Huge blow to Russia as Ukraine destroys four S-400 air defence systems; Why should India be worried?

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New Delhi: The Ukrainian military has once again claimed to have destroyed a Russian S-400 missile system. The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) claimed that its drones destroyed four S-400 Triumph launchers and two radar systems during an attack on Novorossiysk, Russia, on the morning of November 14. This is being considered a major blow to Russia. The S-400 is considered the world's most powerful air defence system. Ukraine has previously claimed to have destroyed S-400 missile systems on several occasions. The S-400 missile system is used by Russia, China, Turkey, and India.

S-400 radars also destroyed

The Kyiv Post quoted SBU sources as saying, "Satellite images confirm that the SBU successfully destroyed four launchers of the S-400 Triumph anti-aircraft missile system." This air defence system was located in the compound of a military unit of the Kuban Red Banner Regiment. The source further stated that two key S-400 radars were also destroyed in the attack, including the 96N6 early warning radar and the 92N6 target acquisition radar.

12 S-400 launchers were deployed at the compound

They stated that approximately 12 S-400 launchers were deployed at the Russian military compound. The Ukrainian military has expressed a strong possibility that additional S-400 units were damaged in the attack. According to reports, the SBU conducted this mission in cooperation with Ukraine's Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR), Special Operations Forces (SSO), and the State Border Guard Service.

Ukraine Targeting Russian Air Defence Systems

The source said, "The SBU continues to systematically destroy air defence systems protecting the Russian military's vital military, infrastructure, and logistics supply centres." He added, "Each destroyed system creates a deeper gap in Russia's defences that Ukrainian drones and missiles will exploit."

Russian Oil Supplies Halted

Meanwhile, Russia has suspended oil supplies to its largest Black Sea port, Novorossiysk, since the morning of November 14 due to the Ukrainian attack. This includes the storage of oil and loading onto tankers for export. The Sheskharis oil-loading terminal at the same port was damaged by a Ukrainian drone attack. According to reports, this attack temporarily halted 2% of global oil shipments. The attack forced Russian pipeline operator Transneft to suspend shipments, although the company declined to comment.

How Asia Is Navigating America’s Fading Financial Control

Elkhan Nuriyev

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For decades, global order rested on a simple premise: U.S. economic and military supremacy structured the system, and others adjusted. From the Bretton Woods institutions to the post-Cold War unipolar moment, Washington stood at the center of both the global economy and its security architecture.

That model is now under strain. The United States continues to dominate the world’s financial plumbing: the dollar accounts for about 58 percent of official foreign-exchange reserves, roughly half of global trade invoicing, and more than 40 percent of cross-border debt issuance. The Federal Reserve remains the world’s de facto central bank, and dollar liquidity still sets the rhythm of global markets. Even governments that oppose U.S. policy – China, Russia, Iran – remain dependent on the dollar’s gravitational pull for trade and reserves.

Yet financial supremacy no longer translates into political alignment. The illusion that economic globalization and U.S. leadership were mutually reinforcing has faded. Globalization has not collapsed – it has simply diversified. What was once a single, U.S.-anchored system has become a network of overlapping regional and functional orders.

Across Asia, the logic of “multialignment” is taking root. China has built a parallel financial and connectivity infrastructure through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and regional digital platforms that challenge Western models. India, the Gulf states, and much of Southeast Asia are hedging – maintaining security ties with Washington while deepening trade, energy, and technology links with Beijing and Moscow. Even U.S. partners such as Japan and South Korea are exploring limited autonomy through regional financial cooperation and local-currency initiatives.

This pattern reflects a deeper shift: countries now view U.S. financial leverage as both indispensable and risky. Dependence on the dollar remains, but it has become a strategic calculation rather than an automatic choice. China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), India’s rupee-denominated trade arrangements, and BRICS proposals for alternative settlement mechanisms are not yet serious competitors to the dollar. But their political purpose is clear – to build options.

Rethinking China

George Friedman

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A few weeks ago, I cited the dismissal of nine senior generals from the People’s Liberation Army by Chinese President Xi Jinping as potential evidence that Xi’s health was deteriorating – as had been rumored in Chinese and, in time, global media. I had considered that the emergence of Xi’s health issues might have been a justification for removing him from office and that the generals were ousted to block the coup. In a country as opaque as China, things like this can be indicative of major internal crises.

Subsequent developments suggest something very different. The purge of the generals was followed by the unexplained dismissal of senior admirals in the Chinese navy. If they were sacked because of their suspected participation in a coup, that means the conspiracy would be so widespread that it would be impossible to keep secret. This is difficult to imagine, as is the degree of carelessness military leaders would demonstrate in talking too much about a coup. And a military that loses most of its senior commanders in a short time is not going to be effective in the event of war.

My new theory is that the purges relate to changes in China’s Taiwan policy. Last week, the U.S. embassy invited Cheng Li-wun, the leader of the opposition Kuomintang political party, to visit Washington. Some consider her to be pro-China, while others see her as merely less hostile than the governing party to China. The United States has supported the Democratic Progressive Party-led government, which is committed to independence rather than accommodation with China, and is generally seen as more U.S.-friendly. Its stance toward Beijing is somewhere between wary and hostile. That makes a visit by the leader of the Kuomintang very interesting – doubly so since Taiwan’s president hasn’t been to the U.S. since his scheduled meeting in July was scrapped.

The invitation came after a meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Xi, from which some other interesting things emerged. Trump has demanded that nations not buy Russian oil on pain of significant tariff increases. Usually, China would have rejected that demand, but this time, it didn’t – not exactly. Though Beijing did not publicly say it would comply, two of the country’s largest oil companies announced they would stop buying Russian oil. So while there was not a total boycott on Russian oil purchases, there was a significant reduction. Whether the companies honor the pledge is less important than the fact that Beijing has publicly let it be known that it will meet Washington’s demands.

China rapidly expands nuclear test site as Trump revives Cold War tension

Cate Cadell

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President Donald Trump’s announcement this month that the United States would restart nuclear weapons testing on an “equal basis” with other nations — alluding to unverified claims that Moscow and Beijing are conducting secret tests and suggesting the U.S. will revive programs abandoned in the early 1990s — has sowed confusion among the world’s nuclear powers and revived echoes of the Cold War arms race.

While Moscow was quick to call for proposals on restarting its own nuclear weapons testing program, Beijing has stayed largely silent. But in the remote deserts of western China, the People’s Liberation Army has long been bracing for just this kind of threat.

In far western Xinjiang, satellite imagery and expert analysis show that China is rapidly expanding a historic nuclear test site, where it conducted its first atomic bomb test in 1964. The country’s military has quietly carved new tunnels, hollowed out explosive chambers and built support facilities that researchers say suggest preparations for nuclear testing.

Though China’s nuclear program remains years behind those of Russia and the United States, analysts say it is precisely that disparity that may be driving the apparent expansion of its testing facilities.

“Given the fact that China has conducted the smallest number of nuclear tests, it has much less empirical data. … China may have a need to conduct more experiments at either the subcritical level or through very low-yield supercritical testing to learn more about nuclear weapons,” said Tong Zhao, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Behind China’s drive to expand its nuclear arsenal — the world’s third largest — is a broader strategy under President Xi Jinping to modernize the country’s military by 2030 and achieve a world‑class force by the middle of the century.

“China is increasingly interested in acquiring the capability to manage nuclear escalation at the regional level. … [It] has an incentive to develop lower-yield warheads, and that need may be part of what China is doing in the testing side,” Zhao said.

President Xi’s freedom-stomping thugs are targeting speech in NYC

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In this photo released by Xinhua News Agency on Thursday, Oct 23, 2025, Chinese President Xi Jinping speaks during the fourth plenary session of the 20th Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee in Beijing.AP

Not even tiny indie film festivals are safe from the long-reaching arm of the Chinese Communist Party.

On Monday, The New York Times reported that Chinese director Zhu Rikun had to cancel the NYC-based IndieChina Film Festival after the CCP harassed participants and their families (particularly members in China) over the inclusion of films that Beijing had never approved.

The director himself was willing to take some heat over the festival, but when any other filmmakers, panel moderators and a volunteer pulled out, and a few admitted they or their families had been bullied by Chinese police, Zhu opted to shutter the event.

The jackboots won: There will be no unapproved speech about China on President Xi Jinping’s watch — not even on American soil.

It’s no surprise that Xi’s thought police moved against art the CCP hadn’t OK’d — Chinese authorities strong-armed Zhu’s previous project, the Beijing Independent Film Festival, into nonexistence in 2014.

But it’s beyond chilling that the CCP could so effectively squash speech in New York City, thuggishly controlling what US-based independent thinkers can say and watch.

The small festival was mostly funded by Zhu; he expected perhaps 70 people at each screening.

Alarm bells should be sounding from City Hall to Capitol Hill and the White House: Xi’s bullyboys are increasingly bold about meddling in American business.

In August, the Times broke a story about a ring of Chinese agents working through a network of at least 53 organizations fronting as “hometown associations” to sabotage the careers of politicians in New York who met with Taiwanese leaders or criticized the CCP.

The Truth about Chinese Manufacturing

David Hebert, Peter C. Earle

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Imagine for a minute that you have the world’s greatest chef working in your restaurant. The food is so incredible that people regularly travel from miles away to dine at your restaurant. Then, a new restaurant opens, and while it sells an impressive quantity of food, everyone is very much aware that its quality is lacking. While your restaurant’s output has remained steady, you decide that you need to protect your restaurant from this new entrant. To do so, you actively make it harder for your chef to buy ingredients, telling them, “if you want ingredients, you’ll have to grow them yourself!”

If this sounds absurd, that’s because it is. Unfortunately, this is exactly what Washington politicians are doing to the manufacturing sector in the United States right now. Why is that? Because of, primarily, China’s supposed manufacturing “dominance.”

It has become standard parlance for members of both parties to wax poetically about the “hollowing out” of the American manufacturing industry. said as much in 2022 as did just this past April. For the most part, these two are referring to jobs in manufacturing, which have certainly declined over the last 50 years. However, some go even further, purporting that “we don’t make anything anymore.” said as much in 2015 while on the campaign trail to his first term in office, echoed this in 2023, and joined this chorus just this past March.

What are the facts?. for 2024 reached a staggering in total value added. The US, by comparison, produced a mere. By all accounts, in raw terms, China is producing about 60% more output than we are.

However, what is often overlooked, despite its widespread acknowledgment in other contexts, is the fact that China has a very large population. And when it comes to manufacturing, the numbers are simply staggering. In 2020, the year of China’s most recent census, over were working in the manufacturing sector. Later, independent reports have the Chinese manufacturing workforce at. This means that the average Chinese manufacturing worker generates between $22,028 and $38,916 in value-added. By comparison, America employs just, which is 6-10.6% of the number of manufacturing workers that China employs. On average, US manufacturing workers generate $229,133, which means our workers are between 6 and 10 times as productive as the average manufacturing worker in China.

China’s DF-17 Hypersonic Weapon is the Ultimate Checkmate for US Military Power

Brandon J. Weichert

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In the opening hours of a US-China war, the DF-17 would crater runways at bases like Kadena in Japan or Andersen in Guam, crippling American airpower in the Indo-Pacific.

Quietly and without much media coverage, the Pentagon’s top military scientists are admitting that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has leapfrogged Uncle Sam, despite the obvious spending gap between the two nations, in the key strategic domain of hypersonic weapons development.

Having poured the equivalent of $10 billion into developing not just a single, advanced hypersonic weapon but an entire ecosystem of such weapons, China has arrayed these lethal weapons along their anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) zone of defense forward-deployed in places, like the South China Sea (SCS),where these systems can reach out and threaten distant US airbases and aircraft carriers.

America Doesn’t Have an Answer to China’s DF-17 Hypersonic Missile

The DF-17 (Dong Feng-17) is a medium-range ballistic missile system developed by China’s People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF). It is notable for being one of the first operational hypersonic weapons in the world. The weapon was unveiled during China’s 70th anniversary military parade in October 2019 and is believed to have entered service around that time.

A solid-fueled, road-mobile missile, this weapon allows the PLARF to keep the weapon concealed, its transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) vehicle gives it rapid deployment capabilities. Because of this, the PLARF can employ “shoot-and-scoot” tactics to avoid detection and counterstrikes.

Weighing 33,069 pounds, this two-stage missile boosts a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), designated DF-ZF, to near-space altitudes before the HGV glides back to its target at hypersonic speeds. The system is designed to radically maneuver at those hypersonic speeds, making it nearly impossible for modern air defense systems to knock the HGV out of the air before hitting its intended target.

Chinese Satellite Crushes Starlink With 2-Watt Laser Fired From 36,000 KM in Space

Arezki Amiri

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In a high-altitude test that could reshape the future of global satellite communications, China has successfully transmitted data at 1 gigabit per second (Gbps) from a geostationary orbit using a 2-watt laser. The signal, sent from 36,000 kilometers above Earth, outpaces the performance of Starlink by a factor of five—using significantly less power and without the need for a massive satellite constellation.

The breakthrough, led by researchers from Peking University and the Chinese Academy of Sciences, leverages a novel optical system capable of maintaining data integrity despite the vast distance and signal distortion caused by atmospheric turbulence. With this demonstration, China presents a compelling alternative to low-Earth orbit (LEO) models currently dominating the satellite internet industry.

The technology was successfully tested at the Lijiang Observatory in southwestern China, offering a tangible shift toward laser-based satellite networks—a domain that promises faster speeds, lower latency, and broader bandwidth than traditional radio-frequency (RF) systems.

Beyond LEO: A New Model for Orbital Data Transmission

China’s system breaks from the crowded LEO approach taken by companies like SpaceX, which relies on thousands of satellites orbiting just 550 kilometers above the Earth. Instead, Chinese scientists demonstrated a high-speed optical link from a geostationary satellite, positioned over 36,700 kilometers away.

According to reporting from the South China Morning Post, the experiment achieved 1 Gbps data throughput using a 2-watt laser, maintaining signal quality over a transmission range rarely attempted for such high bandwidth.

The system relies on a dual-technology solution known as AO-MDR synergy, which combines adaptive optics (AO) to correct signal distortion in real-time with mode diversity reception (MDR) to recover scattered laser signals. The corrected signal is then split into eight transmission channels via a multi-plane light converter (MPLC), where a real-time algorithm identifies the most coherent paths, enhancing reliability and reducing transmission errors.

The detailed technical analysis is available via Interesting Engineering, which confirmed that this system raised the usable signal rate from 72% to 91.1%, marking a significant gain in performance stability at long range.

Laser vs. Radio

China’s Upgraded Lawfare in the South China Sea

Jacqueline Espenilla

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In this image released by the Philippine Coast Guard, a China Coast Guard vessel fires a water cannon at a boat from the Philippine Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources in the vicinity of Thitu Island in the South China Sea, Oct. 12, 2025.Credit: X/Jay Tarriela

In recent months, China has been doubling down on the narrative that the Philippines is the regional “troublemaker” that repeatedly engages in unlawful behavior and provokes conflict and confrontation. This labelling is part of China’s systematic efforts to promote legal counterfactuals that undermine established international law in order to complement and support its South China Sea agenda.

This is an act of “lawfare,” a term that Charles Dunlap famously defined in 2008 as “the strategy of using – or misusing – law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective.” Over time, the meaning of lawfare has broadened to go beyond simple equivalence to kinetic war. Zakhar Tropin argued in 2021 that the term should also apply to “the use of law aimed at delegitimizing the actions of an opponent (or legitimizing one’s own) and to tie up the time and resources of the opponent and achieve advances in military activity or in any sphere of social relations.”

Let’s delve more deeply into China’s legal narratives regarding the Philippines and the South China Sea. First is the claim that the Philippines’ recent legislative enactments are unlawful and unsupported under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

In November 2024, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. signed two important pieces of legislation: the Philippine Maritime Zones Act (MZA) and the Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act (ASLA). They enshrine in domestic law the Philippines’ continuing adherence to the UNCLOS in the determination of its maritime zones, as well as its rights and obligations in relation to those zones. Notably, the MZA formally incorporates the outcome of the 2016 Philippines vs China UNCLOS Arbitration into Philippine law. The adoption of the MZA and the ASLA are both sovereign actions of the Philippines and are compliant with its international legal obligations under UNCLOS. Indeed, many other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries have enacted similar legislation over the years.

The End of China’s Old Guard

Deng Yuwen

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For the past year, an increasing number of rumors about Chinese leader Xi Jinping have been swirling around Beijing. Some sources privately claim that Xi has lost real power and been sidelined. Others whisper that Xi’s health has deteriorated; the politician appearing in public, they say, is merely a lookalike, while a group of the party’s most venerable elder statesmen are actually calling the shots. Still other stories even imagine an alliance of unlikely bedfellows—once powerful liberal political reformers and conservative generals from the People’s Liberation Army, for instance—who are teaming up to admonish Xi

A Glimpse of the Future of China-US Relations

Sara Hsu

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It’s the year 2028, and the China-U.S. rivalry has hardened into a permanent conflict. The economic relationship between the United States and China remains, but has become more expensive, complex, and defined by mistrust. In the U.S., Section 301 tariffs and entity lists remain in place; in China, reciprocal tariffs, export-licensing regimes, and punishing counter-sanctions continue. Each new rule results in a mirror reaction.

Business continues to flow, but supply chain costs are higher, lead times are longer than in previous years, and firms carry more inventory due to higher risk levels. The technology industry – once a shared sphere of innovation – has split into rival ecosystems, with either side facing the constant threat of losing access to critical parts or resources from their counterpart. Beijing has mobilized massive state funding and engineering talent to narrow the technological gap. Two incompatible technology stacks arise, with diverging cloud and AI toolchains. Major global firms are required to maintain dual compliance tracks for U.S. and Chinese standards.

Military and cyber defense often default to deterrence, but there is a constant risk of an accident at sea or in the air, which could rapidly escalate conflict. Both nations continue to modernize their defense industries, including expanding their nuclear arsenals. China continues to expand its security involvement overseas, while the U.S. maintains its presence and patrolling operation in the Indo-Pacific. Cyber-espionage and gray-zone tactics are daily occurrences, as both sides search for weaknesses they could exploit in the event of ratcheting conflict.

The world of 2028 is not a world at war between the two great powers, but misunderstandings have increased the potential for a face-off. Past cooperation feels more like a faint memory, as unfavorable views between both political leaders and the populace of either nation rising to an all-time high. Neither side views the other as a friend, but as a potential outright enemy.

The world of 2028 is merely an extension of today’s rivalry, both in words and deeds. At his Senate confirmation hearing, Secretary of State-designate Marco Rubio called China “the most potent and dangerous near-peer adversary this nation has ever confronted.” Meanwhile, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin has repeatedly branded U.S. conduct as “hegemonic, domineering and bullying.”

How the Rest of the World Is Moving on From Trump’s ‘America First’

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Hello from Singapore. I’m Erik Schatzker, editorial director of Bloomberg New Economy, bringing you a special edition of the Saturday newsletter. The Bloomberg New Economy Forum gets underway on Nov. 19 with a stellar lineup of newsmaking speakers. Find the full program here and be sure to check out BloombergNewEconomy.com for more. Send us feedback and tips here or get in touch with us online . And if you aren’t yet signed up to receive New Economy Saturday, our weekly exploration of the biggest issues facing governments and economies and what’s coming next, do so here .

Ten months into Donald Trump’s second term as president, “America First” remains as unpopular as ever outside the US. Yet no one’s waiting for a U-turn. The world has little choice but to adapt to the Republican’s program of strategic autonomy, economic coercion and transactional diplomacy.

Minsk in Moscow’s grip: How Russia subjugated Belarus without annexation

Hanna Liubakova

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Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 challenged much of the common Western understanding of Russia. How can the world better understand Russia? What are the steps forward for Western policy? The Eurasia Center’s new “Russia Tomorrow” series seeks to reevaluate conceptions of Russia today and better prepare for its future tomorrow.

For about five years, from 2015 to 2020, Belarus created an illusion that it was changing: a deceptive glimmer that suggested its leader, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, might steer his country away from Russia’s orbit and toward greater independence. In hindsight, this false dawn only masked the tightening grip of Moscow.

Two myths fueled misplaced optimism. First, there was a belief that Belarus could balance between the East and West through a multivector foreign policy. Second, there was a hope that Minsk’s limited reforms, release of some political prisoners, and especially its refusal to unconditionally back Moscow in the 2014 annexation of Crimea and intervention in the Donbas signaled a liberalizing turn. Both illusions ultimately frayed during this period.

At first, Lukashenka positioned Belarus as a neutral host for peace talks on the Ukraine conflict—not a participant. The Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015 fed Western hopes: Belarus as mediator, not accomplice. Lukashenka even rejected Russian demands for a new Russian airbase in Belarusian territory, wary of appearing too dependent.

A partial thaw followed. Some Belarusian political prisoners were released. The European Union (EU) lifted sanctions. Western officials applauded Lukashenka’s apparent pragmatism. Engagement resumed.

But beneath the surface, nothing fundamentally changed. The regime remained authoritarian and Soviet in ethos. The security apparatus stayed intact. Dissent was managed, not tolerated. And Moscow remained the indispensable lifeline—providing cheap energy, market access, and strategic cover.

By the end of the decade, the signs were unmistakable. Crackdowns against dissent intensified. Economic dependence on Moscow deepened. Russia’s regional aggression hardened. The scaffolding of sovereignty remained, but the core was hollow.

A Trump offer that Putin cannot refuse

Jennifer Kavanagh

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Along Ukraine’s eastern frontline, the question is not if Russia will gain full control of Pokrovsk, a key location on Ukraine’s “fortress belt,” but when.

The city’s collapse will be a strategic loss for Ukraine and a tactical win for Russia, but it won’t bring an end to the war closer. This is because none of the key stakeholders is ready to stop fighting. Worse, the coming months could be the war’s most dangerous, with desperation creeping into Kyiv’s upper ranks and nuclear saber-rattling from the United States and Russia on the rise.

For the Trump administration, this is bad news. The slim window of opportunity it had for simply walking away from Ukraine, no strings attached, has closed and now bilateral diplomacy with Russia is stalled. Though President Donald Trump insists that this is still “Biden’s war,” almost a year into his term, he will certainly own the consequences of the conflict’s eventual end — good or bad.

Washington will need a new strategy, however, if it hopes to salvage its efforts to achieve peace. The starting point for this new strategy must be an acceptance that there is no amount of pressure that will drive Russian President Vladimir Putin to stop the war before he has minimally achieved his objectives. Instead, President Trump’s best shot at reaching a deal would leverage his strongest card: the fact that Putin needs U.S. involvement to achieve his political objectives and cares so much more about the details of a settlement than the U.S. president.

In many ways, the battle for Pokrovsk has become a microcosm of the war itself and the difficulty of resolving the nearly four-year old conflict. Despite the fighting’s toll, neither side seems prepared to lay down its weapons, but their reasons could not be more different.

Moscow’s unwillingness to back down is a sign of resolve and a reminder that Russia is largely impervious to Western-imposed and battlefield costs. Believing that he has the military advantage, Putin has responded to Trump’s calls for peace with escalation, pressing forward where Ukraine’s defenses appear on the verge of collapse. The losses from this strategy are high but sustainable and acceptable given the stakes of the war’s outcome for Putin and his regime.

Mamdani Is a Warning for Western Civilization

Mike Gonzalez

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Mike is the Angeles T. Arredondo E Pluribus Unum Senior Fellow in the Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy at The Heritage Foundation. Read his research.

Three days before last week’s elections, the once-trenchant “Saturday Night Live” devoted its cold opening skit to poking fun at Zohran Mamdani, now New York mayor-elect, for “smiling so much my face hurts.” The joke was that Mamdani’s permanent grin is false, an artifice he uses to appear relatable.

Well, “SNL” is no longer the must-watch entertainment it was in its earlier years, but it remains a good political prognosticator. Mamdani’s face hurts no more; the metamorphosis from candidate to mayor-elect means the toothy grin is gone, and Mamdani can now bear his totalitarian fangs.

On election night, the soon-to-be “Hizzhoner” devoted his nearly 25-minute victory speech at the Brooklyn Paramount theater to laying out his politics of grievances and a worldview made up of the oppressed and their oppressors, the stock-in-trade of all good Marxists since the 1848 Communist Manifesto.

A question at this point is why the Democratic Party allowed Mamdani’s true political faction, the Democratic Socialists of America, to take it over. DSA members repeatedly make clear that they do not like the Democratic Party, but that their strategy is to become zombie-like body snatchers in a bad Halloween movie.

As for the rest of the country, what is imperative now is saving Western civilization from the likes of Mamdani. This can be done one step at a time, but with a grand strategy.

One of those steps is saving Columbus Circle and the statue of its namesake from the ravages of Mamdani, who would just as soon raze it and erect a Mosque in its place, not because he is religious, but because he understands that Islam can be used as an anti-Western symbol.

This is not hyperbole. We should understand why, once elected, Mamdani let the mask slip. He made clear not only that he believes in big government, but that he has totalitarian inclinations.

Here in Sweden, the Vikings are back. And this time they’re searching for stability in a chaotic age

Siri Christiansen

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“Hail Thor!” The priestess and her heathens, standing in a circle, raised their mead-filled horns. We were gathered in an unassuming spot in a pine forest outside Stockholm. This was our temple, and the large, mossy stone before us was our altar. I was relieved to see that the animal-based sacrificial offerings were long-dead and highly processed. A bearded man reached his tattooed arms into his backpack and raised a red, horseshoe-shaped sausage to the sky. A goth girl unboxed a plastic tub of hammer-shaped cookies. The priestess offered me a handful of flaxseeds to toss on the altar, which was overflowing with gifts, apples and bottles of homemade mead.

A dozen people had gathered for an autumn sacrifice to summon Thor, the hammer-wielding Norse god of harvests and storms. Many pleaded for him to bring rain, after a summer plagued with drought. Others asked for the strength to battle unemployment, or for the recovery of a sick mother. We all had our own reasons for being there. A middle-aged man, perspiring in his blue office shirt, seemed to be there to connect with his hippy-looking wife and teenage daughter.

I was there because pagan events kept popping up in my Facebook feed, and I couldn’t fathom why. I’m not “spiritual”, or even agnostic. I’m staunchly secular, I like modern medicine, and my social media usually reflects that. Having just moved back to Sweden after five years living in the UK, my online world mainly consisted of London friends and British banter. But there was a glaring exception: my algorithm kept recommending that I check out neo-Norse sacrifices in my local area. It suggested that the movement may be surprisingly mainstream, and the two middle-aged women standing beside me in the forest seemed to confirm this: they looked perfectly normal – like they could work at a nursery. I really had not expected to return home to a Viking revival; nor that it would be so chilled out, when I did.

Sweden’s conversion to Christianity in the middle ages largely eradicated the pagan religion of the Viking era. Now, people are intent on bringing it back. While far from a nationwide trend, the fringe faith has racked up a notable following. Two formally recognised faith groups, Nordic Asa-Community (NAC) and Community of Forn Sed Sweden have around 2,700 members between them according to their own estimates, though no official figures exist. On Facebook, they have 16,000 followers combined. They offer naming ceremonies, initiation rites, weddings, funerals, new holidays and a reason to gather in forests and fields. They have a total of 20 sub-divisions across Sweden that organise local, small-scale sacrifices like the one I went to, and their annual, nationwide sacrifices are said to attract about 300 participants.

Control the Hemisphere, Contain China: Inside America’s Two-Front Strategy

Andrew Latham

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ATLANTIC OCEAN (Oct. 29, 2019) USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) conducts high-speed turns in the Atlantic Ocean. Ford is at sea conducting sea trials following the in port portion of its 15 month post-shakedown availability. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Connor Loessin)

Key Points and Summary – USS Gerald R. Ford’s Caribbean patrol is more than counternarcotics theater; it signals a hemispheric-first grand strategy.

-Trump’s team is refortifying the Americas—using carrier presence, tariffs on Canada, and tougher rules for Mexico—to build a “continental fortress” that underwrites Indo-Pacific competition with China.

The U.S. Navy Gerald R. Ford–class aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) and the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) underway in the Atlantic Ocean on 4 June 2020, marking the first time a Gerald R. Ford–class and a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier operated together underway.

-Maritime denial in the Caribbean, scrutiny of Chinese port deals, and tighter border and supply-chain controls fuse into one deterrence system.

-The bet: consolidate power close to home, then project outward.

-Risks include miscalculation with Venezuela, trade blowback, and friction with allies, but advocates call the shift disciplined rather than isolationist.

The “Continental Fortress”: Why the U.S. Is Re-arming the Americas Now

The USS Gerald R. Ford’s gray silhouette cutting across the Caribbean horizon marks a decisive shift in American statecraft: U.S. foreign policy, long focused on policing the planet-wide Rules-Based International Order, is narrowing to a more restrained focus on the Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific.

How to fight in ‘hell’: Ukraine veterans say Nato not ready for war with Russia

Sam Kiley 

Sourec Link

Ukrainian intelligence is warning that a Russian Lancet drone is prowling the sky, loitering above Kramatorsk, like a heron poised over a fish pond, ready to strike.

A laptop shows multiscreen images of medics racing through shredded forest, Russian soldiers in Ukrainian sights, bunkers being blown up – everyday terror.

This is the future of war – and the West isn’t ready for what may be coming in an open conflict with Russia: mass casualties and a transformation of the battle beyond anything that Nato’s armies are training for.

The laptop feed is for Rebekah Maciorowski, an American volunteer paramedic who runs the medical operations, evacuation and training for an entire battalion of men and women on Ukraine’s eastern front, under its 3rd Brigade. In a conventional war, she would be a major. In this conflict? She has no idea what her rank is and cares even less.

But the revelations from this frontline soldier, one who has the rare claim to have shot down an incoming Russian drone attacking her patients, are chilling.

“You have had encounters with Nato training teams. You’ve talked to Nato when you’ve been back in Europe. Do you think that they’re ready for the next war with Russia?” The Independent asks her.

“No. No, I’m honestly a little bit terrified,” she replies – after more than 40 months at war here.

She goes on to explain: “If you were to talk to Nato military officials, they would reassure you that everything is under control, they’re well equipped, they’re well prepared. But I don’t think anyone can be prepared for a conflict like this. I don’t think anyone can.

“And what’s concerning to me is, while they’re offering training [in Europe for Ukrainians], I think it would do them well to also take some information and training from the Ukrainians.”

America’s Quasi Alliances

Rebecca Lissner

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During his successful 2024 U.S. presidential campaign, Donald Trump assured voters that he would end the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, perhaps even before taking office. But both conflicts dragged on at great human cost, and diplomacy proceeded only in fits and starts. Nine months into his presidency, Trump finally brokered a cease-fire between Israel and Hamas—but only after presiding over the breakdown of the truce he inherited from President Joe Biden and an escalating humanitarian crisis in Gaza. The war in Ukraine, meanwhile, continues unabated.

These challenges are not unique to Trump; they bedeviled Biden, too.

The US Army says it's now getting soldiers next-day fixes on new tech rather than making them wait 6 months

Chris Panella 

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US Army soldiers are working with developers to refine the service's new command and control system in real time.

NGC2 is a software-driven command-and-control system now being tested through a series of Army exercises.

Soldiers are getting fixes overnight rather than in six months, officials said.

The US Army is rushing to close the dangerous gap between how fast technology evolves and how slowly the military usually moves.

The service's Next Generation Command and Control (NGC2) system is being developed with soldiers and developers fixing problems in real time instead of waiting months for upgrades, Army officials said.

It's a different, faster approach to developing weapons than the service is used to; it's a process officials said is essential for preparing the Army for a potential high-intensity future conflict.

NGC2, has been a leading new development in the Army's broader transformation initiative that's focused on new weapons and technologies like uncrewed capabilities and artificial intelligence, and the service is leaning hard on soldier feedback for faster development.

"What soldiers are really enjoying is having the ability to talk to the developers," Maj. Gen. Patrick Ellis, commanding general of the Army's 4th Infantry Division, told reporters at a recent media roundtable.

Ellis said that while industry likes this setup, the soldiers really like it because it's not the usual "I've offered my opinion, and six months later another engineering release comes out."

"It's much more a case of, 'I've offered my opinion, and tomorrow, what I asked you to fix has now been fixed,'" he said.

Recent exercises have put soldiers and NGC2 developers in close contact as they work through feedback. US Army photo by Pvt. Jacob Cruz

Trump has suggested he’s made a decision on Venezuela military operations. Here’s what we know

Betsy Klein, Kevin Liptak, Haley Britzky, Kylie Atwood

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President Donald Trump suggested he has made up his mind on a course of action in Venezuela following multiple high-level briefings last week and a mounting US show of force in the region.

Officials briefed Trump last week on options for military operations inside Venezuela, four sources told CNN, as he weighs the risks and benefits of launching a scaled-up campaign to potentially oust President Nicolás Maduro. The US military, meanwhile, has amassed more than a dozen warships and 15,000 troops into the region as part of what the Pentagon branded “Operation Southern Spear.”

In another sign of increasing tensions, the US announced Sunday that it will designate a Venezuelan cartel as a foreign terrorist organization, which Trump suggested would allow the US military to target Maduro’s assets and infrastructure in the country.

The president indicated Friday he was drawing closer to a path forward on his attempts to cut down on illegal flows of migrants and drugs — and the possibility of regime change.

“I sort of have made up my mind — yeah. I mean, I can’t tell you what it would be, but I sort of have,” Trump told reporters aboard Air Force One when asked directly about those meetings and whether he had made a decision.

Trump told reporters Sunday, however, that the US may have discussions with Maduro, adding Venezuela “would like to talk.”

What has Trump been briefed on?

A small group, including Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine, briefed the president on Wednesday. A larger national security team, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio and other top officials, met with Trump in the Situation Room on Thursday, according to a US official.

Trump and his team reviewed target options during both meetings.

Sell Your Children Tony Wood

Ariel Goldstein Farid Kahhat Ernesto Bohoslavsky.

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The last seven years​ have brought a string of successes for the right in Latin America. In October 2018, Jair Bolsonaro won the Brazilian presidency. In June the following year, Nayib Bukele came to power in El Salvador, and that November, the Bolivian right seized on an electoral crisis and ousted Evo Morales. In Peru, after the leftist Pedro Castillo narrowly won the presidency in 2021, right-wing forces in Congress paralysed his government and eighteen months later, after his failed attempt to dissolve the parliament, booted him out of office; they have maintained a lock on the country’s politics since. In Chile, the far right made a strong showing in the 2021 elections, successfully mobilised to vote down the country’s proposed new constitution in 2022 and dominated elections to the body tasked with drawing up an alternative charter in 2023. Javier Milei’s surprise win in Argentina in late 2023 confirmed and consolidated the region’s rightward drift.

This year brought another big win for the right: the implosion of the Movimiento al Socialismo in Bolivia ended almost twenty years of left-wing dominance, opening the way for the centre-right candidate Rodrigo Paz to win the presidency, while right and centre-right parties gained control of both chambers of the Legislative Assembly. In Colombia, Gustavo Petro’s left coalition is struggling, and parliamentary and presidential elections are due next year. In Chile, three of the four leading candidates for the imminent presidential contest are on the far right. Polls currently show José Antonio Kast, the far-right candidate who came close to winning four years ago, in second place behind the left coalition’s candidate, Jeannette Jara of the Chilean Communist Party; in third place is Evelyn Matthei of the Unión Demócrata Independiente, a party created in the 1980s by the Pinochet dictatorship. Kast broke with the UDI in 2016 because it was too moderate. In fourth place is Johannes Kaiser, a libertarian who broke with Kast’s new party because for him that was too moderate.

What explains this right-wing surge? To some extent it conforms to a global pattern exemplified in the US by Trump, in Asia by Modi and Duterte, and in Europe by Orbán, Le Pen, Meloni and Farage. There are parallels between these right-wing populists and Latin America’s contemporary right: they share a hostility to ‘globalism’ and to ‘gender ideology’ and the conviction that ‘cultural Marxism’ has taken hold of most of the world’s media outlets and universities. Like its peers elsewhere, Latin America’s right has also effectively exploited social media to ratchet up polarisation and outrage.

Analysis: With all eyes on Pokrovsk, Russia drives forward in Zaporizhzhia Oblast

Francis Farrell

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While Ukraine, Russia, and the world have been watching the dramatic final act of the Battle of Pokrovsk unfold, Russian gains in the eastern parts of Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts — a section of the frontline that has been dynamic but chronically overlooked — have picked up speed.

On November 11th, the same day that Russia’s wretched Mad Max–style convoy of troops was filmed entering Pokrovsk through the fog, the Ukrainian military announced its withdrawal from five villages north of the small city of Huliaipole in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, amid a deteriorating and chaotic defense of the area.

These Russian advances represent only the latest escalation in a broader offensive that has been ongoing since last winter, when Russian forces overran the vast open plains in the south of what remained of Ukrainian-controlled neighbouring Donetsk Oblast.

Remarkably, throughout 2025, the part of the front line where Russia has gained the most territory — these wide open spaces around the meeting point of Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts — has also been one of the most under-reported.

These lands, known in Ukrainian as the dyke pole, or “wild field,” have been sparsely populated for centuries, going back to the times when Zaporizhzhian Cossacks and Crimean Tatars jostled for territory and influence, or when Ukrainian anarchist warlord Nestor Makhno made Huliaipole his home base during the period of revolution and war that followed World War I.

The territory crisscrossed by meandering minor rivers but lacking any large population centres, is so empty that there is no obvious name for the sector to use, neither in official General Staff reports, nor in this article.

Whatever it is called, the defense of the area has long been de-prioritized both in Ukraine’s defense and in the eyes of the world’s attention.

But that looks to be changing very fast, as the price of ignoring the territory is catching up with Kyiv — and the defense of the entire Zaporizhzhia front line could soon be in serious jeopardy.

Data Centers at Risk: The Fragile Core of American Power

Macdonald Amoah, Morgan D. Bazilian

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On October 20, 2025, a glitch at an Amazon Web Services (AWS) data center in northern Virginia triggered more than 6.5 million website outages, disrupting banking, logistics, and government operations. What appeared to be a software fault was, in fact, a warning about the material fragility of American power. Behind every “cloud” lies a mountain of hardware: transformers, copper cabling, rare earth magnets, and fiber optics. These materials anchor the digital infrastructure of the United States. When the supply chains for data centers and industry falter, compute slows, translating into degraded command-and-control capabilities for the US military.

In an era of strategic competition, digital reliability is deterrence. A single outage in a hyperscale facility can ripple across intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) networks, disrupting real-time operational efficiency. Data centers power the digital age and the associated server farms underpin everything from economic productivity to military decision-making and intelligence operations. Current data center infrastructure is composed of thousands of acres of servers, transformers, and cooling towers scattered across North America. However, these private-sector behemoths remain perilously exposed. In the digital era, failure to treat data and data centers as national defense assets is a strategic blind spot.

The dynamics of deterrence have evolved in the 21st century. Previously, power projection relied on fuel and steel; currently, it relies on megawatts and computational throughput. The physical foundations of the cloud, including transformers, rare earth elements, and copper, are as essential to national security capabilities as shipyards and automobile assembly lines previously were.

The same materials that make fighter jets, missiles, and satellites are what make artificial intelligence (AI), cloud computing, cyber warfare, and command and control possible. When supply chains for these materials falter, such as through Chinese export controls on certain minerals and rare earths, or when power grid bottlenecks delay new facilities, the US military’s ability to process and act on information stalls. A targeted mineral embargo against the United States could undermine the infrastructure that supports military networks for collection and dissemination of ISR information.

Transitioning Professional Military Education to All AI – All the Time

James Lacey 

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Similar to the arrival of the technologically advanced Borg in Star Trek, Artificial Intelligence has arrived within the hallowed halls of professional military education, leaving resistance as futile. Thus, this article is not intended to persuade those who remain skeptical about the AI invasion. For, at the risk of sounding overly harsh, they have opted for obsolescence, and their opinions are no longer relevant. As their final denouement approaches, they will, undoubtedly, still be shouting “AI is killing critical thinking” as they are pushed into history’s trash bin.

In an earlier article, “Peering into the Future of Artificial Intelligence in the Military Classroom,” I stated that AI would not replace Title 10 professors, but that many professors would be replaced by professors who are comfortable with AI tools. I no longer believe that statement to be true. AI advances in just the last six months have made it an existential risk to all but a few Title 10 professors. We are rapidly entering an educational environment where only those who master human-AI teaming are likely to survive.

We are already living in a world where 85% of college students admit to regularly using AI, where high schoolers are writing in The Atlantic about AI “demolishing” their education, and parents are finding AI cheat sheets in their grade schoolers’ laundry. If we can assume that PME students are at least as clever as a grade-schooler, we must also accept that every one of them is, or soon will be, using AI throughout the academic year. Moreover, given the speed at which AI is being integrated into the administrative and warfighting infrastructure of every Service, educators have a duty to ensure that their students are as familiar with AI tools as possible.

This cheat sheet was found in a grade-schooler’s laundry (author provided).

Although the full integration of AI into professional military education is inevitable, many schools, as well as their faculties, remain hesitant to incorporate AI into coursework or research. Even those who pay lip service to increasing AI use within PME are all too eager to throw up roadblocks. For instance, in a recent War on the Rocks article (23 October 2025), “A Guide to Collaborating With AI in the Military Classroom, Matthew Woessner opened with, “If educators do not learn to embrace AI, they risk being left behind.” I fully agree with this sentiment but was then amazed to find that the remainder of the article was a litany of reasons for schools and educators to slow down AI integration in favor of a “middle way.”