Why ISIS should torment Omar Abdullah?

ByRSN Singh

16 Oct , 2014

ISIS Flags appeared In Jamia Masjid, Srinagar, Kashmir after Friday prayers

On October 10, masked men hoisted the ISIS flag in Srinagar’s Jamia Masjid. This incident followed the Friday prayers. A similar incident had taken place on October 6, wherein some youth waved the ISIS flag after Eid prayers. Three months earlier on June 27, some youth were seen carrying the same flag Friday prayers.

Do these separatists by inviting the ISIS want to purge the Shias in J&K in their desire to join the failed state of Pakistan? It appears so, because the ISIS that they support is rabidly anti-Shia.

In Kashmir the linkage between Friday prayers or religious gatherings, and demonstration of ISIS flags is, therefore unmistakable.

Despite these incidents or show of solidarity with the idea of Islamic Caliphate in the Kashmir Valley, on no less than three occasions in five months, the Hon’ble Chief Minister of J&K Mr Omar Abdullah maintains that there is no ISIS in the Kashmir, and all the reports and visual footage is a hype by the media. Significantly, the Chief Minister made comments to this effect as he emerged from the Union Home Minister’s office.

Mr Abdullah should be very concerned that the last two incidents took place even as the State is struggling to recover from the most devastating floods in the history of that land. During these floods, the Indian Armed Forces put their own families and lives at stake to provide rescue, relief and rehabilitation to the affected, which includes the ‘separatist leaders’. The same separatist leaders who after being rescued, tried to hijack relief material once the situation abated.

Mr. Abdullah, the young Chief Minister of J&K, should be disturbed at the abysmal dehumanization of elements within the population. They are only confined to the Kashmir Valley of the State. No floods and no outreach by the Union could wean these elements from the path of religious radicalization. How diabolical?

The entire country rallied behind the flood affected in Kashmir. Goodwill and resources flowed and continue to flow. The per capita expenditure by the Union government has always been highest with regard to Kashmir. These elements in the Kashmir Valley have defied the oft repeated logic that development unites. Even after the floods, the separatists continue to clamour for Pakistan, which was created as a homeland for Muslims. The Ahamadiyas and Shias find this homeland veritable hell. The violence against Shias and Ahamadiyas, leave alone the barbarism against Hindus and Christians, have deflated all the pretentions of Pakistan of being secular in governance.

No jihadi discourse has elicited as much support as ISIS. There has been unprecedented support from even Western countries.

Do these separatists by inviting the ISIS want to purge the Shias in J&K in their desire to join the failed state of Pakistan? It appears so, because the ISIS that they support is rabidly anti-Shia. In fact, the ISIS speaks of Sunni supremacy. The Islamic caliphate that they envisage has only a subsidiary and subordinate status for Shias.

The ISIS spokesperson Abu Mohammad al-Adnani has spoken about transforming Iraq into a living hell for Shias and called for destruction of Nazaf and Karbala. In fact, the guiding philosophy of ISIS is not ‘anti-Westernism’ or ‘pan-Islamism’, it is patently and unequivocally ‘pan-Sunnism’.

Double Trouble: American Strategic Options Regarding ISIS

Daniel L. Davis

October 15, 2014

On September 10, President Barak Obama announced that he had ordered the United States military to conduct airstrikes against the Islamic State (known as ISIS and ISIL). He said, “Our objective is clear: We will degrade, and ultimately destroy, ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy… That means I will not hesitate to take action against ISIL in Syria, as well as Iraq.” Many well-known former US officials, both Democrat and Republican, were quick to share their opinions regarding how the President’s plan might be adjusted to ensure success. The recommendations offered by a number of these senior officials, however, exposes a troubling lack of understanding of critical on-the-ground fundamentals and an almost disregard for a decade’s worth of physical evidence. If this advice were to be acted upon in the future, the current bad situation could deteriorate into disaster.

One week after the speech, former Republican Secretary of Defense Robert Gates voiced his disapproval of the President’s vow that the mission would not result in American “boots on the ground.” The reality, he said on CBS This Morning, is that “they're not gonna be able to be successful against ISIS strictly from the air, or strictly depending on the Iraqi forces, or the Peshmerga, or the Sunni tribes acting on their own… So there will be boots on the ground if there's to be any hope of success in the strategy.” Former Democratic President Bill Clinton, meanwhile, shared a very different opinion about the use of ground troops.

On September 23 he told a CNN audience he believed the mission would require “an extended involvement with air power and with providing intelligence and other institutional support to the people who are fighting ISIS… I actually think in this case the…strategy has a chance to succeed… We don't need to be there on the ground and I don't think it means a land war in Iraq." There was one important point on which both men agreed: both maintained the mission could succeed if President Obama would only follow their advice. Current conditions in the region and an analysis of numerous wars and battles over the past two decades, however, suggest that both are wrong.

Consider a few critical facts regarding the situation with ISIS before US airstrikes began. Many of the members of the self-proclaimed Islamic State have a decade or more experience in fighting insurgent and guerilla warfare. As most know, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS, has fought against the US in Iraq since 2003. al-Baghdadi and his men are well acquainted with the capabilities and limitations of American air power, and critically, how to survive it by burrowing deeper into civilian areas.

Further, and of greater significance to the current situation, since 9/11 there has been no location in the world where modern air power – even when complemented with hundreds of thousands of ground troops – has militarily defeated a committed insurgent enemy. The list is long and painful: Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Syria, Libya, the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, and others.

Many in recent months have argued that the 2007 surge in Iraq “set the conditions” for success in Iraq, but the Obama Administration’s inability to keep 10,000 US troops there after 2011 was, as former Army General Jack Keane recently said, “an absolute strategic failure.” Such claims, however, do not stand up to examination. An analysis of the 2007 Iraq surge and scrutiny of the current situation in Afghanistan explains why this claim is dubious at best.

In combination with the tactical cooperation of Sunni tribes, the 2007 Iraq surge succeeded in reducing the violence by the near-destruction of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). But as has been well chronicled in recent weeks, AQI wasn’t destroyed. It merely limped off to reform itself, learned from its mistakes, and renamed itself Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). In 2013 ISI moved across the border into Syria to fight in the civil war, changed its name to Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and by February of this year launched an offensive, eventually capturing large swaths of Syria and Iraq.

Can Syria be Obama's Vietnam?

It's not a silly question at all

Inder Malhotra

Source Link

ON the face of it the question I have raised does look silly. After all President Barack Obama, whose supporters call him a “gloomy realist”, has learnt the lessons of not only the Vietnam war but also of those in Iraq and Afghanistan, America’s longest war. In this it is ending its combat role while retaining a relatively small number of American troops there to train and advise the Afghan National Army. More remarkably, while announcing his plan to “degrade and finally destroy the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria”, Obama made it clear that this objective would be achieved by intensive air strikes on the ISIS (besides sending some special forces to Iraq) and there would be “no boots on the ground”.

Before proceeding further, let me admit that the headline I have used is taken verbatim from The New York Times of October 7. In the article under it eminent historians have argued that half a century ago President Lyndon Johnson had also authorised “only a strategic bombing campaign” against targets in North Vietnam, but this was swiftly followed by deployment of ground troops. The rest of the story, including LBJ's undoing, is well known. To the argument that Johnson was deeply committed to winning the war in Vietnam and had indeed made it a “personal war”, historians reply that this widely held belief is factually wrong. They have cited evidence to show that privately Johnson often told his confidants and aides that there “was no point fighting when there was no daylight in sight”. Another quote attributed to him is: “What can Vietnam mean to me?” Yet he had to go on escalating the war in Vietnam under "pressure" from his hard-line adviser who felt that the withdrawal from or defeat in Vietnam would have a “domino effect”. Some are suggesting that Obama may soon be in the same plight that LBJ was in then.

This assessment must not be swept away with a flippant wave of the hand. For only one month after its start, the failure of Obama's current strategy is becoming evident and he obviously cannot call it a day. One of the several points on which there is unanimity among military leaders, diplomats and analysts is that air strikes alone cannot defeat the IS. At best these might have delayed the Islamists' advance but the air strikes haven't prevented their conquests. Their grip on strategically vital Kurdish town of Kobane on Syria’s northern border with Turkey is undeniable. In a few places the air strikes have helped the Kurds regain some territory from the IS but the Islamists control large areas in Syria and Iraq. Security in the Sunni-dominated Iraqi province of Anbar is deteriorating fast. Even more stark is the success of IS fighters in overrunning several Iraqi army bases, and seizing Abu Ghraib, which is within shelling distance of Baghdad's international airport. Alarmed over this, the Americans, for the first time, sent Apache helicopters to strike at the IS targets on the road that runs west of Baghdad to the IS stronghold of Falluja. The Economist's comment on this is eloquent and revealing: “Calling up the Apaches — no boots on the ground, perhaps, but certainly boots in the air — is an admission that the high-flying jets have their limitation”. A further problem confronting Obama is that some of its “willing allies” bomb only Iraq whose government has invited them to do so, but are staying away from Syria. A cruel irony is that the American air strikes on Syria have driven the “moderate fighters against President Assad of Syria”, whom the Americans were hoping to train and arm, to the side of the jihadists!

Moreover, despite the change of government in Iraq at American behest, Baghdad is still unable to win over suspicious Sunnis. Despite America’s strong advice to the new government to be more inclusive, Shia militias of Iraq are still killing Sunnis. The US knows that the country best able to persuade the Shia-led government in Baghdad to win the confidence of the Sunni minority that ruled in the era of Saddam Hussein is Iran. But then Iran is the closest ally of Assad-led Syria. No wonder Saudi Arabia, the leader of the Sunnis and a bitter rival of Shia Iran, saying openly and loudly that the war in the Middle East will last long and also become a source of terrorism in both the West and the East. In this context one has to bemoan the tragic fact that, in the words of an eminent Kurd leader on the CNN, “the Iraqi army no longer exists; it has evaporated”.

ISIS Has a Bigger Coalition Than We Do

Michael Daly

10.15.14

The Daily Beast

In the ’30s, Spain attracted the world’s romantic idealists. Now the ‘caliphate’ is drawing psychopathic losers from countless countries—and they’ll risk all to feel like winners.

As President Obama met Tuesday with the defense ministers of 21 nations to strategize against ISIS, the terror state in the making extended its murder spree with jihadis from that many countries and more.

The same way that the fight for the Spanish Republic in the 1930s drew romantic idealists from all over the world, the jihad for an Islamic caliphate is attractingpsychopathic losers from seemingly everywhere.

These vile volunteers from at least 25 nations include not just the British-accented monster who has been videoed beheading Western hostages, but a fighter who sounds distinctly Trinidadian.

That fighter’s name is Shane Crawford, and he is one of at least four Trinidadian jihadis fighting with ISIS. He is the central figure in a video that is on one level more disturbing than the ones showing the beheadings.

In this other video, 29-year-old Crawford is not committing an atrocity such as might be expected of ISIS. He is instead frolicking with his pals in the Euphrates River as if they were not a crowd of murderers but simply a bunch of frat bros.

“It’s not that bad,” exclaims Crawford, aka Asadullah. “When you come out, you not feeling cold again!”

His giddy glee turns sickening when you consider the coldhearted inhumanity that necessarily lies beneath. He surely knows of his group’s unending beheadings and mass executions.

“I made ghusul in the Euphrates!” he boasts.

Ghusul is a ritual cleansing from head to toe, in this instance performed with all the solemnity of a trip to a water park. He exuberantly announces this winter day’s Celsius temperature.

“Minus one degree!”

Another fighter has on a black mask such as a beheader would wear and now begins to undress to join Crawford and their pals. Crawford leads them in plunging back into the river whose waters fed the first civilization. They whoop just as if they were partying and then call out just as they might at an execution:

“Allahu Akbar!”

That they would give the same cry in mirth as they would in murder makes you think that they are propelled not by fervent faith but by some twisted desire for excitement, be it diving into a historic river or hacking off somebody’s head.

In another ISIS video, the central figure’s identity is more difficult to discern. But the accent is just as clearly Trinidadian as he cracks jokes about a severed head he holds by the hair in his right hand.

“See, he doesn’t smile today,” the Trini-terrorist says of the victim. “This guy died of natural causes—by a knife. It cut this throat. Natural causes for an apostate.”

ISIS’s power ultimately derives from how unhorrified its frontline fighters are at the prospect of their own deaths. What scares them is the prospect of returning to the lives such as they led before jihad.

He tosses the head aside and there comes the same cry heard by the river:

“Allahu Akbar!”

A third ISIS video shows another man with a Trinidadian accent, a child on his hip. He grins as if all his hopes had been realized.

Republicans Are Pressing the ISIS Fear Button Hard for Midterm Votes

Josh Rogin

10.15.14

The Daily Beast

Jihadis pouring across the border. Obama powerless to respond to the chaos. Democrats out to lunch. That’s the picture GOP campaigns and political groups are painting—and it’s working.

As the war against ISIS in Iraq and Syria flails, Republican congressional candidates and political action groups are spending at breakneck speeds to attach the calamity to Democratic incumbents in vulnerable seats, and the worse it gets overseas, the worse it gets for those Democrats.

Less than a month before Election Day, national security and foreign policy hasemerged as a top-tier campaign issue for the first time in several years. In aGallup poll released Monday, 78 percent of respondents said “the situation with Islamic militants in Iraq and Syria” was extremely or very important to their vote. That’s higher than the number of voters who are focused on the budget deficit, equal pay for women, immigration, and Obamacare, just behind jobs and the economy. The poll also showed Republicans with a 19 percent advantage over Democrats on ISIS and a 13 percent advantage on foreign affairs in general. In Gallup’s April survey, foreign affairs ranked low on the voters’ list of priorities and ISIS wasn’t even on the questionnaire.

In recent weeks, GOP campaigns and outside groups, looking for any voter trend to capitalize on in the homestretch, have seized on Democratic incumbents’ records on foreign policy and their past support for Obama administration policies. On Tuesday, the National Republican Senatorial Committee released a series of ads in four close Senate races focused on the president’s perceived foreign-policy failures.

“Big money is going toward foreign policy, people are investing in it. Jobs and the economy will always be No. 1, but this has popped from issue maybe 5 or 6 to maybe 2 or 3,” said Joe Pounder, president of America Rising LLC, which works with several GOP campaigns. “ISIS is just one of the things leading to a crisis mentality among voters. And when you don’t have much new in the way of the economy going on, this is the new issue.”

While the campaigns had been doing much of the spending on their own, big super PACs and issue advocacy organizations are now joining the fight, spending millions on new national-security-related ads, according to public disclosures. The groups now increasing their investments in national-security-related ads include Crossroads GPS, the Ending Spending Action Fund, the Koch brothers-backed Concerned Veterans for America, and many others.

Their strategy is twofold: to paint the Obama administration and its supporters in Congress as failed stewards of foreign policy who have put the country at greater risk, and to call into question the competence and consistency of incumbent Democrats with incomplete or incoherent messages on the crises in Iraq and Syria.

A Sept. 30 NRSC ad attacks Colorado Sen. Mark Udall for saying, “ISIS does not present an imminent threat to our nation.” (He later walked back that comment.) The NRSC’s Oct. 13 ad on Udall alleges that he missed over 60 percent of Senate Armed Services Committee meetings.

“Obama’s foreign policy has already led to one slaughter in Iraq and Syria, and it may lead to another here in November for the Democrats.”

The Air War Against ISIS: The Deciding Factor

Clint Hinote

October 14, 2014

On the first night of airstrikes against ISIS in Syria, U.S. warplanes were not alone. They were accompanied by several others in the anti-ISIS coalition, including fighter aircraft from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This is a big deal.

Over several decades, the United States has provided advanced equipment and world-class training for partner nations, including the five mentioned above. These investments have been controversial at times, but now they are having significant payoffs. The continued participation of Middle Eastern states in anti-ISIS operations is crucial for their long-term success, and it has far-reaching implications for U.S. leadership throughout the world.

With U.S. help, these air forces have made tremendous progress. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE have purchased very capable aircraft from the United States. UAE F-16s, for example, are superior in many respects to the United States’ legacy F-16s. In addition to providing advanced equipment, the United States has encouraged participation in the most realistic training exercises, including the flagship Red Flag exercise in Nevada (where I had the opportunity to observe U.A.E. training personally).

Another major development is the Gulf Air Warfare Center in U.A.E., which has grown steadily since its establishment in 2000 to become a leader in tactical training. Its “Iron Falcon”exercise comes complete with dedicated aircraft that act as the enemy, excellent planning and briefing facilities, and tracking and debriefing technology that allows the participants to visualize how the battle unfolded—and identify what they could do better.

The payoff for these investments came last month when Middle Eastern air forces participated in airstrikes against ISIS in Syria. As a U.S. Air Force weapons and tactics instructor, I have helped to plan numerous raids and strikes similar to this one. Prior to my experiences with partner nations at Red Flag, I would have argued against having them participate on a first-night strike where precise execution is critical for both safety and mission accomplishment. I simply would not have trusted the Middle Eastern air forces to be where they were supposed to be.

My opinion of them changed as I watched their growth in realistic training scenarios. These air forces prepared well in peacetime, and when war came, they were ready. They have acquitted themselves well against ISIS, and their performance shows how much progress they have made since partnering with the United States.

Solid tactics cannot win wars in the absence of good strategy; this is another reason why these nations’ participation is critical. If we are to “destroy” ISIS, it will not be accomplished with military power. Instead, the ideology that fuels ISIS must be soundly rejected by people around the world, and most importantly, it must be disavowed by Sunnis in the Middle East. Having adherents of Sunni Islam participate in attacking ISIS sends a powerful message to the rest of the Sunni world that the teachings of ISIS are flat wrong. It also sent a message to others that Middle Eastern countries are willing to stand against ISIS, making it much more palatable to join a coalition that has now grown to over forty members.

Daily CENTCOM Brief on Airstrikes in Iraq and Syria

October 14, 2014

U.S., Partners Continue Airstrikes Against ISIL

From a U.S. Central Command News Release

TAMPA, Fla., Oct. 14, 2014 - U.S. and partner-nation military forces continued to attack Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant terrorists in Syria yesterday and today, using bomber and fighter aircraft to conduct 22 airstrikes, U.S. Central Command officials reported.

Separately, Centcom officials said, U.S. military forces used attack aircraftyesterday to conduct an airstrike against ISIL in Iraq.

In Syria, 21 airstrikes near Kobani destroyed two ISIL staging locations and damaged another, destroyed one ISIL building and damaged two others, damaged three ISIL compounds, destroyed one ISIL truck, destroyed one ISIL armed vehicle and one other ISIL vehicle, officials said.

As part of these strikes, an additional seven ISIL staging areas, two ISIL mortar positions, three ISIL occupied buildings and an ISIL artillery storage facility were struck. A strike near Dayr az Zawr struck a modular oil refinery. Initial indications are that these strikes were successful, officials said.

These airstrikes are designed to interdict ISIL reinforcements and resupply and prevent ISIL from massing combat power on the Kurdish held portions of Kobani, officials explained.

Saudi Arabia also participated

To conduct these strikes, U.S. forces used fighter and bomber aircraft deployed to the Centcom area of operations. In addition, officials said, fighter aircraft from Saudi Arabia participated in these airstrikes.

Centcom continues to closely monitor the situation in Kobani, officials said, and indications are that airstrikes have slowed ISIL advances. But the security situation on the ground there remains fluid, they added, with ISIL attempting to gain territory and Kurdish militia continuing to hold out.

In Iraq, one strike southwest of Kirkuk destroyed an ISIL armed vehicle and another ISIL vehicle.

All aircraft departed the strike areas safely, Centcom officials said.

IN IRAN – ‘THE DARK KNIGHT RISES,’ TEHRAN’S SECRET COVERT OPS PUPPET MASTER

BY SIOBHÁN O’GRADY

October 15, 2014 

Excerpt:

In the United States, the subject of Suleimani is one that is particularly sensitive. A former Iranian soldier who fought in the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988, Suleimani quickly rose through the ranks of Iran’s national military. He was named a Quds commander in 1998 and gained fame when he led Quds operatives on a special mission to southern Lebanon that helped end the Israeli occupation there.

Though the United States and Iran have refused to negotiate since 1979, Suleimani’s relationship with Washington was not always so cut-and-dry. Even as he operated out of the former American Embassy in Tehran, he was the organizer of secret meetings between Iranian and American diplomats in Geneva after 9/11 that were intended to help destroy their common enemy: the Taliban.

But in early 2002, George W. Bush named Iran a member of the “Axis of Evil” in the Middle East, in what Ryan Crocker, the former American ambassador to Iraq, called a decision that “changed history.”

The Dark Knight Rises

For years Qassem Suleimani has been Iran’s secret covert-ops puppet master. Why has he suddenly stepped out of the shadows?

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ articles/2014/10/14/the_dark_ knight_rises_qassem_suleimani_ iran_quds_force

Qassem Suleimani, a silver-haired Iranian spymaster Washington has long disparaged as a terrorist, has spent decades staying out of public view as he quietly worked to funnel arms and money to Iranian proxies and allies across the Middle East. Now, he’s stepping into the limelight as the face of Tehran’s intensifying battle with the Islamic State.

In recent weeks, photos of Suleimani on a mountaintop alongside Yazidi elders who had faced extermination at the hands of the Islamic State and shaking hands with Kurdish Peshmerga fighters on battlefields in Kurdistan have been widely shared on Twitter, Facebook, and Iranian state-run media. That means the once-elusive leader of the Quds Force, a branch of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard responsible for high-profile missions outside of Iran, is enjoying a strange form of celebrity among those cheering Iran’s willingness to deploy small numbers of ground troops against the Islamic State, something Washington has steadfastly refused to do.

Suleimani’s emergence highlights the vastly different ways Washington and Tehran are trying to portray their roles in the fight against the Islamic State. While the United States downplays its involvement in strikes against the militants by hiding under the umbrella of a fragile coalition, the Iranian government is taking a totally different approach: boasting of its solo ventures into Iraq and trying to argue that Iran, not the United States, deserves credit for recent victories, no matter how temporary.

According to reports from the Guardian, soon after the first images of Suleimani appeared, Yadollah Javani, a senior advisor to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said on Iranian state TV that “Baghdad was prevented from falling because of the presence and assistance of the Islamic Republic.”

Iran’s Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh made similar assertions on state TV about the preservation of Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, which was nearly captured by ISIS militants last month.

For U.S. officials, Suleimani’s leadership role in the fight against the Islamic State is a double-edged sword. Senior American military and intelligence officials have long seen Suleimani as an unusually canny adversary who has managed to build and maintain a network of proxies ranging from Hezbollah in Lebanon to an array of Shiite militias inside Iraq. With Washington seeking allies in the fight against the Islamic State, Suleimani has decades of experience cajoling others into fighting on his country’s behalf.

At the same time, U.S. officials believe that Suleimani was responsible, at least in part, for hundreds of American combat deaths in Iraq. Shiite militias used advanced weapons called explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) to destroy American armored vehicles and kill those inside. Those weapons were almost certainly made in Iran and then given, using networks Suleimani helped establish, to Shiite fighters. The militants also used Iranian-made rockets and mortars to batter the Green Zone in central Baghdad.

Politics Keep Syrian Kurdish Troops From Fighting in Their Homeland

Vager Saadullah

Oct 15, 2014

Source Link

Never mind Islamic State—one faction rejects another’s fighters

Back in September, Kurdish Peshmerga forces attacked the Islamic State-held village of Hassan Sham, just 30 kilometers from Mosul in northern Iraq. Six Pesh died in the fighting.

Three of them were from Syrian Kurdistan, two from Iraqi Kurdistan and one from Turkish Kurdistan. Their deaths in battle—and the way Kurdish forces returned their bodies to their families—illustrate the complexity of the Kurds’ anti-Islamic State coalition.

While pretty much all the various Kurdish factions are fighting Islamic State, they aren’t necessarily fighting Islamic State together. And one possible reason … is a chilling one.

Some Kurds have suggested that the regime of Syrian president Bashar Al Assad, which has systematically oppressed Syrian Kurds, is now backingsome Kurdish factions in Syria in order to open up an eastern front against Islamic State.

If true, Al Assad’s support could be driving a wedge between the Kurds, all of whom oppose Islamic State—and most of whom also oppose Al Assad.

The three Syrian Kurdish Peshmerga who died in Hassan Sham—Jomard Msho, Sulaiman Hamza Haji and Daleel Ahmad—first came to Iraqi Kurdistan as refugees from Syria’s three-year-old civil war.

The Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government and the Kurdish National Council—the latter a Syrian entity—offered some of these refugees military training. The goal was to reinforce Syrian Kurdish fighters in their struggle against both Al Assad’s brutal regime and Islamic extremists.

But this new force was unable to enter to Syria from Iraq because of disagreements between the Kurdish National Council and another Syrian-Kurdish group, the People’s Council of Western Kurdistan.

The factions still hadn’t resolved their disagreements by the time Islamic State attacked Iraqi Kurdistan this summer. So the Syrian-Kurdish Peshmerga troops instead joined the KRG’s own Iraqi Peshmerga in battling the militant invaders.

Yes, it’s confusing.

Above—Peshmerga troops stand along a road on the Iraq-Syria border before returning their comrades’ remains to Syria. At top—a Pesh kisses the coffin of a fallen comrade. Vager Saadullah photos

Solidarity

On Sept. 17, Syrian-Kurdish Peshmerga troops, officials from the Iraqi KRG and Syrian Kurdish parties and thousands of Syrian refugees living in Iraqi Kurdistan gathered to honor the three Syrian-Kurdish Peshmerga who died in Hassan Sham.

They assembled on the Iraq-Syria border crossing at Peshabour. Peshmerga troops carried the bodies into Syria, where another crowd waited to receive them.

Mustafa Shafeeq Ari—the KRG’s deputy prime minister—recited a speech. He told the crowd that the six Peshmerga who died were martyrs not just for Kurdistan, but for all humanity.

Mustafa Shafeeq Ari, at center in the grey suit. Vager Saadullah photo

“The Peshmerga are not only fighting for Kurdistan, but fighting against the brutality that is trying to darken all human life,” Ari said. “Until now our fighting was for life and death in Kurdistan. But from now, this fight is about the victory of light against darkness.”

Ari insisted that deaths of Syrian Kurds fighting in Iraq has symbolic significance.

THE FIGHT GOES ON IN ANBAR: ISIL VS THE WORLD

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

October 15, 2014

Source Link

Over the past week, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has been able to build on its previous gains in Iraq’s Anbar province. The situation in the province has rapidly deteriorated. At this point, the districts of al-Qa’im, Anah, Hit, Fallujah, and Karmah are all under the control of anti-government forces—which amounts to about 80% of the province. As was the case for last week’s report, this new contribution draws heavily on regional Arabic-language reporting to chronicle ISIL’s continuing victories in Anbar.

Beginning on October 6, ISIL mounted a direct attack into Tuway Albu Risha, farmland located on the western side of Ramadi that belongs to the Albu Risha tribe. This tribe was an important part of the Sahwa (Awakening) movement in the 2005-07 period. Our recent article on ISIL’s Anbar offensive noted the centrality of the field commander Umar al-Shishani, who has employed tactics far different from those ISIL utilizes elsewhere in Iraq and Syria. In most areas of Iraq and Syria, the group has fought like a conventional military, but this isn’t the case in Anbar. Shishani has emphasized speed and agility, and his tactics have several layers of complexity, including regularly utilizing feints and harassing attacks to try to force his opponents to chase him and thus place themselves in a vulnerable position.

Shishani’s October 6 attack on Tuway Albu Risha was actually something of a military sprint. In addition to striking Tuway Albu Risha, he hit three major targets around Hit (Jazirat Albu Nimr and the villages of al-Furat and Dulab) and three targets east of Ramadi (the village of Hamidiyah and land belonging to the Albu Itha and Albu Shihab tribes). These strikes succeeded in luring three Iraqi security forces (ISF) platoons outside of Ramadi, after which he encircled them for two days.

On October 8, Shishani launched further attacks west of Ramadi—including against Khamsah Kilu (essentially a roadhouse at a five-kilometer marker) and Zangora—as well as against Zabiriyah, which is located between Hit and Baghdad. The following day, he hit Camp Warrar in western Ramadi and launched a raid into northern Ramadi. On October 10, Shishani attacked both al-Madham and the 1st Regiment Headquarters in Ramadi. On October 11, ISIL overran the villages of Salamiyah and Zushaykhah near Hit, and mounted large-scale attacks against both Tuway Albu Risha and Amiriyah. This should provide some indication of the pace of Shishani’s attacks, as well as the geographic range of his operations.

Many of the locations that Shishani attacked are extremely obscure—and indeed, many of the locations he attacked made it through the entire U.S. war in Iraq without a single recorded attack against American forces. Further, with the exception of Hit (which fell to ISIL on Monday), Shishani has still made no effort to actually take and hold territory. He is instead deliberately baiting the Iraqi Security Forces and Sahwa out into the open, causing them to divide their forces, and then picking and choosing where to fight them with overwhelming force. The last week’s fighting resulted in a majority of the 1,800 total Sahwa casualties in Anbar that have beenreported by CNN—a completely unsustainable rate of attrition for the Sahwa.

To prevent the United States from using close air support in defense of anti-ISIL positions in Anbar, Shishani has outfitted his troops with captured Stinger missiles. He has been steadily reinforcing his fighters in Anbar, with 400 fresh troops recently brought in from Syria.

The difference between Shishani’s approach and that of other ISIL factions is underscored by the relative size of their units. ISIL’s standard model is to have 300 to 350 fighters per front, while Shishani’s al-Aqsa Battalion appears to be fighting in groups no larger than fifty. The larger model ISIL employs elsewhere has been considerably less effective than Shishani’s in the face of airstrikes.

Indeed, ISIL has settled into a largely defensive posture throughout the majority of Iraq in an effort to avoid airstrikes and artillery. This is a harbinger that other ISIL factions will likely need to adopt Shishani’s methods or risk losing momentum. This, however, presents one of the dilemmas that ISIL has created for itself through its caliphate declaration: while an insurgent model may be more advantageous, ISIL needs to maintain a viable state-like façade to defend the legitimacy of its claims. The group is therefore not as flexible as some other militant organizations.

Moral Hazard in the Gaza Strip

Paul R. Pillar

October 15, 2014

The passage in the British House of Commons of a resolution favoring recognition of a Palestinian state, coming on the heels of the Swedish government's announcement of its intention to extend such recognition, is the latest indicator of European disgust with Israeli policies. Recognizing a Palestinian state is, of course, an empty gesture as long as no such state exists on the ground, and the ground that would constitute such a state is under another state's occupation. But recognition is a peaceful and respectable way to express dismay. The Conservative MP who chairs the House of Commons foreign affairs committee probably was speaking for many both inside and outside Parliament when he said that he had “stood by Israel through thick and thin” but that “over the past 20 years...Israel has been slowly drifting away from world public opinion,” and that “such is my anger over Israel's behavior in recent months that I will not oppose the motion. I have to say to the government of Israel that if they are losing people like me, they will be losing a lot of people.”

As the comments of the MP suggest, the behavior that is the object of the dismay and anger has both long-term and short-term components. The long-term part is the continued Israel occupation of conquered territory, with the accompanying subjugation of Palestinians and denial to them of political rights. In the shorter term is the destruction that the Israeli military wreaked on the Gaza Strip earlier this year, in an operation that began when the Netanyahu government attempted to use force to disrupt a unity pact between the main Palestinian political factions. This week United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon toured the devastation in Gaza, remarking that “no amount of Security Council sessions, reports, or briefings could have prepared me for what I witnessed today.”

Another, even more recent, component of the Israeli-inflicted destruction in Gaza may also have influenced the mood of the Swedes, the MPs at Westminster, and indeed taxpayers in any Western country. At an international conference in Cairo participating countries pledged a total of $5.4 billion in aid, half for reconstruction in the Gaza Strip and the other half as budget support for the Palestinian Authority. Besides the sheer irksomeness of any of the rest of us in the world community having to pay to repair that damage, think about what this situation implies for Israeli incentives. The Israelis mow the lawn in Gaza as often as they like, and they don't even have to pay for the clean-up. They may even profit from itbecause any building supplies that Israel allows to enter the Strip generally come from Israeli sources. (Investment tip: it's time to be bullish on cement manufacturers in Israel.)

This is an example of what economists call moral hazard: of someone having no incentive to curtail risky (or in this case, outright destructive) behavior because someone else is covering the losses. This in turn is one reason to be pessimistic that the whole tragic cycle of periodic Israeli lawn-mowing will end any time soon. The Israelis' economic flank is covered by donor conferences, just as their political flank is covered by U.S. vetoes at the Security Council.

Those on the American political Right, who tend to be most sympathetic to those on the Israeli Right who are running that country, ought to think carefully about this situation and how it relates to the principles of economic policy in which they profess to believe. Governments, including the U.S. government, are stepping in with subsidies that are keeping people from being held accountable for their behavior and its consequences. This isn't just about makers and takers; it's makers and takers with the takers also being destroyers. The situation also ought to be thought of in terms of U.S. fiscal priorities. Any program for the benefit of the United States and U.S. citizens that gets brutalized in the Paul Ryan budget should be stacked up against U.S. subsidization of behavior by countries in the Middle East, and hard questions asked about what U.S. priorities ought to be.

Here's an approach to reconstruction from the most recent Gaza war that admittedly has no political chance of enactment but would be fair and principled: hold each side responsible for the destruction that it inflicted. Hamas would be responsible for paying for the damage it caused, including from rockets fired into Israel, and Israel would be responsible for the damage its forces inflicted.

Hamas by all reports is in tough financial shape; that's one of the incentives it had for making the unity agreement with Fatah. But the damage it caused in this summer's war was so small that Hamas's friends in Qatar and Turkey could cover the bill with loose change that has fallen between the cushions of their divans. Heck, one could probably even add to the bill the cost of the Iron Dome missiles that Israel fired at rockets that never caused any damage, and it would be a pretty painless check for the Qataris to write.

The damage that Israeli forces inflicted is many orders of magnitude greater. But Israel is also far wealthier. In terms of GDP per capita it ranks right between New Zealand and Spain, according to the International Monetary Fund. It certainly can pay the bill. And if it balks at doing so, there are established methods that can peacefully and legitimately be used to collect from deadbeats. The half of the pledges from the Cairo conference devoted to reconstruction in Gaza totals less than the more than $3 billion in annual aid the United States bestows on Israel. Apply a garnishment to less than a year's worth of the subsidy, and that bill is paid. Hold the taker/destroyer accountable.

Ukrainians Shop AUSA Floor For Drones, Armored Vehicles

By RICHARD WHITTLE

October 13, 2014 

Source Link

AUSA: With a long border to protect from Russia and $116 million in non-lethal U.S. military aid burning a hole in their pockets, representatives of Ukraine’s defense industry conglomerate UkrObornProm –“The State Concern” — came to the Association of the United States Army’s annual conference in Washington with a shopping list. Industry sources said the Ukrainians seemed to like what they saw for sale in the way of drones, helicopters and armored vehicles at Textron Systems, a conglomerate that can offer a wide range of weapons systems.

The Ukrainians specifically talked to Textron about the company’s unarmed Aerosonde Mark 4.7 and Shadow M2 drones, the latter a less capable version of the RQ-7B Shadow flown by the U.S. Army. They also showed interest in Textron’s Commando wheeled armored vehicle, which can be fitted with a screen to receive video feeds from drones. Textron announced Monday that NATO member Bulgaria is buying 10 Commandos, included an armed variant and an ambulance variant, for use by Bulgarian troops assigned to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

Beyond the drones and armored vehicles, industry sources said, the Ukrainians are interested in OH-58 Kiowa Warrior scout helicopters the Army is offering foreign nations as surplus defense equipment. The Army decided this year to retire the venerable Kiowa Warriors, made by Textron subsidiary Bell Helicopter, and use Boeing AH-64 Apache attack helicopters to perform the scout mission as well.

During a visit to Washington last month, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko asked for lethal military aid to help his country resist the threat from Russia, but President Obama so far has limited U.S. aid to non-lethal items.

De-Modernization and Degradation—A Net Assessment of Russia’s Domestic Situation Since the Start of 2014

By: Pavel K. Baev

October 14, 2014 

Pro-Kremlin activists rally in support of ethnic Russians in Ukraine. (Source: AFP)

Considering Russia’s shocking transformation in the course of just half a year, it is easy to forget that last February the country was united in the joy of hosting the Sochi Winter Olympic games. The issues that dominated the political agenda at the start of the year—like growing outrage over rampant corruption or concerns about the violent instability in the North Caucasus—have all but disappeared from the present-day debates. At the same time, the issues that one would expect to be at the top of the agenda currently—like the deteriorating economic situation or the falling ruble—attract some expert opinions but by far less public worry. Indeed, in today’s Russia, the basic trends of de-modernization and degradation are now beyond doubt.

Moscow’s swift annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula generated an explosion of public triumphalism that has flattened and simplified rather than enriched Russia’s political landscape. The regional elections in September were reduced to the pro-forma confirmation of the Kremlin-vetted candidates, and this year’s vote registered particularly low participation. In Moscow, for that matter, a legislature entirely free of opposition figures was duly elected, even though, just one year earlier, the opposition blogger Alexei Navalny gained surprisingly strong support in the capital’s mayoral elections. This growing irrelevance of domestic politics is aggravated by the Russian government’s aggressive and poisonous propaganda, which has become a political force in its own right. Opinion polls show the population’s apparent eagerness to subscribe to the simple solutions on offer: A strong majority of Russians consistently embraces the conflict with Ukraine and vouches that Russia is on the right course.

One figure stands in splendid isolation at the head of this course—President Vladimir Putin, whose approval ratings have reached the level typical for mature authoritarian leaders. After 15 years at the summit of power, and at just 62 years of age, he has established such dominance over other Russian elites that all speculations about a possible successor—so lively just a year ago, when he appeared at loss over how to address the steadily declining popularity of his regime—have now entirely ceased (Moscow Echo, October 7). Even if this absolute concentration of authority addresses some archaic deformities in the Russian political psyche, it nonetheless distorts the workings of the country’s huge bureaucratic machine, since all cadre or cash-flow decisions can only be taken at the supreme level and nothing is delegated. Putin’s mood swings and idiosyncrasies—like his disdain for the Internet—overrule every bureaucratic preference for stability and quiet self-enrichment.

This super-concentration of decision-making is particularly harmful for economic policy because Putin refuses to acknowledge the reality of stagnation turning into recession. Alexei Kudrin, the only person who was able to insist on common economic sense, has been expelled from the Kremlin; German Gref, the designer of the first set of reforms at the dawn of the Putin “era,” has been reduced to an eccentric contrarian; and court aides like Sergei Glazyev have learned to deliver only the advice that the boss likes to hear (Moskovsky Komsomolets, October 9). This explains such odd decisions by the Russian government as the enforcement of counter-sanctions (banning food imports from the West) that have inflicted great damage to Russia’s own agriculture, not to mention spur inflation. Such “mundane” matters as the devaluation of the ruble (last week, the ruble reached the landmark level of 40 for one US dollar) attract scant attention from the president. But one figure continues to touch an old raw nerve—the international oil price, which has slipped below the minimum level the Russian state budget needs to support the country’s generous social programs and re-armament goals (Gazeta.ru, October 7).

The erosion of the relative prosperity of the urban low-middle classes may now proceed quickly because the higher-middle classes (consisting primarily of government bureaucrats and security services personnel—siloviki) not only refuse to diminish their earnings by reducing their corrupt practices, but in fact continue to boldly pursue ever more brazen embezzlement schemes. This shameless profiteering is tacitly approved from above, since Putin is primarily concerned with elite loyalty, and largely ignored by the wider public opinion, which is focused on the Kremlin-directed “patriotic” agenda (Levada.ru, September 12). Alexei Navalny keeps his fierce anti-corruption campaign going, despite the pressure of his house arrest. He insists that public indifference is a transitory feature and that outrage will eventually return with a vengeance (Slon.ru, October 9). Over the course of this year, Russia’s liberal opposition was disheartened by the dominance of the triumphalist “Crimean” discourse and dismayed by the loud excoriation of a “fifth column.” Yet, the relative strength of the Peace March, held in Moscow on September 21, showed that the political opposition is, nevertheless, once more readying itself to challenge the entrenched Putinist system.

Ceasefire in Ukraine: An Assessment

Rajorshi Roy

October 14, 2014

Recently, two important agreements known as the Minsk agreements were signed by the governments of Ukraine, Russia, representatives of OSCE and Donbass region on September 5 and 20, 2014. These agreements outlined steps to de-escalate the mounting tensions including cessation of military hostilities, exchange of prisoners, protection of Russian language and gradual devolution of power. This key development came against the backdrop of a strong military offensive by the Ukrainian troops against the pro-Russian supporters, while the threat of a Russian military intervention loomed large. It led ‘Verkhovna Rada’, the Ukrainian Parliament, to pass a law sketching the contours of local self-government in south-eastern part the country.

While the ceasefire is a much needed respite yet it does raise two pertinent questions: What made the key players arrive at such agreements? Can these deals facilitate the initiation of a political dialogue in Ukraine?

The Agreements and Stakeholders

As the events in Ukraine unfolded, the agreements involving key protagonists was expected:

Russia

Russia’s stake in the ongoing crisis has been to retain its sphere of influence in the region. Having raised the stakes it would have been detrimental for President Putin to see pro-Russian supporters get defeated by the Ukrainian forces. However, a full scale Russian military intervention may not have been in Kremlin’s long term interest. Ukraine is not Crimea and nationalist sentiments even in the pro-Russian eastern Ukrainian cities run high. An intrusion could have fast-tracked Ukraine’s NATO membership and possibly led Moscow to international political isolation. Russia would also have to bear the cost of restoring the region’s crumbling economy. Therefore, a surge in military support that would allow the rebels to fight back and establish new areas of control seemed to solve the dilemma. This move enabled Russia to leverage its influence for policy decisions in Kiev. As the decision to suspend Ukraine’s Association Agreement with the EU prove, Moscow retained the decisive strings in this standoff.

Ukraine

The military setbacks suffered by government troops had left President Poroshenko with few options. There was a real danger of pro-Russian separatists gaining further territorial ground. With the Ukrainian economy in shambles and the core of its industries and natural resource base being in the restive south-east, Kiev could not afford to let go of this strategic region. Moreover, NATO’s refusal to strengthen Ukraine’s military capabilities and inability of the ‘West’ to meet its energy needs against the onset of winter forced the hands of President Poroshenko. The ceasefire paves the way for a modium of stability while preserving the country’s territorial integrity.

‘West’

A ceasefire suits both the US and EU since the only way to stop an imminent Russian military intervention would have been to send in NATO troops. But it is unlikely that the ‘West’ retains an appetite for a direct military confrontation with the Kremlin. The ceasefire allows it to continue to provide Ukraine with modest support without taking full responsibility for events there. Moreover, driven by strong economic and energy interdependence with Russia, EU’s backing for the Minsk dialogue reveals an intention to repair ties with Moscow. Interestingly, neither the US nor the EU is a party to the two agreements.

Consequently, the ceasefire allows all parties to recalibrate their positions while keeping the door open for a political reconciliation in this chess game of Eurasian geo-politics. 

Prospects

The first impression is that the agreements have the potential to diffuse the volatile atmosphere. Barring a few sporadic cases of violence the ceasefire has held so far. However, as always the devil lies in the details and several issues have started emerging:

First, with Parliamentary elections around the corner and having previously labelled the pro-Russian separatists as ‘terrorists’, it remains to be seen how much devolution of power is President Poroshenko willing to give in to. 

FBI Publishes List of Cyber Most Wanted

FBI National Press Office

October 14, 2014

Cyber’s Most Wanted: We Need Your Help

They are wanted on a variety of charges—like installing insidious malware on unsuspecting victims’ computers, hacking into company networks and stealing trade secrets and user identity data, selling fraudulent computer security programs and other bogus software, manufacturing spyware to intercept private communications, and illegally accessing financial accounts and stealing the funds. But these individual criminals all have one thing in common—they are fugitives from justice who are currently featured on the Cyber’s Most Wanted section of the FBI’s public website.

And during National Cyber Security Awareness Month, we’d like to call your attention to these nearly 30 individuals in the hope that someone, somewhere, has information that could lead to their apprehension.

Among the FBI’s wanted cyber fugitives are:

Five members of China’s People’s Liberation Army indicted on charges of illegally penetrating the networks of six U.S. companies and stealing proprietary information, including trade secrets;

The Russian administrator and other co-conspirators wanted in connection with an alleged scheme to install the Zeus malware on unsuspecting victims’ computers and capture bank account numbers, passwords, personal identification numbers, and other information needed to log into online bank accounts and make unauthorized transfers;

A New York-born man allegedly responsible for stealing the identities of 40,000 people and then using the stolen information to siphon funds from their brokerage or bank accounts and purchase expensive electronic items with their credit;

Two Pakistani nationals wanted for their alleged involvement in an international telecommunications scheme that defrauded unsuspecting individuals, companies, and government entities in both the United States and abroad out of more than $50 million by compromising business telephone systems; and

An El Salvadoran national allegedly involved in manufacturing spyware which was used to intercept the private communications of hundreds, if not thousands, of victims.

The FBI’s Most Wanted program is best known for its Ten Most Wanted Fugitives list, which was established more than 60 years ago and has become a symbol of the FBI’s crime-fighting ability around the world. But the Bureau highlights other wanted fugitives as well—terrorists, white-collar criminals, and increasingly, those who commit cyber crimes.

So take a look at our Cyber’s Most Wanted webpage, and if you have any information concerning any of these individuals—or any FBI wanted fugitive—please contact your nearest FBI office or nearest American Embassy or Consulate.