically withdrew all U.S. all forces from the country, boasting that he was finally bringing an end to “the long war in Iraq.” 

Now the “long war in Iraq” is back. And because Obama has not learned from his past mistakes, it is likely to get even longer. 

Last week, Obama announced a strategy to re-defeat the terrorists in Iraq. But instead of listening to his commanders this time around, Obama once again rejected the advice of . . . you guessed it . . . Gen. Lloyd Austin. 

The Post reports that, when asked for his recommendation for the best way to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, Austin told the president that “his best military advice was to send a modest contingent of American troops, principally Special Operations forces, to advise and assist Iraqi army units in fighting the militants.” Obama was having none of it. Austin’s recommendation, The Post reports, “was cast aside in favor of options that did not involve U.S. ground forces in a front-line role.” 

Indeed, in his address to the nation, Obama insisted that “American forces will not have a combat mission — we will not get dragged into another ground war in Iraq.” He declared the effort against the Islamic State “different from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan” and modeled instead on the air campaigns he has waged against al-Qaeda affiliates such as the one in Yemen. 

There’s one problem with that: The air campaign in Yemen is not working. Just this weekend al-Qaeda infiltrated forces into Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, and Yemeni officials say that al-Qaeda’s strength in Yemen is growing. And as American Enterprise Institute counterterrorism expert Katherine Zimmerman points out, al-Qaeda’s Yemeni affiliate was behind a “terror threat that closed more than 20 U.S. diplomatic posts in North Africa and the Middle East in August 2013.” If, four years from now, the Islamic State is still strong enough to force the closure of 20 U.S. embassies and consulates, then Obama’s strategy to “degrade and destroy” the group will have failed. 

The Islamic State cannot be defeated from the air alone. This does not mean a re-invasion of Iraq. But as Fred and Kimberly Kagan — two key thinkers behind the successful 2007 surge in Iraq — point out in a new paper, defeating the Islamic State “will require as many as 25,000 ground troops in Iraq and Syria.” The vast majority of those troops would play a supporting role for several thousand U.S. Special Forces troops and special mission units — who would be deployed in small groups embedded with Sunni tribes (like the Sons of Iraq, who fought alongside us during the surge) as well as Kurdish pesh merga forces and Iraqi military units. 

OBAMA’S NEW STRATEGY TOWARDS THE ISLAMIC STATE: IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA – ANALYSIS

By PR Chari

SEPTEMBER 15, 2014

In his widely anticipated 15th anniversary address on the 9/11 attacks, President Obama has clarified his objectives in the Middle East: “We will degrade, and ultimately destroy, [the Islamic State] through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy.”

Its contours are taking shape, but the new strategy would involve airstrikes against militants and training the moderate opposition fighters in Syria. The US will wage war against the Islamic extremists and the regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad. Wary of domestic opposition to getting mired in another overseas conflict after Iraq and Afghanistan, Obama emphasized that he would seek Congressional approval and international support from America’s Middle East and NATO allies.

Could American air power and the ground forces of its partners destroy the Islamic State? There is enough realism around to appreciate that al Qaeda, ISIS and similar extremist organizations propagate beguiling ideals of equality, freedom, religious purity and so on to confront the Western alliance, headed by the United States. It is difficult to defeat an ideal, but its baneful effects can certainly be contained. This understanding, is currently informing Obama’s rejuvenated counter-insurgency strategy premised on assured domestic support and the cooperation of allies, but restricting military action to airstrikes and leaving ground action to allies.

Only a modest augmentation of US troops in Iraq is envisaged, raising their total number to around 1500 for performing advisory functions by manning tactical operations centers, protecting American personnel and helping local security forces. An important, though unstated, component of this revised strategy is human intelligence to pinpoint the location of individual militant leaders for elimination by air and ground action. Jordan is critical here.

The new Obama strategy envisages training the Free Syrian Army. Saudi Arabia has apparently agreed to provide facilities in its territory for their training and turning them turned around to combat the Islamic extremists and the Assad regime. The dangers of this radical policy are two-fold. First, the US and its allies, including Saudi Arabia, would be getting embroiled in an enlarging Shia- Sunni sectarian conflict, with the lines of division getting increasingly blurred. Thus Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States are becoming uneasy partners to confront the ISIS and al Qaeda. But, Iran, alongside remnants of the Iraqi and Assad regime still feel obligated to support Hamas against Israel. How Obama’s revised Middle East strategy will sidestep these land mines of Middle East politics remains to be seen.

It's Still a Good Idea for China to Send Troops to Fight ISIS

By Dingding Chen

September 16, 2014

Beijing has more to gain than to lose by intervening against ISIS in Iraq. 

In my last piece, I argued that China should send troops to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) for global public goods and its own national interests. I listed five major benefits of doing so. Unsurprisingly, many have pointed out the potential dangers and pitfalls of my proposal, and some of them have good points. After considering all the major counterarguments, I remain convinced that China still should send troops to fight ISIS. Let’s consider these counterarguments one by one.

The biggest worry and concern from many Chinese observers is that the U.S. offer to China is simply a trap to get China involved in a big mess in Iraq. According to this argument, China should not fight the war for the United States. This kind of conspiracy theory is always popular in some quarters in China. The interesting thing is that we cannot tell whether the conspiracy on the part of the U.S. is real or not, but it does not really matter. Whether China will be trapped in Iraq or not depends on China’s own strategic goals and actions. The reason the U.S. was trapped in Iraq for many years was because it had unrealistic and overly ambitious goals, i.e., reforming the whole Middle East through military occupation. China should not and will not pursue such goals as its objectives are much narrower like peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and protecting its own interests.

One related worry is that China’s involvement in Iraq might generate anti-China feelings among terrorist groups and some Arab countries. This shouldn’t be a concern either because, unlike the U.S., China’s goals will be limited. The U.S. went into Iraq for the purpose of regime change, which always generates hatred and resentment. Terrorist groups and some countries in the Middle East hate the U.S. mainly because it has a tendency to impose its own values and systems on others through military occupation and it maintains a special relationship with Israel, which is the root cause of the Palestinian problem. China does not face any of the above issues, thus making itself an unlikely target of Arab anger. In addition, ISIS is also regarded by Arab countries as a cancer to regional stability and peace, further increasing China’s legitimacy in the fight against ISIS. If some groups in the Middle East shift their resentment to China, then it only shows that those groups are already hostile toward China. The best response to such hostilities, then, is to confront them rather than running away from them.

Another concern is that China’s PLA has very limited capabilities to fight overseas. This is true, but it is precisely because of this shortcoming that it is imperative for China to join the campaign against ISIS. By doing so, China can improve its fighting capabilities. Given China’s deteriorating security environment, a military conflict with others cannot be entirely ruled out. In order to win a war, there is no better preparation than participating in a real war. More importantly, a military presence in Iraq could provide solid security for Chinese investment there. Imagine how China’s investment could have been saved during the Libyan civil war if Chinese troops were there. China lost about $20 billion in Libya and its stake in Iraq is much bigger (although most of China’s investments are in southern Iraq, far away from ISIS-controlled territory). Given the uncertainties in Iraq, we can never be sure that our investments are safe. Sooner or later China will need a security force in Iraq and now is a good time to start it. In the next five to 10 years there will be no better opportunity.

In the end, a Chinese military presence in Iraq (if China does send troops there) should meet three preconditions. First, it must be under a U.N. framework. Second, it must focus on humanitarian and peacekeeping purposes and not involve the toppling of a regime. Third, the size of China’s troop commitment must be small, letting regional actors and the U.S. do most of the heavy lifting. If the U.S. cannot agree to these terms, then China should not dispatch a singer soldier to Iraq.

URANIUM AND NUCLEAR POWER: THREE INDIAN STORIES – ANALYSIS

By Manpreet Sethi

SEPTEMBER 15, 2014

In one of his short stories entitled “Higher Mathematics”, written during the period 1935-1950, R K Narayanan had jocularly written “Any news that mentions the atom becomes suspect these days”. Nothing much has changed in the many decades since then. News about the atom still evinces much interest. Three stories related to nuclear energy dominated the Indian media during the first two weeks of September. It is worth examining the import of the three, individually and collectively, to understand the big picture pertaining to the nuclear energy programme in India.

The first news that broke early in September was the decision by Australia to sell uranium to India. This is big deal considering the hard line view that this possessor of nearly 31% of the world’s uranium has traditionally taken against supplying uranium to non-NPT countries. Though India was granted a waiver by the NSG (of which Australia is a member) in 2008 itself, it has taken six long years since then, and long-winded bilateral negotiations since 2011, for the domestic politics in Australia to come around to acknowledging that India could be trusted with its uranium.

GROWING WATER TENSIONS IN CENTRAL ASIA

By Eurasia Review

SEPTEMBER 15, 2014 

Growing tensions in the Ferghana Valley are exacerbated by disputes over shared water resources. To address this, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan urgently need to step back from using water or energy as a coercive tool and focus on reaching a series of modest, bilateral agreements, pending comprehensive resolution of this serious problem.

Political rivalries, economic competition, heightened nationalism and mistrust hamper the search for a solution to the region’s growing water and energy needs. In its latest report, Water Pressures in Central Asia, the International Crisis Group examines the impact of water issues on shared border areas in the volatile Ferghana Valley; water shortages in urban areas; and competing water and energy needs among the three riparian states of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The report also analyses the international community’s potential to contribute to national and regional stability in Central Asia.

Kyrgyzstan is looking at a bleak winter of energy shortages because of low water levels at the Toktogul reservoir and hydropower plant. Energy insecurity and resentment are growing and have proved to be major catalysts in the downfall of successive Kyrgyz administrations. Only mass labour migration and authoritarian tactics have prevented similar upheavals in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

Attempts at comprehensive regional solutions have foundered on mistrust. The three countries (and international backers) should act in the Ferghana Valley border areas to end annual competition and conflict over water by seeking step-by-step solutions rather than an all-inclusive resource settlement. If Uzbekistan will not join, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan should work bilaterally.

THE 7 HABITS OF HIGHLY EFFECTIVE COALITIONS: BY ADM (RET.) JAMES STAVRIDIS

by Fortuna's Corner

September 16, 2014

The 7 Habits of Highly Effective Coalitions

Powerful lessons in personnel management from the former supreme allied commander of NATO.

During my time leading NATO global operations from 2009 through 2013 as the supreme allied commander, I spent an inordinate amount of time and effort focused on keeping the 50-nation coalition of the International Security Assistance Force on a steady course and speed in Afghanistan. In every sense, the coalition itself represented the strategic center of gravity in the complex struggle for the future of Afghanistan — and still does.

I believe in coalition warfare, but believe me: I do not wear rose-colored glasses as to the efficacy of such structures. And I yield to no man in my frustration with the care and management of such operations. As Gen. John Allen, one of the very best NATO commanders in history, takes up responsibility for building such a group to face the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria, here are some thoughts on the start-up phase:

1. Be patient, but push.

While speed in operations is essential, the assembly and maintenance of a coalition will move at a far more leisurely pace, reflecting the stately movements of diplomacy. This can be very frustrating. As Winston Churchill said, “The only thing worse that fighting a war with allies is fighting one without them.” So the necessary mindset at the beginning must be to “take what we can get.”

As things get underway, we cannot allow perfect to become the enemy of the good (or even the moderately helpful). The United States cannot accept the first “no” from nations asked to join the coalition, but rather must rephrase, apply more pressure, and ask again.

As additional nations join, peer pressure comes into play, but patience will be key.

As additional nations join, peer pressure comes into play, but patience will be key. The bottom line: Getting individual national parliaments, congresses, assemblies, and other political structures onboard will take time — be prepared to play the long game.

2. Deal with caveats as they come.

In the context of coalitions, a “caveat” is a no-go geographic zone, warfighting behavior, or operational activity for a given nation. For example, some nations chose to fight caveat-free in Afghanistan; others would not authorize their soldiers to fight at night, or outside Kabul, or to take prisoners.

New World Symphony

PRANAY SHARMA

http://www.outlookindia.com/article/New-World-Symphony/291936 

Narendra Modi, Xi Jinping at the BRICS summit in Brazil 

China’s mammoth Silk Route plan would dynamise half the world. Will India accept the invitation? 

Old Silk Route 

Distance: Over 4,000 miles, stretching from China to the Mediterranean Sea 

The route linked ancient lands of China, India, Persia, Arabia, Bactria and Rome 

Combining extant, ancient trade routes, its golden age was from 2nd century BC till the 13th century 

Got its name from trade in Chinese silk, though cotton and spices from India and precious stones and other items from Persia, Arabia and Europe were also sold 

New Silk Route 

Nearly 20 countries—China, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Czech Republic, Germany, Netherlands, Malaysia, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Kenya—over three continents—are part of proposed project. The number may go up. 

Silk Strategy 

China’s proposed Silk Route would uplink connectivity within China to the region and beyond and also give a boost to Chinese industry and investment in different parts of the world 

Build and develop ports and naval bases to ensure the important sea lanes carrying oil, gas and other minerals as well as Chinese goods from the mainland remain unhindered and without trouble 

By developing infrastructure in different countries, present the soft power of China and raise stakes of others to minimise confrontation with Beijing 

Lastly, it would allow China to develop a parallel trading network—a huge overland and maritime arc encircling the whole of Asia and running into Europe—that would challenge the ones by a US-led West 

Shrouded in myths and legends, the ancient ‘Silk Route’ had for centuries been the main conduit for trade and cultural interaction between East and West, connecting old civilisations, encouraging merchants, scholars, pilgrims and nomads to travel to newer realms. Now, over 800 years after its decline, thanks mainly to a Chinese initiative, global attention is recast on the famed route. Countries from Malaysia and India, Kazakhstan to Germany, Kenya to Italy and Vietnam to Netherlands are busy debating whether the proposed project gives more muscle to China’s global power or helps in making it play a more responsible international role. Touted exclusively as a commercial venture and an enabler for connectivity, the Chinese proposal is now being studied by strategists, policy-makers and diplomats in various world capitals.