Katie Crombe, Steve Ferenzi and Robert Jones
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Much over the course of the past year has been said (and re-said) about “integrated deterrence.” From our point of view, deterrence is fundamentally about shaping adversary decision calculus which requires, inter alia, communication. Communication is about messaging and perceptions. Yet, in today’s discussions on integrated deterrence, we are losing sight of this important relationship. Integrating deterrence is not so much about developing the perfect strategy that incorporates allies or the interagency, and even less so about working across every military domain. This is nothing new. Instead, right now it is more about articulating what is missing — the political, cognitive, and irregular spaces of the gray zone where China, Russia, and Iran (among others) are actually advancing their interests. While we are not trailblazing a new idea here, it is important to revisit certain fundamentals. The gray zone was a side show during the counterterrorism era, and we cannot afford to let it fade another shade lighter now. The military must remain proactive in competition, and ready for crisis and conflict, not just one of them.
Irregular warfare is not the panacea, but it is perhaps the best opportunity space to shape adversary decision calculus in ways that other military tools cannot. The exhaustive argumentation over defining integrated deterrence, “strategic competition,” or any other moniker is not where we should spend time. A “good enough” answer is visible, and we must act to prevent further erosion of our advantages. This good enough answer involves two practical aspects: expanding the aperture beyond a traditional understanding of deterrence to account for irregular warfare and acknowledging the unique role that special operations forces play in campaigning to deter states in the gray zone. Special operations forces do this now and look to expand their strategic effectiveness in the future.
Baselining deterrence theory — setting up for expansion
Alexander George and Richard Smoke noted in their seminal work “Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice” that “deterrence is simply the persuasion of one’s opponent that the costs and/or risk of a given course of action he might take outweigh its benefits.” Costs manifest in one of two ways: denial and punishment.
Denial makes potential opposing actions infeasible or too costly, usually through some form of defense that makes the adversary think twice before acting. Punishment, on the other hand, threatens severe penalties for unacceptable behavior, usually through retaliation in kind or in escalation. Underpinning both mechanisms is the clarity and credibility of the deterrent signal — the message and perception. If the adversary cannot understand the message or does not believe it, then it is moot and may lead to a deterrence failure.
Integrated deterrence will be a cornerstone of the next national defense strategy, so it is vital to scope the concept correctly. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin is right to acknowledge a role for integrated deterrence to address gray zone challenges, which nests neatly with the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance to “better compete and deter gray zone actions.” However, there is danger that high-end challenges like space and nukes may sideline it. We offer considerations for campaigning in the gray zone — focused on irregular warfare, to ensure it becomes more than a platitude. Ultimately, what we are focused on are those problematic acts of competition occurring below the threshold of traditional deterrence. This is where “war without fighting” is waged.
Irregular and gray — closing the gap in a non-traditional way
We need to first acknowledge that we have a “deterrence gap” in the gray zone where the United States is too slow or risk-averse to respond to non-conventional provocations. Because the gray zone seldom involves large or unambiguous challenges, this gap is difficult to quantify and thus easy for planners and programmers to ignore — at least for those sweating the “big stuff.” Trends in the strategic environment, however, are placing a premium for first-mover advantage in the information and human environments, which allow revisionist actors to shape the world in ways inimical to U.S. interests. Most of these actions do not involve going to “war” and seek to “win” well before then, yet we are loathe to commit intellectual capacity or national resources to these subversive activities. Closing this gray zone deterrence gap requires rethinking planning concepts and leveraging new methods of influence in both traditional and non-traditional ways.
Enter irregular warfare as a solution. Irregular warfare offers human-focused deterrence to close the gap by expanding on traditional methods of denial and punishment. The Swiss model of deterrence by resistance is one such example that has been subject of discussion since the 1980s, with the idea recently entering serious dialogue in the security community for today’s challenges. We propose three forms of (irregular) deterrence by denial to add to the body of deterrence literature and practice: cognitive access denial; physical denial through support to resistance; and financial access denial. We also offer two forms of (irregular) deterrence by punishment: unconventional warfare; and subversion.
Cognitive access denial involves fostering partner nation societal resilience in ways that can psychologically harden populations against adversary influence operations to prevent subversion, intimidation, or mobilization as proxies. These activities support partner initiatives, such as the Baltics’ whole-of-society “Total Defense” approach to national security. Targeted U.S. investments in this domain can enable partners with whom we have mutual security interests by providing support against coercion and subversive elements challenging their internal stability and credibility.
Support to resistance consists of creating a “bitter pill” or “porcupine” in the form of partner nation resistance capability to signal that military occupation would be too difficult or costly. Resistance is a form of physical denial that complements traditional deterrence by defense. This can be seen in the Baltics and more recently in Taiwan with potential for expansion throughout the Indo-Pacific. While military occupation itself may not be a gray zone activity (as seen in Crimea), signaling the capacity and will to resist an occupation may change the adversary’s decision calculus and prevent that invasion from ever occurring.
Financial access denial can deny adversaries the influence derived from coercive economic statecraft. This approach hardens partner commercial sectors and influencers against adversary proxy, patronage, or corruption networks and state-owned enterprises. Counter-threat finance proved essential in the counter-violent extremism fight. While Chinese infrastructure spending through One Belt, One Road is qualitatively and quantitatively different than threat finance in Iraq, adapting those tools and enhancing the scale and scope of interagency tools like those found in the Treasury and Commerce Departments could prove critical to deterring gray zone behavior. This is also an entree for increased partnership with the commercial sector and a greater societal approach to strategic competition.
Two forms of (irregular) deterrence by punishment, on the other hand, include holding adversary assets at risk through the credible threat of unconventional warfare or subversion. Although punishment is a less reliable form of deterrence, China and Russia nonetheless have exploitable instability issues that offer outside the box deterrence options.
Punishment through unconventional warfare involves supporting resistance movements to destabilize places critical to the strategic interests of adversaries, whether internal or external to their borders. Punishment by subversion similarly may include imposing costs and creating dilemmas indirectly through cognitive and virtual vectors by shaping and amplifying grievances that divert resources, challenge adversaries’ cohesion, and undermining their strategic positions.
For either irregular deterrence by denial or punishment, the convergence of information-related and human-centric capabilities — specifically language, regional expertise, and culture, will prove necessary in cyberspace and other information spaces. This brings us to our second point: acknowledging the unique role that special operations forces play in deterring gray zone behavior.
Counter-revolution, not evolution
We understand that irregular warfare is not a special operations forces-specific mission, nor is it a panacea or replacement for conventional or nuclear deterrence. However, addressing the gray zone in an integrated way requires a fundamental shift in how the nation thinks about special operations forces beyond their association with counterterrorism. Indeed, the answer lies much deeper in the past with special operations forces’ tradition of problem-solving through indirect approaches, only fused with innovations from today’s recent experiences.
U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Cyber Command, and U.S. Space Command will all play critical roles in the cross-domain aspects of integrated deterrence as Secretary Austin envisions with their specific competencies. Likewise, U.S. Special Operations Command maintains the preponderance of U.S. irregular warfare-focused capabilities (this includes both the service component and theater special operations commands).
For irregular warfare, we have an opportunity to optimize that utility now and effect a counter-revolution that returns special operations forces’ employment to its roots in psychological warfare, building partner resilience, support to resistance, sabotage, and subversion. We offer five key aspects of how special operations forces enable (irregular) deterrence in the gray zone.
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