Dan Arbell
Having managed to avoid harsh sanction by the Trump administration, Turkey fears that a Biden White House will immediately adopt a tougher approach towards Ankara, explains Dan Arbell. Could this be an opportune moment for a rapprochement with Israel?
As Joe Biden enters the Oval Office, Middle East regional actors are scrambling to recalibrate their policies with the hope of maintaining close ties or improving relations with the US. One such actor is Turkey, which is concerned that a Biden administration will adopt a tougher approach towards Ankara from the start.
In late December 2020, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan surprised many when he made conciliatory statements expressing hope for improved relations with the US and the EU, and also stated publicly that Turkey would have liked to bring relations with Israel to ‘a better place’, and that people-to-people relations between Turkey and Israel would not be problematic if Israeli politicians were to recognise Turkey’s red lines when it comes to Israel’s policy on the Palestinians. Erdogan stopped short of calling for the strengthening of bilateral relations right away, but his comments came just days after Turkish media reported his intention to appoint one of his advisers, Ufuk Ulutas, as Turkey's ambassador to Israel, after two years without one. Erdogan also publicly acknowledged the fact that there are contacts between the Turkish and Israeli intelligence communities, and that his expectation is that they will continue in the future.
Erdogan’s recent comments come after a decade of heightened tensions between Ankara and Jerusalem, during which the two sides have suspended their political dialogue, called back their ambassadors, and resorted to harsh rhetoric, with only economic interests keeping the relationship afloat. After a close strategic partnership in the 1990s, the two countries became rivals in the 2010s, as a result of Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in Gaza (2008–09) and a flotilla incident in May 2010, during which Israeli commandos raided a Turkish vessel headed to Gaza and killed nine Turks on board. In 2016, a normalisation agreement was signed between the two sides, but it swiftly collapsed as Turkey protested what it described as Donald Trump’s pro-Israeli policies, which it felt came at the expense of the Palestinian people. Erdogan was among the first to criticise the signing of the Abraham Accords by Israel, the UAE and Bahrain, accusing the two Gulf nations of betraying the Palestinian cause.
Driving factors behind Erdogan’s overtures
US and Israeli politicians and analysts view Erdogan’s latest comments with great scepticism, bordering on suspicion, and do not take them at face value. While Israeli officialdom has not formally responded to the comments, senior officials have briefed the Israeli media, stressing the need for ‘Turkish actions and not just words’. Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi reportedly convened a high-level inter-agency consultation earlier this month, aimed at deciphering the motives behind Erdogan’s recent moves. There is, however, wide consensus that Erdogan’s expression of his desire to improve ties with Israel is an attempt to gain favour with the Biden administration and the new Democrat-controlled Congress.
Despite widespread criticism in Washington of Turkey’s policies in Syria, Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean and, above all, its purchase of the S-400 surface-to-air missile system from Russia, Erdogan managed to shield Turkey from severe punitive measures under the Trump administration. It took its time, but in December 2020 the Trump administration did eventually impose limited sanctions on Ankara over the US$2.5 billion S-400 deal under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017.
Erdogan wants to avoid a clash with Biden, who has been very critical of the Turkish president, and hopes to mitigate future additional US sanctions over either the S-400 deal or Turkey’s state-owned Halkbank’s Iran sanctions evasion scheme. Erdogan will be hoping that his comments on Israel will also appeal to the strong pro-Israel lobby in Washington, whose support could be invaluable if Turkey faces further problems in future.
Long-coveted regional leadership role
Erdogan’s comments are also informed by Turkish regional considerations in the Middle East. In 2011, Erdogan hoped the Arab Spring would provide a platform for Turkey to increase its influence in the region, and provide the space for it to assume a leadership position in the Arab and Muslim worlds. This hope was shattered soon afterwards with the military coup led by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Egypt and the intensification of the civil war in Syria, yet Erdogan has always sought to bring Turkey back to a leadership role in the region.
With recent regional trends, mainly the normalisation agreements between four Arab countries and Israel, Turkey senses that its anti-Israel posture could result in its marginalisation. As more Arab countries likely join the widening circle of normalisation in the coming months and years, including even Turkey’s ally Qatar, Erdogan does not want to be left out. The agreement to end the three-and-a-half-year Gulf dispute with Qatar, signed in Saudi Arabia earlier this month, may pave the way for a Turkish effort to mend fences with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi as well, which in turn may contribute to the lowering of regional tensions.
Trade sustains bilateral relationship
Erdogan has an interest in maintaining close economic ties between Turkey and Israel. During a decade of crisis, it was trade that sustained the relationship. In 2018, the value of bilateral trade reached US$6.2 billion, while in 2019 it dipped to US$5.5 billion. Turkey was Israel’s sixth-largest trading partner. Official trade statistics for 2020 have yet to be released, but trade has inevitably taken a hit due to COVID-19. The Turkish economy has been hurt and Erdogan will be anxious to ensure that it does not suffer further.
As tensions over Eastern Mediterranean natural gas between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus have been on the rise, Israel, Cyprus and Greece (together with Italy) have been advancing their EastMed pipeline project, which is envisioned to carry natural gas from Israel to southern Europe through Cyprus and Greece. A plan for an Israeli–Turkish natural gas pipeline, which experts believe is the most viable option economically and logistically, has been shelved in recent years due to tensions between the two leaderships. Attaching great importance to diversifying his country’s energy mix, Erdogan hopes that improved relations with Israel may bring the pipeline plan back to the table (and at the same time nullify the EastMed pipeline project). Finally, despite the animosity the Turkish president feels towards Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and his harsh criticism of Israeli policies, Erdogan understands the value of continued intelligence sharing and cooperation on issues of mutual interest such as Syria and counterterrorism, which could deepen if bilateral relations were to improve.
Israel has its own set of concerns when it comes to Turkey, mainly Erdogan’s cosy relations with Hamas (playing host to a Hamas office in Istanbul) and other Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated groups in the region, Turkey’s alliance with Qatar (which also supports Hamas), and finally Erdogan’s harsh rhetoric towards Israel, which many view as anti-Semitic in nature. Undoubtedly, if Israel were to pursue a rapprochement with Turkey, it would place very clear conditions for Turkey’s president to meet. The beginning of the Biden presidency may provide both countries with an opportunity to explore this possibility.
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