18 October 2020

What North Korea’s latest missile parade tells us, and what it doesn’t

Douglas Barrie, Joseph Dempsey

North Korea displayed two additions to its plethora of ballistic-missile designs during a 10 October parade to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the Korean Workers’ Party. A large, liquid-propellant ‘road-mobile’ intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) was Pyongyang’s big reveal, with what appeared to be a solid-motor submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) preceding it. As with the unveiling of most of North Korea’s missile projects, however, both systems pose more questions than provide answers.

The ICBM was shown on an 11-axle transporter erector launcher (TELs), resembling a modified Chinese WS51200 8-axle chassis, suggesting that its road mobility would be constrained significantly by its size. North Korea has so far been unable to domestically produce large TELs and has had to covertly import those it has. The requirements of a liquid-propellant system are also a limiting factor: it is not clear whether the missile could be transported when fully fuelled; and whether it can be erected fully fuelled. The likely two-stage missile is estimated to be 25m in length, around 15% longer than the Hwasong-15 ICBM (KN-22/KN-SS-??), and with a larger diameter. The missile would notionally have the range, at around 13,000km, to cover the whole of the United States, like the Hwasong-15, but potentially with a greater payload.

One rationale for developing such a large liquid-propellant system, apart from the domestic propaganda value of its sheer size, would be the carriage of multiple warheads combined with decoys, allowing the system to overcome a missile-defence system with a comparatively small number of interceptors. Multiple re-entry vehicles, combined with re-entry vehicle decoys with post boost-phase dispersion, would complicate the target picture for missile defences.

The inclusion of the ICBM in the parade, possibly known as the Hwasong-16, is in keeping with Pyongyang’s habit of sometimes showcasing long-range systems even if flight testing has not begun. Two earlier ICBMs, the Hwasong-14 (KN-20) and the Hwasong-15 have been test-flown, though neither of these was seen until Pyongyang released launch footage. The former was launched twice in 2017, with a test shot of the latter in November 2017. The Hwasong-14 has an estimated range of 10,000km, while the Hwasong-15’s range is thought to be around 25% greater.

The last time that North Korea test-launched an ICBM-class missile was in November 2017. Talks between the US and North Korea over the latter’s nuclear-weapons developments resulted in a testing hiatus. While the subsequent failure of the talks has yet to result in the renewal of ICBM launches, propulsion system testing was again underway in December 2019. And a nuclear-capable medium-range missile, the Pukguksong-3 (KN-26) SLBM, was test fired for the first time in October 2019.

A new submarine-launched ballistic missile?

While it was anticipated that Kim Jong-un could use the parade to show a new ICBM, the unveiling of a further SLBM development was less widely expected.

The Pukguksong-4 (4A) missile appeared similar to the Pukguksong-3 SLBM, though perhaps shorter in length. North Korea has been pursuing a submarine-based deterrent option for well over a decade, with a heavily modified Romeo-class or alternatively what is sometimes known as the Sinpo C, as the intended vessel. Two or three missiles could be housed within an extended sail.

So far, however, test firing appears to have been carried out only from a submerged barge. Test shots of the first of the Pukguksong family, the Pukguksong-1 (KN-11) began in 2015. How and to what extent the Pukguksong-4 differs in terms of design or performance from the Pukguksong-3 is not yet clear. One improvement would be to enhance the range of the Pukguksong-3, which is estimated to be just below 2,000km, while the Pukguksong-1 had an estimated range of 1,200km.
The Pukguksong-4 appeared to have a considerably wider body diameter than the Pukguksong-1, raising the question as to whether the missile can be fitted within a modified Gorae (Sinpo-B) class. The Gorae submarine was used as the test platform for the Pukguksong-1.

The length of the Pukguksong-4 missile gives rise to further questions: if it is indeed shorter than the Puguksong-3, then why is this? Did the designers encounter a modification issue with the Romeo? A further curiosity was that the missile may not have been accompanied by navy personnel, as was the Puguksong-1, during the 2018 parade. Instead, those on the vehicle appeared to be army personnel. This might hint at the possibility that the missile is a land-based SLBM derivative, similar to the relationship between the Pukguksong-1 and its land-based version, the Pukguksong-2.

While there is much around the appearance of the large ICBM and Pukguksong-4 that is unclear, what is apparent is the signalling, both domestic and international. For the domestic audience, the new missiles and the parade in general, were aimed at underscoring the strength of the regime. For Washington, their appearance may have been intended to show the cost of ‘failure’ in reaching a nuclear deal acceptable to Pyongyang.

No comments: