Inside the Battle of Shusha: An Urban Warfare Project Case Study

Liam Collins, Jayson Geroux and John Spencer 

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In the summer of 2020, when Azerbaijan and Armenia went to war over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, few observers predicted that the war’s decisive battle would be for the city of Shusha. It wasn’t the region’s capital, an economic hub, or home to a significant military garrison. But looking beyond its small size—its prewar population was just over four thousand—indicators of its significance were there. Its location along a key transportation corridor and cultural symbolism elevated its strategic value. So when Azerbaijani forces emerged from the battle having taken control of the city, it was quickly followed by an end to the conflict as the warring sides agreed to a ceasefire.

The manner in which Azerbaijan approached the battle—task-organizing special operations forces with conventional units, maintaining flexibility when unmanned systems were grounded by weather, and making effective use of urban terrain—contrasted sharply with Armenian failures in command cohesion and urban defense preparation. These factors ultimately combined to leave Azerbaijani forces in control of the city and the war ended on terms heavily favorable to the victors.

The fifteenth installment in MWI’s Urban Warfare Project Case Study Series explores the 2020 Battle of Shusha, identifying its tactical, operational, and strategic lessons—from the importance of sustainment in urban operations to the battle’s reminder that wars are won or lost not only through firepower and maneuver, but also through leadership, cohesion, and will. You can read it here, and be sure to follow the Urban Warfare Project for future case studies and continuing exploration of the challenges faced by military forces operating in cities.

Liam Collins, PhD is the director of Madison Policy Forum and a distinguished military fellow with the Middle East Institute. He is a retired Special Forces colonel with deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, the Horn of Africa, and South America, with multiple combat operations in Fallujah in 2004. He is coauthor of Understanding Urban Warfare and author of Leadership & Innovation During Crisis: Lessons from the Iraq War.

Major Jayson Geroux is an infantry officer with The Royal Canadian Regiment and is currently with the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre. He has been a fervent student of and has been involved in urban operations training for over two decades. He is an equally passionate military historian and has participated in, planned, executed, and intensively instructed on urban operations and urban warfare history for the past twelve years. He has served thirty years in the Canadian Armed Forces, which included operational tours to the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina) and Afghanistan.