Paper Promises: The Limits of Pakistan's Defence Guarantee to Saudi Arabia

Haleema Saadia

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Introduction

The September 2025 announcement of a “Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement” (SMDA) between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia revived old anxieties about an Islamic bomb being placed at Riyadh’s disposal. These fears are not new. Since the late 1970s, speculation about Pakistan providing Saudi Arabia with nuclear capabilities has recurred with every uptick in bilateral defense cooperation.

Yet, alarmism risks missing the central point: this agreement is far more a political signal than an operational transformation. It offers both governments symbolic reassurance in a volatile moment but falls far short of constituting a credible nuclear umbrella. Understanding why requires two lenses often missing in policy commentary: the theory of extended deterrence and the legal architecture of nuclear governance. Both lenses highlight why Pakistan cannot, and is unlikely to, extend nuclear deterrence to Saudi Arabia in any meaningful sense.

This commentary unpacks the defence pact along three lines. First, it draws on deterrence theory to explain what is required for states to credibly extend deterrence and why Pakistan does not meet these requirements. Second, it examines the international legal and nonproliferation constraints that would make any Pakistani nuclear guarantee controversial and potentially illegal. Third, it situates the pact in the broader politics of US-Saudi relations, Gulf insecurity, Pakistan’s domestic imperatives, and nuclear governance, and explains why this pact is more symbolic than anything else.

Extended Deterrence and Its Requirements

Extended deterrence refers to a state’s ability and willingness to use its capabilities, often nuclear weapons, to defend an ally against attack. The Cold War produced rich literature on what makes such deterrence credible, which translates to: the capability to project power on behalf of an ally, the interests at stake that make defending the ally plausible, and the credibility of commitments through signaling and alliance structures.