Michael Rubin
The Houthis, a Zaydi Shi’ite tribal group, from the mountains of northern Yemen in and around the town of Sa’dah, have controlled Yemen’s capital and broad swaths of northern Yemen for more than a decade. They impose themselves on the territory they control not by winning hearts and minds but, rather, by force of arms. To accomplish this,
they smuggle weaponry through the Red Sea port of Hudaydah and the Al-Mazyunah Free Zone along the Omani border. They also divert international assistance passing through Hudaydah, utilizing it for patronage and to reward their rank-and-file while starving Yemenis they deem disloyal.
The Islamic Republic’s investment in the Houthis is expensive. Arms shipments and logistics cost money that the regime no longer has. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps abandoned long-time ally Bashar al-Assad. They are struggling to defend Hezbollah and can do little to stop Israel’s operations against Hamas. As the regime needs to attend to its own internal security, the Houthis will likely face a reduction, if not a cut-off, in Iranian assistance.
If they cannot live off Iranian assistance and their ability to raise taxes or customs duties is limited, especially if they lose control over Hudaydah, what comes next for the Houthis?
It is wishful thinking to believe the Houthis will simply fade away; they crave both power and money. At the very least, the group’s leaders will need to raise funds to pay their rank-and-file. They may shroud themselves in the trappings of government, but they are essentially a criminal gang. But even criminal gangs need to make payroll.
The Trump administration may hope that the retraction of Iranian power will stabilize the region, but the Houthis will not simply disappear; rather, they will seek other ways to fill their coffers.
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