Cleo Paskal
As the Indo-Pacific's strategic importance increases, countries around the world are developing new policies to strengthen their reach in the region. While there is a long history of international partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, many recent forays in the region are in response to China’s economic, political and military expansion there.
This paper is based on field research, roundtables and face-to-face interviews in seven countries (including China) chosen to provide a variety of perspectives and insights on the Indo-Pacific, particularly regarding policy strategies and objectives.
The research uncovered shared internal divisions within the sample countries in how they perceive and engage with China. In a sense, against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, some of these divisions have since been resolved with countries generally more cautious towards China. Regardless of intentions, a broad understanding of the different actors in the region is crucial for countries seeking to form strong partnerships and to establish a successful Indo-Pacific strategy.
China’s economic, political and military expansion into the Indo-Pacific is meeting growing resistance from a range of countries including the US, India, Japan and Australia. The region is now a significant geopolitical strategic focal point.
A wide range of countries are actively adapting their strategic outlooks and formulating specific policies for the Indo-Pacific, sometimes without fully understanding how these may be perceived by their partners. Understanding convergences and divergences in perception is important for making partnerships more effective. It allows countries to cooperate, collaborate and coordinate where there are shared objectives while mitigating or managing differences.
The extensive field research presented in this paper was conducted in seven countries – the US, the UK, France, India, Tonga, Japan and China – before the political and economic effects of COVID-19 were widely felt. At that time, in six of the countries (not including China), there were domestic divisions, uncertainty and hedging regarding how to engage – or not – with China. Generally, in terms of domestic divisions, political and economic communities favoured engagement, while defence, security and intelligence communities were more cautious. There was also a high degree of domestic uncertainty given major factors such as Brexit and elections. This tended to result in hedging.
Once the impacts of COVID-19 and the subsequent global economic downturn were felt, and in light of China’s continued expansionism, domestic divisions in many countries began to diminish. Those concerned about China gained traction and a wider willingness to push back against China emerged.
This shift has prompted a greater drive for a new round of international partnerships beyond China’s orbit, from economic alliances such as the India–Japan–Australia supply-chain resilience initiative to a reinvigorated Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad).
One potential partnership framework that has the flexibility to incorporate a range of perspectives, while being effective enough to shape a more secure future, is an Indo-Pacific Charter, modelled on the Atlantic Charter of 1941.
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