Mohmad Waseem Malla
Before the announcement of a “ceasefire” by U.S. President Donald Trump on May 10, the likelihood of India and Pakistan entering extended kinetic military activity, and potentially a conventional full-scale war, appeared more real than it has been at any time in recent years. The prelude to the ceasefire saw a marked military escalation that triggered a troubling erosion in the deterrence architecture that has governed India-Pakistan military behavior for decades, especially since their 1998 nuclear tests. However, with fighting now suspended, at least for the time being, the dust has settled on a notable moment of calibrated brinkmanship by both nations.
Following India’s “precision” strikes on the night of May 6-7 under Operation Sindoor – which targeted at least nine sites that India claimed to be militant logistical hubs in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir – Pakistan’s military establishment, widely regarded as the de facto authority on national security and regional policy, came under institutional and public pressure to respond. The retaliation came on May 10 under Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos, with Islamabad claiming targeted strikes on several Indian military installations, some of which were later acknowledged by New Delhi.
In the ensuing tit-for-tat escalation, India launched a second wave of strikes, initially claiming to have hit three Pakistani Air Force (PAF) bases: Nur Khan (Chaklala) near Rawalpindi, Murid (Chakwal), and Rafiqui (Shorkot, in Jhang district). Subsequently, the Indian government raised its claims of targeted PAF sites to eight, in addition to other military assets.
Now that the hostilities have stopped and the mutual “understanding” to halt the violence appears to be holding, it has raised some pertinent questions. One such question concerns the evolving military doctrines of both India and Pakistan and what this recent conflagration means for the two sides. While a broader conflict was averted, the May 6-10 engagements suggest an intensifying contest not just on the battlefield, but in the realm of military signaling and strategic posturing between these nuclear-armed countries. While New Delhi’s actions reflect an apparent shift toward establishing and enforcing an “escalation dominance” framework as a normative to dictate the tempo and terms of engagement, Islamabad’s response appeared seemingly calibrated to reassert the pre-crisis status quo.
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