Indian Strategic Studies: 12/05/25

5 December 2025

Can Chinese Authoritarianism Stay Smart?

Jennifer Lind

The man at the podium wore a dark suit and a red tie. Behind him sat rows of dignitaries in front of a vast wall, draped in gold, from which protruded a yellow hammer and sickle, framed on either side by 100-foot scarlet flags. In front of him, in the cavernous, red-carpeted hall, sat more than 2,000 delegates to the 20th People’s Party Congress in 2022. They listened attentively and took notes like their lives depended on it, which they may well have. The man, Xi Jinping, spoke for over two hours, during which his rapt audience occasionally erupted in ecstatic applause. The moment was both bland in its authoritarian predictability and a sea change in Chinese politics.

Xi was formally taking office for the third time, after altering the Chinese Constitution to make it possible. The move was a striking rejection of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) norms that had been designed to protect China from the personalism associated with Mao Zedong’s rule. The political and economic reforms of the post-Mao era supported China’s stunning economic rise from poverty to the world’s second-largest economy and

A Five-Year Plan for Managed Confrontation

Matthew Johnson

A Five-Year Plan for Managed Confrontation

Executive Summary: Economic planning for systemic rivalry: The Fourth Plenum ratified the culmination of a decade-long project to fuse national planning, security strategy, and technological control under Xi Jinping’s direct command. The 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) formalizes this system as a doctrine of strategic endurance—a framework for sustaining confrontation with the United States through centralized control of capital, industry, and information.

Dual circulation reinterpreted: What appeared in 2020 as a rebalancing toward domestic demand was in fact the source code for managed confrontation, building an economy that can circulate internally under pressure while tightening global dependence on the People’s Republic of China (PRC). “Self-reliance” thus also meant redundancy, coercive leverage, and supply-chain weaponization.

Systemic hardening, 2020–2025: Over the following half-decade, Beijing implemented this blueprint, tightening Party command over finance and platforms, deploying “reverse constrainment” through trade sanctions, and rolling out export controls on rare earths, batteries, and chipmaking equipment. These measures tested the conversion of economic scale into strategic deterrence.

China's Demographic Dilemma

Henrietta Levin

In this episode of Pekingology, CSIS Senior Fellow Henrietta Levin is joined by Philip O’Keefe, Professor of Practice at the University of New South Wales Centre of Excellence in Population Ageing Research and one of the world's leading experts on demographic trends in China and across Asia. They unpack the rapid aging of Chinese society, exploring the impact of a shrinking population on China's politics, economy, and innovation ecosystem, as well as its trade imbalances and Beijing's global ambitions.

Former White House Middle East Envoy: What We Keep Getting Wrong About the UAE and Sudan

Jason D. Greenblatt

The war in Sudan is one of the great humanitarian catastrophes of our time, yet it rarely receives the accuracy it deserves. For many, the conflict feels abstract, if they know anything about it at all. Sudan has endured repeated cycles of political collapse and violence since the 1950s, including two civil wars, multiple internal conflicts and an ongoing war between rival military factions. This crisis did not appear out of nowhere, nor was it triggered by a single outside actor. It is the result of decades of fractured institutions, violent armed groups and a state that has consistently struggled to build lasting national cohesion.

The scale of human suffering is staggering: families with nowhere safe to go, cities emptied and generations robbed of stability. When discussing external involvement, including the role of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), we owe it to the Sudanese to be precise, not performative. We owe them accuracy, not convenient narratives.

Afghan terror and Somalia fraud shows why Trump is right on migrants

Douglas Murray

You have to be careful with a country. Even a nation as vast in size and huge in population as the United States cannot be endlessly experimented upon. You cannot just leave borders open, or allow in large numbers of people with totally different value systems from your own.

That is the mistake many European countries have committed in recent years. They have opened their homes up to people from almost every part of the world where there is civil strife, war or just a lower standard of living.

The results can be seen everywhere. It is the reason why a country like Sweden — that used to be such a placid, decent place — has become one of the most violent countries in the world not actually at war. Grenade attacks, gang-warfare: these things were recently alien to Sweden. Not anymore.

It is the same here in the United States — though here the effects are more dispersed, so the problem can be covered up for longer.

Moscow’s Offshore Menace

Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan

At the October meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club, an annual forum for Russian policy talks that has in recent years become a platform for Kremlin ideology, Russian President Vladimir Putin was asked an unusual question. “Mr. President, why are you sending so many drones to Denmark?” Putin initially dismissed it, joking that he would not send drones to “France, Denmark, or Copenhagen.” But the Russian leader did not stop there. He went on to say that “many eccentric characters,” especially young people, were capable of launching those drones over Europe—an enigmatic assertion that recalled his veiled comments about

America’s Toothless Sanctions on Russian Oil

Erica Downs and Richard Nephew

Last month, the Trump administration imposed fresh sanctions on Russia’s two largest oil companies, Rosneft and Lukoil, signaling a renewed desire to drive Moscow to the negotiating table in its war against Ukraine. But although these measures have the potential to harm the Russian economy, just how much damage they inflict will depend largely on one actor: Beijing. China bought almost half the oil Russia exported in 2024, evading Washington’s existing restrictions in the process. And new sanctions alone will do little to push China into significantly reducing its purchases.

The New Cold War is here

David Roche

The New Cold War is not a forecast. It’s here and now. Where the conflict takes us does need forecasting, however. For our destination I shall set out some scenarios for you to choose from. But first a bit of history.

We had a few misconceptions in 1989, when we welcomed the ‘end of history’, meaning the end of systemic confrontation between hegemonic great powers, after the Berlin Wall fell. And also in 2001, when we invited China to participate in the free world economy by joining the WTO. The idea was that the richer China got, the more Chinese society would become like us, espousing our democratic niceties. China actually became more dictatorial the more it succeeded in becoming a poverty-free, middle-income economy. A few bouts of liberalisation and social eruptions came to nothing. Since President Xi Jinping came to office in 2013, societal control and conformity have become increasingly systemic and ubiquitous. Anecdotally, a decade ago, China had a security camera for every ten citizens. Now there is one for every two.

Why Russia has come to the table

Peter Caddick-Adams

Russia’s economy is imploding. Largely due to sanctions caused by the Ukraine War, this year the Economics Ministry posted a record mid-year budget deficit of 3.7 trillion roubles ($45.8 billion) and the Central Bank expects the full-year deficit to reach $55 billion, or 2 per cent of GDP. This is almost certainly the reason peace proposals with Ukraine have surfaced again.

Firstly, its coal industry has been pushed to the brink of collapse. Russia exported 22.6 per cent of its coal by rail to the EU in 2021, but lost that market due to trade embargoes after the Ukraine invasion, and was forced to redirect shipments to Asia by sea, with higher freight charges. Buyers have leveraged the disruption to negotiate lower rates, and prices have dropped further to $70 per tonne, which no longer covers production and shipping costs. Russia’s overseas customers have ramped up their own production, particularly in China, India and Indonesia, but tracking the development of alternative energy forms, world coal consumption has slowed, which sent international prices plunging from $400 per tonne in late 2022 to around $100 per tonne by May 2025.

What Is “Anti-Access/Area Denial” Technology, and Why Does It Matter?

Harrison Kass

The network’s purpose is simple, yet carries profound implications for the global order: it is designed to make US military operations near China’s borders dangerous, expensive, and ineffective. The network does not rely on a single system, but on a multi-layered web of systems, across domains, which integrates long-range missiles, radars, aircraft, submarines, satellites, cyber tools, and electronic warfare platforms into one of the most capable defensive shields on earth.

At the core of the A2/AD network are long-range ballistic and cruise missiles, which give China striking ability. Systems like the DF-21D “carrier killer” and DF-26 “Guam killer” are designed to threaten large US warships—notably including aircraft carriers—at ranges previously thought unreachable. The effect is to push back US forces, making power projection into the Indo-Pacific more difficult and shifting the regional power balance towards China’s favor. Complementing the long-range missiles are mid-range cruise missiles including the YJ-12 and YJ-18, capable of high-speed terminal maneuvers and saturation attacks. Finally, China’s land-attack cruise missile, the CJ-10, extends its denial zone even further.

The missile systems rely upon data from a network of over-the-horizon (OTH) radars that can accurately monitor maritime activity thousands of kilometers away. Paired with China’s growing constellation of ISR satellites—including electro-optical, synthetic aperture radar, and electronic intelligence platforms—these systems provide wide-area detection, tracking, and fire-control-quality information. This web of satellites and radars is essential to making China’s long-range missiles effective.

US, Philippines take cyberwar games to next level amid ‘pressure from China

Jeoffrey Maitem

The United States and the Philippines are preparing to hardwire advanced cyber operations into the heart of their annual war games, signalling a shift from merely talking about digital threats to practising how to fight through them.

Jennifer Schmidt, head of the US embassy’s information and communications technology unit, said specialised training ranges and sophisticated threat-emulation software would be incorporated into next year’s Balikatan drills so troops could rehearse defending networks and critical systems under fire.

She described cyber cooperation as an emerging “central pillar” of the US-Philippines alliance, on a par with maritime and air defence.

The goal was to bake cyber defence into all levels of government and develop “a deeper, more resilient technical partnership” that linked battlefield interoperability with the protection of national infrastructure, Schmidt told the 2025 Pilipinas Conference in Makati City last Thursday.

Russian Su-35s Force Ukraine’s New F-16s and Mirages to Operate Low and Far to Avoid Targeting

F-16 (top) and Su-35 Fighters

Operations by Russian Aerospace Forces Su-35 air superiority fighters have forced the Ukrainian Air Force’s newly delivered F-16 and Mirage 2000 fighters to operate exclusively at low altitudes in airspace far behind the frontlines, according to recent reports. Flying low and far from Russian forces minimises the possibility of targeting, but limits the kinds of support Ukrainian aircraft can provide for their forces. Commenting on how the Su-35’s presence in the theatre has allegedly shaped Ukrainian fighter operations, Rostec CEO Sergey Chemezov reported: “The Su-35S has driven enemy aircraft low, forcing them to fly at minimal altitudes and in rear areas. Meanwhile, the Su-35S engages targets at distances of hundreds of kilometres. That is why enemy aircraft cannot approach the frontlines to launch air-to-air missiles. This includes American F-16s and French-made Mirages.”

Russian Aerospace Forces Su-35 Fighters

Ukrainian sources have consistently warned that new Western-supplied F-16 and Mirage 2000 fighters are wholly incapable of matching the capabilities of advanced Russian fighters such as the Su-35. Highlighting the much more powerful sensor suites carried by Russian combat jets, and their much longer air-to-air engagement ranges, Ukrainian Air Force spokesman Yuri Ignat observed on June 3: "Unfortunately, today Russia has jets that see farther and missiles that fly farther. That’s even when compared to F-16s. They also have powerful air defences, which work in tandem with aviation.” Ignat in March compared the F-16 to the Su-35 specifically stating: “The modifications that Ukraine has cannot compete one-on-one in an air battle. We need a comprehensive approach as the [Russian] Su-35 is a relatively new jet… This includes ground-based air defence, electronic warfare systems, and ideally, an airborne radar. Also crucial are onboard radars for our aircraft and air-to-air missiles.”

The New Soft-Power Imbalance

Maria Repnikova

Since the start of his second term, U.S. President Donald Trump has been dismantling the traditional channels of American soft power. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is no longer operational, and Voice of America is tied up in legislative and court battles. The State Department has significantly reduced its staff and programming. Restrictive new visa and immigration policies have made the United States less accessible and less attractive to potential visitors, and Washington’s coercive and transactional dealings with U.S. allies have damaged trust abroad. In The New York Times, Jamie Shea, a former NATO

From Oil War to ‘Major Non-NATO Ally’: Trump’s Extraordinary Saudi Pivot

Simon Watkins

From the beginning of Donald Trump’s first term in office in 2017 to the start of his second term earlier this year, the relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia shifted between tense and downright hostile. Those years included an Oil Price War, the de facto Saudi leader labelled a murderer, and all lines of communication between the two sides grinding to a complete halt. However, as Trump and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) sat next to each other at a black?tie dinner at the White House last week – with the former designating the latter’s country as “a major non-NATO ally” -- all this must have seemed a distant past, and as L.P. Hartley put it: “They do things differently there”. So, how does the future for the world’s top superpower and one of its top hydrocarbons powers look from here?

It is apposite to note here that this is not a meaningless designation from the U.S. for Saudi Arabia. Only 19 other countries -- Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, South Korea, Thailand, and Tunisia – have such a standing in Washington’s eyes. Taiwan also has the same de facto designation, but does not officially enjoy the label, given the U.S.’s complicated ‘One China’ policy. Saudi Arabia’s new-found status also brings with it a host of economic and military advantages in its dealings with the U.S. and its allies, according to the State Department. These include eligibility for ‘loans of material, supplies, or equipment for cooperative research, development, testing, or evaluation purposes’, as well as for being a location for the placing of U.S.-owned War Reserve Stockpiles. Saudi Arabia will also now be able to enter into agreements with the U.S. for its security forces’ training on a bilateral or multilateral basis, will be eligible for the priority delivery of ‘excess defence articles’ (including C-130 Hercules aircraft or frigates, at low or zero cost), and for the purchase of depleted uranium ammunition. It will also be entitled to enter into agreements with the U.S. Department of Defense for research and development projects on defence equipment and munitions, and to procure explosives detection devices and other counter-terrorism research and development projects, among many other advantages. In short, Saudi Arabia is officially now regarded by the U.S. and its allies – including NATO members – as ‘one of ours’.

What Taiwan can and can’t learn from Ukraine

Sean Durns

“Generals,” French Prime Minister George Clemenceau allegedly said during World War I, “are always fighting the last war.” A century later, his warning should again be heeded.

2026 will mark four years since Russia invaded Ukraine, remaking the map of Europe and, in many respects, war itself. Taiwan, under threat from China, would be wise to look carefully at what it can and cannot learn from the conflict.

In some ways, the war in Ukraine resembles World War I. The latter was infamous for its static front lines, trench warfare, and the use of new battlefield weapons, from airplanes to mustard gas to advancements in artillery and small arms. It took time for many of the powers to adapt their 19th-century tactics to the new, and more monstrous, terrain of the 20th.

At war’s end, both winners and losers sought to imbibe its lessons. Some, notably France with its Maginot Line fortifications, learned all of the wrong ones. Many expected the next war to also be primarily static. Others recognized that new technologies would allow for wars of maneuver and offense. Militarily, World War II bore scant resemblance to its predecessor. Those who clung to old tactics and outdated technologies paid a heavy price.

Ukraine’s Next Battle: Neutrality vs. Security Guarantees

Robert Farley

Lt. Col. Thomas Wolfe, the 455th Expeditionary Operations Group deputy commander, performs preflight checks on an F-16 Fighting Falcon at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, Feb. 1, 2016. The 421st EFS, based out of Bagram Airfield, is the only dedicated fighter squadron in the country and continuously supports Operation Freedom’s Sentinel and the NATO Resolute Support missions. (U.S. Air Force photo/Tech. Sgt. Nicholas Rau)

-NATO’s Article V and Western alliance prestige make attacks on members far riskier than strikes on Ukraine today.

-For that reason, Russia fears Ukrainian NATO membership more than a neutral but heavily armed Ukraine.

-The column concludes that any durable settlement must bind Ukraine into a bilateral or multilateral security framework that both restrains Kyiv and credibly deters Moscow.

Who lost Ukraine?’: Preview of a political crisis

Gabriel Elefteriu

No one knows exactly how or when the Ukraine war will end. But all realistic scenarios are now unfavourable to Kyiv. Serious assessments of Ukraine’s military, economic and social-political problems – now aggravated by the shocking corruption scandal at the top of the State – vary only in severity; none are positive. A Ukrainian “defeat” would have major perceived consequences for European security, albeit there is also much hyperbole on this point. Far more problematic would be the seismic shock that would hit Europe’s already-fraught politics as a result. This could well become Europe’s version of America’s vicious “Who lost China?” debate after 1949.

The China controversy was one of the most convulsive reckonings in early Cold War Washington. It erupted after Mao’s Communists won the Chinese civil war against American-supported Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalists who retreated to Taiwan. In geopolitical and strategic terms it was seen as a vast, unmitigated disaster for US policy. Defeat for the West, victory for the Reds, the rest of Asia now up for grabs: A first-order debacle.

UN panel hears evidence Israel operating 'de facto policy of torture'

Imogen Foulkes

The United Nations committee on torture says it is concerned by reports indicating that Israel is operating a "de facto state policy of organised and widespread torture".

The committee regularly reviews the records of all countries which have signed the convention against torture, taking testimony from their governments, and from human rights groups.

During Israel's review both Israeli and Palestinian rights groups gave harrowing details about conditions in Israeli detention centres. It is alleged that thousands of Palestinians have been detained by Israel since the Hamas attacks of 7 October 2023.

Under Israel's laws on administrative detention and on Unlawful Combatants, suspects who cannot be classed as prisoners of war can be held for long periods without access to a lawyer or family members.

Many Palestinian families say they have waited months to even find out that a loved has been detained, amounting, the UN committee said, to "enforced disappearance".

The committee was particularly critical of Israel's reported use of the Unlawful Combatants law to detain whole groups of Palestinians, including children, pregnant women, and the elderly.

How Xi Played Trump

Jonathan A. Czin

Although U.S. President Donald Trump promised to unleash an economic fusillade on China after his return to the presidency, Beijing has enjoyed a remarkably strong year of diplomacy. The Trump administration resurrected and expanded its first-term trade war with Beijing, claiming it would use trade negotiations with other countries to put pressure on China. Yet Beijing has hardly been isolated internationally: in the months leading up to his October meeting with Trump in South Korea, Chinese leader Xi Jinping hosted a gaggle of foreign heads of state for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit and a military parade. Nor has

The End of the Longest Peace?

Graham Allison and James A. Winnefeld

The past eight decades have been the longest period without a war between great powers since the Roman Empire. This anomalous era of extended peace came after two catastrophic wars, each of which was so much more destructive than prior conflicts that historians found it necessary to create an entirely new category to describe them: world wars. Had the rest of the twentieth century been as violent as the preceding two millennia, the lifetimes of nearly everyone alive today would have been radically different.

A Letter from Clausewitz to Secretary Rubio

Mark Hertling

During my military career, I spent countless hours studying Carl von Clausewitz and other military theorists whose work still shapes how we think about war, strategy, and—just as importantly—how wars end. Their ideas remain relevant not because they offer formulas, but because they illuminate how human beings, governments, and armies act under pressure. Recently, I found myself asking: What would Clausewitz say about the quest for peace between Russia and Ukraine? Perhaps he might write a letter like the one below. –M.H.

Allow me, from a place beyond politics and beyond time, to offer some reflections as you undertake the difficult task of peacemaking. I have no objection to your pursuit of peace; indeed, I devoted much of my life to understanding its relationship to war. But I must caution you: Peace, like war, has an essence. It cannot be dictated by impatience, convenience, or diplomatic theatrics. It must be anchored in principles that endure after the cannon fall silent.

I have observed many leaders—kings, emperors, ministers—seek peace not because justice demanded it, but because they found war wearisome. Such efforts rarely end well. Given this, I ask you to consider not merely whether any plan you might conceive will produce a document signed on a dais by your president in your capital, but whether it will produce actual peace in Europe, and whether it protects the people whose lives and liberty hang in the balance.

The AI Bubble’s Shaky Math

CARL BENEDIKT FREY

Today’s massive and still-growing investments in AI and its accompanying infrastructure could well pay off like the internet did, following the investment boom of the late 1990s. But, for now, the gains from AI look more muted, and the macro downsides larger, than in the case of the dot-com bubble.

OXFORD – When OpenAI recently committed $1.4 trillion to securing future computing capacity, it was merely the latest indication of irrational exuberance in 2025. By some estimates, US GDP growth in the first half of this year came almost entirely from data centers, prompting a flood of commentary about when the bubble will burst and what it may leave behind. While the late 1990s dot-com party ended with a hangover for Wall Street, Main Street kept what mattered: the infrastructure. Productivity rose, and the fiber laid during the boom years still works today. US President Bill Clinton’s vow to build a “bridge to the 21st century” was one of those rare campaign promises that is actually fulfilled.

Will the AI Boom Continue?

CARL BENEDIKT FREY

Investors remain exuberant about AI, betting that the opportunities will outweigh the risks. But discerning the scale of each in different economic sectors and jurisdictions is a complex undertaking, which must account for a wide range of factors, including financial markets, demographic trends, regulatory policy, democratic accountability, and natural-resource constraints.

As Oxford’s Carl Benedikt Frey notes, while today’s AI investments “could well pay off like the internet did,” the gains currently “look more muted,” with larger “macro downsides,” than in the case of the dot-com bubble of the late 1990s. Unless AI “delivers broad and sustained productivity gains quickly” – thereby easing fiscal pressure, lowering debt ratios, and buttressing financing structures – the “payoff might not compensate for the massive front-loaded costs.”

Then there are the costs to people’s livelihoods, points out UCL Policy Lab’s Noreena Hertz – particularly those of women. In fact, the latest wave of automation is likely to have a disproportionate impact on female workers, who are already at an “economic disadvantage relative to men.” Ensuring that “women don’t bear the brunt of AI-induced job displacement” will require policy intervention, particularly to ensure that they are “offered equal opportunities for access and upskilling.”

Chinese Electric Buses Trigger Cybersecurity Alarm Across Europe

Jack Burnham

China’s reach into critical infrastructure threatens to disrupt Europeans’ daily commute. On November 19, The Wall Street Journal reported that the Oslo transportation authority, working in conjunction with Norwegian officials, discovered that the city’s Chinese-manufactured buses could be remotely disabled via a software vulnerability. Following the Norwegian study, both United Kingdom and Danish authorities announced their own investigations into their bus fleets.

The discovery, which follows earlier warnings over the presence of possible backdoors to Chinese-built devices embedded within European infrastructure, highlights Beijing’s unprecedented access to allied critical infrastructure.

Norway’s Test Proves Chinese Buses Could Be Disabled Remotely

In seeking to pinpoint the vulnerability, Oslo’s transit agency, Ruter, drove both a newly purchased Chinese-made Yutong bus and an older Dutch transit bus deep into a decommissioned mine to eliminate external signals. Once parked away from potential interference, Norwegian cybersecurity experts demonstrated that the Yutong bus’s battery and power systems, which can receive updates over the air, would theoretically allow the manufacturer to disable the vehicle remotely. In contrast, the older Dutch-made bus had no over-the-air update capability, preventing malicious actors from using external access points to sabotage its systems.

As Space Becomes Warfare Domain, Cyber Is on the Frontlines

Shaun Waterman

Space is becoming a domain of warfare, with private sector companies on the front lines - and the first shots will likely be fired in cyberspace, a senior U.S. intelligence official warned this month.

"Cybersecurity for space systems is very likely to be on the front lines of conflict involving space," said Johnathon Martin, acting deputy director of the Office of the Chief Architect at the National Reconnaissance Office, which builds, launches and operates U.S. spy satellites.

Physical attacks are always a possibility, but their potential for spiraling out of attackers' control via the dreaded Kessler effect - a situation in which space collisions produce more debris that provoke more collisions - means cyberattacks are the more likely space weapon, Martin said. That would be especially true of the early stages of a conflict, he said in a keynote address at the annual CyberSat conference in Reston, Virginia.

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