12 March 2023

The War in Ukraine, One Year Later: Five Principal Insights

Arkady Mil-Man, Georgy Poroskoun

Failed assessment: The President of Russia made a decision to invade Ukraine, relying on on basic data and assumptions (the balance of power, moods in Ukraine, the reaction of the West) that were overwhelmingly disconnected from reality, while relying on advice and assessments that were adapted to his worldview at the expense of objectivity. The planning of the invasion did not include professional consideration of terrain levels and caused a huge gap between expectation and realization. The operational decision to abandon the northern front (about five weeks after the invasion) reflected an understanding that the original plan had failed, as well as the lack of any Plan B. The Russian moves throughout the year show that Russia reacts and conducts itself in the face of the changing reality, and no longer controls the pace of developments at the strategic level.

The war of the "Old Guard": Unlike many expectations of change and the "streamlining" of the modern battlefield, the Russia-Ukraine war looks similar to the two World Wars, with massive use of artillery, infantry, trench warfare, armored corps, and more. Although advanced elements are also prominent in combat – extensive use of UAVs, precision missiles, cyber warfare – these do not dictate the results of battles (although the supply of Western precision anti-aircraft missiles to Ukraine, such as HIMARS, manages to score operational successes).
The West’s collective effort: Contrary to the Russian assessment, the Western countries (US, NATO, and their partners) quickly formed a stable coalition of political, military, and economic-humanitarian aid to Ukraine and a political front against Putin's regime. Western ideological-value identity played an important role in this, sometimes at the expense of routine pragmatic interests. This coalition provided Ukraine with multi-level support vis-à-vis Russia, including the ongoing supply of military personnel and intelligence while committing to ensure Ukraine's victory. The processes of strengthening the NATO alliance were accelerated (investment in building strength among member armies, as well as recruiting new members – Sweden and Finland). Despite the close economic ties many European countries had with Russia in the field of energy, these countries managed to free themselves of the dependence within a few months, without being seriously harmed.

The countries do not collapse quickly: Since the invasion, Ukraine has suffered a lethal blow to human capital (dead, injured, and refugees), to the economy, including in its largest sector – agriculture (due to Russian takeover of the territory and the bombings), to energy infrastructure, services, and more. At the same time, Russia also encountered unprecedented problems – sanctions that disrupted its economic stability in a Western attempt to curb its ability to continue financing the war, as well as mass emigration (many hundreds of thousands) of the educated middle class. However, both countries show no signs of establishment foundations crumbling and continue to function and invest in the war effort. Both those who predicted Ukraine would be vanquished within a few days, and those who predicted the economic collapse of Russia within a few months proved wrong.

Interests versus values: Quite a few countries, among them Israel, found themselves caught between the desire to stand by Ukraine (sympathy for the victim, a democratic country, developed bilateral relations), and the fear of the costs involved (relations with Russia, its ability to harm). So far Israel's policy has been to provide aid to Ukraine, but to confine it to limited fields in order not to upset Russia. Unlike European and North American countries who see this war as part of the struggle between Western civilization and revisionist authoritarian forces in which there is no question as to their side in the conflict, for Israel this distinction is not sharp enough, both because of its multitude of security challenges, and because of the geographical-cultural distance. Israel must decide to what extent it sees itself as part of the Western world, and how willing is it to join hands in the effort.

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