Justin Baumann
Introduction
“As USARPAC [United States Army Pacific] reminds us frequently, is that wars may start at sea, but they finish on the land” [1] – Brigadier General Pat Ellis
In his commencement address to West Point graduates in 2022, describing the battlefield of tomorrow, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General Mark Milley stated, “Additionally, the battlefield will be highly complex and almost certainly decisive in urban areas, against elusive ambiguous enemies that combine terrorism and warfare alongside conventional capabilities, all embedded within large civilian populations. In this world, your world, you’re going to have to optimize yourselves for urban combat, not rural combat. That has huge implications for intelligence collection, vehicles, weapons design, development, logistics, commo, and all the other aspects of our profession. The battlefield is going to be non-linear, compartmented, and units are going to have non-contiguous battle space, with significant geographical separation between friendly forces … This type of battlefield is going to place a very high premium on independent, relatively small formations that are highly lethal and linked to very long-range precision fires.” [2]
The main thesis of this article is that the US Army’s force development doctrine for large-scale combat operations reached its culmination near the end of the Korean War and that the lessons learned from that conflict can significantly benefit Army force design into the future. [3] The leaders and Army at that time, especially General Ridgway, were personally familiar with large-scale combat operations across the European and Pacific theatres of WWII, [4] and they incorporated the difficult lessons learned into their force designs when fighting in Korea to great effect, reversing early defeats and turning the Army into a more efficient fighting force before the armistice was signed in 1953. [5] [6]
After Korea, Army doctrine distracted itself by experimenting with the Pentomic Division based on strategic nuclear developments, pivoting to the Vietnam War, adjusting to the Cold War, and finally, designing AirLand Battle with the Big Five as a framework, ending with the Counter Insurgency (COIN) failures in the Middle East. [7] This article seeks to incorporate the knowledge and lessons about large-scale combat operations from these previous doctrine periods into the RCT force design concept presented here, in contrast to the division-centric approach currently favored by the Army, [8] with the intention of creating a more effective and lethal multi-domain land Army spearheading the joint force prepared for positional, maneuver, proxy, and attritional warfare. [9]
The Russian Invasion of Ukraine
“Russia has historically chosen to destroy cities rather than fight for them.” - Benjamin Arbitter and Kurt Carlson [10]
Russian warfare in the Ukraine, albeit poor, does offer some insights into modern combat. LTC Amos Fox wrote in 2017, “Russia’s military strategy is not naïve enough to assume that unconventional, covert action is a silver bullet. Russian policy necessitates an operational approach that embodies the Clausewitzian notion of war as ‘a pulsation of violence,’ variable in time, speed and intensity. Therefore, Russian hybrid warfare operates in the shadows during times of perceived peace to destabilize enemies, while possessing the capability to pulsate to the conventional end of the spectrum to fight and win conventional engagements, battles and operations in proximity to the Russian border. The results are an escalatory hybrid-warfare model that first seeks to achieve its political objectives through covert action, then uses partisan forces if covert action is ineffective or insufficient. If partisan forces are unable to achieve objectives, Russian hybrid warfare will commit conventional Russian troops. In transitioning from partisan warfare to overt conventional warfare, Russian forces attempt to keep a partisan face forward, while quickly melting into the countryside or back across the Russian border upon the completion of localized hostilities.” [11]
It’s important to remember that the Russian army is gaining a lot of LSCO experience in Ukraine, especially in urban warfare, despite their losses. As the character of the war changes, so will their operations. Their process of throwing conscripts into the fire may be an advantage long term for Russia as these young soldiers will be trained in modern warfare fundamentals without formal military training, albeit with heavy losses. In other words, casualties are being traded for experience. While the current Russian army has displayed itself to be ineffective in toppling the Ukrainian government, a future Russian army molded and shaped by current experiences in Ukraine may pose a much greater threat to Eastern Europe, principally using their playbook of pulsating hybrid warfare. [12]
These changes have already occurred and will continue to occur as the war goes on. In one example, they have created new assault groups to deal with their challenges, [13] as well as using 20-man storm groups in Ukraine with combined arms enablers, after their larger forces suffered casualties. [14] These units vary in size and the Russians and Ukrainians will continue to adjust their units based on battlefield developments. [15] This is consistent with the size of urban fighting units in Mosul. [16]
Another feature of Russian tactical adaptations is their use of mercenary groups. These groups have been used by Russia for many years, but this war has featured their increased usage most notably the Wagner Group in Bakhmut. This is a tactical political-military crossover relationship and with reports of disagreements and political infighting, only time will tell whether Russia’s reliance on mercenary groups will be a success or failure. [17]
Finally, Benjamin Phocas and Jayson Geroux wrote in a Modern War Institute article that “Small antitank teams are extremely effective against armored formations. Small Ukrainian hunter-killer teams have been effective maneuvering in urban terrain to launch antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) into the thinly armored roofs of Russian tanks. These teams are flexible and mobile and can move in close before attacking, mimicking the tactics used previously by the Chechens in Grozny in the 1990s. In one video, the members of a Ukrainian antitank team used ruined buildings to mask their location while they engaged three Russian tanks. The tanks seem to be at a loss as to how they should react and one of them is seen firing in the wrong direction. Antitank teams skillfully using the cover and concealment offered in an urban setting can maneuver to maximize the effectiveness of their weapons against the enemy.” [18]
While still ongoing, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine does provide relevant assessments of modern war and its use among, within, and around population centers. [19] The Russian misadventure in Ukraine has provided Army planners with a breadth of new data on urban operations to evaluate. As chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute John Spencer says, “We need new concepts to address these challenges which through analysis, experimentation, exercises, and actual experience can evolve into a comprehensive urban warfare doctrine.” [20]
Urban Warfare
“[A]n examination of military history reveals that urban warfare is common, and in fact is more common in the history of warfare than classic battle in the open field.” – Louis DiMarco [21]
Traditionally, doctrine favored bypassing cities as the cost to take them would be too high. [22] However, modern armies learned from the First Gulf War that pitched battles against America’s forces in the open was a losing proposition, and armies around the world have adapted. [23] Being able to fight and win in urban areas by RCTs will increase their “resilience in complex adaptive systems” and their avoidance of failure. [24] Isolating adversaries in the cities will help lead to their destruction, and the current preferred division-centric model does not seem to support this with its narrow focus on large division formations bypassing cities. [25] [26] [27]
Lieutenant General (Retired) David Barno, in his paper, “The Future of the Army”, says that “The Army should begin designating selected BCTs to focus on urban operations and tailor their mission essential task lists and organizational structures accordingly. This should be done as soon as possible, since urban operations are already an important requirement, and operational units currently do not focus much attention on their unique demands. These missions may often resemble the “three block war” that Marine General Charles Krulak famously described, where forces may fight, conduct peacekeeping, and provide humanitarian aid on adjacent city blocks—all under the scrutiny of international media, and now among a social-networked populace. These designated units could serve as first deployers into future urban operations, but they would also spur innovative thinking by identifying new requirements, testing new technologies, and evaluating potential doctrine. Such units should develop new concepts by experimenting with different mixes of people and equipment—such as combining tanks with light infantry and drones, for example, or operating with special operators, attack helicopters, and Stryker battalions.” [28]
An Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) report on lessons learned from urban operations in 2016 found that “Doctrine, tactics, training, and equipment meant specifically for urban warfare improves military effectiveness in urban environments.” [29] And the Marine Corps Urban Warfare Study cited by AWG found that “Standard military unit configurations are often inappropriate for urban combat” and, “Forces operating in cities need special equipment not in standard tables of organization and equipment.” [30]
This may seem obvious, but this gap is not being addressed by the shift to division-centric formations. Lacking urban-focused unit formations will hamper the Army’s ability to conduct offensive campaigns at scale, and force structure should address these challenges. [31] If the US finds itself in future urban battles, the Army will be more effective if it has formations designed to fight and win in those environments. [32]
Redeveloping American RCTs
“… [The US Army] must present to policy makers in the Department of Defense, the U.S. Congress, and the White House a convincing rationale that justifies support for a purpose-built ground force capable of deterring, and if need be, defeating both peer adversaries and a complex array of rogue state, nonstate, and terror organizations in a variety of expeditionary settings America can continue to win through superior force generation.” - Nathan Jennings [33]
In their 2018 article “The US Army is Wrong on Future War”, authors Nathan Jennings, Amos Fox, and Adam Taliaferro state: “In August 1945, when America initiated the atomic age, the dominant character of land war between great powers transitioned from operational maneuver to positional defense. Now, almost a century later, the US Army is mistakenly structuring for offensive clashes of mass and scale reminiscent of 1944 while competitors like Russia and China have adapted to twenty-first-century reality. This new paradigm—which favors fait accompli acquisitions, projection from sovereign sanctuary, and indirect proxy wars—combines incremental military actions with weaponized political, informational, and economic agendas under the protection of nuclear-fires complexes to advance territorial influence. The Army’s failure to conceptualize these features of the future battlefield is a dangerous mistake.” [34]
The current lack of urban warfare planning in the division-centric force structure presents problems for Army strategists and operational planners. During his talk at the Maneuver Warfighting Conference at Ft. Moore, GA, in March of 2022, Colonel Ryan Morgan, Army Capabilities Manager - Infantry Brigade Combat Team, lists “The BCT must bring together capabilities in all domains to win the close fight” and “The Division, as the unit of action, possesses the bulk of the capabilities” as answers or assumptions of fact to the problem statement slide regarding building the Army for 2028. [35] It’s plausible this is a critical design flaw that will lead to BCTs training to fight and win without the capabilities required to win. Over-centralizing capability decision authorities at a high level (Divisions as units of action) will slow down tactical and operational reaction times, especially in a decentralized urban fight where every second counts. [36] BCTs and Divisions will spend valuable time fighting each other for capabilities they need, rather than employing the ones they have effectively in multi-domain combat operations.
BCTs will be challenged to synchronize multi-domain operations when the capabilities for other domains are located at higher levels of echelons. Different echelons are being expected to fight in different domains, and this could lead to incoherency and disjointed combat operations. Even Colonel Morgan admits these flaws in a 2021 Infantry Magazine article: “While the MBCT and LBCT concepts display many advantages over the current IBCT, they do have a downside. While being more deployable and responsive, their designs lack some of the key capabilities of the current IBCT such as fires, protection, and sustainment. While the new BCT concepts would retain limited reconnaissance, the parent division would have to provide the larger reconnaissance capability. Both the MBCT and LBCT will be dependent on their parent divisions for direct or general support of some or all these capabilities, whereas the IBCT currently retains these abilities.” [37] Additional complexity to employ these capabilities will only increase the time and ability to deploy them effectively.
If the Army wants to look at WWII for the basis of LSCO formations, the Regimental Combat Team (RCT) concept could provide a more efficient model for integrating combined arms with the new influx of technologies such as drones, AI, and loitering munitions, as well as others. The RCT has been discussed before. In his 1984 Combat Studies Institute Research Survey, “Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization,” Captain Jonathan House found, “Regardless of the terrain or enemy involved, most divisions in Europe and many in the Pacific believed that they needed tank, antiaircraft, "tank destroyer" (antitank), and nondivisional engineer support in virtually all circumstances … Thus, the RCT was a combined arms force, a small division in itself” [38] [39]
In his 1996 Army War College paper “Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century”, LTC (P) Douglas Macgregor found that in WWII “Many of the nondivisional elements were permanently organized with the division's infantry regiments to form regimental combat teams (RCT). The RCTs had their own artillery, engineers, tank destroyers, self-propelled antiaircraft guns, medical and logistical support. In practice, the RCT evolved into a small division in itself. As the Second World War in Europe progressed, the division headquarters provided support to the RCTs which actually fought the tactical battles.” [40] He went on to say, “One way to modify the division organization without dramatically changing the existing warfighting structure is to disestablish divisions as standing organizations and to convert the current brigade task force into what amounts to a regimental combat team.” [41]
I would invite readers to do more research and analysis into the RCT as a potential unit of action over the current division-centric plan. [42] Figures 1 and 2 illustrate potential units contained within hypothetical Mechanized and Airmobile RCTs: [43]
Figure 1: Airmobile RCTs
Figure 2: Mechanized RCTs
Part of this restructuring could necessitate changes and additions to infantry Military Occupational Specialty categories. Based on the concepts above, some of these could include: 11W – Weapons Specialist, 11C – Mortar/FO Specialist, 11S – Sniper, 11D – Drone Engineer/Pilot, 11G – Grenadier, or 11U – Subterranean Specialist. [44] Finally, with the need for subterranean-specific units for urban warfare, Figure 3 shows a potential unit identifier for doctrinal clarity.
Figure 3: Subterranean Unit Modifier
Grenadiers
“When stormtroop detachments led the attack at Verdun in February 1916, many of them went into action with their rifles slung, leaving their hands free to lob stick grenades into surviving French positions.” – Ian Drury [45]
Close integration of artillery and infantry were a major component of German advancements in 1918 along with the newly developed infiltration tactics, before Germany succumbed to economic and logistic exhaustion. Centralizing our artillery at the division level, as the current reorganization is attempting to do, will likely result in disjointed combined arms at the tactical level. Tactical units will not have the time nor security to reveal their position, calling for fires to a division headquarters where communications may be jammed, cutoff, or intercepted. [46]
Captain Andre Laffargue, a French Army officer, wrote about his experiences on the Western front in 1915 and wrote “The Attack in Trench Warfare: Impressions and Reflections of a Company Commander”, which quickly gained interest in Germany alongside their own independent developments. [47] These developments by the French and Germans to break the stalemate resulted in the creation of grenadier type units. As Professor Stephen Bull found, “The increasing role of the grenade and its importance vis-Ã -vis firearms in trench warfare was recognised and built upon in official German literature during 1915.” [48]
Just like trench warfare took place in confined spaces, urban warfare is also conducted within limited maneuver space, and some tactical lessons from one environment may apply to the other. In this case, the Germans’ focused use of grenades in their offensive trench warfare tactics warrants much further study and tactical experimentation at CTCs with intended applicability towards creating grenadier-centric units for trench warfare and mega-city and large-scale urban operations.
The current US Army grenadier capability has been diluted. By having the grenade launcher on the rifle, the grenadier in a current US doctrinal squad is half a rifleman and half a grenadier. This is not the way to properly and efficiently mass firepower at the squad and platoon levels. Attaching grenade launchers to rifles degrades rifleman accuracy and firing agility, as well as degrading grenadier functions with greater ammunition carrying requirements. These two should be separate. Grenadiers can be equipped with dedicated grenade launchers as well as pistol sidearms and carry more ammo for their grenade launchers. This facilitates their training and specialization focus on the main functions of firing a grenade over distance accurately and timely. The Marine Corps urban warfare study found that “Machineguns may be more valuable than assault rifles for urban combat.” [49] Experimenting with different weapons and tactics configurations at the CTCs will enable commanders and NCOs to find creative ways to become more effective fighting in urban environments. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate how to modify existing Bradley and Stryker organizations into grenadier specific formations for RCTs:
Figure 4: Bradley/OMFV/AMPV Grenadier Platoon Concept
Figure 5: Stryker Grenadier Platoon Concept
Special Forces Ghost Battalion
The term “Special Operations Forces (SOF)” has diluted the core missions of service-specific units like Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs, creating a false perception of interchangeability by senior leaders. This leads to core-mission atrophy and potential failure during major combat operations. The US Army can help improve the core mission specialty of Green Beret Special Forces units by properly integrating them within the larger conventional force, [50] while continuing to allow them to maintain their training autonomy before conducting operations with conventional forces. [51]
The Marine Corps urban warfare study found that “Special forces are useful in urban settings, but are often misused because conventional force commanders do not understand how to use special skills effectively.” [52] Although the Army wants to increase the centralization of reconnaissance assets at the division level in their 2028 initiative, Special Forces within a Ghost Battalion formation can offset the reduction and centralization of these formations by fulfilling irregular roles such as LRRP, snipers, sabotage, HUMINT, RSTA, etc. at the RCT level, while increasing population-centric capabilities for these conventional formations for greater urban warfare combined arms operations. [53] “Because when the going gets tough, yes Special Forces units will perform pretty well in the light infantry role, but it’s usually not the most valuable job that they could be doing.” [54]
SF may be hesitant to give up operational control of these units, but there are long-term benefits to the Regiment. [55] First, operators assigned to the Ghost Battalion would rotate back into the regiment and spread knowledge and relationships creating a greater unconventional and conventional warfighting bridge. Second, Ghost Battalion units can act as secondary command assignments for Special Forces officers, NCOs, and others in those very specific reconnaissance and warfighting skills which will filter back through doctrine and units. SF officers and conventional officers will be more exposed in training, operations, and planning, and this exposure will result in greater coordination between the two. Finally, by retooling subsets of these forces (similar to Jedburgh teams as mission-specific “Ghost Battalion” units) as conjunctive partners alongside conventional forces within urban operations will help maximize the capabilities and skillsets of both for greater positive American operational urban warfare outcomes. [56]
Modernizing the Sniper Force
The importance of snipers in urban and large-scale warfare cannot be overstated. [57] These soldiers are force multipliers for joint force ground commanders in many different types of urban and rural operations. [58] [59] Increasing the professionalization of sniper skills through increased promotions to warrant officers includes greater pay, reducing the financial burden of the service member, and increasing their focus on their profession. By placing additional importance on the position by increasing rank and pay, the Army also indicates it is a valuable skill, and because it is a force multiplier in urban operations, this would increase the institutionalization of those skills even further.
The Fall 2022 Infantry Magazine edition was focused entirely on sniper operations. In one article, 2LT Ethan Stewart and 2LT Bennett Buick wrote about the need for an advanced sniper course. [60] In another article, SFC Kenneth Howell Jr. wrote about the retention of Army snipers by saying, “The process for creating a new sniper in the Army would benefit from streamlining designed to ensure the lengthy period from arrival at first duty station to B4-qualified sniper is truncated, allowing the Army to produce a greater number of snipers and make the most of their marksmanship skills, all while improving career progression.” [61] To better prepare the sniper force for urban warfare and large-scale com bat operations, figure 6 illustrates how to streamline the recruiting and retention pipeline to elevate this valuable skill for future urban and modern combat:
Figure 6: Infantry Sniper Warrant Officer Career Map [62]
RCT Tactics and Training
RCTs would require adjustment to doctrine and integrating combined arms and warfighting functions at this level. Figure 7 illustrates how an RCT could be deployed using its separate maneuver battalions against an entrenched opponent. This illustrates the concept broadly, and testing and training at CTCs would provide more effective TTPs and lessons learned for innovation and evolution of these potential unit formations:
Figure 7: Mechanized RCT Offensive and Defensive Ground Attack Concept (For Illustrative Purposes Only)
Subterranean Warfare and Urban Command Posts
Using tunnels for warfare has existed throughout history and conflicts. They were used by the Japanese on Iwo Jima, by Hamas in Palestine, Mexican cartels in smuggling narcotics, and the Vietcong famously used them in the Vietnam War. In the urban environment, commanders can disperse their command and control (C2) forces based on some of the principles that made the Vietcong tunnel systems so hard to defeat. By applying this logic and structure in urban combat training scenarios, commanders and NCOs at all echelons can build TTPs and best practices for decentralizing, dispersing, and masking C2 nodes within the urban operating environment using tunnels and the subterranean domain. [63] [64]
With the introduction of cheap drones to the battlefield, “A passive way to withstand a swarm is to build potentially targeted facilities and weapon systems underground. Traditionally, key facilities and weapons have been placed in secluded areas where they cannot be observed or accessed. With more organizations gaining aerial viewing and imagery capabilities, it is less likely for a site to be identified if it is below ground than remote and above ground.” [65] This is also true for hiding forces in urban environments.
As Mr. Lee Grubbs, TRADOC G2 ACE, Director of the “Mad Scientist” Program said, “Nowhere to run, nowhere to hide. We heard from General Ahern talk about this but here’s some very specific facts. The Russians have had over 31 command posts destroyed and there’s a lot of reasons [for] this and we get into it offside but this, you know, our command posts today, are just too large. There’s too much being done for it on the battlefield. We will not fare any better than the Russians did with our command posts.” [66] A similar version of figure 8 of a Tactical Tunnel System can be found in ATP 3-21.51 Subterranean Operations, page 1-15. [67]
Figure 8: Decentralized Urban Command Nodes [68]
Finally, one of the major issues for training for urban combat is the small scale of current urban training centers and proper training for the mega-city environment. “Current Army training for urban operations is grossly inadequate, since few virtual or physical training environments replicate the scale and complexity of modern urban warfare. The Army has built small mock cities for tactical training, such as Shughart-Gordon Village at the Joint Readiness Training Center, but these facilities are very limited—often only a few dozen buildings and limited numbers of civilian role players during exercises. Replicating even a part of a densely populated urban area would be both prohibitively expensive to build and challenging to populate with large numbers of mock civilians and enemy troops. As a result, the Army has no large-scale urban training sites, which means that Army units cannot realistically train in their most demanding and likely future combat environment.” [69]
One way to help fix this gap is to use entire military bases for RCT urban training operations. Bases are urban areas. This can be done in a similar manner to how the US Army currently conducts larger training operations between Hohenfels and Grafenwoehr training area, for increased maneuver space and training value. For instance, an RCT from JBLM could train, then “deploy” to Ft. Moore (like going to NTC or JRTC) and the entire base and maneuver area could be used as a “life-sized urban MOUT training ground” to test urban fighting concepts at the RCT level. Units who currently call Ft. Moore home could participate as OPFOR and environmental actors, and work to record and document the exercise for the Army. These types of exercises could be used as final culminating “crucible” events for basic and AIT soldiers.
We can use these self-contained urban areas to train our forces on large scale urban operations, and do so much more effectively than is being done while saving costs. Certain bases in the United States can be used as urban warfare training centers once or twice a year where civilians, families, and support personnel are used as role players and receive compensation for their time. If the Army maintains these large bases, why not use them for large-scale urban warfare training exercises? Figure 9 illustrates a notional way to use an Army base like Ft. Moore for urban warfare exercises:
Figure 9: Notional mechanized RCT Attack on Ft. Moore, Georgia approaching from the Southwest (For Illustrative Purposes Only)
Casualties, Logistics, and Sustainment
“If you kill the logisticians, you can starve the invaders rather than confront them.” – Patrick Hanlon [70]
Arguably, this is the most important aspect of modern combined arms warfare and should be a major factor in RCT force design. The RCT formation includes a Regimental Support Brigade and these enhanced support units reflect the need to maintain sufficient logistics in LSCOs. Again, the Marine Corps study found that “Urban operations usually stress the logistics system because of unusual requirements and abnormally high consumption rates in some classes of supply.” [71]
As mentioned in ATP 3-94.4 Reconstitution Operations, “Due to the technological complexity of current equipment and weapon systems, the industrial base will be unable to produce materiel as quickly as it is destroyed during LSCO against a peer adversary. As noted in paragraph 1-1, the Army does not have reconstitution-specific resources nor is there an endless supply of personnel or equipment available to maintain combat power indefinitely. While the Army can regenerate an operational force, to regenerate a large force structure at the strategic level requires a full national mobilization of the industrial base and increased personnel assessments into the force. Each decision to reconstitute a unit, and to regenerate in particular, commits resources not easily replaced in the short term. In the latter half of 1944, the U.S. produced approximately 70 combat vehicles per day, but average losses were about 30. The increasing technological complexities of today’s combat systems makes it unlikely that a similar production rate will be achieved in future conflicts.” [72]
Tactical Combat Casualty Care is one of the most difficult sustainment operations. The RCT concept could enable more efficient and better Tactical Combat Casualty Care. As LTC Steven Schauer DO, MS et al say in their article “Opinion: The risks of prolonged casualty care for conventional forces in large-scale combat operations”: “Such a transition from the prolonged casualty care model to a model of mobility and evacuation is desperately necessary to achieve dominance in future MDO operations. The PCC expansion and adoption by conventional forces is a suboptimal course of action and should not be considered part of mission planning as a reliable option. We instead recommend expanding evacuation speed and capabilities. In LSCO, mobility is paramount to ensure survival given widespread sensors (attended and unattended) and increasingly lethal and accurate long-range precision fires. Essentially, forward medical units must be as mobile as artillery or infantry to survive the modern battlefield.” [73]
If the medical corps is having difficulty adjusting to LSCOs, the RCT concept here may help facilitate a greater focus and provide a more decentralized framework for building effective units suited to the task of Tactical Combat Casualty Care. A regimental Support Brigade would have more resources and can experiment with drones, AI, and training for mass casualty events in urban environments.
For force regeneration, Battalions in the RCT can be swapped out with fresh battalions, preserving cohorts of existing combat power, experience, and esprit de corps. There are lessons here from Ukraine as well. The Ukrainians are using unit-based replenishment based on German sustainment methods in the second world war, and the RCT would help facilitate this model of replenishment if it can be proven to be a more effective model. [74]
Combined arms warfare includes additional strain on the different weapons and skills that need to be regenerated. ATP 3-94.4 states, “Regeneration of many support and sustainment units involves unique problems. Such units typically rely on low-density, high technology skills and equipment. Replacements for Soldiers with these skills and the equipment they use are difficult to find. For example, the Infantry branch comprises approximately 18 percent of the Army, while the mechanics who maintain infantry combat systems comprise less than one percent. A dire need for these types of Soldiers and equipment may be just as crippling as a need for infantry personnel, Bradleys, and Strykers. Regeneration of a multifunctional sustainment unit is particularly difficult, as dozens of different skills will be required to restore the unit to near full capability.” [75].
“The ongoing war in Ukraine has shown that indications and warnings are a risky gauge on which to base decisions about the flow of forces into a theater. For Russia, whose deployment distance is stepping across a border, while the United States must cross an ocean and all of Western Europe, it is especially fraught. The Chinese advantage of proximity similarly creates challenges in defending Taiwan and elsewhere in the region. These realities, coupled with the ever-growing threat to air bases and seaports from long-range precision fires, only complicate the getting-to-the-fight challenge. Even if there is sufficient warning, as there was in Ukraine this February, deployment could be stalled because of trepidations over fears of escalation or provoking enemy aggression.” [76]
Conclusion
“Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after.” – Italian Air Marshall Giulio Douhet [77]
This research article originally began as an exploration of what an urban-focused BCT might look like and its unit formations, but slowly developed into the version here, the Regimental Combat Team. The conclusion of this article is that moving forward, the US Army will need a flexible and scalable force design to fight and win battles and wars in diverse expeditionary environments, most of which include urban areas. Figure 10 imagines how this could be integrated strategically into the Joint Force:
Figure 10: US Army RCT Deployable Echelon Concept
Army National Guard Major Garri Hendell wrote in a February 2023 article that “Trimming headquarters may be seen as part of appropriate reductions toward a peacetime military. There are ways in which this might be accomplished. For example, smaller geographic combatant commands might be reduced to three-star billets and consolidated under a smaller number of four-star commanders, reducing the number of four-star commands and consolidating regions where the military footprint is light. By repeating this at multiple intermediate levels (corps, division, brigade), it may be possible to align seniority of controlling headquarters with the number of service members subject to their control.” [78] Figure 11 illustrates how this could look utilizing RCTs as an efficient deployable echelon concept:
Figure 11: Example Division-RCT Organization. Not all Divisions/Units are depicted (For Illustrative Purposes Only)
This design concept reflects RCTs as very light divisions and creates shared organizational efficiencies by combining light and airborne units into airmobile and heavier armor and motorized formations into mechanized ones. This redesign would also help with National Guard unit integration: “Five of the eight current National Guard divisions are spread among two or three states. This arrangement is workable, but it creates some funding and administrative problems. In a brigade-based Army, new National Guard combat brigades could be created with units from within a single state.” [79] National Guard RCTs could be created within single states and improve administrative efficiencies for the Army.
The RCT concept is designed to give Infantry Joint Ground Force Commanders the most agile tools possible to successfully conduct large scale maneuver, positional, and attritional combat operations in urban, rural, suburban, and mega-city environments.
This article was researched and written between March 2022 and May 2023. The opinions in this article are the author’s own, and do not necessarily reflect those of any entity with which he is associated.
Bio
Justin Baumann has received master’s degrees from the University of Southern California and Arizona State University in public and business administration. An Army veteran, he served with the 4th Infantry Regiment in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom and with the 82nd Airborne Division in Iraq during Operation Inherent Resolve. He has been published in The Small Wars Journal and Infantry Magazine. He is a recipient of Gold Spurs, the Combat Infantryman Badge, a Purple Heart, and is a graduate of the Army’s Urban Breachers Course. He manages The Scorpion Group (TSG), an informal private think tank focused on national defense and grand strategy. His research interests include organizational design, hybrid warfare, subterranean warfare, and golf.
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