Indian Strategic Studies: 10/30/25

30 October 2025

India Set To Capitalize On China’s Lost Market In USA, Signaling A New Global Supply Chain Order – Analysis

Subrata Majumder

Deep concern swirled around for India’s exports in the wake of US President Donald Trump’s tariff weaponization. The USA is the biggest destination for India’s export. It account for about one-fifth of India’s global export. Analysts fear that high tariffs by the USA will slash India’s overall exports, leveraging a drop in the GDP.

Nonetheless, the situation has turned into a paradox. Against the paranoia of containment, India’s exports surged despite Trump’s threat of high tariffs, which is the highest in the Asian market. The spike in the tariffs on India is mainly due to a retaliatory tariff of 25 percent for importing oil from Russia, in addition to a reciprocal tariff of 25 percent.

During the first 6 months of 2025-26 (April-September), India’s exports to USA increased by 13.4 percent, corresponding to an increase by 5.7 percent during same period in the preceding year.

In contrast, China’s exports to the USA tightened. In the first 8 months of 2025 (January-August), China’s exports to the USA dropped by 15.5 percent. The USA slipped to 3rd rank in China’s export list, behind ASEAN and EU, even though the USA is largest trading partner of China. In other words, China diversified its exports to emerging markets, particularly to ASEAN, India, Africa, as well to EU. Trade with ASEAN increased by 8.6 percent in January-August 2025, with Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia as the prominent destinations.

How has India built up strong resilience to Trump’s high tariff weaponization?

One of the distinguished features for India’s strong resilience to Trump’s tariff backlash was the fall in Chinese exports to the USA. The downturn in Chinese exports to the USA offered a space to India to capitalize on the market vacated by China.

Notably, India emerged as a tough competitor to China in the export of electronic goods to the USA. There has been a boom in the growth of electronic goods to the USA from India for the last 3 years. Electronic goods emerged the biggest item in the export basket to the USA in 2024-25, accounting for 17.8 percent of total export to the USA. The average growth in India’s export of electronic goods to the USA recorded a 72.8 percent/year during the last 3 years. Hitherto, drugs and pharmaceuticals, diamonds and jewelry and petroleum refinery products were the major items in the export basket to the USA.

Indispensable India and the New Right

Kriti Upadhyaya

As Washington debates how to deter China, one fact rings true: without India, any U.S. deterrence strategy is incomplete. The rise of the New Right has brought Realism into sharper focus in U.S. foreign policy. It rejects illusions about global democracy promotion, endless wars, or the magic of globalization. Instead, it embraces nationalism, focuses on hard power, and is serious about rebuilding America’s industrial base and technological edge. Every aspect of that worldview makes India more, not less, important.

The current Under Secretary of War for Policy, Elbridge Colby, was lead author of the 2018 National Defense Strategy during President Trump’s first term. That document was clear in its ambition: America must concentrate on Asia and deny China hegemony, while leaning on allies to shoulder more of the load. Colby has described India as the type of ally the U.S. “needs more of” because it is an “independent and autonomous partner.”

Now in President Trump’s second term, Vice President JD Vance has argued the U.S. must rebuild its industrial base and end critical dependencies on adversaries. In a Michigan speech earlier this year, he put it plainly: “If we do not protect our nation’s manufacturers, we lose a fundamental part of who we are as a people. Making things, building things, working with our hands is America’s heritage…”

Under President Trump’s guidance, Colby and Vance have sketched a worldview of the New Right that stresses building resilience at home and practicing Realism abroad.

President Trump’s first term elevated the Indo-Pacific, advanced defense ties with India, and put confronting China at the center of U.S. national security strategy. His return now gives the New Right an opportunity to say America is not quitting the world—it’s economizing some of its commitments outside of Asia. Behind this shift is a recognition that China is no longer just a competitor, but a capable peer bent on displacing the United States.

In that challenge, arguably no country matters more than India. A denial strategy in Asia collapses without it. Geography puts India up against China on land and astride China’s critical sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean. Size and scale give India, now the most populous country in the world, weight no ally can match. Political will has already been tested in real clashes with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Restricting Internet Access Is the Taliban’s Latest Ploy to Cut off Afghanistan’s Most Vulnerable

Natalie Gonnella-Platts and Jessica Ludwig

Four years into their totalitarian hold on Afghanistan, the Taliban continue to prove that their tyranny has no limits.

Their latest actions – restricting online content and obstructing internet access for communities across the country – threaten to have catastrophic consequences for Afghanistan’s women, children, and other persecuted communities. The move is the latest on a lengthy list of human rights abuses and global security challenges.

The United States is right to be concerned about the growing security threat emanating from the region, especially considering Afghanistan’s strategic location within Central Asia. But American leaders could have far greater impact on advancing national security interests if, instead of focusing on negotiating with Taliban officials and reacquiring Bagram air base, they looked to embolden Afghanistan’s greatest resource: its people.

To do this, U.S. and global leaders should take the long overdue action of leveraging accountability mechanisms – like expanding targeted sanctions against Taliban leaders – and mobilizing support for Afghan-led efforts that directly challenge the Taliban’s suffocation of personal freedoms.

Tremendous individuals and organizations have resisted, often through everyday actions now criminalized in the Taliban’s version of Afghanistan. Critical thinking, constructive discourse, freedom of expression, secular education, and independent media have been essentially outlawed under Taliban rule.

Independent media platforms have persisted in documenting Taliban atrocities, including the hunting, torturing, and killing of former government officials, Afghan security forces, journalists, educators, and advocates. Activists and data collectors have documented Taliban leaders’ abuses like pilfering humanitarian aid, promoting jihadi propaganda, and providing refuge to terrorists.

Educators and entrepreneurs have created underground schools, online learning platforms, and e-businesses to nurture hope, opportunity, and resilience amid unimaginable persecution and the callous subjugation and exclusion from society of female citizens and ethnic and religious minorities. Women-led media have ensured that stories of women and girls are still told.

From aid to assets: US-Pakistan in a strategic mineral age

Saima Afzal

For decades, the alliance between the United States and Pakistan revolved around security cooperation and development aid.

However, in recent years, this alliance has undergone a crucial transformation—moving from dependency to focused strategic collaboration in economic sectors such as energy, mining and technology. Both countries, it seems, are eager to redefine their engagement in line with emerging global priorities and national interests.

Last month, US President Donald Trump expressed interest in enhancing collaboration with Pakistan on critical minerals, calling it a “strategic priority” that could benefit both countries. The announcement came even before China’s latest restrictions on rare earths exports, the latest salvo in the superpowers’ trade war.

Washington’s recalibration of trade and tariff policies haven’t hurt Pakistan as much as others. Pakistan is now enjoying a favorable 19% tariff on imported goods—the lowest among South Asian nations and far below the punitive 50% tariffs currently imposed on its neighbor and rival, India.

Pakistan’s untapped potential

Despite its abundant mineral reserves, the mining sector currently contributes only 3.2% to Pakistan’s GDP and a mere 0.1% to global exports. Islamabad is now laser-focused on unlocking this largely untapped potential.

Pakistan is home to one of the world’s largest porphyry copper-gold deposits, with the Reko Diq site in southwestern Balochistan alone estimated to contain about 5.9 billion tons of ore.

Barrick Gold, which holds a 50% share in the Reko Diq project, describes it as one of the biggest undeveloped copper-gold assets globally. The project’s development is expected to inject much-needed confidence and revenue into the economy, potentially catalyzing regional industrial growth.

The AI-Robotics Revolution, China-US Rivalry And Southeast Asia – Analysis

John Lee

THE COMING ROBOT REVOLUTION

Over the past decade, robots have played a growing role in Southeast Asia, primarily in manufacturing. Singapore, which has had a national robotics programme promoting development of robots and ‘embodied artificial intelligence (AI)’, is the second-ranked country worldwide for robot density relative to workforce.[1] Malaysia has a National Robotics Roadmap 2021-2030, which aims to ‘extract the value of robotics as the key enabling technology and catalyst for the nation’s productivity (and) competitiveness’.[2]

Several ASEAN countries now have robotics startups supplying the manufacturing, logistics and service sectors.[3] Yet as in many fields, Southeast Asian capacities in robotics and ‘embodied AI’ are tied to supply chains and technical progress concentrated in the world’s largest economies.

Rapid advances in AI centred in the US and China now promise to expand the range of tasks and situations in which robots can viably replace humans. Combined with advances in supporting elements like sensing technologies and batteries, this has made 2025 “the year of proof that the robot can do it”.[4] Highlighting this trend are the humanoid robot demonstrations in China that have captured global media attention.[5]

Simultaneously, prominent voices in the Western world are steering public expectations away from the prospect of ‘artificial general intelligence’ (AGI) and towards more prosaic applications of AI. In July, the CEO of the EU’s most valuable company, software giant SAP, said that Europe will not reap AI’s benefits simply by building data centres, and should focus on applying AI to existing sectors such as automotive manufacturing.[6]

The same month, Silicon Valley entrepreneur Marc Andreesen urged a focus on using AI to transform manufacturing, saying that if the US does not lead a new AI-powered industrial revolution, it will fall behind in a world dominated by Chinese robots.[7] This concern about pending Chinese dominance echoes that expressed in April by Elon Musk, whose Tesla is among the global leaders in developing humanoid robots.[8]

Russia’s Oil Giants Get Sanctioned By US: Will It Hurt Kremlin’s War On Ukraine? (For Now, No) – Analysis

Mike Eckel

The war economy that has fueled Russia’s all-out assault on Ukraine for 45 months has been funded by Moscow’s exports of oil and gas and, critics say, the West’s unwillingness — as well as China and India’s disinterest — to fully turn off the spigot.

Now the United States — along with the European Union and Britain — has taken aim at some of Russia’s biggest oil and gas companies, and their sprawling networks of subsidiaries and affiliates.

The US Treasury Department announced on October 22 that it was sanctioning state-controlled Rosneft and privately owned LUKoil — Russia’s two largest oil companies, whose exports go a long way toward filling the Kremlin’s coffers.

A day later, Brussels targeted Rosneft and Gazpromneft, another major oil company that is a subsidiary of state-controlled gas giant Gazprom.

“These are very big — against their two big oil companies,” US President Donald Trump said at the White House on October 22, describing the sanctions as “tremendous.”

So will it work? Will blacklisting Rosneft and LUKoil run Russia’s war machine dry

Not immediately.

“I think the short-term impact of these sanctions will be limited,” said Aleksandra Prokopenko, a former adviser at the Russian Central Bank, now an analyst at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin.

“Both companies were likely preparing for them. Furthermore, significant volumes of oil exports are denominated in yuan and rubles, so I don’t expect any dramatic impact on the budget,” she said.

The sanctions were the first significant measures taken by the Trump administration, said Maria Shagina, a researcher at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Berlin, reflecting frustration with “Russia’s stalling tactics” in efforts to tamp down, or end, the Ukraine fighting.

Does the Golden Dome Create Strategic Instability or an Opportunity with China and Russia?

Clayton Swope and Melissa Dalton

Will the Golden Dome, the Trump administration’s proposed national missile shield, start a new nuclear or outer space arms race, destabilize the balance between the major global powers, and exacerbate strategic instability? Beijing has asserted the initiative will weaken “global strategic balance and stability,” as well as turn “space into a war zone,” and Moscow has called it a “very destabilizing initiative” that would “[undermine] strategic stability at its core.” Meanwhile, for years, Moscow and Beijing have been tilting the scales to their strategic advantage, expanding their nuclear and missile forces and strengthening their military space power. The United States cannot ignore this threat and should anchor U.S. security on superiority, rather than hope that China and Russia would suddenly end initiatives to improve and expand their strategic forces. While the administration should strive for greater transparency with Congress and the American people on significant questions regarding costs and plans, and pursue deeper coordination with international partners, the Golden Dome and strong missile defenses will provide the United States a valuable security edge, a new tool for strategic deterrence, and a path to preserve peace.

The challenge in refuting arguments about the impact of the Golden Dome on strategic stability and its potential to spark an arms race—a nuclear arms race or arms race in outer space—is that both “strategic stability” and “arms race” are terms without agreed-upon definitions and are impossible to objectively measure. If the litmus test for strategic stability was whether anyone was engaged in a full-scale nuclear war, then yes, the world is basking in a period of strategic stability. But if strategic stability is when nuclear-armed states neither feel compelled to use their nuclear weapons first nor feel the need to increase the size of their nuclear forces—this is a common definition of strategic stability—one arrives at a different conclusion. The United States must sensibly modernize its nuclear forces. By contrast, China and Russia are actively expanding their strategic arsenals with new and novel capabilities. Since 2020, China has tripled the size of its nuclear arsenal, improved the quality of its nuclear weapons, and expanded its military footprint in outer space. Russia is fielding new nuclear weapons systems, including hypersonic ones, a nuclear-powered cruise missile, and a nuclear-armed torpedo. But stability hinges on more than just nuclear weapons. Beyond nukes, China and Russia are also aggressively developing and expanding new tools in the space, cyber, information, and irregular warfare spaces, accelerated by AI, quantum, and other emerging technologies, to undermine U.S. and allied interests and ability to achieve their operational objectives —there is no sign they seek balance.

China’s De-Americanization Strategy

Wang Wen

China is no longer waiting to see whether Washington will decouple. It is moving first ‒ and fast. While U.S. strategists still debate whether China is being isolated, Beijing has already been quietly reshaping its economic and technological foundations.

What began a decade ago as talk of “de-Americanization” has become a steady, data-backed shift toward self-reliance and global diversification.

This is not a Cold War replay or an attempt to cut ties. Instead, it reflects a broader effort by China to redefine its path of development and reduce exposure to U.S. pressure. The results are most visible in five key areas, starting with trade.

1. Trade: From Dependence to Diversification

China’s trade rebalancing is more pragmatic than political. Facing tariffs and protectionism from Washington, Beijing has built new trade routes through Asia, Europe and the Global South.

In 2018, the United States made up 19.3 percent of China’s total foreign trade. By the first eight months of 2025, that share had fallen to 9.2 percent ‒ even as China’s total trade expanded 45 percent. The numbers tell the story: China is trading more, just not as much with the U.S.

Imports and exports of specific goods are also shifting. Once, 85 percent of China’s soybeans came from the United States; today, 68 percent come from Brazil, with U.S. imports down to 22 percent. Exports of high-tech goods to the U.S. have dropped to 28 percent of China’s overall exports, while sales of high-end equipment to Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) countries ‒ a trade bloc spanning Asia and the Pacific ‒ jumped to 41 percent.

Beijing isn’t cutting itself off from the U.S. market so much as ensuring it no longer depends on it. Call it China’s version of “de-risking.”

2. Science and Technology: From Follower to Contender

How China’s Coming 15th Five-Year Plan Will Reshape Military Innovation

Xiaolong (James) Wang

China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030), currently in final formulation stages ahead of its approval at the March 2026 National People’s Congress, contains within its emerging framework a quietly revolutionary element that deserves urgent U.S. attention: the systematic institutionalization of Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) as the primary mechanism for defense modernization.

While the plan’s final outline awaits formal approval, key policy guidance and strategic themes – such as Xi Jinping’s “strategic endurance” directive, the draft AI-Plus initiative, and the expanded Military-Civil Fusion framework – have already been publicly floated by central leadership, ministry white papers, provincial consultations, and official commentaries throughout 2025. These provisional signals reveal a deeper strategic transformation beyond China’s well-publicized semiconductor self-reliance goals or artificial intelligence ambitions: Beijing is creating an integrated ecosystem where civilian technological innovation automatically serves military purposes.

This constitutes a fundamental reimagining of how a major power harnesses its entire technological base for strategic competition. The implications for U.S. defense planning are profound. What is required is an equally comprehensive rethinking of how the United States can compete effectively while preserving the innovation advantages that have historically defined American technological leadership.

Under Xi’s direct oversight through the Central Commission for Military-Civil Fusion Development, China has moved beyond the traditional model of distinct civilian and military technology sectors toward what Beijing terms a “fused” system. The emerging 15th Five-Year Plan framework suggests the final document will institutionalize MCF as the primary pathway for achieving what Chinese strategists call an “intelligentized” People’s Liberation Army (PLA) by 2035.

Recent analysis of PLA procurement contracts reveals the strategy’s accelerating effectiveness: the majority of suppliers for AI-related military capabilities are now civilian companies and universities rather than traditional state-owned defense enterprises. Chinese universities have established hundreds of MCF platforms and national defense laboratories specifically to support PLA requirements in areas like deep learning, machine vision, and intelligent robotics.

Taiwan in the Shadow of War

Charlie Campbell

During a highly charged presidential campaign, a bomb explodes, unleashing panic and a wave of recriminations. Then a Chinese Y-8 reconnaissance aircraft vanishes in Taiwan’s eastern waters. Under the guise of search and rescue, Beijing deploys a massive air and naval force that quarantines the island. Reeling from forced sequestration, Taiwanese society suffers a deluge of propaganda and misinformation, pitting husband against wife, father against son. Political and financial interests foment infighting. By the time the first People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops arrive, the island has defeated itself.

On Aug. 2, people across Taiwan tuned into this dystopian vision, which debuted on Taiwanese TV as the acclaimed drama Zero Day Attack, courtesy of showrunner Cheng Hsin-Mei. Over ten hour-long episodes, Zero Day Attack offers a forensic exploration of how a Chinese invasion of Taiwan could manifest, from the political and religious intrigue to media infiltration and economic manipulation. And while speculative fiction, Zero Day Attack is rooted in events already unfolding.

“If you go to the front lines, you can really feel the tension,” Cheng says in her central Taipei office. “China is getting ready to do something.”

Taiwan politically split from the mainland following China’s 1945-49 civil war and its “reunification” has been dubbed a “historical inevitability” by Chinese strongman Xi Jinping. The PLA regularly dispatches scores of warplanes close to the self-ruling island of 24 million, including a record 153 aircraft in a 25-hour period last October, in what Adm. Sam Paparo, head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, told Congress were “dress rehearsals for forced unification.”

“It is becoming more and more difficult to predict the possibility of the PLA turning an exercise into a real invasion,” Taiwan Defense Minister Wellington Koo tells TIME. “This is the threat and challenge Taiwan faces.”

China Against China

Jonathan A. Czin

Thirteen years after Xi Jinping ascended to the top of China’s leadership hierarchy, observers in Washington remain deeply confused about how to assess his rule. To some, Xi is the second coming of Mao, having accumulated near-total power and bent the state to his will; to others, Xi’s power is so tenuous that he is perpetually at risk of disgruntled elites ousting him in a coup. Xi’s China is either a formidable competitor with the intent, resources, and technological prowess to surpass the United States or an economic basket case on the verge of implosion. Depending on whom one asks, China’s growth model is either dynamic or moribund, relentlessly innovative or hopelessly stuck in the past.

Attempts to analyze Xi’s project have become even more convoluted in the wake of China’s slow recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. When Xi suddenly ended China’s draconian pandemic controls and reopened the country in late 2022, Wall Street did not debate whether China’s economy would come roaring back, but rather what letter of the alphabet—a V or a W—the graph charting the upward path of the recovery would resemble. When the economy sputtered, some in Washington concluded the opposite extreme: that China had peaked, its governance structure had failed, and that it would start to decline relative to the United States.

This analytic confusion has shaped U.S. policy toward China. At the start of the second Trump administration, officials claimed that China was the greatest threat to the United States yet seemed to believe that China’s economic strains were so severe that it would immediately cave in a trade war—a viewpoint reminiscent of Mao’s famous declaration that the United States was a “paper tiger” that appeared threatening but was in fact weak and brittle. The attempt to pressure China with tariffs failed. Beijing responded to Washington’s trade escalation in April 2025 by imposing retaliatory levies and cutting off the U.S. supply of rare-earth magnets. The Chinese economy’s ability to weather the trade shocks endowed Beijing with newfound confidence.

Republican Rep.: America Must Win the Critical Minerals Race | Opinion

Young Kim

On April 4, China imposed unprecedented export controls on seven of the world’s 17 rare earth elements, sending U.S. defense firms into a frenzy. If April’s export controls were a wakeup call to Washington, Beijing’s most recent announcement is a slap in the face.

China’s new controls require foreign countries to obtain licenses for products containing just 0.1 percent of Chinese-origin rare earths. Starting December 1, Beijing may deny licenses to any company with ties to a foreign military, including that of the United States. While this move may look like a sudden supply chain coup, it is actually a calculated, long-game strategy on the part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Representative Young Kim (R-Calif.) speaks onstage during the 2023 Concordia Annual Summit at Sheraton New York on September 18, 2023 in New York City...Read More

Nearly three decades ago, former PRC leader Deng Xiaoping said, “The Middle East has oil, China has rare earths.” In the years since, Beijing has worked relentlessly to establish a global chokehold on rare earth elements, which are the building blocks of modern technology, automotive, and defense industries.

China has wielded its dominance of rare earth production as a geopolitical weapon many times before. These new export controls are not simply a retaliatory measure in the U.S.-China trade war. They represent an aggressive new phase in a decades-long strategy to coerce the world into accepting Beijing’s critical minerals dominance.

China controls about 70 percent of rare earth mining and 90 percent of separation and processing. The latest controls aim to tighten its grip on the supply chains that move rare earths from mine to market—and preempt other nations from establishing their own.

Rare earth elements are critical inputs for semiconductor manufacturing, electric vehicles and advanced defense platforms such as F-35 fighter jets and Tomahawk cruise missiles. Nearly every dimension of U.S.-China competition, from the AI race to military readiness, depends upon secure access to these materials. The U.S. cannot allow itself to be dependent on China for the technologies that power our lives, economy and our future.

Iran nuclear negotiations snap back to the past

Alexander K. Bollfrass

France, Germany and the UK have recently triggered the snapback mechanism of the JCPOA, designed to curb Iran’s nuclear programme. Examining the history of Iran’s nuclear negotiations raises questions about the success of such sanctions and a future of Iranian non-compliance.

Following over two decades of international diplomatic wrangling over, and targeted sabotage of, Iran’s nuclear programme, Israel and the United States struck key components of the country’s nuclear and missile infrastructure in June 2025. In late August 2025, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (collectively referred to as the European three: E3) triggered the 'snapback' mechanism, reinstating the sanctions in late September 2025 that had been lifted under the terms of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Following these events and the further deterioration of Iran–Israel relations, what are the prospects for a diplomatic resolution to the dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme?

Negotiations before the 12-day war

Prior to the 12-day war and the reinstatement of sanctions, negotiations between Iran and the international community were characterised by periods of cooperation and of non-compliance.

In August 2002, Iran’s secret uranium-enrichment facilities at Natanz and a heavy-water production facility at Arak were revealed as part of what is widely believed to have been a covert nuclear-weapons programme. The E3 led the initial international negotiations following the revelations, resulting in a 2004 agreement in which Iran suspended enrichment.

However, Iran resumed enrichment in 2005, ending the E3-led negotiations. In February 2006, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) referred Iran to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), leading to a decade of escalating sanctions on Tehran, while the country continued to build its nuclear infrastructure.

The continuing growth of Iran’s nuclear programme included covert efforts, such as the Fordow enrichment site, which was revealed in 2009. Under then-president Barack Obama, US policy increased pressure on Iran through sanctions and a reportedly joint cyber attack with the Israelis on Iranian centrifuges. However, the US became more flexible on the enrichment issue during negotiations with the five permanent members of the UNSC – China, France, Russia, the UK and the US – and Germany (P5+1).

Why Somalia Is at a Crossroads

Omar S Mahmood

Tensions are once again rising in Somalia. The East African country has been mired in civil strife ever since the central government collapsed in 1991 following a series of uprisings against the then-military dictatorship. Successive Somali national governments have tried ever since to build up the state’s capacity, strengthen democracy, and extend its territorial control. But none of them have managed to temper bruising, deadly fights over power and resources.

Now, the current administration led by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is gearing up for national elections in 2026 by pushing through controversial plans to change the electoral model that it says are necessary to improve the system. But opposition politicians as well as the statelets of Puntland and Jubaland counter that these plans are designed to bolster Mohamud’s re-election and extend his time in office. The dispute is causing paralysis and threatening to spill over into violence.

At the same time, notorious Islamist groups are on the offensive. Al-Shabaab, an Islamist insurgent group that has battled the central government for two decades in southern and central Somalia, is gaining ground. As is the Islamic State. (Though the latter has suffered major losses in recent months following a campaign by Putland forces backed by drone strikes from the UAE and U.S.)

Against this backdrop, the foreign donors who have sustained one of the world’s oldest state building projects, are growing impatient.

The vote impasse

The dispute over elections that are due by May hangs over Somalia. Mohamud wants to scrap the current system, which in 2021 saw a mere 28,000 voters in a country of 15 million choose the country’s politicians. He is aiming to ditch the indirect voting system led by clan leaders in favor of universal suffrage.

Strengthening democratic participation, which the central government argues it is pursuing, is a laudable ambition. It has already established an electoral commission and has begun to register voters. But time is running out and many observers argue that the only practical way to hold timely elections is to keep the indirect election system. Indeed, the previous president, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo, stayed in office for an extra 15 months when the last election in 2021 was not held on time.

The dispute has largely remained peaceful so far. But both sides are increasingly jumpy in the capital Mogadishu—two were killed in late September after rival security units clashed following a visit by opposition politicians to a local police station.

The Terms ‘Theory’ And ‘Doctrine’ In Political Science – OpEd

Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirovic

Political science (politology/politologia) is a general scientific discipline of politics. The term “politics” was most often defined as the art of managing the state (ancient Greek polis – city-state), but it was understood and treated differently as a subject over the course of history.

Initially, political science as a subject was only part of the general history of philosophical thought, but later it gradually became independent in the form of the history of political doctrines, the history of political philosophy or social philosophy, state and/or legal philosophical thought, and even as the history of legal theories, given that the art of managing a state and its citizens is largely based on the application, interpretation, realization, and respect for official legal norms (as well as on the application of unwritten but traditional legal legislation and its socio-moral norms based on which a certain social environment has lived and resolved its interpersonal relations for centuries).

The term “philosophy” in its meaning is sufficiently elaborated and known and essentially boils down to “love of wisdom”, i.e., knowledge or general knowledge (science) about man, i.e., his existence either in this world or the next, as well as the world around him, including a wide range of social and natural phenomena that influence man’s existence. However, the meaning of the terms “theory” and “doctrine” remains in many specific research cases, at least as far as political science is concerned, undefined or, in most cases, unclearly defined or not accepted at some general (global) level.

The term “theory” is of ancient Greek origin and, in a general sense, represents knowledge that is generally accepted as such. However, such knowledge also appears in practice in at least three forms:

1. Theoretical knowledge that is not (or does not need to be) directly related to application in practice;

2. Scientific knowledge, i.e., knowledge obtained through official systems of scientific verification and proof, and which as such becomes formally proven and “generally recognized” as accurate (proven) knowledge (i.e., knowledge of the functioning of a certain phenomenon);

U.S. Carrier to the Caribbean: A Step Closer to War

Mark F. Cancian and Chris H. Park

This commentary was updated on Monday, October 27 with an extended discussion of latest U.S. military activities.

The Trump administration announced that the Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group (CSG) will deploy to the Caribbean to help “dismantle Transnational Criminal Organizations and counter narco-terrorism in defense of the Homeland.” The CSG had been in the Mediterranean for exercises with allies and to respond to potential hostilities around Israel, Gaza, and the Red Sea.

An earlier update on the Caribbean from CSIS wondered whether the forces in the region would decline, stay even, or increase. For a while it looked like they were staying even, as new arrivals replaced departing ships. Now, it looks like the naval presence is expanding.

Moving such a major element of U.S. combat power is highly significant because of the strategic trade-off it represents. The Navy has only 11 aircraft carriers. In general, only three are at sea at any one time because of the need for maintenance and training. All the regional commanders want them. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command always wants one—as a supplement to the carrier permanently stationed in Japan to counter the Chinese navy and conduct exercises with regional allies and partners. Central Command wants one for the Indian Ocean for use against Iran and the Houthis or in the Eastern Mediterranean to provide air defense for Israel. European Command wants one for operations around Europe to deter Russia. By contrast, the Caribbean has been a low-visibility region for decades, with carriers rarely visiting.

The administration attributes the aircraft carrier’s deployment to the counterdrug mission, and a few of its wide range of capabilities can help with ongoing operations. Overall, however, carriers are poorly suited for the surveillance tasks entailed with stopping drug smugglers. On the other hand, they are superbly suited for conducting air attacks and supporting amphibious landings.

Gaza Needs an International Peacekeeping Force Now

Seth J. Frantzman

A multinational peacekeeping force will be severely tested by the current conditions in Gaza.

Arranging an International Gaza Peacekeeping force is a crucial step in the next phases of the peace plan agreed to on October 8. The White House appears to be committed to implementing its terms. This week, Vice President JD Vance, Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, and Trump family associate Jared Kushner visited Israel to ensure the ceasefire holds. Secretary of State Marco Rubio also arrived on a separate trip to deliver the same message.

Maintaining the ceasefire is essential to add momentum to discussions for building a peacekeeping force. Reports indicate that several countries may be interested in playing various roles. These include Egypt, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Pakistan, and some of the Gulf states. What matters now is not so much which countries have shown interest, but what concrete steps they will all take. Most would be cautious and reluctant to commit if they think the peace plan is falling apart.

Another bridge to cross: how many peacekeepers will deploy to Gaza? An Al-Arabiya report speculated that a 4,000-person force was possible. Some of the countries, like Pakistan, have experience deploying troops abroad either directly or as part of international coalitions or UN Peacekeeping missions. Nonetheless, international peacekeepers always face tough hurdles.

For instance, the UN role in Somalia in the 1990s could not prevent the outbreak of the infamous Battle of Mogadishu (of Black Hawk Down fame), in which US forces fought Somali militias. In southern Lebanon, the UN deployment has failed to accomplish its mission and keep Hezbollah disarmed or keep the peace. The list of other failures of international forces, from Haiti to the Congo, is very long. That doesn’t mean there are no successes; the NATO-led international peacekeeping force in Kosovo is one success story whose lessons could help Gaza.

Gaza is currently divided into two zones. The IDF controls around 50 percent of the Strip, and Hamas appears to control the rest. There are also some Israeli-backed militias contending for control. Hamas seeks to demonstrate that it still holds power over the 2 million civilians in Gaza. However, it appears to be stepping back from the brutal executions it carried out in the days following the ceasefire.

How the Army could customize tanks for future urban warfare

Michael Peck

For steel beasts, the most dangerous habitat is urban. Tall buildings and narrow city streets are unfriendly territory for a 12-foot-wide tank that weighs 70 tons.

Yet, as the world becomes increasingly urbanized, and combat in cities and villages has become the norm, armor will have to prepare for more combat in built-up areas. But if the terrain can’t be changed, then how about changing the tank itself? Is it time for the U.S. Army to develop a specialized tank for urban warfare?

“A tank designed for urban terrain would have radically different design requirements than a main battle tank designed for open warfare,” wrote Michael McCabe in a June article for Armor Magazine.

Main battle tanks, which rely on long-range firepower and speed, “are willing to sacrifice extra armor to retain mobility,” McCabe wrote.

“In urban combat, however, the reverse is true: fights are at much closer ranges, mobility is measured by the ability to navigate sharp turns and tight/narrow streets, and speed can be sacrificed to retain maximum armor protection.”

In addition, urban terrain imposes unique demands on tanks, such as the ability to shoot around corners and engage targets at high elevation.

Armies have tried various street fighting vehicles over the years. In World War II, Germany stuck a 150mm howitzer on a Panzer IV medium tank chassis to create the Brumbar, while the Sturmtiger was a Tiger heavy tank with a 380mm rocket mortar. Yet their lack of a rotating turret proved a disadvantage.

“The Germans felt that tanks were better all-around for MOUT [military operations in urban terrain], and that developing AFVs [armored fighting vehicles] for that specific purpose was a waste of time, money and soldiers’ lives,” Douglas Nash, a retired Army colonel and an historian of the Eastern Front in World War II, told Defense News. More recently in the Ukraine war, Russia has fielded the BMPT Terminator, a T-72 tank chassis armed with four anti-tank missiles, two 30mm autocannon and two 30mm grenade launchers.

New sanctions and weapons will not stop Russia. It’s time for Ukraine’s allies to change their flawed strategy

Christopher S Chivvis

On Wednesday, President Trump imposed substantial new sanctions on Russia’s giant oil and gas companies, and lifted restrictions on the use of certain long-range missiles by Ukraine, which will now be able to strike more freely into Russia itself. These moves come on the heels of Trump’s conversations last week with Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelenskyy, after which the US president expressed his frustration at both side’s intransigence. Trump had hoped to end this war long ago. Will this be enough?

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the US and its allies chose a strategy that aimed to use Washington’s awesome political, economic and military power to impose such high costs on Russia that the Kremlin would sue for peace on Ukraine’s terms. This “cost-imposition” strategy makes sense in theory. The problem is that, in practice, it has slowed Russia’s progress but not persuaded Putin to end his aggression.

Despite multiple rounds of sanctions, more advanced weapons for Ukraine and Ukraine’s own development of more capable weapons such as drones, Russia is still far from capitulation. It now occupies more of Ukraine than it did three years ago. In February the war will enter its fifth year of fighting – just a few months shy of the length of the first world war.

For advocates of the cost-imposition strategy, the answer is clear: more pressure. Specifically, they want an indefinite commitment to more sanctions, more weapons for Ukraine (such as Tomahawk missiles, which the US has so far refused to supply) and the seizure of frozen Russian assets in Europe. Yet more such measures are alone unlikely to provide the shock that would be needed to fundamentally change the trajectory of the war and force the Kremlin to capitulate to Ukraine’s negotiating terms.

The oil and gas sanctions just announced increase the pressure, but they come after years and years of sanctions to which Russia has adjusted. The EU is on its 19th package of sanctions on Russia, and the returns are diminishing, with China’s backing for Moscow damping their effect. Few military experts, meanwhile, believe that additional weapons, even the powerful Tomahawk, would have a decisive impact on the war. Back in 2023, Ukraine successfully pleaded for Abrams tanks on the grounds they would turn the tide, but they did nothing of the sort. The long-awaited F-16s were also not the magic bullet some expected – nor was last year’s relaxation of restrictions on Ukraine’s long-range strikes into Russia.

How Europe Is Still Fueling Russia’s War Machine

Ilan Berman

This year, imports of Russian energy actually increased in seven major European countries.

These days in Europe, there is a near-unanimous consensus about the threat posed by Russia and the need to continue to support Ukraine against Moscow’s aggression. But Europe’s steadfastness could be undermined by a different factor—a sustained and growing dependence on Russian energy among a number of its members. Indeed, as a new analysis by Reuters lays out, seven European states (France, the Netherlands, Romania, Belgium, Croatia, Portugal, and Hungary) actually increased their imports of Russian energy over the past year.

The data is striking. In the Netherlands, dependence on Russian energy has surged by some 72 percent, to €498 million ($580 million) since 2024. In France, it rose by 40 percent, reaching €2.2 billion ($2.56 billion). In Croatia and Romania, it has increased by 55 percent and 57 percent, respectively. Meanwhile, Portugal’s imports of Russian energy have truly skyrocketed, jumping by 167 percent between 2024 and 2025.

What accounts for this rise? When it comes to Hungary, the answer is obvious. Since he assumed the premiership in 2010, Viktor Orban has distinguished himself as an erstwhile ally of the Kremlin. He has, among other things, rhetorically backed Russia’s war against Ukraine, sought to undermine alliance consensus within NATO, and tried to block European sanctions on Moscow. Hungary, in other words, has made clear where it stands politically—and buying a greater share of Russian energy is entirely consistent with this policy.

But none of the other countries mentioned by Reuters enjoys such close ties to Russia. To the contrary, many of them (in particular, France) are leading the charge to isolate and punish the Kremlin. As such, their recent consumption patterns are both puzzling and alarming.

In addition to strengthening Ukraine’s military, President Donald Trump can fight Russia and China by strengthening the information outlets that won America the Cold War.

Filip Styczynski October 17, 2025

Maritime sanctions against Russia have backfired badly

Justin Stares

If an uninsured Russian rust-bucket goes down off your coast causing massive environmental damage and loss of life, it will be easy to point the finger of blame.

Operating such a sub-standard vessel is both illegal and immoral, but it is the logical, foreseeable result of the legislation that has forced Russia’s shadow fleet into existence.

The European Commission was warned. The industry lobby, European Community of Shipowners’ Associations (now European Shipowners) told Brussels law-makers before the legislation came into effect that sanctions would backfire. No-one listened.

“You are splitting the industry in two,” the lobby’s president told them.

The message was delivered in private because doing anything other than supporting sanctions was — and to a lesser extent, still is — considered grounds for labelling someone “pro-Putin”.

If you were a Russian shipowner and found yourself suddenly cut off from the dominant London P&I insurance market, what would you do? Simply shut up shop? Or would you, as they have done, look for alternative insurance providers that would inevitably lack access to the massive re-insurance required to cover potential, colossal risks.

Before EU sanctions, there were already sanctions-dodging ships, but the “shadow fleet”, as a concept, didn’t exist; the International Maritime Organization officially approved the term in 2023. Since EU sanctions, the world has seen a shadow or ‘dark’ fleet of hundreds ships spring up, most of them tankers. The number of EU-listed vessels in Russia’s shadow fleet has now reached 557, the Commission said ahead of announcing this week’s raft of legislation.

False-flagging — a trick used to evade sanctions enforcement by pretending a shadow fleet vessel is legitimate — has become a global game of whack-a-mole that authorities are losing. False-flagged Dutch “kingdom” ships claiming to be flagged in Curaçao and Aruba (which doesn’t even have a ship registry) have been spotted in Dutch waters, much to the frustration of local industry.

What Trump needs to understand about ASEAN

Marcus Loh

ASEAN isn't as receptive to Trump's approach as other regions. Photo: Agencies

United States President Donald Trump returns to Southeast Asia this weekend for the 47th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia – his first visit to the region since 2017 – before proceeding to Busan, South Korea for the APEC Leaders’ Meeting and a long-anticipated meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

As ASEAN’s rotational chair, Malaysia underscores the region’s stabilizing role as a convenor in a shifting world order, hosting both the ASEAN and East Asia Summits that will be attended by Trump and Chinese Premier Li Qiang.

Analysts are already speculating about a repeat of the “Trump effect” seen during his Gulf Tour earlier this year, where nearly US$2 trillion in investment and defense deals re-anchored Washington’s influence across Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar. But the Indo-Pacific is not the Gulf – and Trump is not a hegemon here.

In the Middle East, stability depends on hard-power projection to contain a binary axis: Iran and Russia on one side, Washington-aligned Gulf states and Israel on the other. The Indo-Pacific, by contrast, operates through webs of interdependence linking great, middle and small powers.

It is true that at the apex, the US and China anchor the regional system. Washington projects maritime reach through alliances with Japan, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and South Korea, and remains the region’s largest foreign investor.

Beijing, meanwhile, wields economic gravity and industrial depth, extending influence through the Belt and Road Initiative, BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and regional supply chains. China is now ASEAN’s largest trading partner.

Yet rivalry alone does not define the Indo-Pacific’s logic. For all the spectacle of the “Trump effect” – diplomacy conducted through high-stakes deals and headline moments – the region’s steadiness rests on the influence of smaller and middle powers, which have long acted as quieter stabilizers.

The UN at 80: An Unhappy Anniversary

Brett D. Schaefer

If it wants to stay relevant, the United Nations needs to focus more on its original purpose as a forum for conflict resolution rather than global policymaking.

On October 24, the United Nations celebrates its 80th anniversary. To many member nations, however, the 80-year-old world body is fading into costly ineffectiveness and irrelevance. Unsurprisingly, the resulting financial constraints have led Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to propose a retrenchment, restructuring, and sweeping cuts to the 2026 budget and staff.

The central challenge was summed up by President Donald Trump in his speech before the UN last month: “What is the purpose of the United Nations?”

The UN Charter identifies its intended purposes: to take collective measures to maintain international peace and security; to promote friendly relations among nations based on equal rights and self-determination; to promote cooperative efforts to solve international problems; to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and to serve as a forum for addressing those common ends.

Unfortunately, the UN has not lived up to its founders’ lofty goals.

There have been hundreds of wars and significant conflicts since 1945. Yet the UN Security Council has only authorized the use of military force twice: to defend South Korea in 1950 and to compel the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait in 1990. Lesser actions to deploy peacekeepers or bless non-UN military operations have some successes, like Côte d’Ivoire, but also tragic failures like the genocide in Rwanda. Missions in places like South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo drag on for decades, costing billions while failing to deliver lasting stability.

Most glaringly, the UN is largely impotent in major crises like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Indeed, it was actively harmful in Gaza, rewarding terrorism and manipulating standards to declare a state of famine where normal rules would not support such a conclusion. Notably, one of the most consequential peace agreements in decades—the deal to end the conflict in Gaza and return Israeli civilians held hostage by Hamas—was a direct repudiation of UN efforts. There is a reason why the secretary-general was largely uninvolved in the ceasefire negotiation process.

The Electric Vehicle Playbook for Emerging Markets

Ilaria Mazzocco and Ryan Featherston

Against the odds, electric vehicle (EV) adoption has rapidly accelerated over the past two years in several emerging and developing markets.

EVs are rapidly transforming the global $3.5 trillion automotive industry. The transformation also highlights the growing importance of China as a technology provider in emerging markets.

Through the e-mobility transition, countries are racing to meet economic and climate goals while balancing downside risks to industry and the danger of overreliance on Chinese supply chains. China is currently the world’s largest EV and EV battery producer, producing three-quarters of all EV batteries sold globally.

Every country currently crafting an automotive sector strategy must abide by its own unique blend of goals, constraints, and advantages. Emerging markets can identify their goals, such as job creation, technology transfer, or EV adoption, and then evaluate their comparative advantages and relationship with China to identify what tools are available to them. Through this process, they can maximize their climate, environmental, and economic benefits from the EV industry.

To help navigate the EV landscape, the CSIS Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics conducted an in-depth study to spotlight effective approaches and lessons for success.

Is the Global South More Optimistic Than Prepared for AI?

Navin Girishankar and Andrea Leonard Palazzi

Emerging and developing economies are more optimistic than advanced ones about artificial intelligence (AI), but less prepared to adopt it. This gap could offer a “golden opportunity” for partnerships with the United States around AI standards, skills, and exports.

The goal: The Trump administration’s AI Action Plan recognizes full-stack leadership in AI as a key pillar of U.S. economic security. It proposes a full-stack AI export package to drive U.S. AI leadership—a vehicle to shape global standards and open markets for AI-enabled exports.

The gap: The chart shows that while emerging and developing economies are more optimistic about AI-enabled products and services than advanced economies, they are relatively less prepared to adopt them, as shown by the International Monetary Fund’s AI Preparedness Index. The index assesses AI enablers such as digital infrastructure, human capital, technology innovation, and legal frameworks.

The opportunity: Partnerships with the United States on AI standards, exports, and key enablers such as talent and energy could bridge the gap between AI optimism and preparedness in developing and emerging markets. By expanding the world’s access to U.S. AI-enabled services and related manufactured goods, the United States—as Microsoft Vice Chair and President Brad Smith notes—has the opportunity to boost domestic employment while providing a trusted, democratic alternative to authoritarian AI.

The authors would like to thank EST intern Daniel Sixto and former interns Hannah Bases and Omaya Kudsi for their support.

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