Robert Bruce Adolph
America lost the war in Afghanistan. All the blood and treasure expended was – in the end – largely for naught. I understand why many who fought there might feel differently. It is terribly difficult to walk away from the massive sunk costs. The assertion that US efforts were in vain is a hateful idea to those who lost comrades-in-arms or were horribly scarred physically or psychologically. Tragically, the same was true of those in the US Armed Forces who battled bravely in Vietnam. The national warfighting strategy adopted in Southwest Asia by the Bush Administration clearly failed, leaving his successors with the ultimate recurring foreign policy disaster. Everyone involved is the worse for it, especially the Afghans who supported the US and its allies for more than 20 years. In this special issue of Atlantisch Perspectief on multilateralism, Afghanistan is also a recurring topic as America’s lost war is also a lost battle for the international community and multilateral collaboration.
The nation possesses one of the largest and best-funded militaries in the world. US troops are well-trained and disciplined. US general officers are well educated and dedicated to task under constitutionally mandated civilian authority. Moreover, NATO stood shoulder-to-shoulder with its ally. So, how could America lose? Warfighting strategies are gauged through an analysis of three factors: suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. Hint: America’s political and military leadership failed to appreciate all three. The US institutions of the Presidency, Congress, and Pentagon should step up and shoulder the blame. I am concerned that they won’t.
AN ABSURD OBJECTIVE
The opening successful strategic raid into Afghanistan was conducted by the CIA-supported 5th Special Forces Group in the fledgling months of the conflict. They won battle after battle with the assistance of the US Air Force and by making allies of the Afghan Northern Alliance. America should have left following those victories, goal achieved. But she remained based on the wrong-headed notion that the transformation of a centuries-old war-torn tribal society into a semi-modern liberal democracy was possible. Change on such a fantastic scale would have required a multi-generational commitment that was unsustainable. Plus, any competent cultural anthropologist would have confirmed that first allegiances in such societies are to self & family, and village & tribe. The emotional abstraction of primary loyalty to the nation-state in the cultural context of Afghanistan was therefore always amorphous, lacking in both form and substance. The rapid success of the Taliban because of mass desertions within the Afghan Army and security forces is proof of this assertion.
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