ISI’s Shadow Play: Rehabilitating Radical Islamist Networks In Dhaka

Shashwat Gupta Ray

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Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is quietly staging a comeback in Bangladesh, leveraging shifting political winds, porous borders, and radical networks to reassert its strategic footprint in India’s eastern flank.

Recent developments point to a resurgence of ISI-linked activities aimed at destabilising both Bangladesh and India, under the cover of growing “defence cooperation” between Dhaka and Islamabad.

The Return of the Deep State: ISI’s Strategic Encirclement

The latest signal came when Pakistan’s Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), General Sahir Shamshad Mirza, met Bangladesh’s Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus. The meeting, publicised by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), emphasised strengthening bilateral defence and security cooperation — a diplomatic euphemism that masks Islamabad’s covert agenda.

Behind this formal veneer, the ISI is reportedly exploiting Bangladesh’s evolving political and security landscape to advance its regional objectives against India. Intelligence inputs suggest that Pakistani operatives are rebuilding networks of Islamist militant groups, reviving pre-1971-era connections with sympathisers within the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) and Jamaat-e-Islami — an outfit that once opposed Bangladesh’s liberation from Pakistan.

Porous Borders, Fertile Ground: The ISI’s Expanding Footprint

Bangladesh’s porous border with India has long been a vulnerability. Over the years, it has become a logistical artery for cross-border smuggling, arms trafficking, and movement of militants. The ISI and its local proxies reportedly exploit these routes to sustain anti-India operations and maintain clandestine communication lines across the frontier.

Sources indicate that ISI-backed elements have helped set up training and indoctrination camps in Cox’s Bazar and northern Bangladesh, areas with limited state oversight. These facilities are allegedly run by former Pakistani Special Service Group (SSG) operatives and cater to both Bangladeshi recruits and Rohingya refugees — creating a volatile mix of radicalised fighters under the guise of humanitarian displacement.

The camps serve dual purposes: strengthening local extremist outfits like Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and preparing operatives for cross-border infiltration into India’s Northeast. The use of Rohingya recruits further complicates the security calculus, turning a humanitarian crisis into a geopolitical weapon.

Whatever the outcome, the Xi-Trump meeting is a win for China

Simone McCarthy

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Chinese leader Xi Jinping speaks during meeting of senior Communist Party leadership earlier this month. Xie Huanchi/Xinhua/AP

Beijing —

For Chinese leader Xi Jinping, a landmark meeting with Donald Trump expected this week is a moment to showcase something Beijing has long sought: China standing as an equal to the United States on the global stage.

The US president’s trade war against China has challenged Xi’s drive for growth and innovation, but it’s also given Beijing the unintended gift of a bright spotlight under which to flex its economic strength.

As much of the rest of the world scrambled to flatter Trump and negotiate down global tariffs he unleashed this spring, China fought back with its own measures – until both sides were forced to the table for a truce.

In recent weeks, after US rules hit China’s access to American technology and targeted its shipping industry, Beijing fired back by announcing a sweeping expansion of export controls on critical rare earth minerals – a move that rattled Washington and pushed Trump to threaten to pile an additional 100% tariffs on Chinese goods.

Both sides have appeared to climb down from that latest escalation following eleventh-hour trade talks between top negotiators this weekend in Malaysia.

Xi and Trump are now set to meet on the sidelines of an international summit in South Korea Thursday – their first face-to-face meeting of Trump’s second term, where they’re expected to agree to a framework for managing their economic ties.

It’s not yet clear what each side has agreed to concede to get to that point – and this is just one touchstone in a complex and volatile competition between superpowers.

But it will also be a moment where Xi is entering the room after cementing a new reality in US-China relations: China will negotiate, but it won’t be cowed.

Toward a Taiwan Truce

Stephen Wertheim

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When U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping meet on Thursday, they should take bold action to reduce the risk of war over Taiwan. That risk has reached alarming heights in recent years. China, the most dangerous party, has militarized the strait, launching large military drills simulating blockades of the island and daily incursions across the median line. Taiwan, under President Lai Ching-te, has asserted its sovereignty in new and destabilizing ways, casting its political system as separate from and threatened by the mainland’s. And the United States has been increasingly one-sided in backing Taiwan, chipping

Water geopolitics of disputed river basins in the Levant

Noor Hammad

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The Middle East is the world’s most water-stressed region, making it a prime battleground for control of scarce water resources.

Middle Eastern states account for 16 of the 25 most water-stressed countries in the world. As a scarce, and therefore strategic, natural resource, shared waters are susceptible to monopolistic practices and inter-state disputes.

Water rights in shared river basins are contested across the region, with Iraq and Syria particularly affected in the Levant. Both countries are downstream states, making them vulnerable to unilateral changes in water supply from upstream states that may divert river water to prioritise domestic needs. Despite the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria and decreasing tensions between Iraq and Turkiye, the resolution of long-standing water disputes in the Levant is proceeding at an uncertain pace.

The Levant’s disputed river basins

A 1987 agreement allocated water rights between Turkiye and Syria as well as, indirectly, Iraq through a subsequent Syrian–Iraqi treaty ratified in 1990. A 2009 memorandum of understanding supplemented this, providing for technical cooperation between the three riparian states.

Despite these agreements, Turkiye has altered river flows and built dams to the detriment of its downstream neighbours. For example, Turkiye’s Southeastern Anatolia Project, aimed at generating hydroelectric energy and irrigating over one million hectares of farmland in the southeast, comprises over 22 dams across the Tigris and Euphrates, both of which are key sources of water for Syria and Iraq. As a result, Iraqi and Syrian water flows have become heavily restricted. Iraq’s water supply from the two rivers has fallen by 30–40% since Turkiye began its dam-building projects in 1975; Syrian water flow has decreased by 40%. To make matters worse for Iraq, Iran has diverted water from the Little Zab (where water levels have dropped by 80% due to Iran’s Kolsa Dam) and Diyala rivers for its domestic agricultural and drinking water use.

Concrete action from Iraq on this issue has been stymied by internal discord. In 2021, Iraqi officials from the Ministry of Water Resources announced that they were prepared to sue Iran at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) over its water policies, pending a decision from Iraq’s foreign ministry and central government. The case never reached the ICJ’s docket, however, likely due to Iranian influence over Iraqi politics, both through its funding of Iraqi militias and its status as a key supplier of natural gas to Iraq.

The Kurdistan Regional Government has taken matters into its own hands, building dams (nine since 2019) to generate electricity within Kurdish territories to the detriment of Iraq’s other provinces. During disputes with the central government, Kurdish officials have withheld water flows, further highlighting Iraq’s political fragmentation. Frustration over Turkish military operations against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party in Iraq, and Turkish–Kurdish oil agreements excluding the Iraqi government, have also complicated water cooperation between the two states.

Under the Turkiye-backed administration of President Ahmed al-Sharaa, Syria may also find it challenging to press Turkiye on water security. Syria’s deputy energy minister, Osama Abu Zaid, recently complained of Turkish failures to release Iraqi and Syrian shares of the Euphrates. Water cooperation is complicated by the fact that key rivers, notably the Euphrates and the Khabur, pass through the Kurdish-held northeastern region of Syria, which Turkiye views as a strategic threat. Turkiye has bombed the Tishrin Dam near Aleppo, which was held under the control of the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), multiple times this year.

The West Learned From Defeat. So Must Islamic Civilization.

Shmuel Klatzkin

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Three gentlemen in Istanbul/Ottoman empire circa 1900, shortly before defeat in WWI (Istanbulphotos/Shutterstock)

Hebrew Scripture has many accounts of great victories, such as Joshua’s conquest of the Holy Land and King David’s many successful battles against his enemies all around. But its pages are also filled with accounts of defeat, destruction and exile.

All are part of sacred history. The Biblical texts teach defeat was a result of our own failings, whatever else might be going on. Conquerors like Nebuchadnezzar are not excused, but our first responsibility is not their evil, but our own.

The Abraham Accords give real hope that we all may choose life .. and so help the cults of victimhood … die a swift, painless, and, natural death.

Why should the Bible not focus on the greater evil of the Babylonian emperor? It is because it is teaching us a great lesson — even in defeat, one still has agency that no conqueror can ever take away. Even in defeat, we justify what happened as an act of Providence from which we may recover and even gain if we learn its hard truth. The alternative is to be stuck in rationalizations and excuses that keep us subservient to something other than truth and truth’s Author.

The late Professor Bernard Lewis pointed out that defeat and persecution were suffered in the formative years of the Jewish and Christian faith communities. Lewis compared this to Islamic history. Islam knew only victory for nearly a century after its founding. It established an empire that stretched eastward, northward, and westward from its birthplace in the Arabian Peninsula, until it stretched all across northern Africa and into Europe. Only there, after a hundred years, was its expansion decisively checked for the first time at Tours, France.

This proved only a breathing spell. Islam survived the brief setback at Tours and later of the Crusades. It recouped from its loss in the Holy Land and went on to expel the Christian kingdom from there. By the middle of the 15th century, the Ottoman Turks conquered Constantinople and ended the Roman Empire that had been officially Christian for more than a thousand years. Constantinople became the home of the caliphate and the conquering Ottoman armies forged on ever deeper into the middle of Europe until it was, at last, twice turned back at the gates of Vienna, in 1529 and again in 1683.

The War That Rewrote the Middle East

Gad Yishayahu

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Ultimately, the war has shredded more than a few assumptions about Israeli strategic and military limitations.

Exactly twenty-four months after the October 7 massacre that ignited the October 7 War, the first stage of President Donald Trump’s 20-point Gaza peace plan has taken effect. Under the US brokered deal, Hamas began releasing the last group of Israeli hostages, twenty alive and twenty-eight bodies (so far, fifteen returned), in exchange for 2,000 Palestinian prisoners, alongside commitments toward Gaza’s demilitarization and technocratic governance. The ceasefire, while fragile and dogged by disputes over the return of the remains of deceased Israeli hostages, still looks like it will hold.

Following the back-to-back speeches of President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the Israeli parliament in Jerusalem, this moment feels less like the end of a war than the beginning of a new strategic chapter. It is, therefore, an apt time to reflect on the paradigms that have collapsed and those that continue to define the region’s strategic and political trajectory.

For decades, Israel’s own military doctrine, echoed by outside analysts, rested on the belief that survival depended on swift, decisive campaigns designed to restore deterrence and avoid prolonged entanglement. From the Sinai campaign of 1956 and the Six-Day War of 1967 to Lebanon (1982, 2006) and Gaza (2008, 2012, 2014), Israel’s strategic ethos prized speed, initiative, and overwhelming force. The October 7 War shattered that assumption. Over twenty-four months of sustained combat, Israel demonstrated an unexpected capacity for prolonged warfare politically, economically, and psychologically. The public, long accustomed to brief campaigns, absorbed heavy losses without withholding support from the government, while the state maintained operations across multiple fronts.

Equally outdated is the notion that Israel cannot wage more than two or three domains simultaneously. This time, it operated across seven domains: Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Iran, and the West Bank without losing strategic coherence. Cyber, intelligence, air, and ground operations converged into a single multidomain campaign. Israel ceased to behave like a besieged enclave and emerged as a regional power with expansive capabilities.

The war also destroyed the myth of sanctuary. From Tehran to Yemen and even Doha, Israel struck its enemies with ease and precision. The era of “safe havens” for planners and financiers of anti-Israeli operations has ended. Alongside this, the legend of underground invincibility collapsed. Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas had poured vast resources into subterranean networks they believed impregnable. Yet the killing of Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah in a fortified bunker last year put an end to this myth. The Israeli-American strikes on Iranian facilities also underscored that even the deepest tunnels and bunkers may no longer guarantee safety.

Another paradigm fell: the belief that existential peril forges Israeli unity. The October 7 War revealed a society capable of endurance yet fractured in purpose, a democracy resilient, if no longer cohesive.

Equally significant was a revolution in diplomacy. For the first time, Israel’s peace treaties with Arab states translated into active, real-time defense cooperation. Under US CENTCOM, several Arab militaries quietly joined missile-defense efforts against Iranian strikes, an event unthinkable prior to this war. The long-standing pattern of Arab states recalling ambassadors during Israeli wars also broke down: over two years of fighting, Egypt, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco maintained diplomatic representatives and security cooperation. Jordan recalled its ambassador in 2023 but has otherwise maintained defense ties. What once signaled rupture now produced quiet coordination.

The United States, too, shifted from a passive supporter to an operational partner, with the alliance maturing into a working, action-based partnership reminiscent of US relations with NATO members.

Not every paradigm fell. Israel’s posture toward nuclear threats remains unchanged. As in 1981 and 2007, it retains the willingness to act alone against existential threats. The moral calculus surrounding the hostage issue also persisted. Once again, Hamas exploited Israel’s deepest moral vulnerability, compelling the release of thousands of prisoners, including terrorists convicted of murdering civilians in cold blood.

What Trump’s visit really meant for ASEAN

Trump’s presence at ASEAN summit was more than ceremonial – it was a signal that SE Asia is central to America’s Indo-Pacific vision

David A Merkel

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Donald Trump's participation at the recent ASEAN summit in Malaysia was more than symbolic. Image: X Screengrab

US President Donald Trump’s six-day tour of Asia, his longest foreign trip of his second term, was more than symbolic.

His attendance at the 47th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, the APEC Leaders’ Meeting in South Korea and his first bilateral talks with Japan’s new prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, marked a defining moment for Washington to reaffirm its Indo-Pacific strategy amid intensifying great power rivalry.

The Indo-Pacific has entered a new era of turbulence. China’s maritime assertiveness, economic coercion, and technological competition are reshaping regional dynamics. For smaller Southeast Asian states, these shifts highlight ASEAN’s enduring claim to “centrality” as a diplomatic hub designed to give its members autonomy and insulation from great power pressure.

That centrality is exercised through ASEAN-led forums, including the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum, which bring together the United States, China, Japan, India, and others. ASEAN members continue to hedge, engaging both Washington and Beijing, and even participating in both US and China-led naval exercises, underscoring their determination to avoid choosing sides in the deepening US-China rivalry.

ASEAN’s consensus-driven decision-making, however, limits its ability to respond collectively to Beijing’s coercive tactics. China’s water cannon-wielding maritime militias, economic blackmail, and debt-trap diplomacy have tested ASEAN unity. Internal divisions often exploited by Beijing make it difficult for the bloc to take united positions on timely issues, including the South China Sea and digital governance.

CIA cyberattacks targeting the Maduro regime didn’t satisfy Trump in his first term. Now the US is flexing its military might

Katie Bo Lillis,Sean Lyngaas,Kylie Atwood

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President of Venezuela Nicolás Maduro waves following a press conference at Hotel Melia Caracas in Caracas, Venezuela, on September 1, 2025. Jesus Vargas/Getty Images/File

In the final year of President Donald Trump’s first administration, the CIA carried out a clandestine cyberattack against the Venezuelan government, disabling the computer network used by Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro’s intelligence service.

The attack, described to CNN by four sources familiar with the operation, was perfectly successful.

It was also a throwaway, those sources said — an effort by the CIA to satisfy the president’s ambitions to do something about Venezuela and avoid taking riskier, more direct action against Caracas.

The previously unreported episode was one of a series of moves that national security officials took to placate Trump during his first term in office as he sought to oust Maduro, covert maneuvering that came to deeply frustrate the president and his team as the Venezuelan strong man remained stubbornly in power.

It helps underscore the president’s public determination to take a maximalist approach toward Venezuela in his second term.

Since the summer, the US has amassed a huge military force in the region, including roughly 10,000 troops, with an aircraft carrier now en route from Europe. The president has said in recent weeks that the US is considering direct strikes on Venezuelan territory, and that he has authorized the CIA to conduct covert activity there. A series of what the military termed “attack demonstration” flights off the Venezuelan coast by US bombers last week were an even more visible indicator of the US’ intentions.

Although the administration has characterized the mission for all those military assets as a counternarcotics effort, the size and scope of the buildup has raised the specter of a possible regime-change operation.

U.S. Universities: Engines of Economic Growth

Sujai Shivakumar, Charles Wessner, Shruti Sharma, and Chris Borges

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Universities are among the United States’ most enduring sources of competitive advantage and a key pillar of the nation’s innovation system. Home to more than 35 of the world’s top 100 research universities, the United States owes many of its most transformative inventions of the past century to universities—from the internet and Global Positioning System (GPS) to CRISPR gene editing and mRNA vaccines. These breakthroughs, along with countless others to come out of university labs, have delivered significant benefits to the United States: new industries, sustained economic growth, and strengthened defense capabilities. Indeed, by advancing frontier technologies and training the next generation of scientists, engineers, and business leaders, universities help sustain U.S. leadership in strategic domains such as semiconductors, AI, quantum computing, and biotechnology, thereby strengthening the United States’ ability to compete with rivals and safeguarding its security interests.

The foundation of this remarkable performance is federally funded university research. By combining steady and substantial federal investment, a sophisticated system of technology commercialization, and world-class talent and facilities, university research transforms public funding into lasting economic, health, and national security benefits. While no other nation does this as well as or at the scale of the United States, China is now rapidly emerging as a peer competitor.

Driving Economic Returns

The returns on university research are substantial. Per the Association of University Technology Managers, in the 25 years between 1996 and 2020, university research generated 554,000 invention disclosures, 141,000 U.S. patents, and 15,000 startups. These inventions and new companies generated up to $1 trillion in GDP and $1.9 trillion in gross industrial output, while supporting 6.5 million jobs for U.S. workers. Put differently, every single day, federally supported university research helps launch three new startups and two new products into the economy.

Some of these innovations have fundamentally reshaped industries, if not created entirely new ones. For example, at Stanford University, federal support from the National Science Foundation’s Digital Libraries Initiative enabled graduate students Larry Page and Sergey Brin to create the algorithm that became the foundation of Google’s search engine. In 2024 alone, Google Search, Google Play, Google Cloud, YouTube, and Google advertising tools collectively supported over $850 billion in economic activity for millions of U.S. businesses, nonprofits, publishers, creators, and developers. These massive economic returns stem from early federal research investments.

Trump Comes To Asia As Peacemaker

M.K. Bhadrakumar

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The United States used to be an ardent supporter of the rechristening of the Asia-Pacific region as the Indo-Pacific, and in all fairness, President Donald Trump should have included India in his itinerary of Asia tour, the first in his second term. Delhi would have been more than happy to schedule a Quad summit to peg such a visit but evidently, Trump was uninterested.

Trump has no need for India as a ‘counterweight’ to China in the dramatically changing Asian (and international) environment. Trump has other ideas toward engaging with China in a constructive spirit. Quad has become an albatross Trump can do without. Never once after setting foot in Asia on the current tour, Trump made even a cursory reference to Quad. Life is getting even more complicated for India.

In the cold war era, ASEAN would have been the US’s ‘natural ally’ but by the mid-2010s, the southeast Asian grouping had already begun tapping into China’s phenomenal growth. The blossoming of the adorable China-ASEAN bromance, an exceptionally tight, affectional, homosocial bonding relationship by itself, began almost unnoticed in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008 when China

toppled the US’ traditional role as the locomotive of the world economy by accommodating the US’ distress calls to Beijing to keep US interest rates low by buying billions of dollars of new Treasury debt, and by launching a US$ 586 billion fiscal stimulus in 2008 (an amount more than 12 percent of China’s GDP at that time) by way of an aggressive, dare-devil monetary policy.

By a curious coincidence, 2008 also happened to be the Year of the Rat by the Chinese Zodiac calendar which is associated with the smart, quick-witted, flexible, adaptable, and outgoing human traits. At any rate, as the US, UK and Japan all fell into recession (and probably are yet to see a real recovery), amidst an increasing disdain and lack of trust among many in the southeast Asian region of the West’s financial practices, China turned out to be the single biggest factor in why Asia managed to escape the global financial crisis relatively unscathed. Suffice to say, China’s massive stimulus package not only helped to stabilise and revive China’s economy, its market, but became the lifeline for the rest of Asia. China never looked back, and has remained the largest trading partner of the ASEAN for 16 consecutive years.

Such stark realities influence Trump’s strategy toward China. His mothballing of the Indo-Pacific strategy is not whimsical but an acknowledgment of emergent geopolitical realities. Indians are still on a learning curve here.

In the run-up to Trump’s Asia tour, RAND, Pentagon’s think tank, brought out a research report entitled Stabilising the US-China Rivalry. The report’s key findings are that: some degree of modus vivendi must necessarily be part of the US-China relationship; both countries should accept “the essential political legitimacy of the other”; they should develop “sets of shared rules, norms, institutions, and other tools that create lasting conditions of a stable modus vivendi; each side should “practice restraint in the development of capabilities explicitly designed to undermine the deterrent and defensive capabilities of the other”; the two countries should accept “some essential list of characteristics of a shared vision of organising principles for world politics that can provide at least a baseline for an agreed status quo”.

Russia’s Burevestnik: A Geopolitical Game-Changer?

Scott N. Romaniuk and László Csicsmann

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Reinventing Deterrence

A missile capable of theoretically flying indefinitely has thrust the world’s eyes back onto the fragile balance of global security. Russia’s test of the Burevestnik (Буревестник, ‘Storm Bird’), a nuclear-powered cruise missile, has reignited global debate over strategic weapons, highlighting a new era of technological uncertainty.

Described as a ‘flying Chernobyl’, the missile’s defining feature is its compact nuclear propulsion system, which effectively eliminates conventional range limitations. First announced by President Vladimir Putin during his 2018 address to the Federal Assembly, the Burevestnik was presented as part of a new generation of strategic systems designed to counter U.S. missile-defence capabilities.

The Burevestnik programme has encountered a highly turbulent development path. Its progress has been punctuated by repeated setbacks, including numerous flight-test failures — of more than a dozen publicly reported tests since 2016, only two were partially successful. The dangers inherent in the programme were tragically highlighted in 2019, when an explosion and subsequent radiation leak linked to a Burevestnik test claimed the lives of five Russian nuclear specialists. Nonetheless, Moscow has continued to advance the project, with Putin announcing a successful test in October 2023, underscoring the Kremlin’s enduring commitment to this high-stakes technological venture.

This technological innovation represents a fundamental departure from traditional cruise-missile design. Nuclear propulsion enables the Burevestnik to sustain low-altitude, terrain-following flight over intercontinental distances, making it exceptionally difficult to detect or intercept. Existing missile-defence systems — designed primarily to counter predictable, high-trajectory ballistic threats — are ill-suited to engage a platform with indefinite flight time, erratic routes, and minimal radar visibility. In this respect, the Burevestnik stands as a unique and potentially disruptive component of Russia’s strategic deterrent arsenal. NATO designates the system as the SSC-X-9 Skyfall, reflecting its experimental and unconventional nature.

Challenging the ‘Golden Dome’ Defence Shield

A central strategic objective of the Burevestnik is to bypass sophisticated missile-defence systems, including Trump’s proposed ‘Golden Dome’ global missile shield. The Golden Dome concept seeks to establish a multilayered defensive architecture combining space-based interceptors, advanced radar systems, and integrated ground networks to neutralise missile threats worldwide. The Burevestnik, however, poses a direct challenge to this vision. Its unpredictable flight path, low radar signature, and theoretically unlimited endurance allow it to exploit gaps in static and orbital defence networks — approaching from unconventional directions or remaining airborne until enemy defences are saturated or misdirected.

From suppliers to partners: Europe’s growing role in Gulf security

Albert Vidal Ribe

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Europe’s defence relationships with Gulf Cooperation Council states are deepening. While the United States remains the Gulf’s primary security guarantor, European firms are carving out a complementary role supporting defence localisation and attracting Gulf investment into Europe’s own defence-industrial base.

European defence cooperation with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states is often overshadowed by larger defence deals with the United States. Nonetheless, Europe’s defence ties with the Gulf are extensive and have evolved significantly, shifting from a supplier-focused relationship to one centred on arms-production localisation since around 2018 and, more recently, on growing Gulf investment in Europe’s defence ecosystem.

This evolving relationship is enhancing GCC states’ strategic flexibility, enabling them not only to purchase platforms and systems that the US may not be willing or able to supply, but also to collaborate on technology development.

European defence sales to the Gulf

As Table 1 illustrates, European companies supply arms to GCC states in various sectors. Although they are influential actors in the air domain, supplying fixed-wing fighters, transport and tanker aircraft, and helicopters, they still trail the US, which supplies two-thirds of GCC fighter aircraft compared to one-third from Europe. In the naval domain, European shipyards are dominant, delivering a wide range of vessels, from frigates and corvettes to patrol craft and a landing platform dock. Over 72% of GCC frigates and corvettes were built in Europe compared to less than 14% in the US. In the land domain, the US holds a clear advantage, particularly in ground-based air-defence systems.

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European assists with defence localisation in the Gulf

As more Gulf states began to focus on localising arms production after 2018 to align with their economic diversification plans and strengthen strategic autonomy, European defence firms also expanded their localisation efforts in the region. While many initiatives have been channelled through national defence ‘champions’ (state-backed conglomerates), others are also being established outside of their purview.

In the United Arab Emirates, EDGE – the national defence conglomerate – has formed a wide range of joint ventures (JVs) and partnerships with large European defence companies (see Table 3). Notably, EDGE and CMN Naval recently co-developed an uninhabited surface vessel and established a new shipbuilding JV that includes a design bureau, while a JV with Fincantieri has been awarded contracts worth EUR900 million (USD970m). Beyond JVs, EDGE and other UAE-based companies are partnering with European firms to localise technologies and capabilities (see Table 2).

Trump’s Asia Gambit: Can the US Really Overtake China?

Presence matters; leaders take global powers seriously who show up

By: Salman Rafi Sheikh

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The chairman shuffles

President Donald Trump’s recent sprint across Southeast Asia – a flurry of reciprocal-trade announcements, a high-profile ceasefire ceremony between Thailand and Cambodia, and the promise of talks with Xi Jinping in South Korea – was intended to do one thing loudly: show that the US still matters in Asia.

With Trump dancing to performances in Malaysia and assuring the region “that the United States is with you 100 percent and [that] we intend to be a strong partner for many generations,” the optics and the rhetoric have been undeniable even if the trade terms negotiated are onerous. But the deeper question raised by the trip is structural rather than rhetorical: can this kind of transactional diplomacy reverse China’s deep economic lead in the region?

The empirical backdrop matters. The Lowy Institute’s 2025 Asia Power Index finds China to be Asia’s largest economic player, with the strongest economic relationships and broad investment networks across Southeast Asia. Most importantly, Beijing, even with its surveillance state and bullying tactics in the South China Sea, has overcome the US in terms of popularity. Although the Lowy Institute report shows China’s lead by a tiny margin of just 1 percent, China’s rise has been palpable, translating into a visible structural advantage measured in trade volume, infrastructure finance, and persistent supply-chain integration.

In short, China’s footprint in the region is not merely political theatre; it is baked into how Southeast Asian economies function. Plus, Beijing’s engagement is multilateral, which aligns with regional associations like Asean’s own largely regional and global outlook. The region is known more for thinking regionally than extra-regionally, a policy vision that China understands more than the US. It is for this lack of understanding that Trump, for instance, withdrew from the Trans-Pacific treaty in 2016 and why he didn’t attend the Asia Pacific Economic Forum (APEC) meeting in South Korea on this visit.

Still, Washington’s primary objective remains to tackle China. So what is Trump’s strategy? In practice, it has three visible strands: spectacle, leverage, and hedging. The spectacle is the president showing up – the photo ops, the signing ceremonies, the public mediation of a border ceasefire – that seeks to reassert the US presence after years when many in Asia felt Washington had been distracted. By brokering peace, even if more performance than reality, the drudgery having been accomplished by local players, Trump wants not just to win the Nobel Peace Prize next year, but he also wants to indicate Washington’s continued geopolitical relevance in the region.

Trump outmaneuvers China in the battle for rare earth power

Elizabeth MacDonald

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Aclara Resources CEO Ramón Barúa Costa addresses how his company is joining the U.S.' push for rare earth independence from China on 'The Claman Countdown.'

Call it "The Art of the Rare Earth Deal." President Trump has embarked on bold new rare earths diplomacy to reduce China’s global dominance in the rare earth supply chain needed to power industries worldwide. And to do it, Trump is moving to strike rare earth gold in a new global mineral blitz to outflank Beijing, with new deals from Asia to Australia.

Rare earths are the foundation materials for much of modern technology and defense systems. Without these elements, production of EVs, iPhones, F-35 fighter jets, and even MRI machines would stall.

The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Barry launches a Tomahawk cruise missile from the ships bow. Barry is currently supporting Joint Task Force Odyssey Dawn. (U.S. Navy photo by Lt.j.g. Monika Hess / DVIDS)

For defense, they're used for precision-guided missiles, radar, jet engines, satellites, drones and night-vision systems. For consumers, smartphones, flat-screens, hard drives, lasers.

TRUMP, JAPAN SIGN BLOCKBUSTER RARE EARTH MINERALS DEAL

Michael Grabinski, two weeks old is slid into a MRI machine Dr. David Brumbaugh at The Children's Hospital in Aurora, Colo. Aug. 23, 2010 during a research study on obesity in infants. The overall theme of the study is to understand the continuum of (Rick Wilking/Reuters / Reuters)

For the medical sector and factories, they're needed for MRI contrast agents and catalytic converters. For clean energy, they're needed for electric-vehicle motors, wind-turbine magnets.

Drivers charge their Teslas in Fountain Valley, Calif., on Wednesday, March 20, 2024. (Jeff Gritchen/MediaNews Group/Orange County Register via Getty Images / Getty Images)

China currently controls 60–70% of rare-earth mining and over 85–90% of global refining capacity. This gives Beijing massive leverage over supply chains, especially since refining rare earths involves toxic waste and complex chemistry that many countries outsourced to China decades ago.

TRUMP CALLS XI’S RARE EARTH MOVE A ‘BAD MOMENT’ — WHY IT MATTERS FOR US NATIONAL SECURITY, CHINA TIES

But China has threatened and implemented tighter export controls on rare-earth elements and related materials, using them as leverage in trade and geopolitical negotiations.

Because these minerals are so critical, export controls or bans (like China’s in 2025) can cripple industries in the U.S., Japan, or Europe.

So what did President Trump and his team do? At least four major deals with Australia, Japan, plus in Southeast Asia. Plus President Trump is getting the EU, and allies to diversify their rare earth supply chains with Australia, Canada, and Southeast Asia.

Why Rare Earths Are About to Cost a Lot More

Contrary to Trump’s claim, diversifying the supply chain won’t drive down prices.

Patrick Schröder

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a senior research fellow at the Environment and Society Centre, Chatham House.A man in construction clothes and a safety helmet picks up reddish-brown soilA worker picks up a handful of rare earth concentrate that has been left to dry in the sun before it is packed and shipped to Malaysia for further processing, at Mount Weld, northeast of Perth, Australia, on Aug. 23, 2019. Melanie Burton/Reuters

China’s latest announcement of export controls on rare-earth minerals has reignited familiar concerns in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere about supply chain vulnerabilities, technological dependencies, and geopolitical risk. The seeds of this crisis were planted decades ago, when rare-earth production and processing shifted to China because it was cheaper, or even below cost, and came with little environmental constraints. By outsourcing the environmental burden of rare-earth production to China in exchange for cheap materials, foreign buyers created a structural dependency that has since become both economically and geopolitically risky. Much of the world has benefited from artificially low prices while building their high-tech military technologies and now green industries on very unstable foundations.

To address these geopolitical risks and diversify its rare-earth supply chains, the United States and Australia signed a new $8.5 billion agreement on Oct. 20 following several months of negotiations. Commenting on the deal, U.S. President Donald Trump claimed that “in about a year from now we’ll have so much critical mineral and rare earth that you won’t know what to do with them”; he added that “they’ll be worth $2.”

Skyfall Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missile Long-Range Test Claimed By Russia

Thomas Newdick

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Russian Ministry of Defense screencap

Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.

Russia has said that it conducted a long-awaited test of its mysterious Burevestnik (also known to NATO as SSC-X-9 Skyfall) cruise missile last week, claiming that it flew for 8,700 miles. The missile, which is nuclear-powered, is said to have remained in the air for around 15 hours. For the time being, we don’t know if those statements are factually accurate, and details about how the missile actually works remain very scarce. However, the claimed test has led to boasts about the missile’s performance from Russian President Vladimir Putin, while his U.S. counterpart, Donald Trump, called upon Putin to end the war in Ukraine “instead of testing missiles.”

Russia’s Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, told Putin yesterday that a successful test of the Burevestnik was carried out on October 21. Gerasimov said that the 15-hour flight “is not the [maximum] limit” for the missile. Regardless, if true, this would appear to be the first long-endurance test of the missile.Russian President Vladimir Putin shakes hands with Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov during a meeting earlier this month in Saint Petersburg. Photo by Mikhail METZEL / POOL / AFP MIKHAIL METZEL

In response to Gerasimov’s remarks, Putin commented: “I remember vividly when we announced that we were developing such a weapon, even highly qualified specialists told me that, yes, it was a good and worthy goal, but unrealizable in the near future. This was the opinion of specialists, I repeat, highly qualified. And now the decisive tests have been completed.”

The Russian president was referring to the revelation of the Burevestnik’s existence back in 2018. It was one of six ‘super weapons’ that also included hypersonic weapons and a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed torpedo.

The Return of the Energy Weapon

An Old Tool Creating New Dangers

Jason Bordoff and Meghan L. O’Sullivan

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Throughout much of the modern era, limiting or disrupting the flow of energy was a highly effective tool of global power. In 1923, Admiral Reginald Bacon of the Royal Navy declared that the United Kingdom’s oil blockade of Germany in World War I was the powerful economic weapon to which “the ultimate collapse of that nation and her armies was mainly due.” A generation later, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin attributed the Allied victory over Nazi Germany to the Red Army’s success in denying Hitler access to oilfields in the Caucasus. Then there was the 1973 Arab oil embargo, which caused

When Commanders Play Judge and Jury

Theresa Carpenter & Eric Gilmet

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The Crisis Destroying Military Justice

Imagine facing criminal charges where your commanding officer—not evidence, not law—determines your fate. For thousands of service members, this isn't a hypothetical nightmare. It's the reality of America's military justice system, where unlawful command influence (UCI) has metastasized into a crisis that mocks the Constitution our troops swear to defend.

The Promise and Failure of Military Justice

The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) was born from noble intentions. Established after World War II to replace the archaic Articles of War, it promised fair trials and due process for those who wear the uniform. Over decades, Congress refined it to mirror civilian justice reforms. Today's UCMJ contains 146 Articles, with Article 37 explicitly prohibiting UCI—the improper use of superior authority to interfere with court-martial proceedings.

Yet Article 37 has become a paper tiger. The pattern repeats with numbing regularity: commanders interfere with trials, lives are shattered, convictions collapse on appeal—and the officers who poisoned justice face zero consequences. Three cases expose this systemic corruption, where the powerful escape accountability for violations that would destroy any junior service member.

Case One: A Conflicted Commander Who Caved to Political Pressure

In 2014, Navy SEAL Senior Chief Keith Barry was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to three years in prison. He lost his rank, received a dishonorable discharge, and was branded a sex offender for life. The verdict seemed final—until Rear Admiral Patrick Lorge made a stunning confession. In a sworn affidavit, Lorge admitted he harbored serious doubts about Barry's guilt and wanted to overturn the conviction. But senior officials, including Vice Admiral James Crawford III, a top Navy lawyer, pressured him to uphold it anyway saying “Don’t put a target on your back.” Lorge's testimony revealed the ugly truth: "the political climate regarding sexual assault in the military was such that a decision to disapprove findings, regardless of merit, would bring hate and discontent on the Navy from the President, as well as senators including Senator Kirsten Gillibrand."

From Front Lines to Factories: Embedding Industry in US Army Units to Accelerate Combat Iteration

Kai L. Youngren 

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The blood-soaked battlefields of Ukraine combine timeless operational principles— speed, surprise, and combined arms maneuver—with new technology, like drones, electronic warfare, and AI. Yet, more striking than the change in the character of war is the pace at which it is changing. In such a dynamic environment, one principle remains firm: Those who adapt, win.

There is no single step the US Army can take to meet this adaptation imperative. But one that it can begin to take now, and that would have a disproportionate impact, is to embed small, collaborative workshop cells— teams of industry engineers and military subject matter experts—within frontline units and training centers. These teams would enable the rapid iteration of low-cost unmanned systems (UxS) and counter–unmanned systems (cUxS), ensuring that battlefield feedback shapes design in real time. Inspired by Ukraine’s success in accelerating UxS innovation, this approach offers a practical path to make the Army more adaptable, agile, and lethal.

The Problem

The UxS and cUxS fight in Ukraine vividly illustrates the speed of battlefield evolution. What began as operational intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, drones have become more agile—utilized for mass fires, precision strikes, mine-laying, cUxS, and more. The versality has been driven by the fielding of increasingly inexpensive commercial FPV and one-way attack drones. As both belligerents developed cUxS measures, like electronic warfare jamming and interceptor drones, UxS operators have had to rapidly modify their systems to remain operationally effective. Adaptations include larger frames, quieter engines, AI targeting systems, and fiber-optic control cables. This continuous adaptation reflects what Zachary Kallenborn and Marcel Plichta call the “counter-counterdrone” dynamic—a multilayered cycle of technological escalation that makes iteration speed decisive. According to a UK Ministry of Defence official, this grinding process produces new UxS capabilities every two to three weeks, highlighting the necessity of constant technological adaptation to maintain superiority. This tit-for-tat arms race is not only shaping the future of warfare—it is revealing that the US defense industrial base is too slow, expensive, and inflexible to cope with the rapid battlefield change. To remain competitive, procurement must move as fast as the fight and institutions must reward adaptation, not perfection.

Gaza’s new normal is a truce without peace

Oren Liebermann

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Anyone who looked at the situation in Gaza on Tuesday might reasonably have concluded that the ceasefire had collapsed.

Israeli forces in Gaza came under grenade and sniper fire in Rafah, according to the military, killing an Israeli soldier. In retaliation, Israel unleashed punishing strikes across Gaza that killed more than 100 people, according to the Palestinian Ministry of Health.

The US-brokered ceasefire looked like it had disintegrated. But by Wednesday morning, both Hamas and Israel had announced they were once again committed to the deal.

It was the second violent escalation since the ceasefire took effect on October 10. But, just like the fighting that occurred nine days later, when two Israeli soldiers and at least 36 Palestinians were killed, it was short, ending within a matter of hours.

Gaza’s new normal seems to be a ceasefire that is both fragile and durable. A truce that holds in general but can vanish in an instant, only to be restored within hours or days.

Until the next escalation.

This situation between all-out conflict and a comprehensive peace provides no closure: Palestinians will be in constant fear of the next wave of deadly strikes, while Israel will teeter perpetually on the brink of war.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said last week the ceasefire was “not going to be a linear journey.” It would have “ups and downs” and “twists and turns,” he said. Vice President JD Vance said yesterday there would be “little skirmishes here and there.” And yet both were optimistic about the ceasefire holding.

The deal was imposed in large part by the sheer willpower of US President Donald Trump, who reined in Israel, while mediators pressured Hamas to accept. It will take continued US interest to keep the deal intact, especially during the next phase, which requires the creation of an international force for Gaza and the disarmament of Hamas, among other difficult tasks.

An Israeli army flare drifts over an area in the northern Gaza Strip, as seen from southern Israel, on Tuesday. - Leo Correa/AP

The ceasefire’s fragility is a function of the chasm between what the agreement has so far accomplished and what it has yet to achieve. The fighting has largely stopped. Hamas has turned over the living hostages and more than half of the deceased. Israel has pulled back to the yellow line that demarcates the first withdrawal position inside Gaza.

Cyber resilience: an unseen battle ground

Henry Ea 

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In a new digital era, cybersecurity is about more than just firewalls and antivirus software. Every employee, client, and connected device presents a potential vulnerability. So, what does it take to protect client trust and a firm’s integrity?

The year was 1988, and the world was on the cusp of a digital revolution. But before the internet could truly connect us all, something else began to spread; an invisible, insidious force born in the quiet hum of servers at NASA Ames Research Center. At the time, there was speculation that it had slipped out of California, a whisper of code travelling on the nascent electronic mail networks, and then it had exploded. Across America, it moved, a phantom contagion infecting machines in its wake.

“It spread very quickly,” exclaimed Mark Eichin, an MIT student and self-proclaimed part-time virus hunter, his voice a mix of awe and alarm. “We believe it was intended to spread more slowly than it did, so that it wouldn’t be noticed as quickly.”

But it was noticed. Soon, the news channels were buzzing. “There are reports in newspapers today that it has made its way to Europe and to Australia,” announced James D. Bruce, an MIT professor.

It arrived at MIT in the dead of night, a silent intruder. “It just ran. It would enter your machine, it would do its thing, it would go to other machines,” a student recounted with frantic energy. Yet, amidst the chaos, a strange consensus began to form. “It’s benign. It’s not malicious. It attempts to do no damage besides propagate itself, and that’s why I think it’s a warning.”

“My personal speculation is that this is somebody who is trying to warn people,” another mused, “to say, ‘it can happen to you’.”

That “somebody” was Robert Tappan Morris, at the time a graduate student and this was the dawn of the infamous Morris Worm, the first computer virus to “break the internet” on 2 November, 1988.

As the chaos unfolded, the spotlight inevitably turned to the source. Though initially obscured, the digital fingerprints eventually pointed back to Cornell University in Ithaca, New York, and then, inevitably, to Morris. This wasn’t just a technical glitch or a harmless prank. This act brought a significant portion of America’s nascent digital infrastructure to its knees.

The legal ramifications were unprecedented. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, a relatively new legislation, suddenly found its first significant test case. Morris was indicted. The public closely watched the court proceedings, and in the end, Morris was convicted. He received a sentence of three years’ probation, 400 hours of community service, and a fine of over US$10,000. While his sentence was relatively lenient, the conviction was monumental, establishing that the digital world was subject to the rule of law. The Morris Worm exposed the vulnerabilities of the early internet and laid the groundwork for the legal framework that would govern cybersecurity for decades.

From curious kids to professional criminals

The evolution of cybercrime is a story from innocent, non-monetised mischief to today’s highly professionalised, financially driven, and state-sponsored attacks.

Richard Buckland, a Professor in Cybercrime, Cyberwar, and Cyberterror at the School of Computer Science and Engineering at UNSW, has provided cybersecurity education and training for the past 20 years.

He amuses the Journal by stating that, in the “really old days,” cyber attackers were primarily “kids in their underpants, in their mum’s basement,” driven by curiosity and a desire to “hack around.”

AI Needs Its Complements: Investing in the Next Wave of Innovation

Matt Pearl and Kuhu Badgi

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During the British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the United Kingdom experienced an unprecedented time of innovation, technological advancement, and economic growth. The most noteworthy invention during this time was the steam engine, which turned coal and boiling water into motion, pushing pistons, turning wheels, and for the first time, supplying reliable power on demand. This invention, however, was insufficient on its own to advance the British economy. Steam engines enabled reliable power generation independent of natural forces such as wind or water currents. Still, they were limited in their utility because of their great expense and the imperfect fit between all the cylinders and components. Beyond these limitations, the engines also had external effects that needed to be mitigated, such as coal-fired boilers that consumed enormous amounts of fuel, polluted waterways, and contributed to urban smog.

Improvements in manufacturing processes—such as the creation of the cylinder boring machine—created stronger and cheaper steam engines. At the same time, pollution was addressed by furnaces capable of better combustion, efficient steam boilers, and safer engineering standards. To make the steam engine scalable, however, incremental improvements were not enough: The United Kingdom ultimately relied on new complementary technologies, such as improvements in metallurgy that created better rails and the development of the mechanized factory system.

Thus, the steam engine did not singlehandedly achieve a technological revolution. Instead, it was also the ability of Britain to harness this technology, make gradual improvements to it, mitigate any problems it created, and combine it with other technological breakthroughs that led to their success. This last factor was critical: the British Industrial Revolution was not marked by one technology alone, but by synergies between several supporting technologies. While today’s technologies have advanced far beyond steam engines, the principles of cross-technological integration and diffusion remain just as critical.

Robert Reich: Is Elon Worth It?

Robert Reich

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Tesla’s profit fell 37 percent in the third quarter. Yet Elon Musk is demanding a pay package of $1 trillion.

A trillion dollars is hard to envision. It’s a thousand billion. It’s a million million. It’s almost the entire GDP of Indonesia, a country of 284 million people. It’s the annual output of North Dakota, South Dakota, Kansas, Nebraska, Wyoming, Idaho, Arkansas, Mississippi, and West Virginia put together. It’s close to Tesla’s entire current market value.

Elon is demanding $1 trillion even as the legal battle continues over his 2018 pay package, then valued at a relatively paltry $56 billion. (He’s now seeking a package that’s roughly 18 times the size of that contested plan.)

Tesla’s shareholders will be voting on this absurd pay package next week, but it’s not just other Tesla shareholders who’ll be shafted if Elon gets what he’s seeking. Musk is moving the national goal posts for CEO pay all the way to Mars, at a time when American CEOs are already getting paid far more than they’re worth by any reasonable accounting of their contributions to the U.S. economy.

Tesla’s board — handpicked by Elon — is telling Tesla shareholders that the trillion-dollar pay package is necessary to keep Musk “focused and incentivized.” The board’s words in proposing the $1 trillion package are worth repeating:

“Musk also raised the possibility that he may pursue other interests that may afford him greater influence. Simply put, retaining and incentivizing Elon is fundamental to Tesla … becoming the most valuable company in history.”

But he’s already Tesla’s largest shareholder. He’s raking in billions. He’s the richest person on the planet. If he’s not already adequately motivated to stay focused on Tesla, why the hell does his board believe a trillion dollars will do the trick?

What are the “other interests” that could possibly “afford him greater influence?” He might devote more time to supporting authoritarian movements around the world, such as his favored far-right AfD party in Germany. Or the right-wing leaders in Italy, the Netherlands, the UK, and Argentina who he’s been pushing for. Or to his makeover of X into a cesspool of right-wing bigotry.

If not adequately paid to stay focused on Tesla, his attention might drift to one of his other businesses, such as the Boring Company, which is now digging a tunnel under Nashville for a Tesla-powered “people mover.”

That tunnel, by the way, doesn’t have the approval of Nashville officials, who are worried about it with good reason. Boring has dug one such tunnel under Las Vegas, where Nevada officials have charged the company with violating environmental regulations nearly 800 times over the last two years for such things as releasing untreated water onto city streets, spilling muck from its trucks, and flooding. Nashville officials worry that flooding there could be far worse because Nashville gets 10 times the amount of rainfall as Vegas.

How to Make AI More Useful

The obsession with powerful large language models overlooks the developing world.

Bhaskar Chakravorti

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the dean of global business at Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.An illustration shows a tech-textured shape being pulled down to include the Southern hemisphere.Sebastien Thibault illustration for Foreign Policy

The artificial intelligence industry seems poised for a crash. Spending on AI infrastructure is expected to hit $2.8 trillion by 2029, and it is hard to imagine how any potential financial returns can justify this as a rational investment decision. Analysts across Wall Street, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Bank of England are already voicing their concerns.

One of the biggest challenges in getting people to pay for the industry’s products is that there are not enough use cases—the term most frequently offered, which means value-creating jobs done by AI—to justify the expense. The irony is that while use cases for big AI, built for power, are hard to find, there is no shortage of use cases for simpler forms of AI—what I call “small” AI—which could be deployed for narrower purposes across the developing world. Not only are the use cases plentiful, the need for solutions to long-standing problems is urgent, and the impact could be felt by 6.7 billion people who populate low- and middle-income countries.

Getting the AI industry away from its singular obsession with building ever more powerful large language models will not be easy. The goal of OpenAI’s CEO, Sam Altman, is artificial general intelligence (AGI), a form of superintelligence that will require adjusting hundreds of billions of parameters in AI models for months and maybe years. The repeated computations required involve immense processing power and high-performance computing that, in turn, consume massive amounts of electricity. Altman has reportedly signed an agreement with Microsoft that says OpenAI will only have achieved AGI when its AI delivers $100 billion or more in profits. Given that OpenAI’s revenue target for 2025 is $13 billion against $1 trillion of investment, achieving AGI will take time.

As fears of an AI bubble grow, and as the U.S. and global economies have become a giant bet on AI, it is a good time to ask: Can the technology be directed toward more immediate needs?

Across this big AI ecosystem, the staggering pace of investments—at the equivalent of $1,800 per American—now add up to 2 percent of the United States’ GDP and have artificially boosted GDP growth by 0.7 percent. OpenAI alone has locked in $1 trillion in deals this year, giving it the power to harness the equivalent of 20 nuclear reactors. This kind of spending is problematic beyond the missing use cases: Uncontrolled AI development comes with many unresolved risks; the AI boom has taken over the critical U.S. venture capital sector, crowding out a wider cross-section of innovations; and it is masking serious vulnerabilities in the overall economy.

To get a sense of why big AI appears to be an investment in too much power with too little purpose, consider OpenAI’s own data, which reveals that people are using the product mostly as a personal assistant for simple tasks. The uses of AI today are primarily in areas where we have substitutes and other tools at our disposal. Also, the users are mostly in rich countries where affordable alternatives are available. The customers that could justify the massive spending would be businesses, but these businesses are also hard-pressed to find use cases: A 2025 MIT report found that 95 percent of surveyed businesses failed to find any financial return on their AI initiatives.