Indian Strategic Studies: 10/19/25

19 October 2025

Trump's puzzling Pakistan pivot Story

Prabhu Dayal

It may be recalled that during his first term as President, Donald Trump had tweeted on January 1, 2018 that the US had "foolishly given Pakistan more than $33 billion in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies & deceit". He accused the Pakistan army of providing "safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan".

In his second term, Donald Trump has adopted a completely different approach toward Pakistan, a dramatic shift from his first term. At the recent Gaza peace summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, President Trump publicly referred to General Asim Munir as his "favourite Field Marshal". Trump has displayed a remarkably warm and friendly relationship with the Pakistan's army chief. This coincides with a significant shift from his earlier stance toward Pakistan and has been highlighted by several recent events and public comments.

Earlier in the year, Trump hosted Munir at the White House on two occasions. On June 18, Trump held an unprecedented lunch meeting with Munir, the first time a US president had hosted Pakistan's military chief at the White House without civilian leadership present. Later, on September 25 Trump hosted both Munir and Prime Minister (PM) Shehbaz Sharif, a key sign of the rapidly improving US-Pakistan relations.

Following a border conflict between India and Pakistan in May, Trump praised Munir for acknowledging his role in de-escalating tensions. Trump said he was "honoured" by Munir's praise and quoted the general as saying that he (Trump) had "saved millions of lives" by preventing the war from escalating. Pakistan nominated Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize after he claimed to have brokered a ceasefire between India and Pakistan in May 2025. This was part of a larger campaign to appeal to Trump's personal ego. Pakistan nominated Trump for the prize again in October 2025, this time for his role in securing a Gaza ceasefire.

Trump's personal business interests are certainly playing a pivotal role in shaping his policy towards Pakistan. These interests primarily involve ventures related to cryptocurrency and potential deals for rare earth mineral exploration.

Why Pakistan and Afghanistan Turned on Each Other

Mohammed Ayoob

Afghanistan’s embrace of India over Pakistan is a return to the geopolitical norm.

The rapid downturn in the Afghanistan–Pakistan relationship may have caught many observers off guard. This may appear especially jarring since the Pakistani military, the real power center in the country, was the midwife of the Taliban movement in the 1990s and supported its rise to power. It also clandestinely supported the Taliban in the first two decades of this century when it was at war with the US-supported government in Kabul. Islamabad openly rejoiced at the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021.

At that time, Islamabad had assumed that the Taliban would act as its vassals in Afghanistan, providing it the defense in depth it needed to continue its confrontation with India. A friendly government in Kabul would also neutralize the danger of a two-front conflict if Islamabad were embroiled in a shooting war with New Delhi. Afghanistan also acted as the training ground for Pakistan-supported terrorist groups that could infiltrate Indian-administered Kashmir.

Unfortunately for Pakistan, this turned out to be a colossal miscalculation. The Taliban, resentful of their dependence on Pakistan and its highhanded ways, has turned against its mentors. This became very clear earlier this month in the clashes on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border that left dozens dead on both sides. These clashes followed Pakistani aerial attacks in Kabul and Paktia province.

The Pakistani government implied that these attacks were aimed at Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) targets. The TTP has been engaged in fighting the Pakistan army for years in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province bordering Afghanistan, which is populated by the same Pashtun ethnic group that forms the backbone of the Afghan Taliban. The two formations are ideological twins.

The Taliban added insult to Pakistan’s injury since the clashes coincided with Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi’s visit to New Delhi, where he issued dire warnings to Islamabad. Furthermore, in the joint statement issued at the end of his visit, Muttaqi condemned the terrorist attacks on Pahalgam in Kashmir attributed to Pakistan-backed groups, and both sides unequivocally supported the territorial integrity of each other, which, according to Indian interpretation, implicitly includes Kashmir.

Trade Routes Rise, Security Risks Multiply in Central Asia

James Durso

China is rapidly expanding its influence through the Belt and Road Initiative, investing $25 billion in Central Asia in early 2025 alone.

Analysts warn that regional connectivity must be balanced with security cooperation.

The infrastructure boom raises risks of smuggling, trafficking, and transnational crime across increasingly open borders.

When war in Afghanistan ended in 2021, the Central Asian republics could now focus on investments in human development and physical infrastructure without the prospect of violence spilling over the border from Afghanistan.

One of the republics, Uzbekistan, pursued what Yunis Sharifli has called a “multi-vector transport strategy” coupled with a “good neighbor” foreign policy.

The region has seen many proposed regional transport links, such as the Kabul and Kandahar corridors through Afghanistan to Pakistan, the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, the China-Kazakhstan railway, and the Intentional North-South Transport Corridor, and the Middle Corridor.

Though these corridors will facilitate investment and trade, they are a significant incentive for smuggling and illicit trading.

The International Institute for Central Asia in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, recently queried “whether greater connectivity could create new vulnerabilities for the movement of illicit goods, extremist networks, and transnational crime.”

The smugglers - they are really transport specialists - may move narcotics today, weapons next week, then branch into humans, rare animals, and antiquities. As a side note, antiquities trafficking may be a new concern for Uzbekistan as it raises its profile as a destination for cultural tourism and the restoration of historic sites.

Trump, China, and Declining US Influence in Asia

Robert Sutter

The clashing interests of the United States and China sustain their continuing rivalry in Asia, the main determinant of regional dynamics. The struggle focuses on the Indo-Pacific countries ranging from India in the west to Japan in the northeast, and Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands in the southeast. Other factors in regional dynamics – such as North Korea’s threats and the ongoing civil war in Myanmar – remain secondary.

The major escalation of superpower competition in Asia began with hardened U.S. policies countering the multifaceted adverse challenges from China. These polices began during the first Trump administration (2017-2021) and developed strongly during the Biden administration (2021-2025). To the United States, a hostile China gaining regional leadership and dominance would represent an existential threat comparable to the threat posed by Imperial Japan in the dark days after the attack on Pearl Harbor. For 70 years, major U.S. sacrifices to avoid such dominance by an adversary included very costly wars in Korea and Vietnam.

A centerpiece in President Joe Biden’s argument for re-election – and, following his withdrawal from the race, the election of his vice president, Kamala Harris – in 2024 was his administration’s achievement in building U.S. economic, high technology, and military strengths at home while strengthening growing U.S. influence in the Indo-Pacific region to counter China’s adverse ambitions. He repeatedly claimed to have “checked” China.

Indeed, Biden strengthened the United States domestically with legislation worth $2 trillion supporting modern infrastructure and high technology development. He sustained Trump administration tariffs on Chinese imports and added to them in the fields of high technology and advanced industry. He curbed the sale of U.S. highly advanced semiconductor technology, significantly complicating China’s high technology ambitions.

He and his administration went on the offensive in supporting multilateral international arrangements countering China, including the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with Australia, India, and Japan; the AUKUS security and high technology agreement with Australia and the United Kingdom; the Japan-South Korea-U.S. cooperative framework; and various other bilateral and multilateral arrangements. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and China’s support for Russia saw Biden lead Western and Indo-Pacific allies and partners in supporting Ukraine, sanctioning Russia, and deterring Chinese expansionism in Asia.

New Emphases in the PLA’s Operational Centers of Gravity

K. Tristan Tang

Executive Summary:Like many militaries around the world, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) places strong emphasis on Clausewitz’s concept of the center of gravity—the single most important and decisive operational problem to the PLA in a given phase or time window.

A recent PLA Daily article places new emphasis on information-centric centers of gravity, time-sensitive targeting, and the requirement for higher-level approval.

These three shifts reflect intensified preparations for operations against Taiwan, as well as suggesting an ongoing breakdown of trust between military authorities and frontline officers.

Carl von Clausewitz’s concept of the center of gravity remains a key analytic tool for military and operational planning that is used by armed forces worldwide. The 19th century theorist of war derived the term (Schwerpunkt, or “main point” in the original German) from its use in the physical sciences. He used it metaphorically to refer to a focal point in an enemy’s forces when its acts with a substantial degree of unity (Echevarria, 2003). [1] In military discourse within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), analysts define a “center of gravity” (作战重心) as the single most important and decisive “operational problem” (作战问题) in a conflict’s given phase or time window. Analyzing operational problems can uncover the nature and patterns of a military confrontation. This analysis focuses on real adversaries, the PLA’s own capabilities, and potential battlefields, while studying key issues such as guidance, methods, and deployment. The aim is to ensure victory in future wars and keep pace with the evolution of warfare (PLA Daily, July 7, 2022; November 24, 2022; July 8).

On October 2, Xu Shiyong (许世勇), likely a professor at the PLA Army Command College, published an article on the concept of operational centers of gravity in the PLA Daily (PLA Daily, October 2). According to Xu’s operational definition, operational or tactical planners who apply the concept well can seize the initiative on the battlefield and ultimately achieve their operational objectives (PLA Daily, April 23, 2024; October 2). Xu had previously written a piece on the concept that appeared in April 2024 (PLA Daily, April 23, 2024). [2] A comparison of the two articles suggests an evolution in the understanding of this concept within the PLA. The more recent piece focuses more on information-centric gravity, time-sensitive targeting, and approval from higher authorities. This shift in emphasis carries implications for potential operations against Taiwan as well as for recent controversies surrounding the PLA’s personnel management.

Three Aspects of ‘Center of Gravity’

China has the world in a $1tn choke hold Story

Hans van Leeuwen

The world’s investors, executives, policymakers and politicians all now keep an eye on the Truth Social account @realDonaldTrump. The president’s posts have the power to move markets and even shake up the world order.

Now there’s another habit they might need to cultivate: watching the announcements from China’s ministry of commerce.

The ministry’s initially low-key announcement last week of new regulations on Chinese rare earth exports has sent shock waves through the West.

Beijing awarded itself the power to dictate what many companies, based anywhere in the world, do with key products that contain rare earths or battery materials sourced from China. The sweeping powers affect everything from cars to solar panels and missiles. And almost all companies affected have nowhere else to go.

“This is a completely new dawn. This no longer has anything to do with trade. We’ve morphed from a trade war into a grey-zone operation,” says James Kynge, a China watcher at think tank Chatham House.

“It’s a complete step change in China’s leverage and China’s ability to coerce not only the US, but every other country in the West, if it chooses to do so. The evidence of the past suggests that Beijing may well use this leverage. And then we’re into a whole different world.”

For years, Beijing has been building up an arsenal of economic weaponry. Chinese goods could be either withheld from a country or dumped on it. Exports to China could be blocked. The world’s largest creditor could toy with an indebted government’s bond market, or call in its loans.

From time to time, it has turned this coercive firepower on countries that it views as transgressive. Countries including Japan, Norway, Lithuania and Australia have already been put through the vice.

Now, it is showing the world just how far it is prepared to go.

The new rare earth powers have been announced amid claims that Britain dropped a trial against two alleged Chinese spies because of its dependence on Beijing for cash.

China and Iran After the 12-Day War

Thomas Gormley

Technology, Deterrence, and the Future of U.S. Leverage

Iran’s 12-Day War with Israel has accelerated Tehran’s interest in Chinese technology. The emerging trajectory of the China-Iran technological partnership suggests it could undermine U.S. or Israeli freedom of action in a future confrontation.

China offered little more than rhetorical condemnation as it watched Israel operate with near impunity above and on the ground in Iran this June, raising serious doubts about their ability to project meaningful hard power in the region. However, the months following the war have seen a change in China’s posture. While Iran is already an established testing ground for China’s digital-authoritarianism, Beijing has now become keen to help the regime in Tehran address the major gaps in its national security exposed by Israel’s operations. This comes as Russia, Iran’s main external military partner, has increasingly come-up short in delivering Tehran military hardware and systems (hardware and systems the Kremlin itself needs for its ongoing invasion of Ukraine).

The backdrop for this increased military support is the 25-year strategic cooperation pact signed by Beijing and Tehran in 2021. The pact envisioned Chinese investment in Iran’s energy and infrastructure in exchange for Iranian oil. Crucially, the agreement brought Iran into China’s Belt and Road Initiative. This accelerated the transfer of Chinese technology to Tehran, with firms such as Tiandy Technologies supporting domestic surveillance. The export of surveillance software more than doubled following renewed anti-government protests in Iran in 2022, and Chinese facial recognition software played a significant role in suppressing these protests in 2023. China has also provided dual-use technologies, such as semiconductors and intelligence gathering software.

In the past, illicit procurement and reverse engineering of Western technology had offered Iran a secondary route to foreign innovation not supplied by Russia or China. Iran’s tech sector has partially relied on Western technology transferred through sanction-evading front companies procuring dual-use technologies. This illicit global procurement network was brought to light by the 2022 revelation that Iranian Mohajer-6 drones used against Ukraine contained components made in both the U.S. and EU. Despite the regime frequently claiming to have weaned Iran off foreign tech in multiple sectors of its economy and critical infrastructure, its recent war with Israel highlighted its remaining vulnerabilities. Israeli strikes targeted nuclear and advanced military infrastructure understood to be hard to replace due to their foreign origins. Furthermore, as confirmed by Iran’s Ministry of Information and Communications Technology, Tehran deliberately jammed domestic GPS signals to counter major disruptions to the U.S.-operated system during the war.

How the Houthis rule in Yemen: Prisons, a personality cult, and pilfered food aid Story

REUTERS

Protesters, predominantly Houthi supporters, rally to celebrate the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in Gaza on the day it went into effect, in Sanaa, Yemen, October 10, 2025.

Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi terror group has been lionized at pro-Palestinian protests around the world and on social media for its missile strikes on Israel over the Gaza war. In May, even US President Donald Trump lauded the Houthis’ grit.

“We hit them very hard,” Trump said, in announcing the group had agreed to stop attacking ships in the Red Sea following weeks of US strikes on them. “They had a great capacity to withstand punishment … You can say there’s a lot of bravery there.”

At home, many who have lived under Houthi rule have a starkly different view. In interviews with hundreds of Yemenis who have fled the Houthi-controlled part of this divided country, people described a terrorist group that silences critics, drives people into starvation, and has used international food aid to force parents to hand over children to be soldiers in its armed forces.

“People are between a rock and a hard place,” said Abdul-Salam, a 37-year-old farmer who lives in a displaced persons camp in Yemen after fleeing the Houthi-controlled part of the country. “The Houthis would give you a choice: be with them and take a food basket to stave off hunger, or get nothing.”

Like many interviewed for this story, Abdul-Salam spoke on condition that only his first name be used, saying he has family members still living under the Houthis.

Interviews with Yemeni civilians and dozens of aid workers, as well as a review of internal UN aid agency documents, reveal how the Houthis maintain their iron grip.

How Houthis maintain iron grip

They levy an array of taxes on their impoverished subjects, manipulate the international aid system and imprison hundreds. Human rights and aid organizations have faced waves of arrests: In late August, the World Food Program said 15 staff members were detained after Houthi authorities forced their way into the organization’s offices in Sanaa, the capital. This brings the number of aid workers currently being held in detention to 53.

How Including Nuclear in the Loss and Damage Fund Advances US and the Global South’s Interests

Lindsay Hall, and Paul Murphy

Nuclear energy can serve as the “bridge” in the discussion between geopolitical and energy security on one side, and decarbonization and development on the other. Including nuclear energy in the Loss and Damage Fund can strengthen US nuclear leadership and help the Global South build low-carbon solutions that support water security and economic growth.

There is a clear correlation between electrification and prosperity. Intergovernmental organizations have recognized the economic and security imperative of developing reliable and resilient infrastructure, with the United Nations (UN) recognizing the need to close the “significant infrastructure gap in critical sectors” in developing countries, including energy and water infrastructure, to “greatly improve access to essential services, employment opportunities, economic growth and sustainable development.”

By 2050, the global urban population is expected to double, with nearly seven of 10 people living in urban areas, many being pulled by economic opportunities and pushed from agricultural disruptions, conflict, and other issues in rural areas. As urban populations continue to swell, energy, water, transportation, and other infrastructure must also grow to meet new residential, commercial, and industrial needs. Urban areas account for around 75 percent of current global energy consumption, which is projected to increase as urban populations continue to rise. However, more than 100 million people living in cities around the world lack access to electricity, with even greater numbers lacking access to safely managed drinking water.

With tremendous financial resources available to developing countries through the United Nations Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD), many cities in the Global South have a unique opportunity to build the modern energy and water infrastructure needed to support the rising demands of growing urban centers. Given that much of this available funding is allocated based on climate vulnerabilities, recipient countries may be particularly concerned about the entrenchment of oil and gas infrastructure, and local governments will need to scrutinize a power source’s air quality impacts on urban environments and the feasibility of supporting dispersed ancillary infrastructure.

The Return of Landmines Marks a Darker Era for Europe – and the World

Grant Wyeth

Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, border crossings between Finland and Russia numbered close to 1 million per month. Russians would cross seeking products not available at home, while Finns would fill up on cheap petrol. Yet as pandemic restrictions eased, Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the Finns placed new restrictions on crossings. In May 2022, Finland applied to join NATO. Then, in November 2023, Finland closed the border completely following Russia’s hybrid tactics of pushing asylum seekers into Finland to create political problems for the government.

In July this year Finland signalled that its trust in Moscow had eroded completely. Following decisions by Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, Finland also informed the United Nations that it will withdraw from the Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. A move designed to potentially turn the Finnish-Russian border into something far more inhospitable.

Since becoming effective in the late-1990s, the Ottawa Convention had been a great success as an arms control treaty. Global landmine and explosive-remnant casualties fell from about 25,000 annually in the mid-1990s to fewer than 1000 in 2012. However, there has been a recent uptick of several thousand more due to extensive landmine use by Russia in eastern Ukraine and by the junta in Myanmar. The nature of the weapons means that the vast majority of victims remain civilians – 84% in 2023, with more than a third being children – making the decision to withdraw all the more fraught.

Withdrawal from the convention requires a six month notice period, however, as the treaty was designed to prevent the use of landmines within warzones, it contains a condition that withdrawal cannot take place before the end of any on-going conflict a state is party to. Ukraine has also decided to withdraw from the convention, but given its extraordinary circumstances fighting a state who is not a signatory, it has chosen to be in violation of this provision.

Ukraine’s Drone War Over the Black Sea Is Heating Up

David Kirichenko

Ukraine’s naval drones have sunk warships, hit oil terminals, and even downed Russian helicopters and fighter jets over the Black Sea.

Ukraine has turned to drones and asymmetrical warfare to counter Russia’s superior firepower, but nowhere has this strategy been more effective than in the Black Sea. Over the course of the war, Ukraine neutralized a third of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, forcing much of the navy to retreat from occupied Crimea. Today, Ukrainian naval drones or unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) are effectively enforcing a blockade on Russian ports.

Yet the contest is far from over. Moscow is gradually adapting, learning from its mistakes, and investing in new defenses. Ukraine is still ahead, but signs indicate that the Kremlin is taking the issue of unmanned systems and their impact on naval warfare more seriously.

Ukraine Builds a High-Tech Navy

Following Russia’s first invasion in 2014, Ukraine lost most of its navy, and by the time of the 2022 invasion, Kyiv even abandoned its only remaining warship to prevent it from falling into Russian hands. Well before the full-scale invasion, Ukraine recognized that achieving military parity with Russia would be impossible.

“As a result, the navy had to be built according to an asymmetric principle,” said Serhii Kuzan, chairman of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center and former Ministry of Defense adviser, in an interview published by the US Naval Institute. With Russia holding far greater resources and manpower, Kyiv turned to the ingenuity of its people, leveraging innovation wherever possible.

General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Ukraine’s former commander-in-chief, wrote, “Ukraine’s advantage lies in its people, who have not only stopped the enemy, but have already transformed the country into a center of innovation on the battlefield.” In practice, that innovation meant substituting the warships it lacked with drones.

Deborah Fairlamb, founding partner of the Ukraine-focused venture capital firm Green Flag Ventures, put it succinctly: “Ukrainians are right when they say ‘send robots, not humans.’” Protecting soldiers’ lives has become the most important objective, and Ukraine is increasingly pursuing a “robots first” strategy by building a technology shield across the front. “This isn’t a traditional war. It’s a war of drones,” as one Ukrainian soldier told me. “A war of technology.”

Lessons From the Black Sea

A Space Week Without Strategy

Richard M. Harrison & Peter A. Garretson

Sixty-eight years ago, the Soviet Union shocked the world by launching Sputnik 1 and igniting the space race. Today, new Sputnik moments loom on the horizon, and the stakes are far higher. The country that emerges as a preeminent space power will guarantee its own economic and national security, and shape the “rules of the road” that govern the international community for decades to come.

Who will that be? In the absence of strong leadership on space, China is poised to surpass the United States. That the federal government was shut down during Space Week (which ran from Oct. 4-10) is symbolic of a rudderless American space strategy. Meanwhile, over the past six months, China began deploying an AI “supercomputing” satellite constellation and, together with Russia, unveiled plans to construct a Lunar nuclear power plant to support their planned International Lunar Research Station (ILRS). Beijing, in other words, has a clear vision for space and is executing it.

Dr. Namrata Goswami, a leading China space analyst, has eloquently outlined how the Chinese Communist Party’s strategic prioritization of reusable rockets, orbital logistics, and Lunar industrialization may allow the PRC to outpace America in space before too long.

These factors matter. Reusable rockets are the principal reason why the U.S. remains the leader in space launch. But that advantage may be slipping. Today, SpaceX, the private corporation of billionaire entrepreneur Elon Musk, out-launches not only every other company in the space economy, but every country as well. That volume is a double-edged sword; now that the U.S. has effectively lowered the barrier for entry into the space market, some analysts warn that America has only a handful of years before China matches this output.

Indeed, signs of this are already emerging. Over the last five years, Beijing has demonstrated in-space refueling, tested a fractional orbital bombardment system, and launched its own crewed space station. Moreover, China has also landed and returned samples from the far side of the Moon—a feat that the U.S. has never accomplished.

In the blink of an eye, Trump is suddenly winning World War III

Mark Toth and Jonathan Sweet

Back in August, while standing alongside President Trump in Alaska, Russian President Vladimir Putin chuckled while glancing back at the B-2 stealth bomber flyover. He understood its messaging. Yet he failed fully to understand just how much meaning Trump’s show of force was meant to convey to Putin and the Kremlin.

Now, less than two months later, the full meaning of the B-2 flyover is clear. Trump’s decision to bomb Iran’s three principal nuclear facilities — Fordow, Isfahan, and Natanz — was aimed at transforming Eastern Europe as much as the Middle East. It was an inflection point in Putin’s and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s war against the West.

Trump himself made that clear in Egypt during the recent Israel-Hamas ceasefire signing. Trump argued that the impetus for the deal “really started when we took out the nuclear capability of Iran.”

Hamas, now lacking Iran’s active support and gradually abandoned by Turkey and Qatar, was fast running out of options. Israel threatened to retake all of Gaza City, and Trump made clear he was on board, absent a deal.

Moscow is now reeling. With his key ally Iran neutered and Syria’s pro-Russian regime overthrown, Putin finds himself on the outside looking in when it comes to the Middle East. Putin’s isolation was evinced by his canceling of an Oct. 15 Arab conference in Moscow. As Bloomberg put it, “There simply weren’t enough Arab leaders saying ‘yes’ to warrant holding a summit.”

Contrast that with Trump’s triumphant appearance with key Middle and Near East leaders in Egypt — of Egypt itself and of Qatar, Jordan, Kuwait, Iraq and Pakistan. Flanking them were key NATO leaders from France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, plus six others. Trump, like him or not, was a global powerhouse magnet in Egypt. Putin has essentially been reduced to bug repellent in the Arab world.

Is Gen Z Reshaping Africa’s Political Landscape?

Charles A. Ray

In “Does Africa Matter to the United States?”, published by FPRI on January 11, 2021, it was argued that the youth of Africa, who currently account for almost half the continent’s population, could become recruits for extremist movements if they are not provided gainful employment and economic opportunities. What that article failed to address is the possibility that Africa’s youth, if denied opportunity, can also pose a direct threat to governments.

Recent events across sub-Saharan Africa, where youth-led protests have challenged entrenched leadership, raise the possibility that the changes forecast in the article mentioned above could unfold well ahead of 2050, when African youth will be one of the world’s largest demographics.

Across Africa, the “Youth Bubble” is Rising

In September 2025, hundreds of young protesters took to the streets across Morocco, seeking improvements in government services and an end to endemic corruption. Demonstrators, organized by a movement known as GenZ 212, have staged protests in at least eleven of Morocco’s cities, including Casablanca, Rabat, and Marrakesh. They are urging more investment in public health and education and denouncing what they call misplaced national priorities—among them is the government’s multibillion-dollar investment in football infrastructure in preparation for the Africa Cup of Nations and FIFA World Cup soccer events, while women are dying in maternity hospitals because of the lack of sufficient medical staff. These have been some of the largest anti-government demonstrations in Morocco since the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings and resulted in an aggressive security force response and the arrest of hundreds.

Gen-Z protests in Kenya in June 2025 saw young people across the nation taking to the streets, demanding justice, accountability, and a better future. Eight young protestors were killed in a confrontation with police, and one lost fingers when a tear gas canister he was attempting to throw back at riot police exploded in his hands. While these protests have not resulted in any immediate change, observers note that they have shaken the political landscape and are likely to impact the future direction of governance in Kenya. The Kenya protests, organized by youth activists and civil society groups, reflect the frustration of young people with government policies, police brutality, and economic hardships. While protests over tax hikes in 2024 led to some reforms, including abandoning of the proposed tax legislation, it remains to be seen if this year’s protests will have similar results.

Trump Tightens the Vise on Venezuela’s Maduro

Brendan Cole

President Donald Trump's policy of attacks on vessels he says are linked to the drug trade and the regime of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro could lead to the U.S. leader ordering air strikes on narcotics sites in the South American country, an analyst has told Newsweek.

Trump announced Tuesday a U.S. military strike on a boat off the coast of Venezuela purportedly linked to drug trafficking and terrorist networks and posted video of the strike he said killed six people.

There have been a number of similar attacks in recent weeks, coinciding with a U.S. military buildup in the southern Caribbean involving F-35 aircraft in Puerto Rico, eight U.S. warships and one nuclear-powered submarine.

Prior to Tuesday’s strike, Zev Faintuch, from security firm Global Guardian, told Newsweek that Trump is likely to increase the pressure on Maduro with more strikes on vessels, and may even order attacks on sites inside Venezuela.

“It's about putting the regime in a situation where there's only bad options,” Faintuch said.

Washington linked it directly to the regime of Maduro, whom the U.S. does not recognize as the president of Venezuela, following 2024 elections he is accused of stealing.

The latest strikes show a more aggressive U.S. counternarcotics policy in the Western Hemisphere, raising concerns about unilateral military force in the region.

What To Know

Trump announced Tuesday he had ordered a “lethal kinetic strike” in international waters near Venezuela on a vessel allegedly linked to a designated terrorist organization, without specifying which group.

Trump posted on TruthSocial a video which appeared to show a stationary vessel in a body of water being hit with a projectile before exploding.

Will Trump’s $20 Billion Backing Help Milei Change Argentina’s Fortunes?

Brad W. Setser

This unusual credit line—and even more unusual decision to use U.S. foreign exchange reserves to buy the Argentine peso last week—seeks to support the battered currency of South America’s third-largest economy, officials with President Donald Trump’s administration said. There is concern, however, that Argentina lacks a clear path to repaying both the United States and the already over-exposed IMF. Critics argue U.S. taxpayer dollars are being put at risk to provide Javier Milei, Argentina’s unorthodox and fiscally conservative president, a political lifeline weeks ahead of legislative elections on October 26.

Brad Setser, a senior fellow at CFR with expertise in global trade and capital flows, explains the rationale behind the Treasury’s actions—and the risks it poses—just ahead of Milei’s visit on October 14.

Why does Argentina need help now?

The details of Argentina’s economic crisis are complex, but the bottom line is simple: Argentina needs help because it is running out of hard currency.

Most people know that Argentina did a dramatic fiscal tightening immediately after Milei won Argentina’s presidency in late 2023—the image of Milei wielding a chainsaw is pretty vivid. There were large cuts to public spending that produced a more or less balanced budget this year. There is no doubt that they were real, even if there is a small hidden deficit on the books of the central bank. And yet, there are doubts about the sustainability of the cuts—public investment was reduced a bit too much, for example—and not all have broad political support.

Buenos Aires’ path back to economic stability requires more than a balanced budget. The country’s economy has historically suffered from a shortage of foreign exchange. Its export base is small and commodity heavy. Its external debts are relatively large, and its foreign exchange reserves are low.

Trump Dreams of Bagram’s Geopolitical Reemergence

Islomkhon Gafarov, Shokhrux Saidov & Alisher Akhmedov

Following Donald Trump’s return to office, US foreign policy toward Afghanistan has undergone noticeable changes. Unlike the Biden era, which was characterized by inactive political engagement and an indifference to the Afghan issue, the new administration has taken steps to renew dialogue with Kabul.

As early as March 2025, former US Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad and the US Envoy for Hostage Affairs Adam Boehler arrived in Afghanistan. In September of the same year, two visits followed: in mid-September, Khalilzad and Boehler jointly traveled to Kabul, while at the end of the month Boehler returned independently. These visits indicate the Trump administration’s growing interest in Afghanistan and its attempts to reconfigure the US strategic presence in the region. Moreover, discussions have taken place between the Taliban government and US officials regarding a possible reopening of diplomatic missions; specifically, the Afghan embassy in Washington D.C. and the US embassy in Kabul.

Nevertheless, Donald Trump’s statements reveal the duality of his approach. At the beginning of the year, he demanded that Afghan authorities return US weapons left behind after the troop withdrawal. Later, in September, he publicly declared his intention to restore US control over the Bagram Air Base, emphasizing its strategic significance and declaring: “one of the reasons we want the base is, as you know, it’s an hour away from where China makes its nuclear weapons.”

Trump’s statement underscores the geopolitical significance of Afghan territory. Historically, the Soviet-era Bagram Air Base served as the largest US military installation in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021, and is now under the control of the Taliban government. In response to Trump’s remarks, Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi declared: “Not even one meter of land will be given to U.S.” The exchange set off a new cycle of US-Afghan tensions while demonstrating once again the centrality of the Bagram in regional geopolitics.

The Strategic Importance of the Bagram Air Base

Tomahawks not sole Trump option for increasing pressure on Putin

Stephen Bryen

USS Barry launching a Tomahawk missile. Photo: by US Navy / Interior Communications Electrician Fireman Roderick Eubanks / Wikimedia Commons

US President Donald Trump, in the midst of his triumph ending the Gaza war and gaining the return of the Israeli hostages, is jacking up the pressure on Russia. The major threat, but not the only one, is the threat to deliver Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine that would be used to target assets inside Russia.

Russia has not won the war on the ground in Ukraine. Even without the Tomahawk, Russia will experience heavy losses to Ukrainian drones aimed at Russia’s energy infrastructure and military industries. Ukrainian raids on Russia happen nearly every night, just as Russian raids on Ukraine appear fairly persistent.

Russia has limited financial ability to replace its losses, and shutdowns of power and equipment losses do not play well with the public.

In effect, Ukraine has retaliated fairly effectively for heavy Russian raids on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, and so far at least Ukraine has been able to manage such losses or at least persist through them.

Russian Emergency Situation Ministry’s firefighters work at the scene of a fire at the Novoshakhtinsk oil processing plant in the Rostov region. Photo: Russian Emergency Ministry Press Service.

Nonetheless there are limits to everything. How long can Ukraine sustain mounting losses, and how much reverse punishment can Russia take in pursuit of its goals in Ukraine? There are no answers to these questions, or to the question of how long the war itself will continue.

The modern battlefield has changed significantly. Drones and precision weapons, along with aerial-dropped mines, have made armored assaults nearly a thing of the past. Some say that the life of a main battle tank is a mere 72 hours, meaning that hardware will be rapidly destroyed and experienced crews are few and far between.

The 3 ‘Spoilers’ Who Could Kill the Gaza Peace Deal

Andrew Latham

President Donald Trump delivers the Commencement address at the graduation ceremony for the University of Alabama, Thursday, May 1, 2025, at Coleman Coliseum in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)

-The initial success was a simple transaction. The hard part is disarming Hamas, a condition the group has already rejected.

-The plan is vulnerable to three key “spoilers”: Hamas seeking to retain power, the Israeli far-right working to block a Palestinian state, and Iran seeking to re-arm its proxies. Without strict, daily, and intrusive international enforcement with real consequences, the peace process will likely collapse.

Gaza Peace? Here Comes the Tough Part

The current Israeli–Hamas ceasefire plan is a roadmap, and a fairly simple one at that. It comprises 20 steps that can be divided into three phases: first, hostage–prisoner swaps and cessation of hostilities, then on to disarming Hamas, then reconstructing both the institutions of governance and the physical infrastructure of Gaza.

Phase one is proceeding relatively smoothly, largely because it is a re-run of hostage-prisoner exchanges past. The next two phases, however, will not be so smooth. Indeed, if the past is indeed prologue, the entire peace process is likely to come crashing to a halt long before Phase 2 is complete.

Why Phase One Worked

The opening phase worked because it was both built on prior experience and served both party’s interests. It was, in a word, transactional – a mutually beneficial exchange of 20 living Israeli hostages on the one hand for roughly 2,000 Palestinian prisoners and the resumption of aid on the other.

A Realist View of Europe’s ‘Drone Wall’

Andrew Davidson

European capitals and NATO partners are getting serious about a “drone wall” for Europe’s eastern flank. Public pressure and a series of recent incursions by small unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in multiple European states have pushed air defense onto national agendas. While drones can be used as weapons themselves (and often are in war zones), European governments today are focused on other UAS-related threats. Indeed, drones can serve as persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, and can carry jammers, spoofers or electronic decoys that interfere with air defense systems. Europe’s political commitment to a barrier against this threat is real, but the operational foundations beneath the rhetoric remain uncertain simply because there is no common understanding of what a wall would entail.

Cheap, long-range drones have become a cost-effective way of needling an adversary. A $30,000 one-way drone can force a defending nation to spend 10 times more on interception. Unless this gap narrows, perimeter deployments could become financially unsustainable over time. Low-altitude flight and near-border launch zones reduce reaction time, demanding dense sensor networks that expand costs and require continuous energy input and coordination few states can sustain alone.

Electronic warfare is a powerful but limited counter. Its reach depends on power, geometry and logistics: Small jammers cover only a few kilometers, while even large fixed emitters rarely exceed 70-100 kilometers (about 40-60 miles) under ideal conditions. That limited reach matters because much of Europe’s industrial and energy base lies close to its eastern borders. The absence of deep geographic buffers – and the presence of open air corridors such as the narrow Baltic passage near Kaliningrad – makes detection and response complex. Europe’s geography thus underscores that mobility, coordination and energy resilience should be central to its counter-drone strategy.

Logistics

Defending against long-range and loitering drones is first a problem of physics and logistics, not just technology. Effective jamming is ultimately a power contest: the jammer must overwhelm the drone’s control signal by transmitting a stronger interfering signal – known as achieving a favorable jammer-to-signal ratio – requiring antenna alignment, cooling and constant energy. Maintaining that margin requires continuous power supply and operational flexibility to sustain detection and response across European airspace. A comprehensive defense also depends on shared command structures and compatible procedures between states to manage the wider network and prevent gaps in coverage.

Small Powers, Big Impact: Asymmetric Warfare in the Age of Tech

Shaheer Ahmad

Incremental adaptation in modern warfare has astonished military observers globally. Ukraine’s meticulously planned Operation Spider Web stands as a stark reminder of how bottom-up innovation combined with hi-tech solutions can prove their mettle on the battlefield. It has also exposed the recurring flaw in the strategic mindsets of the great powers: undermining small powers, their propensity for defence, and their will to resist. Having large-scale conventional militaries and legacy battle systems, great powers are generally guided by a hubris of technological preeminence and expectations of fighting large-scale industrial wars. In contrast, small powers don’t fight in the same paradigm; they innovate from the bottom up, leveraging terrain advantage by repurposing dual-use tech, turning the asymmetries to their favour.

History offers notable instances of great power failures in asymmetric conflicts. From the French Peninsular War to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, these conflicts demonstrate the great powers’ failure to adapt to the opponent’s asymmetric strategies. This is partly due to their infatuation with the homogeneity of military thought, overwhelming firepower and opponents’ strategic circumspection to avoid symmetric confrontation with the great powers.

On the contrary, small powers possess limited means and objectives when confronting a great power. They simply avoid fighting in the opponent’s favoured paradigm. Instead, they employ an indirect strategy of attrition, foster bottom-up high-tech innovation and leverage terrain knowledge to increase attritional cost and exhaust opponents’ political will to fight. Similarly, small powers are often more resilient, which is manifested by their higher threshold of pain to incur losses, an aspect notably absent in great powers’ war calculus.

In the Operation Spider Web, Ukraine employed a fusion of drone technology with human intelligence (HUMINT) to attack Russia’s strategic aviation mainstays. Eighteen months before the attack, Ukraine’s Security Services (SBU) covertly smuggled small drones and modular launch systems compartmentalised inside cargo trucks. These drones were later transported close to Russian airbases. Utilising an open-source software called ArduPilot, these drones struck a handful of Russia’s rear defences, including Olenya, Ivanovo, Dyagilevo and Belaya airbases. Among these bases, Olenya is home to the 40th Composite Aviation Regiment—a guardian of Russia’s strategic bomber fleet capable of conducting long-range strikes.

Army begins ‘talent panels’ to cut 6,500 manned aviation jobs

Hope Hodge Seck

The Army has officially embarked on its effort to relocate some 6,500 junior officers and warrant officers who it says are no longer needed in the aviation field.

Aviation officials say, however, that they hope to reach that target without forcing many troops out of the service.

Maj. Gen. Clair Gill, commander of the Army Aviation Center of Excellence and Fort Rucker, Alabama, told reporters at the Association of the United States Army’s annual meeting on Wednesday that talent panels launched this month are intended to keep decision-making power with the soldiers and would not immediately lead to involuntary transfers or reductions.

“We went out to the formations and asked commanders to counsel every single soldier that was in the targeted population [where] we are over strength, and talk to them about where they are, what their goals are, what they want to do in the Army, if this is what they want to do, and if they’re looking for other things,” Gill said. “And then they created an order-of-merit list for their formations and sent that to us.”

That list would be evaluated by a panel that would assess all the soldiers’ records and organize them into top, middle, and bottom thirds, he said.

“We’re going to give that back to those commanders and say, ‘Here’s where your folks fell out. We want you to counsel them and talk to them about options,’” Gill said.

“Right now, they’ll use that as a tool to say, ‘Hey, if you’re in the bottom third, you’re in the at risk population. You might want to think about options available to you, and here’s what they look like.’”

Those affected by the talent panels include junior officers in year groups 2020 to 2023 and untracked warrant officers in year groups 2022 to 2024. The cuts reflect the rise of unmanned aviation and Army force restructuring that will see the elimination of cavalry squadrons within the continental U.S.

War is a Young Man’s Game

Bob Krumm

Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s address to the nation’s generals and admirals last week received mixed reviews. Many veterans and lower-ranking servicemembers applauded his remarks. His critics, however, called them “embarrassing,” “abhorrent,” and “completely unnecessary.” Contrary to the critics, Secretary Hegseth’s comments—particularly on physical fitness standards—were both accurate and long overdue.

When I was assigned to Iraq as an Operations Research Analyst, my office had the responsibility for validating all the data in the database of significant activities, or “SigActs.” Because we used that data to learn quantitative lessons about the war, it was important that it be correct. Consequently, I saw every final report about the death of an American throughout my time in Iraq.

In early 2008 it was uncommon for a day to pass without an American death. However, by spring the “Surge” showed positive results. There were many days without a combat death—sometimes several days in a row. I was back in Iraq again in mid-2009 and the downward trend continued. By the time I left in the spring of 2010, there often were weeks in a row without an American combat casualty.

However, that good news was tempered by something I observed in the data midway through my second deployment. Non-combat-related deaths occurred at the rate of about four to six a month. By late 2009 that number matched, and often surpassed, the number of combat deaths.

I was curious. I dug up the old data going back to the beginning of the Surge. Excluding accidents and adjusted for the population of American service members in Iraq, there was a steady rate of non-combat deaths. Non-combat deaths were mere statistical noise when Americans were dying in numbers of 30 to 50 or more monthly, but by the end of 2009 they were as numerous as combat deaths.

Army to prioritize counterspace tech in future budget requests

Mikayla Easley

1st Space Brigade soldiers observe a U.S. Army Ranger raid during a large-scale combat scenario at the U.S. Army Special Operations Command Capabilities Exercise 2024 at Fort Liberty, North Carolina, April 5-12, 2024. The exercise demonstrated how Army space operations integrate with cyber and special operation forces partners to enable the warfighter on the ground. (U.S. Army photo by Brooke Nevins)

As the Army continues efforts to strengthen operations in the space domain, the service will begin prioritizing new counterspace capabilities in its budget requests beginning in fiscal 2027, according to a senior official.

“This year during program budget review, we included counterspace capabilities for the first time in our strategic priority list,” Col. Peter Atkinson, principal space advisor at the Department of the Army, said Wednesday during the annual AUSA conference. “That’s the Army prioritizing how important these consequential capabilities are in making sure that they get the requisite resources.”

Since the establishment of the Space Force in 2019, Army Space and Missile Defense Command has worked to redefine how it operates in space to focus more on providing critical capabilities tailored to the service’s specific missions.

As part of its 2024 Space Vision, the Army highlights two new mission areas — integrating space capabilities that can be provided to the joint force or coalition partners, and interdicting adversaries from weaponizing the space domain.

Atkinson emphasized that the service’s interdiction mission is “ubiquitous” with counterspace, which broadly means offensive or defensive operations that disrupt or deny an adversary’s use of space-based assets and capabilities.

“What it’s getting at is counter-satellite communications, counter-surveillance and reconnaissance, and navigation warfare,” he said. “How do we protect friendly forces from threats emanating from the air and space domains? It’s really important for the Army. No one service has a monopoly on protection. We have to protect ourselves.”

Army begins ‘talent panels’ to cut 6,500 manned aviation jobs

Hope Hodge Seck

The Army has officially embarked on its effort to relocate some 6,500 junior officers and warrant officers who it says are no longer needed in the aviation field.

Aviation officials say, however, that they hope to reach that target without forcing many troops out of the service.

Maj. Gen. Clair Gill, commander of the Army Aviation Center of Excellence and Fort Rucker, Alabama, told reporters at the Association of the United States Army’s annual meeting on Wednesday that talent panels launched this month are intended to keep decision-making power with the soldiers and would not immediately lead to involuntary transfers or reductions.

“We went out to the formations and asked commanders to counsel every single soldier that was in the targeted population [where] we are over strength, and talk to them about where they are, what their goals are, what they want to do in the Army, if this is what they want to do, and if they’re looking for other things,” Gill said. “And then they created an order-of-merit list for their formations and sent that to us.”

That list would be evaluated by a panel that would assess all the soldiers’ records and organize them into top, middle, and bottom thirds, he said.

“We’re going to give that back to those commanders and say, ‘Here’s where your folks fell out. We want you to counsel them and talk to them about options,’” Gill said.

“Right now, they’ll use that as a tool to say, ‘Hey, if you’re in the bottom third, you’re in the at risk population. You might want to think about options available to you, and here’s what they look like.’”

Those affected by the talent panels include junior officers in year groups 2020 to 2023 and untracked warrant officers in year groups 2022 to 2024. The cuts reflect the rise of unmanned aviation and Army force restructuring that will see the elimination of cavalry squadrons within the continental U.S.

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