15 September 2025

Xi, Modi, Putin, and the New Geopolitics

Michael Froman

Since its establishment in 2001, the SCO has not been a particularly impactful enterprise. Much like the BRICS, its convenings often strike me as grand salons for the axis of the aggrieved to make symbolic progress towards undermining various pillars of what has been the U.S.-led international system. This year was different: it appeared to mark a major step forward in Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s courtship of India and Prime Minister Narendra Modi—a symbolic if not a meaningful win, made all the more striking because they had the United States to thank for doing the heavy lifting.

The trouble began in June, when President Donald Trump claimed publicly and in a direct phone call with Modi that he personally brokered a ceasefire between New Delhi and Islamabad. India has long rejected any notion of external mediation with its neighbor, and Modi has yet to nominate Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize, unlike his Pakistani counterpart. Then, Trump imposed 50 percent punitive secondary tariffs on India (and only India) as a punishment for the country's continued import of Russian oil—despite China, Turkey, and other nations purchasing substantial quantities of the very same oil from Russian firms. Evidently, the president was particularly disturbed that, while China increased Russian oil imports for its own use, India was reselling refined Russian oil products to Europe and elsewhere for a healthy profit.

These actions sent the U.S.-India relationship into a diplomatic free fall. It culminated last weekend on a red carpet in Tianjin, where Xi, Modi, and Putin strode together, awkwardly holding hands, beaming for the cameras. In an aside at the summit, Xi went so far as to proclaim that it is, “time for the dragon and elephant to dance together.”

Modi’s nascent embrace of Xi and warmer relations with China fly in the face of a multi-decade effort, spanning five American presidencies, to court India as a long-term partner with whom the United States could work to offset China’s immense industrial capacity, technological prowess, and increasing military capabilities.

Why Gen Z in Nepal is dying over a state social media ban

Rafi Schwartz

Protests over political corruption and an ongoing effort to regulate social media have plunged Nepal into a state of civic unrest. Led predominantly by younger organizers and activists, demonstrations emerged as Nepal's government banned (and then returned) access to popular platforms like WhatsApp, Facebook and YouTube for failing to register their products under a new national law. At least 19 people were killed and dozens more injured amid protests in the Nepali capital of Kathmandu on Monday. More than simply a matter of access to apps, the Nepali protests have become a generational conflict over the region's future.
'Robust space for debate' faces 'censorship'

Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli resigned on Tuesday in an unsuccessful effort to quell the disquiet. His critics accused his government of "trying to curtail freedom of expression" in a nation where free speech is "highly prized," said The New York Times. Nepal generally offers "robust space for debate," while similar freedoms have "shrunk" in neighboring countries. The government's social media regulatory effort, requiring that companies "appoint a liaison office or point in the country," has been "widely criticized as a tool for censorship and punishing government opponents who voice their protests online," The Associated Press said. Rights groups have similarly accused the Nepali government of working to "curb freedom of expression and violate fundamental rights" with this legislation.

The government has claimed it is not "banning social media" but trying to "bring them in line with Nepali law," said the BBC. That explanation has not been enough for many Nepalese, who "heeded a call by demonstrators describing themselves as Generation Z" to gather at the parliamentary building in Kathmandu on Monday. There, authorities used force including "water cannons, batons and firing rubber bullets," resulting in the day's double-digit fatalities, said the network.

Xi Jinping’s in a race against time to secure his legacy in China

Ian Langford

Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto , Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un look out from Tiananmen Gate as they attend a military parade marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II at Tiananmen Square in Beijing Wednesday, September 3, 2025. Photo: Yue Yuewei / Xinhua

The Chinese military parade that had the world talking last week was more than just pageantry. It was a declaration that Chinese leader Xi Jinping sees himself in a race against time to secure his place in history.

For Xi, who has just turned 72, unification with Taiwan is not just a policy aim; it is the crown jewel that would elevate him above Mao Zedong and cement his reputation as the greatest leader in modern Chinese history.

The timing and staging of the parade underscored this urgency, a showcase of power before an audience of foreign leaders and cameras at a high-stakes anniversary event in Beijing.

Mao, the founder of the People’s Republic of China, unified the country under Communist rule, but left it poor and isolated.

Xi’s mission is to finish the job by formally ending the Chinese civil war that pitted the Communists against the Nationalists and annexing the island of Taiwan to lock in his place in the party pantheon.

But waiting is dangerous. Inside the Chinese Communist Party, loyalty is transactional and rivals constantly watch for weaknesses.

In 2012, for example, Bo Xilai, a rising star and once-close ally of Xi’s, suffered a dramatic and very public downfall. The scandal could easily have consumed Xi, but he turned it into an opportunity, using Bo’s downfall to cement his own rise.

That episode remains a cautionary tale in Beijing’s elite politics: power must never falter; momentum must never slip.

How powerful is the China-Russia alliance?


This summer’s big security summit in Tianjin, followed by the military parade in Beijing on September 3, has been widely interpreted as a sign of a new global realignment. At a time of growing friction within the US alliances in East Asia and Europe, President Xi Jinping of China, President Vladimir Putin of Russia and about 20 leaders mostly from Central Asia have not just reaffirmed their nations’ close ties. They sought to strengthen the emerging multipolar system, which they see as a rejection of the US-dominated global order.

This idea is hardly new. Three decades…

China’s Pipeline Diplomacy is a Nightmare for US Gas

Liam Denning 

It’s a potential prize fight for the ages: US “energy dominance” versus the Power of Siberia. A proposed pipeline to bring natural gas from Russia, across Mongolia and into northern China threatens to complicate President Donald Trump’s energy diplomacy, upend energy markets and even shape the artificial intelligence boom.

The apparent revival of the Power of Siberia 2 gas project during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping represents an enormous wildcard for the US gas sector. Together with mooted expansions of two other pipelines, this would open up 58 billion cubic meters per year (or 5.6 billion cubic feet per day) of capacity to feed Russian gas directly into China. To put that into perspective, it is equivalent to almost half the expected increase in Chinese gas demand over the next decade, and a quarter of the world’s extra demand overall.

More pertinently for the US, it would exacerbate and extend a looming glut in an energy sector at the heart of Trump’s “dominance” agenda: Liquefied natural gas. The US is the world’s biggest exporter of LNG already and is spearheading a huge expansion in liquefaction capacity. Energy Secretary Chris Wright said at a Council of Foreign Affairs event last week that he expects LNG to become the country’s single largest export.

The International Energy Agency’s latest long-term outlook, published late last year, had annual global demand for LNG rising by 144 billion cubic meters between 2023 and 2030. Yet, supply capacity is set to increase by almost double that amount. The industry’s great hope is that this glut will clear as demand keeps growing and the boom in export capacity tails off. Injecting 58 billion cubic meters of effectively stranded Russian gas into the equation would dash that hope.

Can the U.S. Break China's Hold on Critical Minerals?

Maggie Miller

Last month the U.S. opened its first rare earth mine in 70 years, Ramaco’s Brook Mine in Wyoming, a move the Trump administration says will help break China’s grip on critical minerals. But with China producing 90% of rare earth elements and dominating processing, experts warn progress will be slow, costly, and uncertain. Will enough progress be made before Trump leaves office to continue the momentum?

On this episode of The Miller Report: Real Clear Journalism we are joined by investigative journalist James Varney to discuss whether the U.S. can make a meaningful difference in the critical mineral industry, “undermapped” mineral reserves, and if there is bipartisan momentum. His full investigation can be found here.

China’s J-20 Mighty Dragon Stealth Fighter: The Secret Is Out

Reuben Johnson

Key Points and Summary – For the first time, China will put its J-20 stealth fighter on static display at an air show this month, a major shift in a famously secretive program.

-The new openness signals the J-20’s maturation from a rare prototype into the workhorse of the Chinese air force, with hundreds now in service.

-The decision is also likely driven by the fact that the jet has been deployed near foreign borders and detected by adversary radar, meaning its core stealth characteristics are no longer a closely guarded secret.

-The display reflects China’s growing confidence in its premier fighter.

China’s J-20 Mighty Dragon Stealth Fighter Has Arrived

WARSAW, POLAND – Nearly 15 years after its first public flight announcement, the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) pervasive security apparatus is reportedly set to unveil a real Chengdu J-20 at a public air show.

The stealthy-looking, twin-engine fighter was first reported to have flown in January 2011 as an initial validation test flight from the Chengdu Aerospace Corporation (CAC) aerodrome that is co-located with Aircraft Plant No. 132. This is today, where the fighter rolls off the assembly line in series production.

That January 11, 2011, test flight was conducted just hours before then-US Defense Secretary Robert Gates was to have a face-to-face meeting with then-Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary and Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Hu Jintao. The purpose of the official visit by Gates was supposedly to address what were then already deteriorating military-to-military relations between Washington and Beijing. (Not much has improved since.)

The anticipated but unannounced flight was assessed to have “undermined” the purpose of that meeting. Hu himself seemed to have been caught off guard and not aware that the first lift-off was to take place on that day. This in turn prompted questions over whether the PRC’s so-called “civilian leadership” had full, positive control of the increasingly aggressive People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

‘There is only one player’: why China is becoming a world leader in green energy

Jonathan Watts 

Soldiers march during a military parade marking the 80th anniversary of victory over Japan and the end of World War II, in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China. Photograph: Lintao Zhang/Getty Images

That display reminded many of the cold war, but it captured only a fraction of China’s far greater modern influence, primarily built on a formidable economy, dramatic advancements in renewable energy, and a willingness to engage globally with the greatest crisis facing humanity: climate breakdown.

In that sense, the tanks, cannon and missiles that filed past Tiananmen Square may well prove less important in reshaping the world order than the wind turbines, solar panels and electric cars that are churning out of Chinese factories on to fields and roads all over the planet. They are the reason China has already won the battle for the energy of the 21st century.

If history is any guide, the country that dominates energy usually dominates economics and politics, which is why it is not just old war allies that are cosying up to Beijing. Narendra Modi, the president of longtime rival India, also visited China last week for the biggest ever meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation along with dozens of other regional leaders. The European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, led a delegation to Beijing this summer to coordinate climate policy. The Brazilian executive secretary of Cop30 will visit next week with a similar mission, knowing the success or failure of the annual climate summit now depends on China more than any other nation.

Expectations for Chinese climate leadership are rising in tandem with dismay at the US, which will attend Cop30 as an observer and disrupter that, under Donald Trump, appears to be trying to lurch backwards towards a 20th century comfort zone of oil, gas and coal.

We Are Watching a Scientific Superpower Destroy Itself

Stephen Greenblatt

The Trump administration’s assault on America’s universities by cutting billions of dollars of federal support for scientific and medical research has called up from somewhere deep in my memory the phrase “duck and cover.” These were words drilled into American schoolchildren in the 1950s. We heard them on television, where they accompanied a cartoon about a wise turtle named Bert who withdrew into his shell at any sign of danger. In class, when our teachers gave the order, we were instructed to follow Bert’s example by diving under our desks and covering our necks. These actions were meant to protect us from the nuclear attack that could come, we were told, at any time. Though even in elementary school most of us intuited that there was something futile in these attempts to shield ourselves from destruction, we dutifully went through the motions. How else could we deal with the anxiety caused by the menace?

The anxiety greatly increased in October 1957, when Americans learned of the Soviet Union’s successful launch of the world’s first satellite, Sputnik 1. The vivid evidence of the technological superiority in rocketry of our Cold War enemy provoked a remarkably rapid response. In 1958, by a bipartisan vote, Congress passed and President Dwight Eisenhower signed the National Defense Education Act, one of the most consequential federal interventions in education in the nation’s history. Together with the National Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health, it made America into the world’s undisputed leader in science and technology.

Nearly 70 years later, that leadership is in peril. According to the latest annual Nature Index, which tracks research institutions by their contributions to leading science journals, the single remaining U.S. institution among the top 10 is Harvard, in second place, far behind the Chinese Academy of Sciences. The others are:

The University of Science and Technology of China

Deception on the Transparent Battlefield

Michael Posey, Chase Metcalf 

In June 2025, when President Donald Trump launched strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, the B-2s that flew Operation Midnight Hammer employed military deception to ensure Iran remained clueless as to where and when they would be hit. We can expect the future of warfare to continue to require more military deception, where we remain “predictably unpredictable” at the operational level of war. We stand at a strategic inflection point, where advances in cyber, space, artificial intelligence, and information systems foment a rapidly changing character of war. Adversaries will no longer fight with tanks, ships, and aircraft alone. Instead, we should expect them to blend these traditional capabilities with electromagnetic warfare and a sea of misinformation to erode U.S. tactical overmatch. In this evolving environment, the necessity of military deception has risen to an operational imperative. As modern battlefields become increasingly saturated with sensors and surveillance, commanders who master the art of deception will seize the initiative and protect their combat power.

Given the changing character of war, two RAND scholars asserted that “successful deception activities enhance force protection, preserve combat power, and add complexity for the adversary,” especially as near-peer competitors field ubiquitous sensing systems. Likewise, Major General Paul Stanton, commander of the Army Cyber Center of Excellence, leads efforts to field electromagnetic-spectrum decoys and obfuscators that “raise the noise floor” around friendly forces, making them visible only as ambiguous signatures rather than precise targets. However, some argue that ubiquitous overhead and drone sensors have created battlefield transparency, negating the effects of military deception. Nevertheless, these arguments overlook two fundamental aspects of the art of deception: the vulnerability of an adversary’s decision-making and the importance of operational security.

Figure 1: Ubiquitous drones make the battlefield increasingly transparent.

Battlefield Transparency – Reality or Myth

From Defense to War: The Language of a Changing Global Orde

Dr. Hasim Turker

The idea of renaming the US Department of Defense back to the “Department of War” is, in fact, a return to the original nomenclature rather than a brand-new invention. The United States originally maintained a War Department from the nation’s founding through World War II, led by a Secretary of War. In the aftermath of WWII, however, American leaders deliberately shifted away from the blunt War label. In 1947, President Harry Truman urged that US military power be seen as a force for peace, not for conquest, which was one reason the old War Department name was dropped.

Congress reorganized the military under the 1947 National Security Act, initially calling it the “National Military Establishment.” That unwieldy name (unintentionally abbreviated as “NME,” sounding like “enemy”) was quickly changed in 1949 to the more reassuring “Department of Defense.” This rebranding reflected the post-WWII ethos: America’s armed forces were to be guardians of peace and stability, part of a new international order aimed at preventing another global war. The shift from “War” to “Defense” signified an emphasis on deterrence and collective security, in line with the founding of the United Nations and NATO as institutions to uphold peace. Even during the ensuing Cold War, US leaders often spoke of “peace through strength,” maintaining massive military capabilities (including a nuclear arsenal) ostensibly to deter war rather than to wage it. In short, the post-1945 world saw defense and deterrence rhetorically prioritized over overt references to waging war.

The Post-Cold War “Security” Era

When the Cold War ended in 1991, the United States found itself without a peer competitor. This brief unipolar moment ushered in optimistic talk of a “liberal world order” and a broadened concept of global security. The triumph of liberal democracy was proclaimed, and some even argued we had reached the “end of history” – a future where major wars between great powers would no longer occur. Indeed, in the 1990s, international discourse shifted toward security in comprehensive terms: collective security arrangements, peacekeeping missions, and humanitarian interventions took center stage. US foreign policy focused on concepts like global security, human rights, and stability, often assuming that outright war between nations was a fading threat.

How to End Ukraine War: A ‘Total Collapse’ of the Russian Economy?

Stephen Silver

Key Points and Summary – Following Russia’s massive weekend drone attack, the U.S. and European Union are coordinating on a potential new, tougher round of sanctions.

-President Trump threatened a “second phase,” while the Treasury Secretary called for a joint effort to “collapse” the Russian economy.

-An EU delegation is in Washington this week to discuss its 19th sanctions package, which could target Russian banks, energy companies, and payment systems.

-Crucially, the EU may also use its “anti-circumvention tool” against third countries like Kazakhstan that help Moscow evade restrictions, signaling a significant tightening of economic pressure.

Time to Collapse the Russian Economy?

Approached on his way to the U.S. Open on Sunday, President Donald Trump said he’s ready to move to a “second phase” of sanctions against Russia.

Per Reuters, Trump has made that threat before, but backed down as he has pursued peace talks, aimed at ending the war after more than three years. Trump did place secondary tariffs on India, a major importer of Russian energy.

“That cost hundreds of billions of dollars to Russia,” Trump said last week of the India tariffs. “You call that no action? And I haven’t done phase two yet or phase three.”

Russia has responded to the threat, once again making clear that it will not back down due to sanctions.

“Sanctions are the agenda supported by the Kyiv regime and European countries. They are doing everything to bring Washington into their orbit and impose these sanctions,” Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said in a Telegram interview this week.

Russia’s Desperate Pivot: Gas Pipeline Signals Subordination To China

Ariel Cohen

As Russia touts a milestone in the agreement to construct the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, the action signals increasing dependence on China, and Moscow's weakened position in the bilateral relationship.POOL/AFP via Getty Images

The spectacular displays at the 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Tianjin were carefully crafted to showcase the evolution of Xi Jinping’s Beijing-centric political bloc which aspires to rival Washington. The U.S. administration is embracing an “America First” agenda and using tariffs as a foreign policy battering ram. Meanwhile, President Trump may be on to something in writing “Please give my warmest regards to Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un as you conspire against the United States of America.”

Founded in 2001, the SCO has often been heavy on declarations but light on substance. This year, however, marked a significant shift, with member states, led by China, touting economic competition as the primary path to challenging U.S.-centric post-World War Two arrangements. The Chinese leader promised to open the Chinese BeiDou global navigation system to SCO members to compete with GPS. More importantly, Xi announced the launch of the SCO Development Bank, a China-backed initiative aimed at funding infrastructure in Eurasia. This project was long in the works — Moscow had blocked it, clinging to the idea that the region is its backyard.

Now Moscow has reversed its position, embracing Beijing’s initiative. This is the latest in a long line of Kremlin concessions in the increasingly one-way Sino-Russian relationship. Russia needs China more than China needs Russia. Both parties are aware of this, and Beijing is eager to deepen Russia’s strategic dependence. Arms supplies and energy deals Moscow was pushing for earlier might have put Russia in a position to win against Ukraine soon after its 2022 invasion decisively but were deliberately delayed by China. Instead, Xi let Moscow bleed so Beijing could secure a better negotiating position. This dynamic is at play in every sphere of Sino-Russian cooperation. It is most obvious now in energy. Russia used the summit to tout progress on its flagship Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline to China. However, reading between the lines, it is clear this deal is yet another sign of Beijing’s ascendancy.

The Power of Siberia 2 Pipeline and Russian Strategy

A Better Way for Europe to Guarantee Ukraine’s Security

Ivo H. Daalder

In the weeks since U.S. President Donald Trump’s Alaska summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin, two things have become clear. One is that convincing Russia to end the war is proving much harder than Trump expected. Days after his meeting with Putin, Russia launched one of the largest-ever attacks against Kyiv, employing nearly 600 drones and several dozen missiles; and on September 7, it launched an even bigger drone and missile assault, hitting for the first time a major government building in the capital. A second is that providing Ukraine with the post-cease-fire security guarantee it has long insisted on as part of any resolution to the war is more important than ever. Although Kyiv’s ultimate security rests with maintaining a strong and capable military, Ukraine must also be reassured that European countries and the United States have its back—and Moscow must be convinced that any resumption of war would involve a conflict with NATO countries.

The best and strongest guarantee of Ukraine’s security would be membership in NATO, but Trump has ruled this out. The administration has also stated that Europe, not the United States, should bear the primary burden of any guarantees, declining to promise any specific form of U.S. involvement. This has left European leaders scrambling to produce a formula that could provide what is needed. One essential step was taken in September, when French President Emmanuel Macron announced that 26 Western allies were prepared to support Ukraine “by land, sea, or air” once the fighting stops. But the details of these contributions remain vague, given that so far only Britain, Estonia, France, and Lithuania have publicly pledged to put forces on the ground in Ukraine.

Europe’s quandary is how to turn its determination to reassure Ukraine into a tangible reality. To do so, European leaders will need to ensure that Ukrainian forces are as strong and capable as possible, and draw on the resources of NATO to support those forces, even if outright membership in the alliance is out of the question.

The Coming Electricity Crisis

Brian Deese and Lisa Hansmann

The United States faces an energy crunch of historic proportions. After nearly 20 years of flat demand, electricity use is now growing at its fastest rate since World War II. The U.S. economy increasingly relies on electricity to heat and cool homes, to power businesses and factories, and to propel cars, trucks, and buses. New manufacturing facilities, such as those making semiconductors, and the data centers that undergird the country’s artificial intelligence ambitions consume unprecedented amounts of electricity. In total, over the next decade, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, the independent regulator tasked with monitoring grid reliability, projects

Strategic Autonomy Is Europe’s Only Choice

Hugh De Santis

An independent European security structure may be difficult establish, but there is no other alternative to deter Russia.

Europe is at an inflection point. Whether Donald Trump coerces President Volodymyr Zelensky to accept a peace deal favorable to Russia or walks away from the conflict altogether, European leaders can no longer count on the United States to be their security guarantor. They can continue to flatter Trump and lobby congressional leaders in the hope that security ties will not be severed. Or they can plan to defend themselves against a militant Russia without the American backstop.

The transatlantic relationship, which has underpinned global stability since 1949, has frayed on trade and security grounds. To placate Trump and sustain America’s presence in Europe, the European Union acceded to a one-sided trade agreement with the United States in July. The agreement caps tariffs on most EU exports to the United States at 15 percent tariffs, a figure far higher than the current 1.5 percent, in exchange for the elimination of tariffs on US industrial goods and preferential market access for agricultural products. French prime minister Francois Bayrou called it an act of “submission.” To secure Trump’s commitment to NATO’s collective security, the European allies agreed a month earlier at a summit meeting in The Hague to increase defense spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2035.

Given Trump’s unpredictability, however, the European allies cannot be certain that the president’s trade and fiscal demands will not change. True, Trump has approved new arms transfers to Ukraine paid for by the European allies, and he has been angered by Russia’s relentless bombardment of cities, such as the August 29 strike on Kyiv. However, given the view of the Trump administration and much of the public that China poses a greater threat, it would be foolhardy to conclude that such aid signals a sustained willingness to defend Ukraine or its European allies.

The president displayed his striking inconstancy at the August 15 summit in Alaska with President Vladimir Putin. Neither his earlier demand for a ceasefire nor his warning to Russia of “severe consequences” if it failed to do so was achieved. Nor did the summit result in the security guarantees for Ukraine that European leaders had called for.

Drones, Dictators & Debt: India Flirts, Ukraine Fights, Trump Takes on The Fed

Sir Niall Ferguson, John H. Cochrane, H.R. McMaster, Bill Whalen

Hoover senior fellows Niall Ferguson, John Cochrane, and H.R. McMaster discuss the significance of Modi’s summitry with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. This leads into a broader conversation about Ukraine’s durability (with Niall soon to visit Kyiv), as its conflict with Russia becomes a predominantly drone war. Also discussed: the question of power-wielding in Washington—the American president derided as a modern-day fascist for his use of executive authority; the differences between Trump Derangement Syndrome in the past versus the present; the Federal Reserve’s independence (and sprawl); plus the merits of the federal government taking a 10% equity stake in chip manufacturer Intel. Finally, some bad news for our London fans: While the GoodFellows will be gathering in the UK’s capital city, there are no plans for a rooftop concert ร  la the Beatles atop their Apple Corps building.

Russia yet to achieve breakthrough in Ukraine, expert says

Francis Farrell, Alexander Zabolotnyi, Nick Allard

The Kyiv Independent’s Francis Farrell sits down with Rob Lee, a military expert and senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, to assess the state of Russia’s war in Ukraine three and a half years into the full-scale invasion. They discuss the new priority target for both Ukraine and Russia in the era of a drone-saturated battlefield, Russia’s recent rapid advance near the town of Dobropillia, and the overall pace of its advance toward its minimalist goal of occupying the entire Donetsk Oblast, as well as what to expect this fall and winter.

Trump's drug war is now a real shooting war

Joel Mathis

The old "war on drugs" slogan is no longer hyperbole. President Donald Trump is claiming the right to kill suspected drug traffickers, last week approving a deadly attack on a suspected drug-running boat off Venezuela.

The American war on drugs is "officially a war, not a mere law enforcement action," said Axios. By designating traffickers as "terrorists," Trump has claimed the "right to kill them before they or their drugs reach this country." Other suspected "narcoterrorists" will "face the same fate," said Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. But the boat strike has drawn sharp criticism at home and abroad. The killing of crime suspects was a "murder anywhere in the world," said Colombian President Gustavo Petro. "What if we make a mistake and they happen to be people fleeing the Venezuelan dictator?" said Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) on Newsmax.
'Act of war'

Trump has crossed a "line that dates back to the Revolution," said The Atlantic. Crime-fighting has "traditionally been outside" the scope of the U.S. military's mission. In the wake of the United States' revolt against an "overbearing" British Empire, officials governed with a sense that the military "should defend the country from external threats but not be used to routinely enforce the law." Under Trump, the "mission has changed."

The Venezuela strike "was an act of war," said Julio Ricardo Varela at MSNBC. Trump produced a "blurry video" of the deadly explosion, but that does not prove "who was aboard, what they were doing or whether drugs were even present." In truth, Venezuela "doesn't really produce that much cocaine." But its anti-American government provides a "ready stage" for a president who has "built his return to power on projecting American strength abroad" with actions reminiscent of 19th-century U.S. adventurism in Latin America. The U.S. is "again using a familiar script to justify actions that will destabilize a hemisphere."

"Is it awesome to see bad guys getting blown up? Sure," said Jim Geraghty at the National Review. But is it consistent with the American Constitution and laws that mostly prohibit the "use of the American military in domestic law enforcement"? That is murky. If the government is going to "bomb and shoot up Venezuelan drug cartels," that is probably the "sort of thing that ought to be authorized by Congress."

'Testing the limits'

Azerbaijan–Russia Relations Continue to Deteriorate

Kassie Corelli

Relations between Russia and Azerbaijan have degenerated over the past several months, but until recently, the two countries aimed to keep the crisis under control.

Moscow’s aggressive rhetoric regarding Baku has turned into action, including the bombing of Azerbaijani oil depots in Ukraine.

The Kremlin is trying to preserve its influence in the South Caucasus through force or threat, but has only managed to win insignificant concessions so far, losing its leverage over the region in the process.

Relations between Russia and Azerbaijan have deteriorated sharply over the past several months (see EDM, July 7, 22). At the end of June, large-scale arrests of members of the Azerbaijani diaspora in Yekaterinburg related to long-standing criminal cases left two people dead (Deutsche Welle–Russian Service, July 3). In response, the Azerbaijani authorities conducted searches in the office of the Sputnik-Azerbaijan agency in Baku, where they arrested two employees, reporting that they were Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) agents under cover (Deutsche Welle–Russian Service, June 30). Soon afterwards, internet technology (IT) specialists with no formal connection to Russian authorities were detained in Azerbaijan (Deutsche Welle–Russian Service, July 4).

The Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (HUR) declared that Russia is widening its military presence in Armenia due to worsening relations with Azerbaijan (NV.ua, July 4). Later, the Berlin Carnegie Center suggested that the conflict was under control and would not escalate to armed confrontation. The Center’s authors noted that against the backdrop of Moscow’s war against Ukraine, Azerbaijan became an important logistical partner for Russia. In their words, from the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Moscow has actively invested in Azerbaijan’s transport infrastructure and projects for Russia-Iran-India routes (see EDM, June 7, 2023, September 6, 2024, February 6; Carnegie Politika, July 4). Consequently, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev appears to be remaining somewhat cautious, likely to ensure the conflict does not escalate. At the same time, the confrontation with Moscow may be advantageous for Baku because it permits Azerbaijan to position itself in the West as a reliable partner in the energy sector and distract its own population from the country’s internal problems (Carnegie Politika, July 4).

From Defense to War: The Language of a Changing Global Order

Dr. Hasim Turker

The idea of renaming the US Department of Defense back to the “Department of War” is, in fact, a return to the original nomenclature rather than a brand-new invention. The United States originally maintained a War Department from the nation’s founding through World War II, led by a Secretary of War. In the aftermath of WWII, however, American leaders deliberately shifted away from the blunt War label. In 1947, President Harry Truman urged that US military power be seen as a force for peace, not for conquest, which was one reason the old War Department name was dropped.

Congress reorganized the military under the 1947 National Security Act, initially calling it the “National Military Establishment.” That unwieldy name (unintentionally abbreviated as “NME,” sounding like “enemy”) was quickly changed in 1949 to the more reassuring “Department of Defense.” This rebranding reflected the post-WWII ethos: America’s armed forces were to be guardians of peace and stability, part of a new international order aimed at preventing another global war. The shift from “War” to “Defense” signified an emphasis on deterrence and collective security, in line with the founding of the United Nations and NATO as institutions to uphold peace. Even during the ensuing Cold War, US leaders often spoke of “peace through strength,” maintaining massive military capabilities (including a nuclear arsenal) ostensibly to deter war rather than to wage it. In short, the post-1945 world saw defense and deterrence rhetorically prioritized over overt references to waging war.
The Post-Cold War “Security” Era

When the Cold War ended in 1991, the United States found itself without a peer competitor. This brief unipolar moment ushered in optimistic talk of a “liberal world order” and a broadened concept of global security. The triumph of liberal democracy was proclaimed, and some even argued we had reached the “end of history” – a future where major wars between great powers would no longer occur. Indeed, in the 1990s, international discourse shifted toward security in comprehensive terms: collective security arrangements, peacekeeping missions, and humanitarian interventions took center stage. US foreign policy focused on concepts like global security, human rights, and stability, often assuming that outright war between nations was a fading threat.

It may take a generation for a stable new world order to emerge

Dr Samir Puri
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Starkly contrasting visions of world order and global governance are being prominently displayed this September at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Plus meeting and the United Nations General Assembly.

Rather than the outright victory of one vision over the other, the likely long-term outcome will be a more complex blended reality. Established structures of global governance such as the UN are struggling to adapt to a more multipolar reality. Ushering in a more stable future world order will be a generational undertaking. During that time, the risks of insecurity and further wars will simmer.

US retrenchment, Chinese ambition

China’s hosting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Plus meeting in Tianjin on 1 September brings these points home. 20 world leaders from different parts of the non-Western world attended, allowing Xi Jinping to present China as a paragon of stability. This comes at a time when US foreign policy is anything but, given the Trump administration’s aggressive trade policies, including towards its closest allies, and its withdrawal from some multilateral institutions.

As the US cedes important features of its global leadership role to China, both countries are also focusing on military competition in the Indo-Pacific. China’s huge military parade, staged immediately after the SCO meeting, saw Xi flanked by Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un.

Ostensibly the event was intended to commemorate the eightieth anniversary of the Second World War’s end. But it mainly served to project a fearsome display of Beijing’s growing military power.

Israel Escalates War Against Hamas With Doha Strik

John Haltiwanger

The strike has enraged Doha and could significantly undermine efforts to secure a truce in Gaza as Israeli forces continue to press forward with a controversial operation in Gaza City. Qatar has played a central role in cease-fire and hostage deal negotiations throughout the war, and much of Hamas’s political leadership has lived in Doha for years. After Tuesday’s attack, Doha announced that it was suspending its mediation efforts between Hamas and Israel.

Qatar denies White House claim Trump sent warning before Israel’s attack

Joseph Stepansky

Washington, DC – The administration of US President Donald Trump has said it notified Qatari officials before Israel’s attack on Hamas negotiators in Doha, a claim refuted by the Gulf country.

The statement from the White House on Tuesday came hours after the strike on a residential area in Qatar’s capital, Doha. Qatar has been a lead mediator in US-backed ceasefire talks aimed at ending the war in Gaza.

“The Trump administration was notified by the United States military that Israel was attacking Hamas, which, very unfortunately, was located in a section of Doha, the capital of Qatar,” White House spokesperson Karoline Leavitt told reporters.

“Unilaterally bombing inside Qatar, a sovereign nation and close ally of the United States that is working very hard and bravely taking risks with us to broker peace, does not advance Israel or America’s goals,” she said. “However, eliminating Hamas, who have profited off the misery of those living in Gaza, is a worthy goal.”

Leavitt added that Trump had directed his special envoy, Steve Witkoff, to “inform the Qataris of the impending attack”.

However, Qatar refuted the characterisation, with a spokesperson for Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs saying claims that the government had been “pre-informed of the attack are completely false”.

“The call that was received from an American official came during the sound of the explosions that resulted from the Israeli attack in Doha,” Majed al-Ansari wrote in a statement on X.

Qatar’s Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani said the call from the US came ten minutes after the attack began, describing the incident as “state terrorism”.

Hamas said the strike killed five of its members but that its main negotiating team had survived. Among the dead was a Qatari security officer, the country’s Ministry of Interior said.

The hidden trends in battery supply and demand: A regional analysis


Although electric-vehicle (EV) sales have slowed from their peak, battery technology continues to evolve at a breakneck pace. Researchers are constantly experimenting with new chemistries and cell configurations to optimize battery range, charging speed, and vehicle cost—the factors that matter most to consumers. Many automotive OEMs, still convinced that the future is electric, have helped global battery demand rise. Simultaneously, many governments worldwide continue to offer incentives to encourage battery production as part of their efforts to combat climate change and give consumers greener transportation options.

Looking at the global picture, battery suppliers appear to be in a tough situation that could force them to reduce prices or cut their output. But a recent McKinsey analysis provides a more nuanced view of the market, showing that their prospects vary greatly by region. While some countries produce more batteries than they need, others rely on imports because domestic manufacturing cannot fulfill demand. The same pattern holds true for the upstream value chain, including raw materials.

Many industries can eliminate regional supply–demand imbalances through global trade, but the battery market’s unique features, including greater regulatory limitations, trade barriers, high shipping costs, and variations in upstream-material availability, complicate this strategy. While imports now address shortages, they may not be sufficient to fill the gap if demand grows. In consequence, some countries may continue to have a battery surplus while others may still experience shortages—and that means companies along the value chain will need region-specific strategies to capture opportunities. These strategies could become even more important if trade barriers intensify, further limiting imports and exports.
The global view: An unbalanced market in which supply exceeds demand

Before we examined regional trends for batteries, we first reviewed the global market to understand the overall dynamics. Our analysis relied on a bottom-up model that reviewed projected global battery supply in combination with major demand drivers, such as electric vehicles, energy storage applications, and consumer electronics. Note that all our analyses focus on batteries that rely on lithium-type chemistries, such as lithium iron phosphate (LFP) and lithium nickel manganese cobalt mixed oxide (NMC).