Brandon J. Weichert
The fact that the Soviets were using large numbers of their older tanks did not inherently mean that they were likely to lose.
Picture the scene. A group of Western military analysts are snickering at the sight of ancient Soviet T-55 and T-62 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) leading attacks on the battlefield in Russia’s latest foreign conflict. Many in the West believe that the presence of these antiquated tanks, rather than more modern and sophisticated equipment, are a sure sign that the Kremlin is on track to lose.
No, this is not a reference to the Ukraine War—though it very well could have been. In fact, this is an allusion to the Soviet-Afghan War from 1979 to 1989 that defined the geopolitics in the 1980s. It also speaks to a fundamental misunderstanding by many Western analysts about the Russian (or, in this case, Soviet) way of war.
Of course, as those same analysts would point out, the Soviets lost in Afghanistan. But in spite of many of the same disadvantages, Russia is gradually winning in Ukraine. Why the difference? Because the Soviet-Afghan War was never viewed by Moscow as an existential struggle in the same manner that Russian leaders today think about the Ukraine War—and the Kremlin never devoted the same resources to victory in Afghanistan that it has in Ukraine.
The Use of Older Soviet Tanks in Afghanistan
There were a plethora of T-55s and T-62s left over in the USSR when the Soviet-Afghan War erupted. Moscow figured that their newer, more advanced T-72s and T-80s would be needed to continue deterring NATO’s more advanced tanks arrayed against the Soviet bloc in Europe. Conversely, given the abundant supply of older T-55 and T-62 MBTs—as well as the fact that the mujahideen in Afghanistan were by no means a near-peer adversary with sophisticated anti-tank weapons—the Red Army’s leadership assessed their arsenal of T-55s and T-62s were more than sufficient for squelching the rebellion.
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