Indian Strategic Studies: 12/14/25

14 December 2025

The Human Cost of the Largest Electoral Roll Revision Exercise in the World

Kavita Chowdhury

Krishnanagar Member of Parliament Mahua Moitra led a protest march against SIR and the death of local BLO Rinku Tarafdar in Krishnanagar.Credit: Special arrangement

On a ruled sheet of paper torn out from a school exercise book, a note, neatly written in blue ink, in Bengali held an ominous message: “I cannot bear this inhuman workload any longer.”

Rinku Tarafdar, the Booth Level Officer (BLO) in electoral booth no 201, Chapra in Krishnanagar Assembly Constituency in West Bengal, died by suicide on November 21. The 51-year-old schoolteacher’s two-page suicide note made it clear what had caused her death.

“I hold the Election Commission responsible for my current distress,” she wrote, adding, “I am not affiliated to any political party.”

BLOs like Tarafdar, namely government school teachers and government employees, have been appointed by the Election Commission of India (EC) to carry out the mammoth Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls.

India has 960 million registered voters – more than any other country in the world. The SIR exercise has been rolled out across 12 states covering 510 million voters, making it the largest electoral roll revision in history. Aimed at retaining genuine voters on the electoral rolls, the SIR has run into much controversy, especially in crucial election bound states like West Bengal.

Rethinking Terrorism After Afghanistan: India and the Politics of Recognition

Aswathy Chandragiri

The first official visit by a Taliban leader, Afghan Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi, to New Delhi, signalled India’s cautious re-engagement with the Taliban-led government in Afghanistan. The visit has signified an important shift in India’s foreign policy dealing with Afghanistan and has generated diverse reactions across political and academic circles. While this initiative enjoys considerable support, others remain cautious about a deeper engagement. The primary reason for this hesitation lies in the fact that Afghanistan does not function as a conventional nation state. The Taliban regime currently exercise authority and administer large swathes of territory, yet their legitimacy remains contested because they have historically been perceived as an insurgent group with terrorist affiliations.

This historical perception, however, raises many critical questions. As the Taliban increasingly undertakes functions of governance, does its conduct continue to embody the practices of terror that once defined it? In the light of events that took place after the withdrawal of U.S. forces, where does one place a regime that came to power using brutal force? Does engaging with this regime help the Afghan people, or does it deepen the suffering of those already oppressed?

Leadership Turmoil Impacts Eastern Theater Command Readiness

Zi Yang

Tensions between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Japan have risen dramatically after Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks on how Japan might react to an attack on Taiwan. Responding to a question at a budget committee meeting on November 7, Takaichi said that a Taiwan contingency involving the use of force could constitute an “existential risk” for Japan (Nikkei, November 7). [1] This comment was met with threats from online PRC commentators. Most notably, the PRC’s consul general in Osaka, Xue Jian (薛剣), inflamed the situation by posting on the social media platform X to say that “the dirty neck that sticks itself in must be cut off” (UDN, November 10). [2]

The PRC government subsequently discouraged its citizens from visiting Japan and deployed People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ships to waters south of Japan’s Kyushu Island (South China Morning Post [SCMP], November 14). The PLA’s theater commands have also mobilized, producing bellicose videos with the goal of intimidation (Sina, November 19).

How China Wins the Future

Elizabeth Economy

When the Chinese cargo ship Istanbul Bridge docked at the British port of Felixstowe on October 13, 2025, the arrival might have appeared unremarkable. The United Kingdom is China’s third-largest export market, and boats travel between the two countries all year.

What was remarkable about the Bridge was the route it had taken—it was the first major Chinese cargo ship to travel directly to Europe via the Arctic Ocean. The trip took 20 days, weeks faster than the traditional routes through the Suez Canal or around the Cape of Good Hope. Beijing hailed the journey as a geostrategic breakthrough and a contribution to supply chain stability. Yet the more important message was unstated: the extent of China’s economic and security ambitions in a new realm of global power.

China Could Knock Out America in Space, CSIS Warns

Brandon J. Weichert

Experts warned in a congressional hearing last week that China was trying to build a “vertically integrated space ecosystem” to displace America’s prime position in orbit.

On December 4, a meeting of the House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, which is part of the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, was held. That meeting involved experts, such as Clayton Swope, the deputy director of the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

In that ignored meeting, Swope outlined how the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was rapidly advancing toward a significant space program—with a comprehensive grand strategy for space dominance.

According to Swope, the PRC is building a “vertically integrated space ecosystem” that is meant to both rival the capabilities of the United States and outpace the Americans with a whole-of-society approach to space in China.

You Don’t Beat China by Letting Big Tech Run Wild

Autumn Dorsey

China doesn’t need Americans to trust artificial intelligence. Its government can mandate adoption. The United States cannot. Yet some in Washington now argue that the only way to beat China is to weaken the very protections that allow Americans to trust, and therefore, use AI in the first place.

This past summer, the Senate overwhelmingly rejected an attempt to bar states from regulating AI in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, voting 99–1 against national preemption without federal standards. Senators recognized exactly what such a move would mean: letting some of the biggest technology companies run wild. Now, Washington is debating whether to revive this idea.

A national AI preemption without federal standards gives us the worst of both worlds. It allows AI companies to escape accountability for the harms that they have caused while actively hurting U.S. AI competitiveness. We’ve already seen what this kind of hands-off policy looks like. Section 230 effectively left social media companies unaccountable for the damage their platforms inflicted. Now, some want to repeat this mistake with AI, just as public concern about AI risks is starting to reach new heights.

The Collapse of al-Assad’s Syria, One Year On

Alessandro Bruno

When Ahmed al-Sharaa, better known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Julani, walked into the Oval Office this past November, the symbolism was impossible to miss. It marked the first time since 1946 that a Syrian head of state had been welcomed to the White House. Yet this president began his public career not as a diplomat or reformer, but as the emir of al-Nusra Front—al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch—and later as leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).

Julani’s trajectory from Camp Bucca detainee alongside Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to rebel commander, to de facto leader after Assad’s flight in December 2024, and finally to President of Syria’s interim government in January 2025 is often presented as an astonishing twist of Middle Eastern fate.

It is nothing of the sort.

It is the predictable outcome of a decade-long policy architecture that many analysts, including this author, warned about in real time: a regime-change strategy that leveraged jihadist networks, hollowed out the Syrian state, and made balkanization a feature rather than a bug of Western policy. When I wrote on the day Damascus fell that “the collapse has come as part of a long-term Western project that pursued this goal at all costs, even that of supporting organizations formally recognized as terrorist groups,” I was not engaging in hyperbole.

The Long War: Fourteen Years of Methodical Destruction

War Without End: Russia’s Shadow Warfare

Sam Greene, Andrei Soldatov, and Irina Borogan

Severed cables. Disrupted aviation. Arson. Sabotage. Assassination. Infiltration. Attacks designed to distract, to confuse, and to dismay an adversary – but not to provoke a response. Such is shadow warfare, causing damage and costing lives but operating below the traditional threshold of war.

Shadow War as System, Not Strategy

Even as Ukraine continues to suffer under wave after wave of bombardment and an ever deepening occupation of its eastern and southern territory, Europe as a whole is under a sustained assault of a different kind. Earlier this year, the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) launched a major new project—Defend, Deny, Deter: Countering Russia’s Shadow Warfare—to help lay the groundwork for a new transatlantic approach to deterrence.

Prepared, Not Paralyzed

Janet Egan, Spencer Michaels and Caleb Withers

The Trump administration has embraced a pro-innovation approach to artificial intelligence (AI) policy. Its AI Action Plan, released July 2025, underscores the private sector’s central role in advancing AI breakthroughs and positioning the United States as the world’s leading AI power.1 At the Paris AI Action Summit in February 2025, Vice President JD Vance cautioned that an overly restrictive approach to AI development “would mean paralyzing one of the most promising technologies we have seen in generations.”2

Yet this emphasis on innovation does not diminish the government’s critical role in ensuring national security. On the contrary, AI advances will yield significant threats alongside unprecedented potential in this domain. Experts warn of advanced AI introducing more autonomous cyber weapons, bestowing a broader pool of actors with the know-how to develop biological weapons, and potentially malfunctioning in ways that cause massive damage.3 Private and public sector leaders alike have echoed these concerns.4 The urgent task for policymakers is to ensure that the federal government can anticipate and manage the national security implications of AI with advanced capabilities—without resorting to blunt, ill-targeted, or burdensome regulation that would undermine America’s innovative edge. In other words, the government must prepare at once for potential risks from rapidly advancing AI without imposing onerous regulations that unduly stifle the technology’s vast potential for good.

European leaders walk tightrope between backing Ukraine and keeping US on board

Katya Adler

Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky has met key European allies as he faces US pressure to reach a swift peace deal with Russia.

In London, Zelensky held talks with Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer, French President Emmanuel Macron and the German Chancellor Friedrich Merz.

The meeting came amid US efforts to get Moscow and Kyiv to sign up - quickly - to a plan to end the war in Ukraine.

For Kyiv, the crucial, thorny issues are the question of ceding territory to Russia as part of any peace deal and obtaining strong security guarantees to ensure that Moscow respects an eventual agreement.

Ahead of the meeting in London, Starmer insisted - as he often has in the past - that Ukraine needed "hard-edged security guarantees". He has also repeatedly said that Kyiv must determine its own future, not have conditions imposed on it.

The big names Starmer hosted in London discussed hugely significant issues - not only for Ukraine's future, but for the security of the continent as a whole.

There's concern that if Russia is "rewarded" by being given Ukrainian territory as part of a peace deal, it could feel emboldened to attack other European countries in the future.

Why Turkey and Qatar Should Be Kept Away From Gaza

Khaled Abu Toameh

In early December, Turkey hosted a conference called "Pledge to Jerusalem," under the slogan "Towards Renewing the Will of the Ummah in Confronting Liquidation and Genocide." According to reports in the Arabic media, the conference was attended by "a number of Arab and Islamic organizations."

The conference, according to a report by the Hamas-affiliated Quds Press media outlet:

"The conference aims to 'unify the efforts of the Ummah to criminalize genocide and break the siege, stand against plans of forced displacement and annexation of the West Bank, and renew the covenant to protect Al-Aqsa Mosque from the dangers of Judaization...'

At the conclusion of the second day, participants aim to issue the 'Covenant for Jerusalem Document,' described as a comprehensive charter affirming the constants of the Ummah and the choice of resistance, according to the conference vision obtained by Quds Press.

"The conference will... further issue a scholarly fatwa establishing the religious duty to defend Jerusalem, resist normalization, and oppose alignment [between Israel and the Arab and Islamic countries]."

In Places Trump Has Touted Bringing Peace, Conflict Still Rages

Miranda Jeyaretnam

Even as a cease-fire between Thailand and Cambodia brokered by President Donald Trump earlier this year is falling apart, the self-styled “President of Peace” has continued to tout his ability to resolve global conflicts.

Trump has claimed credit for ending multiple wars around the world, but “peace in many of these contexts was secured because of perceived U.S. leverage over other parties,” Mark Cogan, associate professor of peace and conflict studies at Kansai Gaidai University in Osaka, Japan, tells TIME. In the Thailand-Cambodia deal announced in October, Trump leveraged trade relations with the U.S. as political pressure. It also helped to buffer his own domestic case for tariffs, which have been blamed in part for affordability concerns. For Trump, says Cogan, peace is just transactional. A deal between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which was ratified last week, promised Trump access to Congolese rare earth minerals—which could be key in allowing the U.S. to overcome rival China’s dominance of global supply of the minerals.

Ukraine’s wartime experience provides blueprint for infrastructure protection

Oleksandr Bakalinskyi, Maggie McDonough

When cyberattacks and missile strikes converge on the same targets, infrastructure resilience becomes more than a technical mandate; it becomes a matter of national survival. For Ukraine, this is not a hypothetical future scenario. On the contrary, it has been daily reality for more than a decade.

Since 2014, Ukraine’s power grid, banking system, telecommunications networks, and digital infrastructure have faced sustained and increasingly sophisticated attacks. Yet these systems continue to function, adapt, and evolve, offering the world one of the most comprehensive case studies for how national infrastructure can endure under unrelenting cyber-kinetic pressure.

Europe Needs to Hear What America is Saying

Judy Dempsey

Whatever European officials may say about it, U.S. President Donald Trump’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) is good news for Europe. Europe and the rest of the world now know how poorly this U.S. administration regards them and they cannot keep pretending otherwise.

The NSS is not about values. It is not about supporting democracy. It is not about defending principles that the Europeans have taken for granted since the end of World War II. It is about projecting power that should reflect American economic interests. Full stop.

In foreign policy terms, that definition of a power is based on a transactional premise that should benefit Americans and authoritarian regimes. For the latter, conditionality has taken on a new meaning: deliver goods and stability—not human rights (and often hectoring) which is a European criterion. As the NSS states: “The United States will prioritize commercial diplomacy.”

The Situation: Why Did the White House Write This National Security Strategy?

Benjamin Wittes

The Situation on Friday recounted my first ride in a driverless car—a ride, it turns out, that coincided with the release by the White House of Trump’s National Security Strategy. I’ll let the reader decide whether it was a coincidence or a metaphor, and if the latter, a metaphor for what.

The National Security Strategy is a very strange document—strange in what it includes, strange in what it leaves out, strange in its bombastic personalization of policy to President Trump, strange in displaying a certain meta-quality, and strange in its all-but-overt racism. Needless, perhaps, to say, this does not read like the national security strategies of any prior administration.

The meta-quality gives the racism a weirdly-organized sheen. The document spends the first seven of its 33 pages explaining what a strategy is, why previous American national security strategies have all sucked, what the United States (meaning the Trump administration) wants from the rest of the world, and what means are at its disposal to get what it wants. The document spends time justifying the proposition that it can’t focus on everything and has to prioritize—though it actually does bounce from subject to subject a great deal in a fashion that does not reflect rigorous prioritization.

The SAFE Regulation and Its Implications for Non-EU Defence Suppliers

The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument provides loans to EU member states for the acquisition of high-priority, EU-produced defence equipment. SAFE allows limited non-EU product content under strict conditions and breaks new ground by allowing certain closely aligned countries to negotiate enhanced participation terms. SAFE aims to strengthen the EU defence industry, but its complex third-country rules could reduce procurement options and strain relations with allies.

The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the Reinforcement of the European Defence Industry Instrument, or ‘SAFE instrument’, is a mechanism that provides loans to European Union member states for investment in defence capabilities and to strengthen their defence industries. It was launched in March 2025 as part of the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030 and adopted by member states in May 2025. With EUR150 billion in available funds over the five-year period of 2025–30, it is set to have a significant impact on the European defence market, with an annual disbursement likely to equal at least 25% of the current annual total of EU members’ defence procurement, which is expected to just exceed EUR100bn in 2025 according to the European Defence Agency.

The Coming Storm: A 9/11 2.0 Threat and Why America’s Institutions Are Still Fighting Yesterday’s 2nd Generation War

Donald Vandergriff

For nearly two years I have tracked the evolving (unclassified and open source) intelligence picture surrounding what many credible analysts are now calling a “9/11 2.0” attack on the American homeland. As we move deeper into what appears to be the terrorists’ operational window (mid-December 2025 through May 2026), more and more raw intelligence is reaching the public domain. What follows is my synthesis of that reporting combined with thirty-plus years of studying Maneuver Warfare, the generations of modern war, and the institutional inertia that keeps large organizations trapped in obsolete paradigms.

The Nature of the Threat

The enemy intends to rape, torture, murder, and butcher as many American civilians as possible while live-streaming the carnage via GoPro cameras and social media in real time. These are not suicide bombers in the classic sense; they are death squads trained to fight until killed. Negotiation is impossible; any apparent offer to talk is simply a deception to buy time for rearming or maneuver.

Can Anduril’s EagleEye become the new face of warfare?

Travis Pike

Anduril, founded by Palmer Luckey, the inventor of Oculus, has been recently showcasing a concept of its EagleEye system, which will be a heads-up display integrated on a helmet that promises to dramatically enhance the capabilities of the modern soldier.

[The EagleEye] reimagines the battlefield interface giving soldiers superhero-like abilities,” the company wrote in a press release.

Many of the system’s planned capabilities are being held close to the chest, but what has been made public makes the EagleEye seem like something straight out of a science fiction movie if accomplished.

The system will be centered around a helmet that integrates with a set of glasses and a series of cameras. It will be powered by an AI platform called “Lattice” which is designed to receive data from several sources – including drones, sensors, and other troops – and feed them to the user on the ground.

How Do You Know You Are Ready for Battle?

Admiral Charles Richard

“Man Battle Stations! Dong Dong

Dong Dong! Man Battle Stations!”

Everyone who has served on board a ship, submarine, or squadron can remember being jolted out of the rack by that announcement, knowing almost instinctively what to do. For most, that knowledge never leaves. More than 20 years later, I am still pretty confident I could execute the Battle-stations Firing Point Litany in Control on board a submarine, at least as it was at the time, from any watch station in the room. I don’t think I’m unusual.

Why is that? Sets and reps. Seemingly endless sets and reps, under as many conditions as possible. While the sets and reps took many forms—exercises, table-tops, wargames, certifications, drills, etc.—the best had one thing in common: simulated combat against a thinking opponent in which you and your team had to make decisions under uncertain conditions with consequences for those decisions. You could lose. You could die (simulated, of course).

The Biggest Threat to U.S. Navy Aircraft Carriers Summed Up in 3 Letters

Steve Balestrieri

Key Points and Summary – Air-independent propulsion (AIP) submarines keep “sinking” U.S. aircraft carriers in exercises, and the reason is simple: they are brutally quiet, cheap, and deadly in coastal waters.

-This piece explains how AIP systems like Sweden’s Stirling-powered Gotland class can stay submerged for weeks, evade layered defenses, and repeatedly infiltrate carrier strike groups—as they did against USS Ronald Reagan.

(Feb. 25, 2019) The aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) transits the South China Sea at sunset, Feb. 25, 2019. The John C. Stennis Carrier Strike Group is deployed to the U.S. 7th Fleet area of operations in support of security and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Ryan D. McLearnon/Released)

-It walks through AIP technology, cost comparisons with U.S. nuclear boats, Sweden’s next-gen A26, and China’s Yuan-class subs, and asks whether the U.S. Navy—facing shrinking attack sub numbers—can afford to ignore this threat and opportunity much longer.

A southern uprising puts two US partners on collision course in Middle East

Tom O'Connor

The sudden seizure of key positions across southern Yemen by the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a close ally of the United Arab Emirates, has drawn new international attention to the largely frozen front lines of an 11-year civil war where foreign influence has long been dominated by Saudi Arabia and Iran.

While the STC has been predominantly aligned with Yemen’s Saudi-backed and internationally recognized government in their fight against the Iran-supported Ansar Allah, also known as the Houthi movement, the sweeping offensive launched last week and continuing through Monday took place throughout nominally government-held territory, including the oil-rich province of Hadramawt and neighboring Mahra.

And with the Yemeni government’s influence already limited to the south due to Ansar Allah’s early northern victories that included the storming of the capital Sanaa more than a decade ago, the STC’s presence in the presidential palace in the southern de facto capital of Aden now puts the group at the forefront of the conflict and regional faultlines

Why Trump Seeks a Swift End to the Ukraine War

Eldar Mamedov

The publication of the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS) has, predictably, ignited a firestorm through the corridors of power in Kiev and European capitals, while Moscow welcomed it. The document’s stark language, declaring an urgent priority to end the war in Ukraine, has been met with a mixture of outrage and denial from transatlantic elites. What these reactions reveal is a fundamental clash between entrenched transatlantic idealism and a resurgent American realism.

For one thing, the strategy is clear evidence that President Donald Trump’s 28-point peace plan on Ukraine is not an aberration nor is it the product of his special envoy Steve Witkoff being unwittingly manipulated by Russian diplomats—a notion that has spawned absurd theories claiming the plan was "made in Moscow." It is the logical, hard-nosed implementation of a new strategic doctrine that places American interests first and demands a return to realism in Europe.

For too long, U.S. policy has been driven by a moralistic ideology that subordinates national interest to the unrealizable goal of a total Ukrainian victory. The new NSS represents a decisive break from this approach. It grounds American foreign policy in the unvarnished realities of power, risk, and strategic focus. The implications for the Ukraine war are clear: Washington’s goal is no longer to fuel an indefinite proxy conflict, but to compel a negotiated peace and restore a balance of power that prevents a catastrophic direct clash between nuclear powers.

The National Security Strategy: The Good, the Not So Great, and the Alarm Bells

Emily Harding

This National Security Strategy (NSS) marks an ideological and substantive shift in U.S. foreign policy. The administration is attempting to define a new “America First” foreign policy doctrine that is deeply pragmatic, and perhaps short-sighted. For example, the democracy agenda is clearly over. Foreign policy choices will be made based on what makes the United States more powerful and prosperous. That’s fair, and clearly what the American people voted for, but today’s self-interested choices may lead to a far lonelier, weaker, more fractured future. This is a truly pivotal moment in the way the world works.

This NSS is a real, painful, shocking wake-up call for Europe. It is a moment of cavernous divergence between Europe’s view of itself and Trump’s vision for Europe. If Europe had any doubt that the Trump administration is fully committed to a tough love strategy, it now knows for sure. The administration is asking—demanding, really—that Europe polices its own part of the world and, most importantly, pays for it itself. The most worrying parts of the strategy are the ones that chastise Europe for losing its European character. The sentiment behind the words seems to stoke fear of migrants and an adherence to an idealized, old-world Europe that is questionable at best. Modern Europe is vibrant, evolving, and—largely—pretty happy. The majority of Europe’s reaction to this NSS is likely to be the same aghast shock as met Vice President JD Vance’s Munich speech.

IN SEARCH OF STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE: UNDERSTANDING THE LANDSCAPE OF TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION

KIMBERLY PEH AND MICHAEL ALBERTSON

After the end of the Cold War, the United States took a leadership role in reducing nuclear dangers by limiting the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy, implementing dramatic reductions in U.S. nuclear forces, and promoting global efforts to advance nonproliferation, arms control, and nuclear security. However, all these pillars of cooperative security face significant challenges today. Over the past decade, geopolitical rivalry has intensified, and nuclear dangers have dramatically increased. Russia, China, and North Korea are all expanding and diversifying their nuclear arsenals, while arms control mechanisms have crumbled, and there is little hope that they will be replaced. U.S. adversaries have openly expressed their desire to undermine the rulesbased international order and remake the global balance of power in their favor.1 In light of these developments, there is a growing number of analysts that talk about a new nuclear arms race.2 Our understanding of a nuclear arms race is largely informed by the Cold War experience. In the 1950s and 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in an intense nuclear arms race that had many distinct characteristics. In this paper, I compare these characteristics with the main trends in the current security environment and argue that what we see today is not a new nuclear arms race, but an intensifying technology competition with 21st century characteristics.

When it all comes crashing down: The aftermath of the AI boom

Jeremy Hsu

Silicon Valley and its backers have placed a trillion-dollar bet on the idea that generative AI can transform the global economy and possibly pave the way for artificial general intelligence, systems that can exceed human capabilities. But multiple warning signs indicate that the marketing hype surrounding these investments has vastly overrated what current AI technology can achieve, creating an AI bubble with growing societal costs that everyone will pay for regardless of when and how the bubble bursts.

The history of AI development has been punctuated by boom-and-bust cycles (with the busts called AI winters) in the 1970s and 1980s. But there has never been an AI bubble like the one that began inflating around corporate and investor expectations since OpenAI released ChatGPT in November 2022. Tech companies are now spending between $72 billion and $125 billion per year each on purchasing vast arrays of AI computing chips and constructing massive data centers that can consume as much electricity as entire cities—and private investors continue to pour more money into the tech industry’s AI pursuits, sometimes at the expense of other sectors of the economy.

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