17 October 2025

‘Your basis to live is checked at each and every step’: India’s ID system divides opinion

Hannah Ellis-Petersen 

It is often difficult for people in India to remember life before Aadhaar. The digital biometric ID, allegedly available for every Indian citizen, was only introduced 15 years ago but its presence in daily life is ubiquitous.

Indians now need an Aadhaar number to buy a house, get a job, open a bank account, pay their tax, receive benefits, buy a car, get a sim card, book priority train tickets and admit children into school. Babies can be given Aadhaar numbers almost immediately after they are born. While it is not mandatory, not having Aadhaar de facto means the state does not recognise you exist, digital rights activists say.

For Umesh Patel, 47, a textile business owner in the city of Ahmedabad, Aadhaar has brought nothing but relief. He recalls the old days of bringing reams of paper to every official office, just to prove his ID – and confusion often still reigned. Now he simply flashes his Aadhaar and “everything is streamlined”, he said, describing it as a “marker of how our country is using technology for the benefit of its citizens”.

“It’s a robust system that has made life much easier,” said Patel. “It is also good for the security of our country since it reduces the chances of anyone making fake documents.

“Aadhaar is now part of the Indian identity.”

The scheme has been deemed such a success that it was among those studied by the UK government as it looks to introduce mandatory ID cards for all citizens. Yet digital rights groups, activists and humanitarian groups paint a less rosy picture of Aadhaar and its implications for Indian society.

For some of the poorest and least educated in India – whose lack of literacy, education or documents have left them unable to get an Aadhaar – the scheme has been highly exclusionary and therefore punitive, depriving some of those who need it most from being able to receive welfare or work. And as there is a growing push to have Aadhaar linked to voting rights and proof of citizenship, there are fears it will become a tool to further disenfranchise and demonise the poor.

World forgot how ancient India shaped it, William Dalrymple tells Fareed Zakaria

Nakul Ahuja

India, the birthplace of the game of chess, the concept of zero, and the idea that the Earth revolves around the Sun, has long been the source of some of humanity's most revolutionary ideas.

Yet, as historian William Dalrymple argues in his new book 'The Golden Road: How Ancient India Transformed the World', the country's pivotal role in shaping global civilisation has been overlooked for centuries. Far from being a passive corner of the ancient world, Dalrymple paints India as its beating heart, a crossroads of trade, intellect, and spirituality whose influence stretched from Rome to China.

Speaking to Fareed Zakaria on CNN's GPS, Dalrymple said his book seeks to recover the "enormous Indian influence throughout Asia," describing ancient India as "the cultural superpower of Asia". He explained that over half the world today lives in countries that were once shaped by Indian religions or philosophies such as Buddhism and Hinduism.

"Buddhism not only conquered Southeast Asia - Thailand, Laos, Cambodia - but also China itself", he said, adding that India spread its ideas "through culture and trade, not conquest".

Calling it an "empire of the spirit", Dalrymple pointed to how Hindu and Buddhist imagery still endures far beyond India's borders, from Indonesia's national airline, Garuda (named after Vishnu's mount), to Cambodia's grand Angkor Wat temple and the Buddhist monument of Borobudur in Java.

He noted that between 200 BCE and 1200 AD, Sanskrit played the same role across Asia that Latin did in mediaeval Europe. "If you were a scholar or ambassador in 10th-century Java or 7th-century Afghanistan, you would be speaking Sanskrit," Dalrymple said.

The great Indian epics, the Mahabharata and the Ramayana, were retold and revered across continents, their stories appearing on temple walls in Thailand and Sumatra.

Chinese suspect India’s role in Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict Opinion

Sana Hashmi 

Chinese analysts are increasingly framing Pakistan’s ongoing confrontation with Afghanistan not merely as a bilateral conflict but as part of a wider regional dynamic involving India. As one Chinese commentator implied, the real explanation may lie in India’s growing engagement with the Taliban. On Chinese online platforms, much of the discussion links the Taliban administration’s Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi’s visit to India with the escalation of tensions, with a broad consensus emerging that India plays a role in this evolving situation. This framing reflects a pattern in Chinese strategic discourse, where India’s influence is seen as central to emerging fault lines in the subcontinent.

Wang Shida, a researcher at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations and executive director of the Institute of South Asian Studies, argued that Muttaqi’s visit to India marks a gradual build-up of contact and ties between the two sides. He cautioned, however, that this does not mean India will immediately establish formal relations or broad cooperation with Afghanistan; rather, it is a step toward exploring possible areas of collaboration.

That said, the bilateral dimension is receiving limited attention on Chinese online platforms. One Chinese commentator opined that the handshake between Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar and the Afghan Foreign Minister symbolised their shared wariness of Pakistan. The prevailing view online is that India was increasingly concerned about Afghanistan’s growing participation in transnational economic initiatives involving China and Pakistan. Many argue that New Delhi seeks to leverage tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan to reassert its influence in Kabul; and Afghanistan is visibly choosing India.

Liu Zongyi, a researcher at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies and director of the Center for South Asia Studies, observed that “the intersection of India’s and the Taliban’s interests lies in Pakistan. Pakistan is caught between India and Afghanistan in the regional geopolitical structure, becoming the ‘sandwich’ between the two forces.”

China and Iran After the 12-Day War

Thomas Gormley

Technology, Deterrence, and the Future of U.S. Leverage

Iran’s 12-Day War with Israel has accelerated Tehran’s interest in Chinese technology. The emerging trajectory of the China-Iran technological partnership suggests it could undermine U.S. or Israeli freedom of action in a future confrontation.

China offered little more than rhetorical condemnation as it watched Israel operate with near impunity above and on the ground in Iran this June, raising serious doubts about their ability to project meaningful hard power in the region. However, the months following the war have seen a change in China’s posture. While Iran is already an established testing ground for China’s digital-authoritarianism, Beijing has now become keen to help the regime in Tehran address the major gaps in its national security exposed by Israel’s operations. This comes as Russia, Iran’s main external military partner, has increasingly come-up short in delivering Tehran military hardware and systems (hardware and systems the Kremlin itself needs for its ongoing invasion of Ukraine).

The backdrop for this increased military support is the 25-year strategic cooperation pact signed by Beijing and Tehran in 2021. The pact envisioned Chinese investment in Iran’s energy and infrastructure in exchange for Iranian oil. Crucially, the agreement brought Iran into China’s Belt and Road Initiative. This accelerated the transfer of Chinese technology to Tehran, with firms such as Tiandy Technologies supporting domestic surveillance. The export of surveillance software more than doubled following renewed anti-government protests in Iran in 2022, and Chinese facial recognition software played a significant role in suppressing these protests in 2023. China has also provided dual-use technologies, such as semiconductors and intelligence gathering software.

In the past, illicit procurement and reverse engineering of Western technology had offered Iran a secondary route to foreign innovation not supplied by Russia or China. Iran’s tech sector has partially relied on Western technology transferred through sanction-evading front companies procuring dual-use technologies. This illicit global procurement network was brought to light by the 2022 revelation that Iranian Mohajer-6 drones used against Ukraine contained components made in both the U.S. and EU. Despite the regime frequently claiming to have weaned Iran off foreign tech in multiple sectors of its economy and critical infrastructure, its recent war with Israel highlighted its remaining vulnerabilities. Israeli strikes targeted nuclear and advanced military infrastructure understood to be hard to replace due to their foreign origins. Furthermore, as confirmed by Iran’s Ministry of Information and Communications Technology, Tehran deliberately jammed domestic GPS signals to counter major disruptions to the U.S.-operated system during the war.

Mearsheimer’s ‘optimism’ and South Korea’s dilemm

Hanjin Lew

John Mearsheimer, the R. Wendell Harrison distinguished service professor of political science at the University of Chicago, is considered to be one of the most influential international relations theorists of his generation. Image: IAI

The World Knowledge Forum was held on October 10, 2025, in Seoul. One of the headline speakers on the panel “The Future of the Global Geoeconomic Order” was political scientist John Mearsheimer, known worldwide as a leading realist thinker.

His realism – often dismissed as pessimism by liberal internationalists – has repeatedly proven prescient. In international relations, theories are only as valuable as their predictive power, and Mearsheimer’s record stands out.

He warned in the 1990s that NATO’s eastward expansion would provoke Russia – a forecast borne out by the Ukraine war.

In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), he argued that a rising China would inevitably clash with the United States – a view now accepted as conventional wisdom.

He also foresaw that post-Cold War American overreach would exhaust US power while fueling nationalist backlash abroad.
America’s global posture

At the Seoul forum, Mearsheimer outlined Washington’s strategic priorities. The United States, he said, cares most about three regions: Europe, the Middle East and East Asia. Europe was once foremost, but no longer. The Middle East remains critical mainly because of the US-Israel relationship and energy interests.

Today, East Asia is the most important region because of the US-China rivalry. Yet, as he noted, Washington is “deeply enmeshed” in wars elsewhere – bogged down in Ukraine and heavily engaged in the Middle East.

“The fact that we’re enmeshed in the Middle East and Europe means that the last thing we want is a crisis in East Asia,” he said.

Don’t panic about rare earths

Tim Worstall

China has just shot its rare earths industry stone dead. Yes, yes, I know, everyone is convinced of the opposite — they have us over the barrel and they are not preparing to use any lube this time. But my view is the correct one and not just because it’s mine. That intense rogering China is trying to give to the Western industrial world is precisely why that hold they have will be broken — why their rare earths industry is in for a whole world of pain.

The key concept here is one of contestable monopoly. Having a monopoly — say, 80 per cent of global rare earth production, 90 per cent of processing and 100 per cent of some business lines — is lovely and one can take great joy in observing that dominance. But the moment you use that position to try to pressure the customers, others will arise to contest that dominance. That is what “contestable monopoly” means. That by happenstance, hard work, deliberate design even, you are the dominant supplier and well done you. But the only reason that dominance continues is that it is not worth anyone’s while to contest it — give ‘em a reason and they will.

This is where China is with rare earths. They produce what the world wants to eat at prices everyone is willing to pay and have done so for many decades. Excellent — now they want to exert that power. At which point we’ll all contest that position and it’s we who will win.

One reason for certainty in this is that I said this back in 2010, the last time China tried this. By 2014 people were agreeing I had been correct. That non-China world opened a couple of rare earth mines and prices fell back below the starting point. Contestable monopolies will be contested if you try to exercise that market power. This is why we should not worry — at least not overmuch — about contestable monopolies.

Is it more complex this time? Sure it is — we now need to rebuild the entire production chain. But this can be done. Obviously it can be done. Rare earth magnets, the thing being squealed about most, were an American invention after all. Magnaquench was a GM subsidiary sold to Chinese interests, who then — quite literally — packaged up the factories and shipped ’em home. If the US could make them once then the US can make them again — yes, even though China now has a couple of decades more learning by doing under the belt. Easy-peasy might not be the correct description, but it is definitely possible.

EU urges G7 response to China’s rare-earth export curbs

Camille Gijs and Koen Verhelst

HORSENS, Denmark — The European Union will not shy away from a strong response to China’s latest export restrictions on rare earths in coordination with its G7 partners, the EU trade chief said Tuesday.

“This is seen as a critical concern,” Maroลก ล efฤoviฤ said ahead of a meeting of EU trade ministers in Denmark, calling China’s move a “dramatic” expansion of raw materials targeted by the restrictions, which was “aggravating” an already serious situation.

ล efฤoviฤ said he had discussed the situation with U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, and the two agreed “that it would be advisable after this first discussion also to have a G7 video call pretty soon.” The G7 groups the United States, Canada, Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Japan.

China last year imposed similar controls on materials like graphite, germanium and gallium, all of which are also used in tech, defense and green industries. ล efฤoviฤ complained that for those materials “only half of the applications” were properly processed by Beijing.

Beijing announced sweeping new export controls on rare-earth magnets and their raw materials last week on grounds of national security. The move requires magnet-makers to get approval from China if they use even trace amounts of Chinese rare earths. Beijing produces 90 percent of the world’s rare-earth magnets, which are used in electromotors, generators for wind turbines and defense applications.

This drew the ire of U.S. President Donald Trump, who threatened to respond with fresh tariffs and hinted he would no longer meet with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping at the end of October.

Although Washington is moving to de-escalate the clash, ล efฤoviฤ didn’t completely shut the door to a similar response, telling reporters that he wanted to gather a first assessment from EU ministers.

How to Loosen China’s Stranglehold on Rare Earths

Enrique Dans

It is a high-stakes confrontation. After China imposed its export controls, President Donald Trump threatened to impose a 100% extra tariff, sparking a market rout. Washington backtracked, signaling readiness to negotiate, and the markets calmed, at least temporarily.

But the root problem remains: China dominates the supply of 17 key minerals, which have unique magnetic, optical, and electronic properties essential for producing high-powered magnets, batteries, wind turbines, semiconductors, lasers, optical devices, and sensitive military systems. According to recent estimates, China retains about 44 million tons of rare earth oxides equivalent, more than Brazil (21 million), India (6.9 million), or Australia (5.7 million) combined.

Although the name invites one to think of something scarce, critical minerals are not so scarce: many are present in moderate concentrations, but they almost never appear in pure or concentrated veins. They are often mixed with other minerals that make them difficult to extract and separate.

We are not finding more rare earth deposits simply because we did not search for them hard enough. Now that their strategic importance is well known, that is changing. New deposits are periodically announced in other countries. In 2024, China extracted about 270,000 tons of rare earth oxide equivalent, while the US produced only about 45,000 tons.

What’s most problematic is China’s control of almost 90% of global processing and refining capacity, stages where mineral oxides are converted into useful pure substances.

How did China attain this dominance? The answer is not only geological, but strategic and political, the result of a long-term strategy. Beijing began investing in the entire rare earth supply chain back in the 1980s: mining, chemical separation, magnet manufacturing, recycling, and alloy technology. That vertical integration lowered costs, putting it far ahead of its competitors. China also applied regulations, subsidies, and industrial protection to boost Chinese national champions.


Hamas Is Not Done Fighting

Matthew Levitt

The first phase of the U.S.-brokered cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas is a tremendous achievement, securing the release of hostages held by Hamas for over two years and the end to a devastating war in Gaza in a 20-point plan. But the second phase of the plan will confront a set of thorny issues, including the disarmament of Hamas and the future of Palestinian governance. If past is precedent, Hamas will fight tooth and nail to preserve its political and military standing in Gaza and its commitment to violently oppose prospects for peace.

The Autumn of the Ayatollahs

Karim Sadjadpour

For the first time in nearly four decades, Iran is on the cusp of a change of leadership—and maybe even of regime. As Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s reign nears its end, a 12-day war in June laid bare the fragility of the system he built. Israel battered Iranian cities and military installations, paving the way for the United States to drop 14 bunker-busting bombs on Iranian nuclear sites. The war exposed the enormous gulf between Tehran’s ideological bluster and the limited capabilities of a regime that has lost much of its regional power, no longer controls its skies, and exercises diminished control over its streets. At the war’s conclusion, the 86-year-old Khamenei emerged from hiding to declare victory in a raspy voice—a spectacle meant to project strength that instead underscored the regime’s frailty.

In the autumn of the ayatollah, the central question is whether the theocratic regime he has been ruling since 1989 will endure, transform, or implode—and what kind of political order might emerge in its wake. The 1979 revolution transformed Iran from a Western-aligned monarchy into an Islamist theocracy, flipping it virtually overnight from an American ally to a sworn enemy. Because Iran today remains a pivotal state—an energy superpower whose internal politics shape the Middle East’s security and political order and ripple across the global system—the matter of who (or what) succeeds Khamenei is of enormous consequence.

Over the past two years—since Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel, which Khamenei alone among major world leaders openly endorsed—his life’s work has been reduced to ashes by Israel and the United States. His closest military and political proteges have been killed or assassinated. His regional proxies have been hobbled. His vast nuclear enterprise, built at staggering cost to Iran’s economy, has been buried under rubble.

The Islamic Republic has sought to turn its military humbling into an opportunity to rally the country around the flag, but the indignities of daily life are inescapable. Iran’s 92 million people make up the largest population in the world to have been isolated from the global financial and political system for decades. Iran’s economy is among the world’s most sanctioned. Its currency is among the world’s most devalued. Its passport is among the world’s most denied. Its Internet is among the world’s most censored. Its air is among the world’s most polluted.

Bowen: Trump's role in Gaza ceasefire was decisive, but not a roadmap to peace


Donald Trump's quick trip to Israel and Egypt was the victory lap he wanted.

Anyone watching the speeches he made in Jerusalem and Sharm el-Sheikh could see a man luxuriating in his power - enjoying the applause in Israel's parliament, and in Egypt, basking in the fact that so many heads of state and government had flown in.

One veteran diplomat in the room said it looked as if Trump saw the role of the world leaders there as extras on his film set.

Trump's message at Sharm was, in effect, that he had created a historical turning point.

"All I've done all my life is deals. The greatest deals just sort of happen… That's what happened right here. And maybe this is going to be the greatest deal of them all," he said.

Observers might also have had the impression from the speeches that the job is done. It is not.

Without question, Trump can claim credit for the ceasefire and hostage exchange deal. Qatar, Turkey and Egypt used their leverage with Hamas to force it to accept.

That made it a joint effort, but Trump's role was decisive.Live coverage of this story

Without his push to demand Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's agreement to terms that he had previously rejected, the deal would not have been signed.

It helps to recognise what the deal is – and what it isn't.

The agreement was for a ceasefire and an exchange of hostages for prisoners. It is not a peace agreement, or even the start of a peace process.

The next phase of the Trump 20-point plan requires an agreement filling in the gaps of the framework which declares that the Gaza Strip will be demilitarised, secured and governed by a committee including Palestinians.

Israel-Hamas Cease-Fire

David M. Halbfinger and Adam Rasgon

Getting Israel’s hostages released from Gaza and stopping the war may have taken two years and the direct efforts of the American president and the leaders of several Arab and Muslim nations.

But that was almost certainly the easy part.

Getting Hamas to give up its weapons, and demilitarizing the Gaza Strip — key preconditions for Israel to pull out of Gaza fully, as both President Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated on Monday — could prove a lot harder.

Then there are the other issues in Mr. Trump’s 20-point plan, which outlined a comprehensive solution for Gaza. In full, it also called for the establishment of an international force to help maintain security in the territory, an ambitious effort to rebuild Gaza’s economy and infrastructure, and the creation of a temporary Palestinian governing committee, whose work would be overseen by an international board.

During the talks leading up to the cease-fire in Gaza, provisions for who would run the enclave on “the day after” the war was over were among the most complicated and vexing — so much so that they were eventually severed from the cease-fire talks and put off until a second phase of negotiations.

That phase had at least an air of auspiciousness on Monday evening in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, where Mr. Trump and President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt gathered dozens of leaders to try to build on the momentum created by the truce and the exchange of 20 living Israeli hostages and the bodies of others for nearly 2,000 Palestinian prisoners.

“Phase 2 has started,” Mr. Trump said. He predicted “tremendous progress.”

“It’s peace in the Middle East,” he said. “Everyone said it’s not possible to do. And it’s going to happen.”

Rare Earth Showdown

Jersey Lee , Andrew Goledzinowski

Why the West Must Learn To Pick Winners – and Partners

Albanese must convince Trump that only allied cooperation can break China’s rare earth chokehold.

Last week, China rolled out sweeping new export controls, expanding earlier measures that targeted Rare Earth Elements (REEs) to now include the technologies used in their extraction and refining – an apparent bid to kneecap nascent Western efforts to develop alternatives.

While much Western attention has focused on extraction, China’s true dominance – and leverage – lies in refining. For years, Beijing has controlled the global processing of rare earths, giving it a critical chokepoint in the supply chain.

Australia’s experience offers a model for how to respond.

The world’s largest non-Chinese REE supplier is the Australian company Lynas Rare Earths, which will soon celebrate its 15th anniversary as a producer. It almost never got off the ground. After China’s first wave of de facto REE restrictions in 2010, Japan stepped in to bankroll the Lynas Advanced Materials Plant in Malaysia, even though it made little commercial sense at the time. Since then, Beijing has repeatedly tried to shut it down, but Malaysia, for its part, has stood firm.

Here’s how that supply chain works: REE concentrate from Mount Weld in Western Australia is refined in Malaysia, metallised in Japan, and turned into finished products across East and Southeast Asia, with the largest end user being the United States.

Other Australian companies, including Australian Strategic Materials, are following the path blazed by Lynas, with strong supply chain connections with Vietnam and South Korea.

Hegseth wants leaders like Gen. Patton – warts and al

Davis Winkie

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth wants military officers to take risks again – and history may be on his side.

A case in point: the day a 31-year-old U.S. Army lieutenant assigned to hunt Mexican rebel general Pancho Villa was ordered to take 10 men and two cars to buy corn.

After dutifully securing the corn in the spring of 1916, 2nd Lt. George Patton went rogue.More: Hundreds of military leaders went to Quantico for Trump, Hegseth. See inside the Sept. summit

Three horsemen burst forth from the ranch, setting off a flurry of gunfire. The outcome? Patton fatally shot Villa's deputy. The future general triumphantly returned to headquarters with the rebel leader's body strapped to the hood of his car.

This was neither the first nor the last time that Patton disobeyed an order. But in that era, Gen. John Pershing promoted the young officer instead of punishing him. When Pershing crossed the Atlantic Ocean in 1917 to lead the American Expeditionary Force in the grinding trench warfare of World War I, he appointed Captain Patton to lead the force’s experimental tank school. Patton wrote the Army's tank-fighting rules and ultimately became a decisive battlefield commander during World War II.

Hegseth invoked the steel-jawed general in both image and name in his Sept. 30 speech to the military’s generals and admirals at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia.

Standing before an American flag backdrop reminiscent of the opening speech in Francis Ford Coppola’s 1970 "Patton" biopic, Hegseth denounced “fat” and “woke” generals and said he was looking for the “Stockdales, the Schwarzkopfs, and the Pattons,” referencing a stoic Vietnam-era Navy leader and a Gulf War Army general both known for their no-nonsense approach. Hegseth went on to announce an understated but crucially important set of changes aimed at empowering hard-nosed leaders – and giving them chances to learn from their failures. In military terms, Hegseth was flagging that he intended to eliminate a problem he called a “zero-defect command culture.”

Ukraine’s Drone War Over the Black Sea Is Heating Up

David Kirichenko

Ukraine’s naval drones have sunk warships, hit oil terminals, and even downed Russian helicopters and fighter jets over the Black Sea.

Ukraine has turned to drones and asymmetrical warfare to counter Russia’s superior firepower, but nowhere has this strategy been more effective than in the Black Sea. Over the course of the war, Ukraine neutralized a third of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, forcing much of the navy to retreat from occupied Crimea. Today, Ukrainian naval drones or unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) are effectively enforcing a blockade on Russian ports.

Yet the contest is far from over. Moscow is gradually adapting, learning from its mistakes, and investing in new defenses. Ukraine is still ahead, but signs indicate that the Kremlin is taking the issue of unmanned systems and their impact on naval warfare more seriously.
Ukraine Builds a High-Tech Navy

Following Russia’s first invasion in 2014, Ukraine lost most of its navy, and by the time of the 2022 invasion, Kyiv even abandoned its only remaining warship to prevent it from falling into Russian hands. Well before the full-scale invasion, Ukraine recognized that achieving military parity with Russia would be impossible.

“As a result, the navy had to be built according to an asymmetric principle,” said Serhii Kuzan, chairman of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center and former Ministry of Defense adviser, in an interview published by the US Naval Institute. With Russia holding far greater resources and manpower, Kyiv turned to the ingenuity of its people, leveraging innovation wherever possible.

General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Ukraine’s former commander-in-chief, wrote, “Ukraine’s advantage lies in its people, who have not only stopped the enemy, but have already transformed the country into a center of innovation on the battlefield.” In practice, that innovation meant substituting the warships it lacked with drones.

Spain's radically different approach to African migration

Paul Melly

Spain is kicking against the prevailing political mood among Western nations when it comes to migration and policies regarding the African continent.

At a time when the US, the UK, France and Germany are all cutting back their development aid budgets, Madrid remains committed to continued expansion, albeit from a lower starting point.

This week, the Spanish capital has been hosting an African Union-backed "world conference on people of African descent". AfroMadrid2025 will discuss restorative justice and the creation of a new development fund.

It is just the latest sign of how Spain's socialist-led government is seeking to deepen and diversify its engagement with the continent and near neighbour that lies just a few kilometres to the south, across the Straits of Gibraltar.

In July Foreign Minister Josรฉ Manuel Albares launched a new advisory council of prominent intellectual, diplomatic and cultural figures, more than half of them African, to monitor the delivery of the detailed Spain-Africa strategy that his government published at the end of last year.

New embassies south of the Sahara, and partnerships in business and education are planned.

The contrast between Spain's approach and that of others in the West is not just in spending but in tone and mindset – and nowhere more so than in dealing with migration.

Similar to elsewhere in Europe, Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez is looking for ways to contain the influx of irregular arrivals.

Like other centre-left and centre-right leaders, he finds himself facing an electoral challenge from the radical right, largely driven by some voters' concern over migration, with the hardline Vox party well established in parliament and routinely ranking third in opinion polls.

Trump has smashed the Gaza consensus Diplomatic orthodoxies were ignored

Edward Luttwak

During his first term, Trump discovered that the Near East Bureau of the State Department and the CIA’s “national intelligence officers” for the region shared two characteristics. The first was that they were utterly confident in their assertions — in contrast with the cautiously tentative opinions of their China and Russia-focused counterparts.

The second was that they were utterly, totally wrong. This was only discovered by Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, when he learned from his Arab friends — wealthy young men like himself, who were sons of princely potentates — that some Arab rulers would be interested in opening diplomatic relations with Israel if the US President were to ask them.

Trump handed the suggestion to his Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, the former head of Exxon-Mobil, who had two decades of experience in negotiating with oil-country dictators and kings. (I once sat next to him in Astana in a small meeting with Kazakhstan’s then-dictator Nursultan Nazarbayev, which should have been a clash because of a hugely costly production failure by Exxon’s Italian partner, but instead became a contest in amiability.)

Tillerson had already criticised Kushner’s intrusions in US diplomacy, but nevertheless passed on the idea to his Near East Bureau. Its response was prompt and categorical: no Arab state would follow Egypt and Jordan in establishing diplomatic relations with Israel — or even discuss that possibility — until a “process” was solidly underway to implement the “two-state solution” with the establishment of a Palestinian state.

The experts further warned that any attempt to push this non-starter would greatly damage US prestige in the region. So Trump sent Tillerson on the path to his resignation by telling young Kushner to go ahead and try his best. He was met with striking success. The Saudis readily agreed to open their airspace to Israeli civilian overflights, and permitted business travel from Israel, though they delayed a response on diplomatic relations. So did Oman, which had already received Netanyahu in 2018, and which also allowed over-flights.

Tremendous start, but challenges ahead for Trump’s peace plan

James Jay Carafano
Sourec Link

President Trump shows a signed document during a summit on Gaza in Sharm el-Sheikh on October 13, 2025.AFP via Getty Images

President Trump’s peace plan for Gaza has opened with tremendous success, but challenges lie ahead. One of the truest truisms of war is the next war starts, or doesn’t, because of what is done after the war before.

This conflict will be no different.
Trump’s to-do list

Let’s start with the serious to-do list facing the administration — and let there be no doubt, the United States owns this one.

Step one, end Armageddon.

Few wars ended more badly than World War II: Most nations were flattened like flapjacks, and European GDP was measured in fractions. Tens of millions were displaced and homeless. Most countries teetered on starvation.

Yet the United States guided Western Europe past the worst of it. Even before the Marshall Plan kicked in in 1948, every Western European nation had a functioning government and enough food and coal to get through the winter.

The postwar planners called this the “disease and unrest” formula. If a country had an operating government, a modicum of security and public safety and no mass starvation or plague, people could get by.

That formula has proven nearly universal. Trump has to assemble a coalition of powers that can deliver that outcome in Gaza.

Step two, a better world.

Three Reckonings the Gaza Deal Will Force

Michael J. Koplow

An anti-government protest organised by the families of hostages outside the Israeli Prime Minister's residence in Jerusalem on October 4.An anti-government protest organized by the families of hostages held by Hamas takes place outside the Israeli prime minister's residence in Jerusalem on Oct. 4. Israelis woke last Thursday to the news that many of them had been fervently hoping to hear for two years: The Israeli government and Hamas had agreed to a deal to return all Israeli hostages and end the Gaza war.

If the deal holds, it will bring a much-needed end to the violent conflict that begin on Oct. 7, 2023. But it will also force three reckonings for Israelis that will shape the country’s future in more lasting ways.

Cyber-attacks rise by 50% in past year, UK security agency says

Robert Booth 

“Highly significant” cyber-attacks rose by 50% in the past year and the UK’s security services are now dealing with a new nationally significant attack more than every other day, figures from the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) have revealed.

In what officials described as “a call to arms”, national security officials and ministers are urging all organisations, from the smallest businesses to the largest employers, to draw up contingency plans for the eventuality that “your IT infrastructure [is] crippled tomorrow and all your screens [go] blank”.

The NCSC, which is part of GCHQ, said “highly sophisticated” China, “capable and irresponsible” Russia, Iran and North Korea were the main state threats, in its annual review published on Tuesday. The rise is being driven by ransomware attacks, often by criminal actors seeking money, and society’s increasing dependence on technology which increases the number of hackable targets.

The chancellor, Rachel Reeves, the security minister, Dan Jarvis, and the technology and business secretaries, Liz Kendall and Peter Kyle have written to the leaders of hundreds of the largest British companies urging them to make cyber-resilience a board-level responsibility and warning that hostile cyber-activity in the UK has grown “more intense, frequent and sophisticated”.

“Don’t be an easy target,” said Anne Keast-Butler, the director of GCHQ. “Prioritise cyber risk management, embed it into your governance and lead from the top.”

NCSC dealt with 429 cyber incidents in the year to September and nearly half were classed as of national significance – more than doubling in the past year. Eighteen were “highly significant”, which means they had a serious impact on the government, essential services, the mass population or the economy. Most of those were ransomware incidents, including the attacks that significantly affected Marks & Spencer and the Co-op Group.

“Cybercrime is a serious threat to the security of our economy, businesses and people’s livelihoods,” said Jarvis. “While we work round the clock to counter threats and provide support to businesses of all sizes – we cannot do it alone.”

Microsoft Outlines Ambitious Post-Quantum Cryptography Plans

Jason Van der Schyff

It was encouraging to read Microsoft’s thoughts on the transition to post-quantum cryptography—the new generation of encryption designed to resist future quantum computers. Few companies straddle as much of the quantum landscape, including hardware, error correction, algorithm design and deployment. When Microsoft sets a migration timeline, it matters.

The first striking element is pace. Most governments have set 2035 as the deadline for completing migration to post-quantum cryptography. Microsoft has chosen 2033. The company will make such cryptography available for early adopters by 2029, giving organisations a head start. SymCrypt, Microsoft’s cryptographic library, underpins much of its infrastructure. Microsoft plans to modernise it, integrate new tools, then extend across its estate. The ambition is welcome, but the challenge remains large.

The second element is uncertainty. Microsoft’s resource-planning tool and its research into topological qubits—a form of quantum bit designed for greater stability—suggest that attacks on current cryptography may require fewer qubits than other projections assume. Although other approaches by IonQ, Quantinuum, QuEra and PsiQuantum are also progressing, they each carry different implications. Governments and industry cannot anchor plans to one forecast.

Microsoft has also highlighted its contributions to the National Institute of Standards and Technology process. Its involvement has been constructive, but the experience shows how difficult this journey can be. Several Microsoft-backed algorithms were set aside due to cryptanalysis or performance issues. They remind us that migration needs be treated as a living process.

Setbacks should be expected and actively planned for. Microsoft’s Project Natick—an experimental undersea datacentre—originally deployed an algorithm known as SIKE that was later withdrawn after vulnerabilities were identified. The lesson is that even the largest players can be overtaken by the pace of cryptanalysis. If global leaders can be caught out, governments and smaller firms need to assume the unexpected and prepare accordingly.

PERSPECTIVE: The Hybrid Threat Era: Kinetic Warfare, Cyber Escalation, and Global Instability

Andrew Borene

The first half of 2025 has underscored that global conflict no longer moves in isolation. Wars and crises bleed across domains, with drones and missiles paired with cyberattacks, and economic coercion reshaping alliances as much as tanks or troops. This convergence is accelerating, collapsing the old boundaries between traditional battlefields, digital networks, and supply chains.

The result is a security environment defined not by single crises, but by interlocking shocks that reinforce one another. Europe’s confrontation with Russia is hardening into a long-term standoff, sustained by both weapons and cyber campaigns. In the Middle East, Israel’s brief but devastating war with Iran showed how airstrikes and cyberattacks can unfold side by side, destabilizing both regional security and global markets. And across the Global South, an expanding BRICS+ bloc is challenging Western institutions while reshaping trade, technology, and digital infrastructure.

For policymakers, the lesson is clear: hybrid conflict is no longer a warning about the future. It is the operating reality of the present. Meeting it requires foresight, cross-domain coordination, and the ability to prepare leaders for an era in which the front lines are everywhere, from battlefields to boardrooms, from energy grids to financial systems.

Shifting Geopolitical Fault Lines

Europe’s confrontation with Russia is no longer measured only by the battlefield in Ukraine. Stalled ceasefire talks this year underscored the entrenched nature of the conflict, while the Baltic states’ decision to sever their power grids from Russia marked a symbolic and strategic break. Across the continent, governments are pouring more than €800 billion into defense under a “ReArm Europe” plan, with Germany pledging to make the Bundeswehr the strongest conventional force in Europe. At the same time, Russia has paired relentless aerial and drone strikes with cyber operations targeting Ukrainian infrastructure and European allies, ensuring the war is fought as much in power stations and networks as on the front lines. The consequence is a Europe settling into a posture of sustained confrontation, reshaping NATO cohesion, defense industries, and supply chains in ways that will reverberate for decades.

Drone Warfare Over Sudan: The “Siege from the Air”

Avery Warfield

On 11 October 2025, a drone strike by Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) tore through a displacement shelter at Dar al-Arqam, part of Omdurman Islamic University in El Fasher, North Darfur, killing at least 57 people, including 22 women and 17 children. According to witnesses and activists, the drone attack was followed by heavy artillery fire that ripped through the already war-torn city.

This single strike is just one in a series of drone attacks that signal how drones have transformed the Sudan civil war. Once a peripheral technology, Drones have become central to the RSF’s campaign and to the Sudanese Armed Forces’ counterattacks. The conflict, which began in April 2023 as a power struggle between two generals, has since descended into one of the world’s most devastating humanitarian crises. Tens of thousands have died, millions have fled, and cities like Khartoum and El Fasher have become battlefields of both ground and air.

Early in the war, fighting was dominated by ground combat: sieges, artillery, and urban destruction. But over time, both sides turned to drone warfare for an edge. The RSF in particular began using drones not only for reconnaissance but also for precision, or, as often in Sudan’s case, indiscriminate strikes on civilians and infrastructure. In January 2025, a drone hit the Saudi Maternal Teaching Hospital in El Fasher, killing more than 70 people, according to the World Health Organization. Other strikes have targeted power plants, water stations, and even marketplaces.

In January of this year, a series of drone attacks crippled Sudan’s electricity grid, knocking out power in major army-held regions after drones struck substations and the Merowe Dam. Hospitals lost refrigeration, causing medicine and food supplies to spoil, deepening the suffering for millions already displaced. Later, in May 2025, drone strikes hit airports and fuel depots in Kassala and Port Sudan. These incidents reveal how drones have shifted from experimental weapons to tools of control and terror.

The New Logic of the War

Satellites Are Leaking the World’s Secrets: Calls, Texts, Military and Corporate Data

Andy Greenberg and Matt Burgess

Satellites beam data down to the Earth all around us, all the time. So you might expect that those space-based radio communications would be encrypted to prevent any snoop with a satellite dish from accessing the torrent of secret information constantly raining from the sky. You would, to a surprising and troubling degree, be wrong.

Roughly half of geostationary satellite signals, many carrying sensitive consumer, corporate, and government communications, have been left entirely vulnerable to eavesdropping, a team of researchers at UC San Diego and the University of Maryland revealed today in a study that will likely resonate across the cybersecurity industry, telecom firms, and inside military and intelligence agencies worldwide.

For three years, the UCSD and UMD researchers developed and used an off-the-shelf, $800 satellite receiver system on the roof of a university building in the La Jolla seaside neighborhood of San Diego to pick up the communications of geosynchronous satellites in the small band of space visible from their Southern California vantage point. By simply pointing their dish at different satellites and spending months interpreting the obscure—but unprotected—signals they received from them, the researchers assembled an alarming collection of private data: They obtained samples of the contents of Americans’ calls and text messages on T-Mobile’s cellular network, data from airline passengers’ in-flight Wi-Fi browsing, communications to and from critical infrastructure such as electric utilities and offshore oil and gas platforms, and even US and Mexican military and law enforcement communications that revealed the locations of personnel, equipment, and facilities.

“It just completely shocked us. There are some really critical pieces of our infrastructure relying on this satellite ecosystem, and our suspicion was that it would all be encrypted,” says Aaron Schulman, a UCSD professor who co-led the research. “And just time and time again, every time we found something new, it wasn't.”

The group’s paper, which they’re presenting this week at an Association for Computing Machinery conference in Taiwan, is titled “Don’t Look Up”—a reference to the 2021 film of that title but also a phrase the researchers say describes the apparent cybersecurity strategy of the global satellite communications system. “They assumed that no one was ever going to check and scan all these satellites and see what was out there. That was their method of security,” Schulman says. “They just really didn't think anyone would look up.”

Satellites Are Leaking the World’s Secrets: Calls, Texts, Military and Corporate Data

Andy Greenberg and Matt Burgess

Satellites beam data down to the Earth all around us, all the time. So you might expect that those space-based radio communications would be encrypted to prevent any snoop with a satellite dish from accessing the torrent of secret information constantly raining from the sky. You would, to a surprising and troubling degree, be wrong.

Roughly half of geostationary satellite signals, many carrying sensitive consumer, corporate, and government communications, have been left entirely vulnerable to eavesdropping, a team of researchers at UC San Diego and the University of Maryland revealed today in a study that will likely resonate across the cybersecurity industry, telecom firms, and inside military and intelligence agencies worldwide.

For three years, the UCSD and UMD researchers developed and used an off-the-shelf, $800 satellite receiver system on the roof of a university building in the La Jolla seaside neighborhood of San Diego to pick up the communications of geosynchronous satellites in the small band of space visible from their Southern California vantage point. By simply pointing their dish at different satellites and spending months interpreting the obscure—but unprotected—signals they received from them, the researchers assembled an alarming collection of private data: They obtained samples of the contents of Americans’ calls and text messages on T-Mobile’s cellular network, data from airline passengers’ in-flight Wi-Fi browsing, communications to and from critical infrastructure such as electric utilities and offshore oil and gas platforms, and even US and Mexican military and law enforcement communications that revealed the locations of personnel, equipment, and facilities.

“It just completely shocked us. There are some really critical pieces of our infrastructure relying on this satellite ecosystem, and our suspicion was that it would all be encrypted,” says Aaron Schulman, a UCSD professor who co-led the research. “And just time and time again, every time we found something new, it wasn't.”

The group’s paper, which they’re presenting this week at an Association for Computing Machinery conference in Taiwan, is titled “Don’t Look Up”—a reference to the 2021 film of that title but also a phrase the researchers say describes the apparent cybersecurity strategy of the global satellite communications system. “They assumed that no one was ever going to check and scan all these satellites and see what was out there. That was their method of security,” Schulman says. “They just really didn't think anyone would look up.”