13 March 2023

Deterrence Failure in a Cross-Strait Conflict: The Role of Alliances, Military Balance and Emerging Technology


Both regionally and globally, governments and researchers consider Taiwan to be a growing source of contention between China and the United States, with the possibility of armed confrontation or conflict in the near future mounting. Understanding the factors that might contribute to, or deter, any decision by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to employ military force on a large scale and how they interact with each other remains challenging due to the largely opaque nature of high-level decision-making within the CCP. This report reflects on discussions by regional and extra-regional experts at a contingency scenario workshop convened by the IISS in late 2022. Three scenarios, respectively set in 2027, 2032 and 2037, all posit a decision by Beijing to undertake large-scale military action against Taiwan, but against a backdrop of differing domestic and international political situations, focussing on the role of three key variables in possible cross-Strait deterrence failure: the role of alliances, conventional military balance, and integration of emerging technologies. While the workshop and report do not aim to be predictive, cross-comparisons of responses to all three scenarios for each variable offer overarching thoughts for government, industry and academia.

The status of Taiwan as a major potential flashpoint between China and the United States and the possibility of a large-scale military confrontation over the island in the near future are now widely acknowledged by Indo-Pacific and extra-regional governments and researchers. Following the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has devoted significant time and resources into modernising and increasing the capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army for high-intensity war fighting. In October 2022, at the 20th National Congress of the CCP, President Xi Jinping emphasised that, although ‘Peaceful Reunification’ remained the CCP’s preferred approach, China ‘will never promise to renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all measures necessary’.

High-level decision-making within the CCP remains largely opaque. Understanding the factors that might contribute to, or deter, any decision by the CCP to employ military force on a large scale and how they interact with each other, therefore, remains quite challenging. Three hypothetical scenarios of deterrence failure were presented at an IISS workshop of subject matter experts held in late 2022. These scenarios, respectively set in 2027, 2032 and 2037, all posit a decision by Beijing to undertake large-scale military action against Taiwan, but against the backdrop of differing domestic and international political situations. For all three scenarios, participants presented feedback on how plausible and logical they found the behaviour of key actors, with a particular focus on how these were shaped by three key variables.

This report presents overviews of each scenario discussed at the workshop, and reflections by participants in each discussion round on the relative importance of each variable considered for Beijing’s perceptions. While the workshop and report do not aim to be predictive, cross-comparisons of responses to all three scenarios for each variable offer some overarching thoughts.

Alliances: • US and allied access to basing should not be taken for granted and further diplomatic efforts to guarantee this prior to the outbreak of hostilities should be a priority.

• It is unclear how Beijing might react to US aircraft or vessels delivering military supplies to facilities in otherwise neutral third states for onward distribution to stand-in forces operating around Taiwan.

• Widespread support from allies and partners would be crucial to any attempt by Washington to organise a policy of denial by economic punishment, but is not guaranteed.

• The direct military contributions of allies and partners will probably be less significant in their deterrent effect.

• Greater discussion between the US and allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and Europe is, therefore, necessary in order to align political, economic or military responses to a Taiwan contingency.

Conventional Military Balance: • The military balance is likely to play a necessary but not sufficient role in deterring large-scale military action by China across the period covered.

• Beijing’s perceptions of Taiwan’s will to fight a sustained campaign and its capability to do so would almost certainly be a significant factor in its calculus of potential military options.

• Increased investments in the US military’s own short when it comes to the prototyping, testing, survivable/attritable intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and stocks of standoff munitions would also serve to increase the credibility of a US intervention.

• An escalatory cycle resulting from miscalculation on one or both sides will remain a plausible risk factor throughout the period covered.

• More detailed comparative study is needed of systems-destruction warfare and joint all-domain operations in Chinese and US military thinking about the future of warfare, including an attempt at sketching possible technological milestones that need to be achieved to operationalise both concepts. Emerging Technologies: The timeframe of 15 years for the three scenarios, each separated by a span of five years, is extremely evaluating and eventual introduction of new weapons systems and platforms into the respective armed forces of China, Taiwan and the US.

• Technological change will likely be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, be primarily driven by the private sector and need to be accompanied by the associated novel-operational concepts and force-structure changes.

• Perceptions of future advantage or disadvantage resulting from the development of emerging military technological capabilities may have a significant impact on Beijing’s risk calculus.

• There is also a possibility that autonomous platforms with humans out-of-the-loop cause inadvertent escalation and contribute to the breakdown of deterrence, particularly in domains with low transparency.


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