6 October 2025

The Stunning Reversal in U.S.-India Relations

Isaac Chotiner

Almost exactly six years ago, Donald Trump and Narendra Modi headlined an event in the Houston Texans’ football stadium called “Howdy, Modi.” Trump, then in his first term as President of the United States, and Modi, just beginning his second term as Prime Minister of India, held hands and waved to a crowd of around fifty thousand people. The two leaders had each risen to power by taking over their country’s dominant conservative parties—in Modi’s case, the Bharatiya Janata Party (B.J.P.)—and reorienting them around the demonization of ethnic or religious minorities and the promise of economic competence. During Trump’s Howdy, Modi speech, he said, “You have never had a better friend as President than President Donald Trump, that I can tell you.” There are more than five million people of Indian origin in the U.S., and in three Presidential elections Trump has steadily increased his vote share in that group, from under thirty per cent, in 2016, to nearly forty per cent last year, according to some estimates. (Modi is tremendously popular with the Indian diaspora.)

And yet, despite the fact that Trump is back in office, and Modi was elected to a third consecutive term, the relationship between the two countries is at its lowest point in many years. Earlier this summer, Trump put a twenty-five-per-cent tariff on India; then, in late August, he doubled it to fifty per cent, arguing that the rate was meant to punish India for buying Russian oil. Trump had already enraged some Indians by taking credit for brokering a ceasefire, in May, between India and Pakistan, after the countries had engaged in their worst military conflict in decades. (Pakistan’s government said that it would nominate Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize; Modi, on a tense phone call with Trump, was reportedly unwilling to support such a proposal.) And now Modi, whose country was once seen by Washington as a bulwark against China in Asia, recently visited Tianjin as part of Xi Jinping’s push to create a new global diplomatic architecture without the United States.

To talk about the India-America relationship, I recently spoke by phone with Milan Vaishnav, a senior fellow and director of the South Asia program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed why Trump has really turned against India, whether Modi’s political standing in India is finally showing some signs of strain, and why Indian Americans have been so quiet about Trump’s India policies.

Why America Lost the War in Afghanistan: A Requiem Essay

Robert Bruce Adolph

America lost the war in Afghanistan. All the blood and treasure expended was – in the end – largely for naught. I understand why many who fought there might feel differently. It is terribly difficult to walk away from the massive sunk costs. The assertion that US efforts were in vain is a hateful idea to those who lost comrades-in-arms or were horribly scarred physically or psychologically. Tragically, the same was true of those in the US Armed Forces who battled bravely in Vietnam. The national warfighting strategy adopted in Southwest Asia by the Bush Administration clearly failed, leaving his successors with the ultimate recurring foreign policy disaster. Everyone involved is the worse for it, especially the Afghans who supported the US and its allies for more than 20 years. In this special issue of Atlantisch Perspectief on multilateralism, Afghanistan is also a recurring topic as America’s lost war is also a lost battle for the international community and multilateral collaboration.

The nation possesses one of the largest and best-funded militaries in the world. US troops are well-trained and disciplined. US general officers are well educated and dedicated to task under constitutionally mandated civilian authority. Moreover, NATO stood shoulder-to-shoulder with its ally. So, how could America lose? Warfighting strategies are gauged through an analysis of three factors: suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. Hint: America’s political and military leadership failed to appreciate all three. The US institutions of the Presidency, Congress, and Pentagon should step up and shoulder the blame. I am concerned that they won’t.

AN ABSURD OBJECTIVE

The opening successful strategic raid into Afghanistan was conducted by the CIA-supported 5th Special Forces Group in the fledgling months of the conflict. They won battle after battle with the assistance of the US Air Force and by making allies of the Afghan Northern Alliance. America should have left following those victories, goal achieved. But she remained based on the wrong-headed notion that the transformation of a centuries-old war-torn tribal society into a semi-modern liberal democracy was possible. Change on such a fantastic scale would have required a multi-generational commitment that was unsustainable. Plus, any competent cultural anthropologist would have confirmed that first allegiances in such societies are to self & family, and village & tribe. The emotional abstraction of primary loyalty to the nation-state in the cultural context of Afghanistan was therefore always amorphous, lacking in both form and substance. The rapid success of the Taliban because of mass desertions within the Afghan Army and security forces is proof of this assertion.

COMMENT: How water fuels conflict in Pakistan

Professor Daanish Mustafa

For ten days in April 2025, Pakistan almost came to a standstill. No freight was moving from its only port city, Karachi, towards the population centres in the north. The cause was the government’s announcement of a project to build six canals to irrigate the Cholistan Desert in the east of the country.

Protesters in the southern Sindh province, fearing diminished water supplies, demanded the immediate cancellation of the project and blocked all highways running northwards. The government soon relented, with prime minister Shehbaz Sharif announcing the project’s suspension in early May.

This was probably, at least in part, because the government was anticipating Indian military action. India blamed Pakistan for the Pahalgam terrorist attack, in which 26 people were killed in Indian-administered Kashmir the previous month. Internal squabbles had to be diffused in the face of external threats.

Geopolitics handed a temporary victory to the protesters. But the potential of water to cause conflict in Pakistan remains a live issue, from households using suction pumps to draw more than their share, to large inter-provincial disputes.

As someone who has researched water scarcity in Pakistan for 30 years, I argue that water conflict there is entirely avoidable. It is largely a function of the state’s obsession with supply-side mega projects and a lack of attention to questions of equitable access and quality.

At a time when the effects of climate change are becoming more severe, Pakistan can ill afford to continue its engineering-based approach to water if it is to ensure sufficient access for all.

According to the Pakistani government’s own figures, more than 95% of the available water in Pakistan is devoted to agriculture. It is used to cultivate water-guzzling crops, including rice and sugarcane. Pakistan is the fifth-largest producer and fourth-largest exporter of these crops.

Afghans rejoice as internet returns after Taliban blackout

Dearbail Jordan, Hafizullah Maroof

Afghans have taken to the streets to rejoice in the restoration of internet and telecom services after the Taliban government shut them down, provoking widespread condemnation.

Local reporters said communications were resuming, while internet monitor Netblocks said network data showed a "partial restoration" of connectivity.

A source close to the government confirmed to BBC Afghan that the internet was back by order of the Taliban prime minister.

The 48-hour blackout disrupted businesses and flights, limited access to emergency services and raised fears about further isolating women and girls whose rights have been severely eroded since the hardline Islamist group swept back to power in 2021.

On Wednesday evening hundreds of Afghans took the streets in the capital city Kabul to spread the word that the internet was back.

One man told BBC Afghan: "Everyone is happy, holding their cell phones and talking to their relatives.

"From women, to men and Talibs [a member of the Taliban], each was talking on phones after services were restored. There are more crowds now in the city."

Suhail Shaheen, a senior Taliban spokesman in Qatar, said "all communications" were restored by Wednesday afternoon.

The Taliban government has not given an official explanation for the shutdown.

However, last month, a spokesperson for the Taliban governor in the northern province of Balkh said internet access was being blocked "for the prevention of vices".

Since returning to power, the Taliban have imposed numerous restrictions in accordance with their interpretation of Islamic Sharia law.

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia Mutual Defense Pact: Important to Whom?

Rafiq Dossani

The mutual defense pact signed this month between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia has largely been interpreted as Riyadh’s attempt to secure access to nuclear deterrence, hedging against the possibility of an Israeli strike. But who else is it important to? Western media attention has focused on Israel and the United States as involuntary stakeholders.

For Riyadh, Pakistan has long been just a client state—to be bailed out financially in moments of crisis on the grounds of Muslim brotherhood. That Saudi Arabia is now seeking security support from Islamabad reflects a significant shift: the kingdom, shaken by Israel’s strike on Qatar, appears more willing to treat Pakistan as a partner rather than a dependent.

It is doubtful that Riyadh and Islamabad acted without Washington’s knowledge. Even so, the United States has little incentive to pick sides. Israel has already demonstrated its independence by striking Qatar despite American concerns. Iran’s nuclear program is in disarray and unlikely to be affected by the Saudi-Pakistan agreement. For Washington, the agreement offers neither leverage nor a significant policy pivot.

Under the new defense pact, any renewed Indian military operation against Pakistan could now be interpreted as an attack on Saudi Arabia.

But there are others. What has received little attention is the impact on India. Over the past decade, New Delhi has cultivated a strategic partnership with Riyadh. Military cooperation has expanded, with the two countries conducting joint exercises as recently as August 2025. In 2023, India and Saudi Arabia joined the United States, the European Union, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates in an initiative, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, to build a land-and-sea transport corridor linking India to Europe via the Gulf and Israel. The relationship is also solidly grounded in economics: in 2024, Indian workers in Saudi Arabia remitted $7 billion to India, remittances constituting an important contribution to India that dates to the 1970s. Currently, over 2.5 million Indians work in Saudi Arabia.

Asia's Gen Z rises up against entrenched political elites

Carole Dieterich (New Delhi, India, correspondence), Sophie Landrin (New Delhi, India, correspondent) and Brice Pedroletti (Bangkok, southeast Asia correspondent)

Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal: Since 2022, a "political tsunami" has swept through South Asia. The eruption, on September 8 and 9, of a protest movement in Kathmandu led by Gen Z, hyperconnected young people born between 1997 and 2012 known as "zoomers," marked the latest in a string of youth-led uprisings that have called for radical breaks with the past, a phenomenon that could spread to Indonesia and the Philippines.

In three years, three governments have fallen to street protests, with events accelerating at a dramatic pace. It only took five months for young Sri Lankans to oust the Rajapaksa dynasty, which had ruled the country for decades, in 2022; six weeks for Bangladeshis to force out Sheikh Hasina, who was 76 and had held power for more than 15 years, in 2024; and just two days for Nepal's Gen Z to bring down the government of Communist Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli, aged 73, in September 2025.

Pakistan, in May 2023, and Myanmar, in early 2021, might also have joined the list of these "Asian spring" movements, had both countries' extremely powerful militaries not brutally suppressed

Yarlung Tsangpo Hydropower Fuels PRC’s Energy-Computing Strategy

Owen Au & Ryan Wu

Tibet’s Yarlung Tsangpo hydropower project, which broke ground in July, is set to become the world’s largest hydrpower installation.

Officials see it as a key pillar of the PRC’s energy sovereignty and a step toward implementing the “total national security concept” and the “new energy security strategy.”

Beijing wants renewable energy sources in western China to power a surge of computing power and data centers as it seeks technological primacy, something Tibet could assist with.

Challenges persist, and the project has no fixed deadline in sight. Tibet’s remote location, extreme climate, and low level of development make integrating the region as a “national data hub node.”

On July 19, Premier Li Qiang (ๆŽๅผบ) launched construction of the Yarlung Tsangpo hydropower project (้›…้ฒ่—ๅธƒๆฑŸไธ‹ๆธธๆฐด็”ตๅทฅ็จ‹) in Nyingchi in the Tibet Autonomous Region, hailing it as the “project of the century” (ไธ–็บช้กน็›ฎ) (CCTV, July 19). For the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Yarlung project is an unprecedented engineering and energy gambit. At an estimated Renminbi (RMB) 1.2 trillion ($168 billion)—five times the cost of the Three Gorges Dam (ไธ‰ๅณกๅคงๅ)—it is slated to be the world’s largest hydropower installation (Xinhua, July 19). The design calls for five cascading stations burrowed into Tibet’s Great Bend gorge that, once completed, could generate up to 300 billion kWh per year, enough to power the homes of 300 million people (China Energy News, August 9, 2021; Ta Kung Pao, January 7).

International observers have warned that the Yarlung project could serve as a “water weapon” against downstream India and Bangladesh (The Guardian, July 21). This perspective often overlooks the its domestic logic as part of the PRC’s aims to become an “energy powerhouse” (่ƒฝๆบๅผบๅ›ฝ) (CCTV, April 13, 2022). Under these ambitions, the Yarlung project is intertwined with the country’s surging demand for computing power amid intensifying global technology competition.

Beijing Sees Hydropower as Grid Stabilizer

China Goes on Offense

Jeffrey Prescott and Julian Gewirtz

Agreat unanswered question of the second Trump administration has been how its outright rejection of the existing global order would affect China’s international strategy. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has called this order both “obsolete” and “a weapon being used against” the United States, and in his speech at the United Nations on September 23, President Donald Trump pilloried the “globalist” institution for “creating new problems for us to solve.” In the early months of this year, Beijing’s response to Washington’s attacks on the international order seemed mostly cautious and measured. China traded tit-for-tat tariffs with the United States, but it otherwise remained content to sit back and accrue benefits from Trump’s alienation of U.S. allies and withdrawal from international institutions.

That period of caution is now over. Beijing has decided on a much more ambitious course, putting its plans on vivid display at a September meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Hosting the once sleepy regional economic and security body, Chinese leader Xi Jinping clasped hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and met with 18 other leaders from across the Eurasian continent. A few days later, flanked by Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, Xi presided over a massive military parade in Beijing to show off China’s fast-growing arsenal. Trump’s comment about seeing the summitry on TV—“They were hoping I was watching, and I was watching”—inadvertently revealed the precise position in which China hoped to place the United States: the American president, so often the prime mover of global politics, had become a spectator on the sidelines of a changing world.

Xi aims to establish China as the fulcrum of an emerging multipolar world, and he is advancing a new, more active diplomatic strategy to realize that goal. Rather than force the United States out of its leading position in the international system or overturn the existing order, China is exploiting Trump’s rapid, willing abdication of Washington’s role. And China is building up its own power and prestige within existing institutions, seeking to shift their centers of gravity irrevocably toward Beijing. If this gambit succeeds, it will transform the international order from the inside out, placing China at center stage and undermining U.S. influence in ways that future American administrations may find difficult to reverse.

WORLD BUILDING

Netanyahu's bet fails

Lawrence Freedman

Yesterday’s strike by Israel was intended to kill off not only what was left of Hamas’s top leadership as they met in Qatar, but also the peace plan that they were discussing. It failed in the first objective. Did it also fail in the second? The natural assumption is that it is hard to complete even a mediated negotiation with people you have just tried to blow up. But the manner of the attack and its failure to achieve its primary aim changed the power dynamics behind the negotiations. This is especially the case because of the annoyance it caused Donald Trump.

Targeted assassinations have long played a prominent role in Israeli strategy against those organisations committed to its destruction. The value of such an approach is debated less than it should be. In practice these organisations rarely stay decapitated for long and it is not always the case that the successors are less competent or ruthless than those killed. In the case of the pursuit of those responsible for the attacks of 7 October 2023 there is clearly an element of retribution, but that leaves open the question of whether the elimination of particualr individuals makes it harder or easier to deal with Hamas militarily or politically.

At any rate Israel has worked hard on this element of its strategy and has achieved many successes. It has murdered over the years leaders of Hezbollah and of Hamas, as well as Iranian military commanders and nuclear scientists. On 30 August Ahmed al-Rahawi, the prime minister of the Houthi-controlled government in the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, was killed in an Israeli strike along with several ministers. In mounting these strikes, Israel has shown ingenuity in gathering intelligence on the movements and location of its targets. When it has decided to strike it has done so with impunity. The United States, which is the only country with any leverage, has not appeared too bothered by this practice. It has not been averse to targeted assassinations of its own.

The remaining top leadership of Hamas was targeted yesterday. Some in the firing line owed their positions to past assassinations. The most important figure present, Khalil al-Hayya, is the leader of Hamas’s Gaza units. He replaced Yahya Sinwa, the architect of the 7/10 attacks, in 2024. While he survived this attack, his son, chief of staff, and bodyguards were killed, along with one Qatari soldier. Also present was Zaher Jabarin, leader in the West Bank, who had replaced Saleh al-Arouri who had been assassinated in Beirut, also in 2024. Jabarin seems to spend much of his time in Turkey, from where he may have travelled to Qatar for this meeting.

Building the Future U.S. Cyber Force

Dr. Erica Lonergan, RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery

The U.S. military has tried almost everything to fix its cyber problems — except for the one solution that would work: standing up a U.S. Cyber Force as a new branch of the armed forces. Today, the military lacks sufficient readiness to fight and accomplish other missions in cyberspace, and only a Cyber Force can generate the human and technical resources the nation requires to fight and win the conflicts of today and the wars of tomorrow.

This study builds on the authors’ previous report making the case for establishing a Cyber Force. Beginning with that conclusion, this study outlines the practical steps necessary to stand up the new service. It presents an adaptable framework to address the choices and challenges that will likely accompany the Cyber Force’s creation. It is imperative that the Cyber Force gets four fundamental elements right from the outset: personnel, leadership, capabilities, and culture.

The first steps toward the creation of the Cyber Force are to lay out its vision and mission and define its functions. The Cyber Force will be the nation’s principal military force for the cyber domain. Its purpose will be to organize, train, and equip the personnel the military requires to employ cyber power to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. How it achieves these objectives will change over time given the dynamism of technology and international politics. Still, its core mission will endure.

The Cyber Force will have the primary force generation responsibility for offensive and defensive cyber operations, as well as cyber intelligence. Force generation refers to organizing, training, and equipping forces for military operations. The roles that remain outside the Cyber Force’s core mission set will include generating capabilities for information operations, Department of Defense Information Network (DODIN) operations (securing the Defense Department’s networks and systems), and cyber-related emerging technologies (such as artificial intelligence).

Maritime Drones Becoming Flagship of the Ukrainian Navy

Yuri Lapaiev

The September 24 Ukrainian naval drone attack on oil terminals in Novorossiysk and Tuapse marked the first time that Ukraine has used maritime drones to attack Russian oil industry facilities.

Ukraine’s development of advanced maritime drones like the Magura and SeaBaby have demonstrated high effectiveness, sinking ships, striking aircraft, and even damaging infrastructure like the Kerch Bridge.

With proven combat success, Ukraine plans controlled exports of naval drones, while Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) advance their own programs, intensifying competition in unmanned maritime warfare technologies.

On September 24, Ukrainian drones attacked the Russian cities of Novorossiysk and Tuapse. Cyber Boroshno, a Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) team, analyzed video footage and found that the drone struck oil loading piers within the port of Tuapse (Cyber Boroshno, September 24). The attack damaged infrastructure for the Transneft oil terminal and the Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal near Novorossiysk. Both terminals paused operations following the attack, but allegedly resumed loading tankers the next day (Bloomberg; United24 Media, September 25). The Defense Intelligence of Ukraine (GUR) was behind the attack, according to an unnamed source from the agency (Radio Svoboda; Kyiv Independent, September 25).

The September 24 attack is the first time Ukraine has used maritime drones, also known as unmanned surface vessels (USVs), in addition to traditional unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to attack Russian oil industry facilities. Several USVs broke through Russian defenses and successfully reached their targets, demonstrating the growing role of maritime drones in Ukrainian strikes on Russian targets. These drones have already proven their effectiveness, having destroyed or damaged approximately 15 ships from Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. This constitutes almost a third of the total Russian Black Sea Fleet, according to Roman Pogorily, OSINT researcher and co-founder of the DeepState team (Ukrinform, May 30).

Moscow Reaches Out to Buddhists Abroad but Faces Problems with Them at Home

Paul Goble

Moscow is expanding its efforts to use Buddhists within the Russian Federation to expand its influence in Buddhist countries abroad, despite facing growing problems among its own Buddhist population due to its divided response to the war against Ukraine.

While it can still field Buddhist leaders ready to parrot Moscow’s line, the Kremlin can no longer count on unity because its moves against anti-war Buddhists have split this faith community and led it to become, in the words of some, “a protest religion.”

The People’s Republic of China and Mongolia are both increasingly actively involved with Russia’s Buddhists, forcing the Kremlin to take the interests of anti-Buddhist Beijing and pro-Buddhist Ulaanbaatar into account.

Of Russia’s four traditional faiths, Buddhism, the third largest, garners far less attention than any of the others. This gives Moscow a greater opportunity to sell its version of Buddhist life in the Russian Federation without being challenged, as it does with Russian Orthodoxy, Islam, and Judaism. Unsurprisingly, the Kremlin has long exploited this situation to influence Buddhist countries. As its influence elsewhere has slipped since Russian President Vladimir Putin began his expanded war against Ukraine, Moscow has stepped up its efforts to shore up or win additional support among Buddhist countries abroad. Just how far the Kremlin is prepared to go was signaled last week when it attracted more than 7,000 Buddhists from across the world to the Third International Buddhist Forum that Moscow organized in Kalmykia and to which Putin sent an effusively warm message (Asia Russia, September 27; III Mezhdunarodniy Buddiyskiy Forum, September 28).

Moscow media coverage of the event, unsurprisingly, was uniformly upbeat. This did little to conceal the growing anger and divisions within the Buddhist community in Russia, however, which have now become so intense that some Buddhists there describe their faith as having become “a protest religion” (Ekho, January 29, 2023). Nor could it obscure the ways Moscow has been forced to tailor its policies toward Buddhists within the country to cope with Kremlin concerns about the reactions of Mongolia which supports Buddhist dissidents from Russia, and of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), which, because it is concerned about Buddhism in Tibet, favors a more repressive line (Window on Eurasia, February 5, 2023, August 8; see China Brief, September 19). As a result, and despite the Moscow headlines, the latest forum has only complicated the Kremlin’s relations with the Buddhists both inside the Russian Federation and abroad, with some of the former now pursuing independence from Moscow and some of the latter increasingly alienated by it (Readovka, September 26).

PRC Investment in Russian Economy Increasingly Important as Sanctions Deepen

John C. K. Daly

Russia has become increasingly dependent on trade with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, with more than a third of Russia’s total trade turnover being generated by the PRC.

The recent memorandum on the development of the “Power of Siberia 2” pipeline could secure long-term PRC purchases of Russian gas. The PRC’s purported aim for severely discounted prices, however, could ultimately render the project unprofitable for Russia.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent pressure on countries buying Russian oil could imperil Russian energy exports, an issue of major concern in both Russia and the PRC, and ultimately deter continued PRC purchases.

The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) dominant role as Russia’s largest energy customer has only increased since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine three and a half years ago. Determining the scope of this bilateral trade presents difficulties even as it increases. While the topic of Russia–PRC trade is regularly covered by the Russian media, after the start of the war, Russian government data on its foreign trade was partially classified, leaving analysts primarily with statistics from the PRC customs service. According to the PRC’s General Administration of Customs, in 2024, the trade turnover between Russia and the PRC totaled $244.81 billion, representing a 1.9 percent increase from 2023 (RBC, January 13). According to PRC customs data, in 2024, the Russian Federation’s exports to the PRC, which were primarily in the energy sector, remained practically unchanged from the previous year at $129.32 billion. During the same period, the PRC’s exports to Russia increased by 4.1 percent to $115.49 billion (RIA Novosti, January 13). The positive balance of the Russian side in trade resulted in a $13.83 billion surplus, 23.8 percent less compared to 2023 (TASS, January 12).

According to the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (CBRF), in 2024, the PRC’s share in Russia’s exports was 31 percent, compared to 30 percent in 2023. In imports, the PRC’s share was 39 percent, compared to 37 percent the previous year. At the end of 2024, more than a third of the Russian Federation’s total trade turnover was generated by the PRC. For the PRC, Russia’s share in trade is modest, accounting for 4–5 percent of total turnover (Strategic Culture Fund, September 13). According to the CBRF, at the beginning of 2022, the volume of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Russian economy was $497.7 billion, which by mid-2025 had diminished to $216 billion. This means that since the war began, FDI in Russia has more than halved, decreasing to 43 percent of its pre-war level, demonstrating the impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine’s economy. Following the imposition of sanctions against Russia, led by the United States and the European Union in February 2022, and the subsequent abrupt curtailment of trade with the West, Russia’s initial trade losses were largely offset by increased trade with the PRC, India, and other friendly and neutral countries (see EDM, November 13, 2024, January 27, April 28, September 8, 10; see China Brief, July 18). This would diminish over time, however, as more sets of sanctions were imposed, increasing the importance of energy sales to the PRC as options dwindled.

The Role of Cybercrime in Russian Hybrid Warfare

King's Building, Strand Campus, London

Russian hybrid warfare is often characterized by its use of irregular proxies adding a degree of separation between the Russian state and their hostile activities. Given cyberspace's ability to further blur these lines, this event will explore the role of cybercrime in Russian hybrid warfare, delving into their explicit and ambiguous links. The event will further showcase unique research into a cybercriminal actor illustrating the Russian state's likely outsourcing of destabilizing operations from cyber espionage, influence operations, to physical sabotage.
About the speaker

Bernhard Schneider is a Senior Intelligence Analyst at CrowdStrike, where he leads the Targeted eCrime Mission in the Global Threat Analysis Cell. Previously, he helped set up the Geneva-based CyberPeace Institute as founding member. Bernhard has worked on various digital threats, including online extremist propaganda, social media influence operations, and targeted cybercrime.

Bernhard holds a BA in Global Challenges from the Leiden University College and an MA in Intelligence & International Security from the King’s College London War Studies Department. He is a 2025-2026 Virtual Routes European Cybersecurity Fellow.

Trump’s Speech to Generals Was Incitement to Violence Against Americans

Kori Schake

Yesterday morning, U.S. President Donald Trump and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth behaved reprehensibly. Their speeches before several hundred assembled military commanders and their senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) were tantamount to incitement—a genuinely dangerous effort to suborn the military’s oath and condition them for using violence against their fellow Americans.

Their words should leave no doubt in anyone’s mind that the civilian leadership intends to use the threat and actuality of violence to infringe on Americans’ constitutional rights. Where Americans, like me, can take some comfort is in the quiet professionalism displayed by our military in this disgraceful and dangerous maelstrom.

How Trump Could Get Bagram Back

Javid Ahmad

The statement sparked a mix of surprise and skepticism. Once the nerve center of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, the Bagram Airfield was abandoned during the messy 2021 U.S. withdrawal and quickly taken over by the Taliban. Now, four years later, it has resurfaced as Trump’s latest foreign-policy gambit, rekindling debate over the United States’ unfinished business in the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.


Ethiopia inaugurates GERD dam amid downstream tensions with Egypt, Sudan


Ethiopia has inaugurated Africa’s largest hydroelectric dam on the Blue Nile, as the $5bn project continues to sow dismay with downstream neighbours Sudan and Egypt.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has hailed the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) as a “shared opportunity” for the region that is expected to generate more than 5,000 megaWatts of power and allow surplus electricity to be exported.

A handful of regional leaders, including Kenya’s President William Ruto and Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, attended the festivities in person on Tuesday, which kicked off the night before with lantern displays and drones writing slogans such as “geopolitical rise” and “a leap into the future”.

But Sudan and Egypt – who rely heavily on the Nile for water supplies – have expressed fears that the dam will threaten their water security and even breach international law. Their leaders did not attend the inauguration of the dam.

“I understand their worries, because of course, if you look at Egypt from the sky, you see that the street of life is existent” thanks to the Nile, Pietro Salini, the CEO of Italian company Webuild that constructed the dam, told Al Jazeera. But “regulating the water from this dam will create an additional benefit” to neighbours, he added.

The Blue Nile, one of the Nile’s two main tributaries, flows north into Sudan and then Egypt. The dam is located just 14km (9 miles) east of the Sudanese border, measuring 1.8km (1.1 miles) wide and 145 metres (0.1 mile) tall.

The U.S. Military’s Greatest Test

Peter D. Feaver

Why were U.S. military officers fretting about having to show up, on short notice, to a base in Quantico, Virginia, to hear a speech from the two civilians in the chain of command? “All hands” meetings like the one held this week, at which subordinates gather to hear from top leadership, are one of the oldest customs in the U.S. military—think “George Washington addressing the troops.” What made this meeting so notable is that today’s military is buffeted by an atmosphere of extreme partisan polarization, and neither political party is doing much to protect the military from its baleful effects. In such a moment, the long-term health of the American republic depends on the military safely walking an extremely narrow tightrope to uphold civilian control without becoming a partisan institution itself.

High-profile meetings such as the one in Quantico force the military to walk that tightrope in the full glare of the media and without the safety net of strong trust across the civil-military divide. The military audience managed to pull off that feat, but they can be forgiven for fretting about it in advance. The last military audience in that situation—the lower-ranking troops who heard a similarly partisan speech from President Donald Trump at Fort Bragg in June—failed the test, whooping and hollering as if they were the party faithful at a political rally. In that case, many of the “applause lines” were scathing critiques of the lawful orders their military oath had required them to implement barely a year ago.

In the United States, the civil-military balance depends on commanders in chief of either party trusting the military to obey lawful orders regardless of which party is in power. The risk represented by the gathering orchestrated by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and the speech delivered by Donald Trump is that it threatens to leave military leaders with no choice but to become partisan actors or to violate norms of civilian control of the military. So far, senior U.S. officers have managed that dilemma reasonably effectively. But the more that civilian leaders treat the military as a partisan institution, the more the military will start behaving like a partisan institution—and the less it can be relied on to fight and win wars.

WHAT YOU DON’T KNOW

Trump’s Gaza Peace Plan: Comprehensive, Ambitious, and Uncomfortably Ambiguous

Amr Hamzawy

The Middle East Program in Washington combines in-depth regional knowledge with incisive comparative analysis to provide deeply informed recommendations. With expertise in the Gulf, North Africa, Iran, and Israel/Palestine, we examine crosscutting themes of political, economic, and social change in both English and Arabic.Learn More

U.S. President Donald Trump’s proposed peace plan for the Gaza Strip, unveiled on Monday during meetings with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, comes at a crossroads. On the eve of the war’s two-year anniversary, the humanitarian dimensions of the crisis increasingly are intersecting with political pressures and security priorities. This makes any approach to reconstruction and stability in Gaza a difficult test: Can this peace plan reconcile its ambitions with the reality on the ground?

Trump’s proposal offers a comprehensive vision for rebuilding the Gaza Strip and halting the cycle of violence. The twenty-point plan is based on four integrated frameworks: security, reconstruction and development, political and administrative arrangements, and international and regional cooperation.

For security, the plan emphasizes the return of Israeli hostages (living and dead) in exchange for the release of a number of Palestinian prisoners and detainees. Without specifying a timeline, the plan calls for a gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces and establishes mechanisms for disarming Hamas and other resistance movements. To ensure sustainability, the plan requires continuous monitoring of borders and crossings, as well as training of Palestinian security forces under international supervision. It also includes arrangements for the establishment of specialized security units—the International Stabilization Force—to oversee implementation and contain potential threats or outbreaks of violence.

In terms of development, the plan addresses the reconstruction of basic services such as electricity, water, and health care, as well as the rebuilding of schools and hospitals. It also offers support for small- and medium-sized economic projects to provide job opportunities for the local population. The plan emphasizes transparency in aid management, in order to prevent exploitation by armed or outlaw groups. This measure is a prerequisite both for building Gaza’s citizens’ confidence in international security efforts and for creating an environment conducive for other measures’ success.

Trump’s Show of Force

TIMOTHY SNYDER

DNIPRO – In the nine months since Donald Trump’s return to the White House, the overall goals of his agenda have become clear enough: weaken the United States abroad to create an environment friendly to dictators, while using the US government and armed forces to establish a dictatorship at home. Will it work?

The success of Trump’s plan depends on how we see it, or rather, whether we choose not to see it. In the worst case, Americans choose not to notice, look away as their neighbors and coworkers are swept up in immigration raids and their cities become militarized, and then pretend that they had no other choice but to abandon democracy.

Pretexts will be found. They already are, most obviously in the drumbeat of lies about urban crime and – as we have seen in the aftermath of the murder of the right-wing activist Charlie Kirk – the selective exploitation of political violence.

Let us not make the mistake of confusing pretexts for the underlying policies. Whether the transition to authoritarianism in the US succeeds depends on us. In Trump’s paradigm, this is all a reality show, and we are merely inconsequential extras, without lines, forever in the background.

Call it a “show of force.” That is how the deployments of National Guard troops (and Marines) in US cities have been (too frequently) described. But what kind of force is it? And what kind of show? And how can we get beyond seeing it as a “show” in which we have no role to play?

Go beyond the headlines to understand the issues, forces, and trends shaping the US presidential election – and the likely implications of its outcome.

The military deployments are obviously illegal and designed to intimidate. Even if the current Supreme Court’s maximal deference to Trump means lawsuits will have minimal impact, what soldiers are being ordered to do plainly violates the long and rightly valued precedent that the military is not to be used for law enforcement. Deploying troops for that purpose traduces the rationale for maintaining armed forces, which is to defend a country from attack.

Japan between the Great Powers

John Nilsson-Wright

For Japan’s governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), securing and sustaining political power has been the dominant factor in uniting a diverse coalition of interests over 70 years of remarkable success since the party’s founding at the height of the Cold War in 1955.

A little like Britain’s Conservative Party, the LDP has embraced often competing policy options, tailoring them to reflect changing political and economic realities. At different times in its history, the party has included advocates of an activist state, reliant on redistributive welfare and interventionist industrial policies to promote economic prosperity (for example, Prime Ministers Hayato Ikeda in the first half of the 1960s and Kakuei Tanaka in the 1970s); at other times, especially since the early 2000s, it has been led by proponents of a smaller, deregulatory state, stressing economic liberalism and the encouragement of entrepreneurship and innovation (for example, prime ministers Jun’ichirล Koizumi and, most recently, Fumio Kishida).

On security and foreign policy, LDP leaders have all recognised the indispensability of the country’s alliance with the United States, but some have periodically sought to moderate this partnership by reaching out to other states (China and Russia, for example, in the mid-1950s when Ichirล Hatoyama was briefly prime minister), or by stressing the need to promote the country’s ties with the United Nations and with the non-aligned movement or with regional actors in Southeast Asia (Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda in the 1970s).

Conservative nationalism has also been a core feature of the agenda of the country’s leaders, with some expressing this primarily in economic terms (Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida in the 1940s and 1950s), and others focusing on gradual but deliberate rearmament and proactive security policies (Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi in the late 1950s, Yasuhiro Nakasone in the 1980s, and most strikingly of all Shinzล Abe – Kishi’s grandson – between 2012 and 2020).

These diverse approaches represent differences of emphasis, rather than zero-sum choices. They reflect the inherent pragmatism of a political party that has been remarkably adaptive and pluralistic in responding with Darwinian agility to changing political environments both at home and abroad.

The Fatal Flaw in the Transatlantic Alliance

Jennifer Kavanagh and Peter Slezkine

When U.S. President Donald Trump returned to the White House, he had his sights set on rebalancing the transatlantic relationship. He would be right to do so. The United States’ burden in NATO is out of proportion with the interests at stake, and regulations set in Brussels have resulted in a lopsided U.S.-EU trade regime. Although it is one of 32 NATO members, the United States covers 16 percent of NATO’s annual budget and shoulders most of the operational and logistical burden for Europe’s security. Meanwhile, the EU has long used tariff and nontariff barriers to limit

The U.S. Military’s Greatest Test

Peter D. Feaver

Why were U.S. military officers fretting about having to show up, on short notice, to a base in Quantico, Virginia, to hear a speech from the two civilians in the chain of command? “All hands” meetings like the one held this week, at which subordinates gather to hear from top leadership, are one of the oldest customs in the U.S. military—think “George Washington addressing the troops.” What made this meeting so notable is that today’s military is buffeted by an atmosphere of extreme partisan polarization, and neither political party is doing much to protect the military from its baleful effects. In such a moment, the long-term health of the American republic depends on the military safely walking an extremely narrow tightrope to uphold civilian control without becoming a partisan institution itself.

High-profile meetings such as the one in Quantico force the military to walk that tightrope in the full glare of the media and without the safety net of strong trust across the civil-military divide. The military audience managed to pull off that feat, but they can be forgiven for fretting about it in advance. The last military audience in that situation—the lower-ranking troops who heard a similarly partisan speech from President Donald Trump at Fort Bragg in June—failed the test, whooping and hollering as if they were the party faithful at a political rally. In that case, many of the “applause lines” were scathing critiques of the lawful orders their military oath had required them to implement barely a year ago.

In the United States, the civil-military balance depends on commanders in chief of either party trusting the military to obey lawful orders regardless of which party is in power. The risk represented by the gathering orchestrated by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and the speech delivered by Donald Trump is that it threatens to leave military leaders with no choice but to become partisan actors or to violate norms of civilian control of the military. So far, senior U.S. officers have managed that dilemma reasonably effectively. But the more that civilian leaders treat the military as a partisan institution, the more the military will start behaving like a partisan institution—and the less it can be relied on to fight and win wars.

WHAT YOU DON’T KNOW

The Price of Unpredictability

Keren Yarhi-Milo

For decades, U.S. foreign policy has depended on credibility: the belief that Washington would honor its commitments and that its past behavior signaled its future conduct. The United States, for instance, was able to develop a large network of allies because its partners trusted that, if attacked, Washington would defend them. It could strike free-trade deals with countries around the world and negotiate peace agreements because, generally speaking, it was seen as an honest broker. That is not to say the United States has never surprised, or that it never reneged on a promise. But for most of its modern history, it has been a trustworthy actor.

But unlike any U.S. president before him, Donald Trump has abandoned all efforts to make Washington reliable or consistent. His predecessors had also, at times, made decisions that undermined American credibility. But Trump’s lack of consistency is of an entirely different magnitude—and appears to be part of a deliberate strategy. He proposes deals before backing down. He promises to end wars before expanding them. He berates U.S. allies and embraces adversaries. With Trump, the only pattern is the lack of one.

Trump’s theory of the case is simple. By keeping friends and foes off balance, the president believes he can secure quick wins, such as modest increases in European defense spending. Trump also thinks that unpredictability affords him greater wiggle room in international affairs by ensuring that allies and adversaries are always second-guessing his next course of action. Finally, Trump thinks that he can frighten and thus deter opponents by appearing unhinged—an idea that political scientists call the madman theory. As Trump once boasted, Chinese President Xi Jinping would never risk a blockade of Taiwan while he is president because Xi “knows I’m fucking crazy.”

As some analysts have pointed out, Trump’s approach has delivered a few temporary international victories. But in the long term, Trump’s approach to global politics is not likely to strengthen the country. Other states will work to flatter Washington for a time, in hopes of avoiding U.S. penalties. But eventually, governments will look to protect themselves by aligning with other countries. The United States’ list of adversaries will, accordingly, grow. Its alliances will weaken. Washington, in other words, could find itself ever more isolated—and without any clear path to reestablishing its reputation.

Here is what a separate cyber force could look like

Anastasia Obis

The Pentagon has long pushed against the idea of a stand-alone cyber service to fix its cyber problems. But the Trump administration is more open to establishing a separate cyber force — and a new think tank report provides a roadmap for how to build it.

The report, co-authored by Mark Montgomery, senior director of the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation at The Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and Erica Lonergan, adjunct fellow at FDD’s Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation, outlines practical steps for establishing the new service and provides a framework for navigating the challenges of creating a cyber force.

“There’s a chance that President Trump makes the decision in six to 12 weeks. And if that’s the case, someone needs to have done a blueprint,” Montgomery told reporters Tuesday.

If this administration makes the decision to create a separate cyber branch, “we don’t want to be scrambling to sort of build the aircraft as we’re flying it,” Lonergan said.

“What we are trying to do in this monograph is really articulate a set of core principles and philosophies and vision that should guide the building of this service. There are a lot of additional decisions that will need to be made if a service is created. But our hope is that this product can provide the blueprint to help guide whatever team is responsible for ultimately making those tough decisions,” she added.

Last year, Montgomery and Lonergan made the case for a separate cyber service, arguing that the Pentagon’s continued push to apply a Special Operations Command-like model to U.S. Cyber Command has not solved its longstanding readiness challenges. “America’s cyber force generation system is clearly broken. Fixing it demands nothing less than the establishment of an independent cyber service,” they said in the report.

The new report, released today, builds on that work by answering the “how” and detailing what a separate cyber service would look like, its core mission and what is outside of the scope of the cyber force’s mission set.