16 September 2025

Art and Culture with Devdutt Pattanaik | How Afghan and Turkic invaders transformed Indian warfare

Devdutt Pattanaik

We know that from the 10th century, horse‑breeding groups from Afghanistan and Central Asia invaded India in successive waves. The early invaders simply looted the gold‑rich temples of the land. The later invaders, after the 12th century, established Sultanates to exploit India’s vast agricultural wealth and to control trade routes.

Religious aspects of these invasions often receive enough attention – how temples were replaced by mosques, minarets, tombs, palaces and forts. But this communal narrative usually overlooks technological transformation. Few discuss the new technologies that arrived with these invaders—technologies that Indians initially looked down upon.

It is known that Rajput warriors of India preferred death to dishonour and even glorified defeat – so long as they did not turn their backs on the battlefield. Their values were shakti (strength) and bhakti (passion, devotion). Yukti, or strategy, was looked down upon..
Military strategies of Afghans and Turks

By contrast, the Afghans and Central Asians who entered India brought new military strategies that helped them win wars – strategies they used to survive on the Central Asian steppes and mountainous terrain, closely related to their horse‑breeding practices.

The Afghans and Turks knew the Parthian shot, an ancient steppe‑developed technique in which a mounted archer, while riding away, would twist his body to shoot backwards—feigning retreat, then ambushing enemies who presumed victory. This was seen as cowardice and trickery by Rajputs but as a brilliant war manoeuvre by Central Asian tribes.

It is not that the Rajputs did not know archery. The Prithviraj Raso speaks of how the Rajput king can shoot targets even when blind because he knows the art of locating a target by simply hearing the sound (shabd-bhedi baan). In Hindu mythology, though, kings who could shoot such arrows without looking at the target were seen as overconfident, who suffered for their pride.

Rafale Jet & Pakistan’s “Great Firewall”! How French Firm Is Quietly Helping Pak To Monitor, Censor & Intimidate Its Citizens

Shubhangi Palve

When people hear the name Thales, they usually think of fighter jets, radar, and electronic warfare. The French defense giant is best known for providing the electronics backbone of the Rafale, a fighter jet that has become a symbol of France’s aerospace industry.

But a new investigation by Amnesty International shows that Thales is also quietly connected to something far less celebrated – Pakistan’s notorious digital firewall.

According to Amnesty’s report “Shadows of Control,” Pakistan’s mass surveillance programs are not homegrown. They rely on a hidden supply chain that stretches across Germany, France, the UAE, China, Canada, and the United States.

The year-long investigation was conducted with Paper Trail Media, DER STANDARD, Follow the Money, The Globe and Mail, Justice For Myanmar, InterSecLab, and the Tor Project.

Together, they tracked how Pakistani authorities obtained advanced technology through a hidden supply chain of surveillance and censorship tools.

At the heart of this system sit two programs: the Web Monitoring System (WMS) and the Lawful Intercept Management System (LIMS). Together, they form the backbone of Pakistan’s internet surveillance architecture.

Building Pakistan’s Firewall

Pakistan’s national firewall, known as the Web Monitoring System (WMS), has gone through several iterations. The first version, set up in 2018, was built on technology from the Canadian company Sandvine, now operating as AppLogic Networks.

For a few years, Sandvine provided the backbone of the system. Trade records even show that as early as 2017, the company had shipped equipment to at least three Pakistani firms with government ties: Inbox Technologies, SN Skies Pvt Ltd, and A Hamson Inc. But when Sandvine pulled out in 2023, Pakistan quickly looked elsewhere.

India's IT sector nervous as US proposes outsourcing tax

Haripriya Suresh and Urvi Manoj Dugar

BENGALURU, Sept 11 (Reuters) - India's massive IT sector faces a lengthy period of uncertainty with customers delaying or re-negotiating contracts while the U.S. debates a proposed 25% tax on American firms using foreign outsourcing services, analysts and lawyers said.
The sector is likely to be on the receiving end of a bill which, though unlikely to pass in its nascent form, will initiate a gradual shift in how big-name firms in the world's largest outsourcing market buy IT services, they said.

Still, with U.S. firms having to pay the tax, those heavily reliant on overseas IT services are likely to push back, setting the stage for extensive lobbying and legal battles, analysts and lawyers said.

India's $283 billion information technology sector has thrived for more than three decades exporting software services, with prominent clients including Apple (AAPL.O), opens new tab, American Express (AXP.N), opens new tab, Cisco (CSCO.O), opens new tab, Citigroup (C.N), opens new tab, FedEx (FDX.N), opens new tab and Home Depot (HD.N), opens new tab. It has grown to make up over 7% of GDP.

However, it has also drawn criticism in customer countries over job loss to lower-cost workers in India.

Last week, U.S. Republican Senator Bernie Moreno introduced the HIRE Act, opens new tab which proposes taxing companies that hire foreign workers over Americans, with the tax revenue used for U.S. workforce development. The bill also seeks to bar firms from claiming outsourcing payments as tax-deductible expenses.

How Pakistan has become opium capital of the world with Afghan expertise

Sushim Mukul

Kabul's opium throne has shifted east. The Taliban's 2022 ban on poppy farming in Afghanistan has driven cultivation across the border, with neighbouring Pakistan overtaking it as the world's new opium hub. Satellite imagery has revealed sprawling poppy fields in the volatile province of Balochistan, which is home to several armed militant groups like the Islamic State, reported The Telegraph of the UK. This is likely to be a concern for New Delhi, not only because the heroin from it could reach India, but because the narco-money could be used to fund terrorism against it.

This shift could funnel millions into the hands of terrorists and militants, destabilise the region further and is capable of "reshaping security dynamics across the region", said The Telegraph.

The unrestrained poppy cultivation in Pakistan has surged past the historic highs of Afghanistan, which once produced more than 80% of the world's opium. It's through Afghan farmers' expertise, desert irrigation, and their role as share-croppers that Pakistan, which was declared "poppy-free" in 2001, is turning into the world's primary opium hub.

Poppy isn't used just for opium but for semisynthetic narcotics like heroin, which is wrecking havoc across the world.

Reacting to what he called the "bad news from Pakistan", American diplomat and foreign policy expert Zalmay Khalilzad said, "If true, there are many risks: financing terror and violent groups; increased criminalisation of the economy and politics, and increased narcotics addiction of the population".

"It is also a threat to the neighbours and beyond. Does Pakistan have a plan to deal with this menace?," Khalilzad, who was the US special representative for Afghanistan reconciliation (2018-2021).

The flower of the poppy plant is the source of opium. It is the source behind other deadly drugs like morphine, codeine, heroin, and oxycodone, according to the US DEA.

Gen Z Seeks A Larger Role in Nepal's Politics

Sonal Nain

The morning sun barely pierced the haze over Maitighar Mandala, yet the atmosphere was electric.

Tens of thousands of young people had gathered, banners in hand, voices rising in unison. Bikash Singh, a legal expert and observer on the scene, recalls the overwhelming sight: "By late morning, the crowd had swelled into tens of thousands chanting, waving placards and marching toward The Everest Hotel in New Baneshwor. The mood was hopeful, almost celebratory, as if we were witnessing a new chapter of accountability and freedom unfolding."

The procession carried a clear message: an end to entrenched corruption, bureaucratic red tape and political nepotism. Social media had become their meeting place, a space where young voices came together and coordinated their actions—even as the government banned 26 platforms, including Facebook, WhatsApp, Messenger and Instagram, citing registration and data rules.

The ban fueled the frustration that was already simmering among the youth. Blocking these platforms, Singh, 28, argued, violated their fundamental right to information and freedom of expression and turned an already tense situation into something far worse.

Nepal has spent the last ten years under the leadership of KP Sharma Oli, Sher Bahadur Deuba and Pushpa Kamal Dahal, who have cycled through the prime minister's office. The protests may have been triggered by social media restrictions, but the people of Nepal were already deeply aggrieved with the government.

The protests, primarily organized by Gen Z through loosely connected youth groups like Hami Nepal, were united in purpose: transparency, opportunity and accountability. Ashvina Basnet, 32, a Nepali social worker and women's rights advocate, explained the roots of the movement: "This is a mass revolution. The youth are showing that change is possible." The "Nepo" campaign, highlighting the undue privileges of politicians' children, struck a particular chord with young people frustrated by systemic inequality.

Semantics as Strategy: Interpreting China’s Official Discourse on South Asia

Shruti Jargad & Constantino Xavier

China’s engagement with South Asia has grown significantly over the past decade, particularly under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While research on the material aspects of China’s engagements in the region has expanded, including by measuring its growing economic capabilities and security footprint, the discursive and ideational aspects remain understudied. As China’s role in the region becomes more complex, this limited knowledge of Chinese semantics could lead to practical consequences, such as the loss of valuable signals and consequent policy misjudgements about China’s goals and intentions in the region.

This paper uses discourse analysis to examine and interpret hundreds of mostly Chinese-language texts. These include official speeches, interviews, and signed articles by the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) leadership between 2013 and 2023. To explain Chinese narratives on South Asia, we structured our research around key questions: How do Chinese officials define the region’s boundaries? How do they see the predominant role of India, as well as its relations with Pakistan and other smaller states? How do they perceive the economic and democratic models of governance in South Asia? And how do PRC officials conceptualise China’s own role in the region?

This study reveals critical insights into how China perceives and communicates its role in the region. By systematically engaging with Chinese narratives, India and other South Asian countries can craft more informed and effective policies to navigate their complex relationships with China. Strengthening regional collaboration, developing independent research capacity, and maintaining a diversified strategic outlook will be key to managing China’s influence in South Asia.

Key Findings in Chinese Discourse on South AsiaFlexible Definitions of South Asia: Chinese officials adopt multiple perspectives to define South Asia, including ecological, economic, geopolitical, and civilisational. Ecologically, South Asia is framed around the Himalayan region, emphasising shared environmental concerns. Economically, the region is viewed as an underdeveloped space requiring integration into broader Asian connectivity frameworks. Geopolitically, South Asia is portrayed as a contested space where external, non-Asian powers should not interfere. Civilisationally, it is depicted as part of a larger Asian identity that shares historical and cultural ties with China.

FDD Uncovers Likely Chinese Intelligence Operation That Began More Than 3 Years Ago

Max Lesser

A firm calling itself Foresight and Strategy Consulting Ltd. posted an ad on May 15 looking for a remote analyst with “a minimum of 3 years of professional experience in policy research, preferably within international organizations [or] government agencies.”1 The firm and the job are bogus. They are likely part of a Chinese intelligence operation looking to recruit new assets.

The Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) uncovered the operation while investigating a similar group of fake consulting firms we dubbed the Smiao Network.2 While the websites in the Smiao Network were registered in 2024, the sites in this newly detected network — which we call the Foresight Network — date back to 2021, indicating the operation has persisted for more than three years. There are multiple known cases of Chinese intelligence conducting virtual espionage campaigns.3 Often, these involve nonexistent companies that post job listings both on their own websites as well as on external recruiting sites and online platforms such as Craigslist.

The Foresight Network may have capitalized on the global shift to remote work during the COVID-19 pandemic. When the recent wave of federal layoffs and forced retirements created a fresh pool of targets, the years-old operation quickly posted new listings on Craigslist.4 While there is no way for FDD to discern from the posts themselves if the operation has been successful, the fact that it remains active indicates there has likely been some return on the investment made in running it.

Publicly available records of online activity demonstrate that the three main websites in the network share key infrastructure, including a dedicated email server. All three were registered in China in a 90-day period beginning in December 2021. The sites were built with the same design tools and use nearly identical language. One of the three main sites claims to represent a Taiwanese firm. The inauthentic nature of these websites is not difficult to spot. One of the firms has a supposed CEO named “John Doe.” There are no entries for these firms in major Asian corporate directories. And the language on these sites is stilted and full of grammatical mistakes.

'I don't dare go back': BBC visits Cambodian villages caught in Thai border conflict

Jonathan Head

Rolls of razor wire now run through the middle of the village Cambodia calls Chouk Chey, and on through fields of sugar cane.

Behind them, just over the border, tall black screens rise up from the ground, concealing the Thai soldiers who put them up.

This is the new, hard border between the two countries, which was once open and easily crossed by people from both sides.

Then, at 15:20 local time on 13 August, that changed.

"The Thai soldiers came and asked us to leave," said Huis Malis. "Then they rolled out the razor wire. I asked if I could go back to get my cooking pots. They gave me just 20 minutes."

Hers is one of 13 families who have been cut off from houses and fields on the other side of the wire where they say they have been living and working for decades.

Signs have now been erected by the Thai authorities warning Cambodians that they have been illegally encroaching on Thai territory.

In Chouk Chey, they argue, the border should run in a straight line between two stone boundary markers which were agreed and installed more than a century ago.

Thailand says it is merely securing its territory, given the current state of conflict with Cambodia. That is not the way Cambodia sees it.

Months of tension along disputed parts of their border erupted into open conflict in July, leaving around 40 people dead. Since then a fragile ceasefire has held, although a war of words, fuelled by nationalist sentiments on social media, has kept both sides on edge.

The BBC has been to border areas of Cambodia, meeting people caught in the middle and seeing some of the damage left by the five days of shelling and bombing.


How China’s Propaganda and Surveillance Systems Really Operate

Zeyi Yang and Louise Matsakis

Atrove of internal documents leaked from a little-known Chinese company has pulled back the curtain on how digital censorship tools are being marketed and exported globally. Geedge Networks sells what amounts to a commercialized “Great Firewall” to at least four countries, including Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Ethiopia, and Myanmar. The groundbreaking leak shows in granular detail the capabilities this company has to monitor, intercept, and hack internet traffic. Researchers who examined the files described it as “digital authoritarianism as a service.”

But I want to focus on another thing the documents demonstrate: While people often look at China’s Great Firewall as a single, all-powerful government system unique to China, the actual process of developing and maintaining it works the same way as surveillance technology in the West. Geedge collaborates with academic institutions on research and development, adapts its business strategy to fit different clients’ needs, and even repurposes leftover infrastructure from its competitors. In Pakistan, for example, Geedge landed a contract to work with and later replace gear made by the Canadian company Sandvine, the leaked files show.


Coincidentally, another leak from a different Chinese company published this week reinforces the same point. On Monday, researchers at Vanderbilt University made public a 399-page document from GoLaxy, a Chinese company that uses AI to analyze social media and generate propaganda materials. The leaked documents, which include internal pitch decks, business goals, and meeting notes, may have come from a disgruntled former employee—the last two pages accuse GoLaxy of mistreating workers by underpaying them and mandating long hours. The document had been sitting on the open internet for months before another researcher flagged it to Brett Goldstein, a research professor in the School of Engineering at Vanderbilt.

GoLaxy’s main business is different from Geedge’s: It collects open source information from social media, maps relationships among political figures and news organizations, and pushes targeted narratives online through synthetic social media profiles. In the leaked document, GoLaxy claims to be the “number one brand in intelligence big data analysis” in China, servicing three main customers: the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese government, and the Chinese military. The included technology demos focus heavily on geopolitical issues like Taiwan, Hong Kong, and US elections. And unlike Geedge, GoLaxy seems to be targeting only domestic government entities as clients.

Just How Dangerous Is China’s Air Force?

Harrison Kass

Paired with ground-based missile forces, naval aviation, and electronic warfare units, the PLAAF fields a dense web of capabilities designed to complicate US intervention in the Indo-Pacific.

China’s revisionist ambitions, paired with increasingly dominant economic capabilities, have manifested in a military that is rapidly improving in both qualitative and quantitative terms. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is no exception—having transformed in the past two decades from a defensive, territorial force into one of the world’s most modern and capable air arms.

Through the Cold War, China, still a middling power, was deeply reliant on outdated Soviet aircraft, forcing a strategic focus limited to the defense of Chinese airspace. Since the beginning of the 21st century, however, China has enacted widespread reform and modernization, catalyzing a strategic shift towards power projection.

China Now Makes Its Own Aircraft

Enabling the PLAAF’s newer strategy of power projection is an increasingly modern and diverse fleet of domestically-produced combat aircraft. No longer so reliant on Soviet models, the PLAAF has benefited from platforms like the Chengdu J-10 multirole fighter and the Chengdu J-20 stealth fighter, which demonstrate China’s ability to produce advanced platforms at scale. The J-20 in particular shows that China is capable of developing a fifth-generation fighter—which puts China in exclusive company, along with only the United States and Russia. Aside from demonstrating technological prowess, the J-20 is significant for its strategic implications; the plane can potentially counter US fifth-generation fighters like the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor and the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II, but also impose a cost on US and allied forces operating in the Indo-Pacific—a new capability. Supplementing its indigenous platforms, China still fields upgraded versions of Russian-origin aircraft like the Sukhoi Su-30 and Sukhoi Su-35, creating a force structure much like America’s—blending cutting-edge 4.5- and fifth-generation fighters with legacy workhorses.

China’s Aerial Infrastructure Is Second to None

America Alone Can’t Match China, but With Our Allies, It’s No Contest

Kurt Campbell and Rush Doshi

For the first time in its modern history, the United States faces a rival — China — that has greater scale in most of the critical dimensions of power, and American national capacity alone may not be enough to rise to the challenge.

We are entering an era in which the true measure of American primacy will be whether Washington can build what we call allied scale: the power to compete globally in tandem with other countries across economic, technological and military domains.

President Trump appears to be moving in the opposite direction. His go-it-alone, tariff-centric diplomacy has alienated allies and left openings for Beijing to build its own coalitions. Mr. Trump’s recent imposition of high tariffs on India is just one example. The United States spent three decades courting India as a geopolitical counterweight to China. But after the tariffs were applied on India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi last week visited China for the first time in seven years, where he and President Xi Jinping agreed to move past a recent history of tense relations and work as partners, not rivals.

Mr. Trump is playing with fire.

Throughout the 20th century, America outproduced and out-innovated Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union. But China is different. On the metrics that matter most in strategic competition, it has already surpassed the United States.

Its economy, while slowing, is still nearly 30 percent larger than America’s when one accounts for purchasing power. China has twice the manufacturing capacity, producing vastly more cars, ships, steel and solar panels than the United States and more than 70 percent of the world’s batteries, electric vehicles and critical minerals. In science and technology, China produces more active patents and top-cited publications than the United States. And militarily, it has the world’s largest naval fleet, has a shipbuilding capacity estimated to be more than 230 times as great as America’s and is fast establishing itself as a leader in hypersonic weapons, drones and quantum communications.

Doha Under Attack, Diplomacy at Risk

Kurniawan Arif Maspul

The strike on Doha in September 2025 was more than just a headline — it was a geopolitically seismic event that shattered a fragile structure of mediation and revealed a dangerous new approach in the Middle East. For twenty years, Qatar built a rare strategic asset: credibility as a mediator capable of engaging with everyone — Washington and Tehran, Israel and Hamas — and, importantly, getting results. Doha’s shuttle diplomacy and aid to Gaza (estimated at over US$1 billion since 2014) helped maintain humanitarian corridors, secured hostage releases, and created a channel for discreet, challenging diplomacy. The Israeli strike changed that approach overnight. It not only killed people and the fragile hope of a pause but also undermined the implicit deal that made Doha a safe space for adversaries to meet.

The immediate political impact was predictably corrosive. Qatar’s government, stunned and angered, stepped back from mediation; Gulf capitals rallied to Doha’s defense; European partners condemned the violation of sovereignty; and the already slim prospects for a Gaza ceasefire were further eroded. Analysts from major centers all reached the same blunt conclusion: striking a host capital destroys the back-channels negotiators rely upon and reduces the incentives for either side to trust mediated deals. The cost is not just diplomatic prestige; it is the loss of practical routes that save lives on the ground.

This episode also forced a painful reckoning about the limits of hedging in small-state diplomacy. Qatar’s “friend-of-all” posture was always a high-wire act. It bought leverage and relevance, but it also made Doha vulnerable. When the state that one side hates most feels empowered to strike across borders, the calculus for small mediators shifts from “how much influence can we build?” to “how safe is our soil, our people, our role?” Gulf leaders now face a binary choice: accept greater risk in the name of mediation, or recalibrate their policies and the guarantees that underpin them. Either path matters for regional stability.

A presidential jet and a massive US airbase didn’t shield Qatar from Israel’s attack. America’s Arab allies are taking not

Paula Hancocks

Qatar would have been forgiven for thinking it was immune from Israeli attack.

The tiny Gulf state is a key US ally that welcomed President Donald Trump just four months ago; red carpets were laid, billion-dollar deals were done and a controversial presidential aircraft bequeathed.

As for its role as mediator to end the war in Gaza, Qatar’s Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani personally met with Hamas’ chief negotiator Khalil Al-Hayya on Monday to push for the new US-led ceasefire and hostage deal. Hamas’ response was expected at a follow-up meeting Tuesday evening; a couple of hours before that answer, Israeli jets struck a residential building in Doha, killing five Hamas members and a Qatari security official.

The sense of shock and betrayal is palpable in the Qatari capital. The vocabulary being used by Qatar’s prime minister is strong, evocative and damning, a departure from his usual composed response to the incessant twists and turns of trying to end the 23-month war in Gaza.

In an interview with CNN’s Becky Anderson Wednesday, he described the attack as “state terror” and warned the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had “killed any hope” for the hostages and undermined “any chance of peace.” He also said the Israeli leader must be “brought to justice,” accusing him of breaking “every international law.”

A country with no diplomatic ties to Israel invited its delegations to come and negotiate indirectly with Hamas; an endeavor appreciated by President Trump, who spoke of Doha “bravely taking risks with us to broker peace.”

Qatar is also considered to have taken a hit on America’s behalf when Iran struck the Al Udeid military base in June of this year, the largest US military facility in the region. Tehran said it was in response to US strikes on its nuclear facilities. Doha issued strong condemnation but little more.

Moscow’s Hybrid War Falters Along the Middle Corridor

Eric Rudenshiold

Moscow’s hybrid war strategy in the Caucasus is beginning to crumble, as countries in the region have begun to find their voice.

Russia is unhappy with its neighbors and expressing displeasure with increasing energy costs. Seeking to secure a measure of independence from their big neighbor to the north, the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus are forming new relationships and alliances that Moscow has no control over. Baku and Astana, with the region’s largest economies, are the latest victims to feel the brunt of Moscow’s retaliatory hybrid pressure.

Russia’s most recent moves draw from a tried-and-true playbook of coercion that seeks to disrupt Azerbaijan’s and Kazakhstan’s oil and gas sectors — the lifeblood of their economies. Using guided drones, Russia twice struck and destroyed the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan’s (SOCAR) oil terminal in Odessa, contaminated pipeline crude shipments, and coerced Kazakhstan back to oil transfer dependence on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC).

What is striking is not Moscow’s aggression but the mounting resilience and pushback by the South Caucasus and Central Asian countries. Since independence in 1991, Russia has leveraged geography, infrastructure, and legacies to keep its neighbors tethered to Russia’s transit architecture, markets, and political direction. Now, however, Baku, Astana, Tashkent, and the other capitals are charting new courses that seek to counter Moscow’s leverage. While Russia may have innovated its hybrid tactics, its former dependencies no longer see themselves as hostages.

Russia Ups the Pressure

Energy remains perhaps Russia’s most potent lever of influence in the post-Soviet space. By targeting Azerbaijan’s oil depots and the facilities that support Ukraine and supply Europe, Moscow sent a clear threat to Baku’s growing economy and expanding energy and transit footprint. The alleged contamination of Azerbaijani oil shipments mirrors earlier Russian efforts to sabotage the integrity of rival energy corridors. Forcing Kazakhstan to reroute its crude back into the CPC system underlines how Moscow uses legacy infrastructure chokepoints to constrain its neighbors’ strategic options.

The Hollow Promise of the New World Order

Leon Hadar

George HW Bush’s famous 1990 speech embodied an era when American power seemed unlimited. Thirty-five years later, we know better.

Today is the 35th anniversary of George HW Bush’s September 11, 1990, address to Congress—the speech that introduced Americans to his vision of a “New World Order.” It’s worth examining how dramatically that utopian promise has diverged from the messy realities of international politics.

Standing before Congress as Iraqi forces occupied Kuwait, Bush painted a picture of unprecedented global cooperation. “We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment,” he declared, envisioning a world where the United Nations would finally fulfill its founding promise, where aggression would be met with a unified international response, and where American leadership would guide humanity toward a more peaceful and prosperous future.
The Gulf War and the Seductive Logic of Hegemonic Benevolence

Bush’s New World Order represented the apex of what we might call “hegemonic idealism”— the belief that American power, properly deployed, could remake the international system in democracy’s image. The collapse of the Soviet Union had seemingly vindicated decades of containment strategy, leaving the United States as history’s first truly global superpower. What could be more natural than using this “unipolar moment” to establish lasting peace?

The Gulf War itself appeared to validate this vision. A broad international coalition, operating under UN auspices, swiftly expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait with minimal American casualties. Here was multilateralism with teeth, backed by overwhelming American military superiority. The ghosts of Vietnam seemed finally exorcised.

But this triumph, like many others, contained the seeds of future disasters. The very ease of victory in the Gulf encouraged a dangerous hubris about American capabilities and the malleability of international politics. If Saddam Hussein could be rolled back so effortlessly, why not apply the same formula elsewhere? Why not expand NATO eastward, intervene in the Balkans, democratize the Middle East, and contain rising powers like China?

The Costs of US Overextension

Trump or no Trump, Europe’s relationship with the US will never recover

Nathalie Tocci

Is the transatlantic rupture temporary or structural? Is Donald Trump the cause of the rift, or is the US president only a symptom of underlying trends? Optimists latch on to the hope that the stability we have lost can be restored post-Trump. Having spent the past few days in Washington, I doubt it.

Even in recent history, things were not quite so bad for the transatlantic relationship. The current tensions make the first Trump administration look like a walk in the park for Europeans. It is one thing to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal, which Trump did in his first term. It is quite another to bomb Iran and give Israel the green light for its war against the regime.

It is one thing to be threatened with tariffs, and have to offer empty promises, as Jean-Claude Juncker did, to buy more US goods. It is quite another to swallow 15% US tariffs, leaving a queasy-looking Ursula von der Leyen giving a thumbs up for the cameras next to a smirking Trump.

When it comes to security cooperation, Trump in his first term at least sent anti-tank Javelin missiles to Ukraine; now at best he’ll allow European governments to buy US weapons for Kyiv. Meanwhile, he is taken for a ride by Vladimir Putin as the Russian dictator gloats walking down the red carpet in Anchorage, Alaska.

Optimism can become a form of faith – and some still cling to the belief, despite all the evidence, that the good old transatlantic days will be back.

This scenario is delusional. Even if Trump were to vanish, it’s hard to see the transatlantic relationship reverting to that shared sense of kinship that characterised it in past decades. The most we can hope, as one Washington observer framed it for me, is to become a separated couple temporarily living under the same roof for the sake of the children, and then amicably parting ways.

Inside Ukraine’s drone wall holding off Russia’s meatgrinder assaults

David Kirichenko

A soldier from the Unmanned Systems Battalion of Ukraine’s 110th Separate Mechanized Brigade prepares the explosives on an FPV drone. Photo: David Kirichenko

Past midnight, in near-total darkness, Andrii, callsign “Drunya,” a driver from the Unmanned Systems Battalion of Ukraine’s 110th Separate Mechanized Brigade, prepares for a resupply run to a drone unit on the front just after midnight. He loads a pickup truck with first-person-view (FPV) drones and explosives. The vehicle is fitted with a jammer to guard against incoming enemy FPV strikes.

Once the truck is ready, the dash to the front begins. Along the roads leading to the frontline, trucks, civilian vehicles and heavy armor crawl forward under makeshift cages and welded plating – protection against the ever-present drone threat. It’s a scene that looks torn from “Mad Max,” but it’s also a stark reflection of how today’s small, cheap drones have reshaped modern warfare.

With me is Ryan Van Ert, a filmmaker from Los Angeles. We met on a previous trip to Ukraine, and he decided to join this mission. Last year, I spent nearly a week embedded with a drone unit in Chasiv Yar, getting as close as 1.5 kilometers to Russian lines. But in the past year, the kill zone has expanded greatly; now, anything within 10-15 kilometers of the front is fair game for enemy drones.

Before setting out, Andrii warns us: If the truck stops for any reason, don’t bother grabbing anything – just run for cover under the nearest treeline. Wearing body armor and helmets, we speed down pitted country roads. In the passenger seat, a soldier keeps his rifle ready, prepared to shoot down an enemy FPV if one dives toward us. Fiber-optic drones lying in wait along the roadside have become a deadly hazard for both sides.

Andrii cues up music on the Bluetooth speaker, each song somehow amplifying the tension in the air. I stare out the window, imagining Russian drones circling above, watching us from the darkness. As we near the front, Andrii switches off the headlights, slips on his night-vision goggles, and drives the rest of the way in pitch black.

Netanyahu’s deadly gamble Israel has targeted diplomacy

David Patrikarakos

At around 4pm local time yesterday, Israeli forces carried out an airstrike on a residential compound in Doha’s Leqtaifiya district. The operation, reportedly codenamed “Summit of Fire” and conducted by the IDF with possible involvement of Shin Bet, targeted several senior Hamas leaders, who had gathered to discuss a US-backed ceasefire proposal for Gaza. In the event, the officials survived, but six others were killed, including three bodyguards and a Qatari security officer.

It was the first time Israel has struck on Qatari soil, and, more than just shrapnel, its missiles carried two messages. The first is that Israel’s war with Hamas is now global. For decades, Hamas’s political bureau has operated from Qatar, tolerated by the United States, Europe, and indeed Israel, with Doha a useful channel for diplomacy. Hamas could plot, posture, and negotiate in five-star hotels while Israeli bombs flattened Gaza. The fiction was that these men, in their Gulf exile, could be treated differently from those directing the war on the ground.

By attacking Doha, Israel has made clear that this distinction is now a delusion. Yet, if anything, the second message is even more controversial. The men Israel tried to kill were reviewing Washington’s latest ceasefire proposal. By hitting them mid-discussion, it has therefore made the peace process itself a target. Israel has long raged at the diplomatic scaffolding that keeps Hamas at the table; the Doha strike is a challenge not just to Hamas but to the very architecture of mediation that has sustained the brief pauses in the Gaza war.

The strike could be a warning to get on with things, to accept the deal on offer. Let’s not forget that on 7 September, Donald Trump posted a clear warning on Truth Social: “The Israelis have accepted my Terms,” he said. “It is time for Hamas to accept as well. I have warned Hamas about the consequences of not accepting. This is my last warning, there will not be another one!”


Inside Israel’s operation to kill Hamas leaders in Qatar

Oren Liebermann, Becky Anderson, Tal Shalev

The Qatari prime minister sat across from Hamas’ chief negotiator, Khalil Al-Hayya, under the maroon-and-white flag of the Gulf nation on Monday evening. The two had met many times before in talks that often proved fruitless.

But this time was different.

The United States had just put forward a new ceasefire proposal that could end the nearly two-year war in Gaza. And Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al-Thani was pressuring Al-Hayya to accept.

The discussion wrapped up shortly before 9:30 in the evening, according to a source familiar with the meeting, but the real work was just beginning. After Al-Hayya left, Qatari negotiators got on the phone with their Israeli counterparts to update them on the nascent ceasefire effort.

Unlike most proposals, which came from Qatar and Egypt – the two key mediators able to speak with the US, Israel, and Hamas – this plan came directly from the Trump administration. Qatari negotiators had met with US envoy Steve Witkoff in Paris last week, and President Donald Trump wanted to see progress.

On Sunday, Trump issued what he described as his “last warning” to Hamas to accept the deal. He prematurely claimed Israel had accepted the proposal, even though Israeli officials had only said they were “seriously considering” it.

Why Vital Anti-Drone Artillery Comes At A Sky-High Price

David Hambling

Such incidents are likely to continue, and any future war is likely to involve even bigger waves of attack drones. As the DSEI Defence Exhibition & Trade Show opened in London yesterday, drone defense for Europe loomed large, with many anti-drone guns on display.

Armin Papperger, CEO of German arms maker Rheinmetall, says he is expecting an order from the German government worth several billion Euros for hundreds of Skyranger air defence guns. This huge bill is one of the reasons why governments have been slow to acquire urgently needed drone protection.

Meanwhile Ukraine is using weapons costing a hundred times less to bring down Shaheds, suggesting that there is something wrong with European defence procurement. Dr. Jack Watling of UK defence thinktank RUSI told me that European defence hardware is “pretty universally overpriced” – but the causes are complex and harder to tackle than you might think.

How Gepard Came Out Of Retirement To Rescue Ukraine

Existing missile-based air defenses struggle to cope with the threat of small drones. Pricey high-performance surface-to-air missiles like Patriot can easily tackle fast jets, helicopters and cruise missiles, but are only bought in small numbers. The U.S. only makes 650 PAC-3 Patriot missiles in a whole year, and Russia can launch more Shaheds than that on one night which would exhaust supplies immediately. Hence the renewed interest in old-school anti-aircraft guns with plenty of ammo.

Cruising at 120 mph and under 10,000 feet, Shaheds are individually easy to down. Stopping hundreds in one night is a challenge. Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft guns vehicles, made in Germany in the 1970s, have been notably successful at downing the drones. The tank-like Gepard has a turret with a pair of 35mm automatic cannon firing almost 20 rounds a second, guided by the Gepard’s own radar.

Post-war, rules-based global order dying, European Union warns in new report

Finbarr Bermingham

After months of being pummelled with trade tariffs and security threats from the United States and years of pushing back against a rising China, the European Union on Tuesday sounded a death knell for the global rules-based order.
In its “Strategic Foresight Report 2025”, designed to steel the bloc for a risk-laden future that looks darker by the day, the European Commission said “we are witnessing the erosion of the rules-based international order and fracturing of the global landscape”.

“Geopolitical turmoil and erosion of global multilateral order further enhance the need for autonomy in the capability to protect current and future generations,” read the report, adding that “a return to the previous status quo seems increasingly unlikely”.

Alluding to, but rarely referring to, China or the US by name, the commission called on the EU to reduce its dangerous levels of dependence on the US for digital and financial services and China for critical minerals.

“Recent years show that everything can be weaponised: supply chains, migration, trade, humanitarian aid, space and information,” according to the report, seen as a curtain-raiser for an annual speech from European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on Wednesday.

Reliance on other powers for minerals, the report said, “poses serious economic and security risks, especially given that the export restrictions on industrial raw materials have seen a more than five-fold increase since 2023”.

“Excessive dependency on key services provided by non-EU entities in sectors such as digital and finance exposes the EU to risks, including data security vulnerabilities, service disruptions, espionage and economic coercion,” it added, noting that “around 70 per cent of the EU’s cloud infrastructure is controlled by three US companies: Amazon Web Services, Microsoft, and Google”.

During her state of the EU address, the German official – who, through a series of crises, has become increasingly embattled over recent months – will set out her suite of policies for the year ahead.

The end of Pax Britannica

Graeme Thompson

In 1906, the British journalist and future Conservative politician Leo Amery penned The Fundamental Fallacies of Free Trade, an attack on more than half a century of British economic policy. While Liberals (and most Conservatives) fetishised free trade dogma, Amery argued, Britain’s rivals had embraced protectionism and were rapidly turning British global supremacy into a relic of the past. Tariffs seemed to offer an alternative – a way to revitalise domestic industry, reduce reliance on foreign imports, and knit the British Empire more tightly together, thereby arresting Britain’s relative geopolitical decline and positioning it to compete with ambitious new empires. After all, Amery pointed out, ‘through protectionism, other countries, America, Germany, Japan, are building up vast industries, and breeding great armies of citizens for the economic and political struggle of the future’.

Amery’s polemic was part of a broader assault on British economic and foreign policy orthodoxy at the turn of the 20th–century. The long-standing hegemony of laissez-faire liberalism, which prevailed under the influence of the Manchester School and became government policy under Chancellor of the Exchequer and later Prime Minister William Gladstone, was coming to an end, challenged by arguments for economic interventionism. The rise of great power rivals, moreover, undermined Victorian verities about splendid isolation and the Concert of Europe. From the 1890s, with an increasingly powerful Germany on the Continent and imperial challengers proliferating – France in Africa and the Mediterranean, Russia threatening India and the Suez Canal from Central Asia and the Turkish Straits respectively, burgeoning US influence in the Americas, and a rising Japan in East Asia – Britain’s long-standing strategy of offshore balancing to focus on global trade and empire looked increasingly untenable. As Liberal Cabinet minister John Morley aptly put it after Gladstone’s death in 1898: ‘Many things went down into Mr Gladstone’s grave.’

The years before the First World War are commonly seen as a high point for the first great wave of liberal globalisation and the British imperial power, which made it possible. The corollary is that global economic integration hit a wall in 1914, and despite valiant efforts to reconstruct the international order in the 1920s, it succumbed to protectionism, autarky, and deglobalisation in the 1930s. There is, to be sure, much truth in that narrative. But history is rarely so straightforward. Long before the outbreak of the Great War, the world was already entering a post-liberal moment of protectionism and great power competition in which mercantilist tendencies and zero-sum geopolitics began to reshape and rewire the global order. Though Amery would have to wait until 1932 for Britain to abandon free trade, his critique reflected the shift from a British-led liberal order towards a more multipolar and mercantilist world. That history has renewed relevance amid the economic and geopolitical upheavals of our own times.

SEVEN QUESTIONS: EW Unit Breaks New Ground

Gina Cavallaro, Senior Staff Writer

Capt. Caleb Rogers may have the most exciting assignment in the U.S. Army right now. On June 7, he became commander of the 111th Electromagnetic Warfare Company, the first unit of its kind in the history of the Army. The unit is part of the Georgia Army National Guard’s 221st Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Battalion. With an imperative for continuous transformation as set forth by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George, the new company’s capabilities already are in great demand. Rogers, a former enlisted soldier with a passion for electromagnetic warfare, explains.

1. Can you describe the new company’s mission?

We [will] support a division by providing additional electromagnetic warfare specialists a commander can use as needed. So, in a division, brigade combat teams have platoons of EW [electromagnetic warfare] soldiers, and they have their mission, which is short-range sensing, where the enemy is based on anything that emits a signal. That’s electromagnetic support. Electromagnetic attack is what people think about as jamming, making sure the enemy can’t talk and their systems aren’t working. Three of our platoons can do either of those missions. And then we have a fourth platoon that’s dedicated only to electromagnetic warfare, which is electromagnetic protection. That’s working with units to make sure they’re not as vulnerable to enemy EW assets.Capt. Caleb Rogers. 

2. How would you describe the electromagnetic spectrum to a layperson?

I like to think about it as people yelling at each other across a field. Where we come in is with our three missions of support, attack and protection. The support piece is me standing on the side of that field pointing at a map and telling commanders, this is where people are emitting. Jamming is not about making signals quieter; it’s about being louder than the other people. So, that can be me with a megaphone just yelling nonsense, interrupting their ability to communicate. The protection piece is maybe I put up a barricade so the enemy EW assets can’t see us.

3. Do you use futuristic radios with lots of antennas?

What if the AI stockmarket blows up?


Since the release of ChatGPT in 2022, the value of America’s stockmarket has risen by $21trn. Just ten firms—including Amazon, Broadcom and Nvidia—account for 55% of the rise. All are riding high on enthusiasm for artificial intelligence, and they are not the only ones. Larry Ellison briefly became the world’s richest man, after AI enthusiasm prompted the share price of Oracle, his firm, to leap. In the first half of the year an IT investment boom accounted for all America’s GDP growth; in the year to date a third of the West’s venture-capital dollars have gone to AI firms.

AI will never be a shortcut to wisdom

Jeff DeGraff

Once upon a time — not so long ago — the internet opened like a library with no closing hours. It offered us Google, and then Wikipedia, and with them a curious kind of magic: everything we ever wanted to know, right there, blinking in front of us. It was harmless enough, even liberating. We no longer had to argue about who directed Casablanca or the difference between a quark and a lepton. Answers flowed like tap water.

But something happened in that flood. We began mistaking the map for the terrain.

Not long after came the shortcuts — CliffsNotes for Shakespeare, then for Kant, then for life itself. Everything abstract or difficult was carved into quick summaries, punchy headlines, 30-second reels. Learning became a buffet of “life hacks,” each one promising to make you smarter, faster, richer, or more “optimized.” We began slicing reality into slivers, assuming that each fragment bore the same shimmering reflection as the whole. It was as if a single puzzle piece, held aloft and scrutinized, could reveal the full picture.

But ask anyone who actually knows something — really knows it. A scientist who’s spent decades in a lab, an artist whose hands are stained with pigment, a leader who’s failed forward more times than they can count. They’ll tell you: a fact out of context is just a shard of glass. It cuts. It glints. But it doesn’t build a window. That’s why we ask contestants in a spelling bee to “use the word in a sentence.” It’s not about rote recall. It’s about anchoring meaning in context — about knowing when, why, and how a thing matters.

Then came AI.

At first, it was dazzling. It finished your sentence, cleaned your prose, did your homework. The answers got longer, smoother, more convincing. It stopped being a search engine and became an oracle. A velvet voice in your ear. An expert on demand.