Vadim Shtepa
Late-Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s widow, Yulia Navalnaya, calls for Europe to develop a united, long-term strategy toward Russia while preserving the country’s territorial integrity.
The Russian opposition remains fragmented, divided between Moscow-centric reformists such as Navalnaya’s camp and ethno-national or regionalist forces advocating de-imperialization. This lack of consensus undermines the opposition’s ability to present a cohesive alternative to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime.
This disunity hampers engagement with European institutions, such as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe’s Platform for Dialogue with Russian Democratic Forces, and undermines prospects for coherent democratic reform.
Late-Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s widow, Yulia Navalnaya, who considers herself a successor to her late husband’s policies, published a column in The Economist on September 24 arguing that Europe should have a united, long-term strategy toward Russia (The Economist, September 24). The Russian opposition to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime itself, however, lacks a unified approach (see Promethean Liberation, May 30). Some oppositionists not only offer incompatible ideas about how to accomplish their goals but, at times, have also accused each other of working for the Kremlin (DW, September 12, 2024). It is often challenging for foreign observers to determine which movements can be considered genuine representatives of the opposition.
In her article, Navalnaya advocates the principle of a united Russia while rejecting the policies of the ruling party of the same name. She has advised Western politicians not to threaten to divide Russia into many parts, as Putin has long accused his opponents of having such plans, in order to discredit those opposed to him and consolidate Russian society around his leadership (The Moscow Times, September 6, 2024). By this logic, if Putin accuses someone of something, the accused is guilty (The Moscow Times, September 30). It is difficult to imagine any Western politician or political scientist speaking in the language of “threats of Russia’s division.” For example, Jamestown Senior Fellow Janusz Bugajski’s anthology of articles on Russian de-imperialization, published in 2025, is not a threat, as the Kremlin perceives other initiatives similar to this, but rather a free discussion about a possible future (Free Nations, New States, accessed October 15). In Russia itself, such discussions are prohibited under real threat of criminal prosecution for calls to violate territorial integrity (President of Russia, July 22, 2014).
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