Indian Strategic Studies: June 2025

3 June 2025

Breaking the Ice: India’s First Ministerial Engagement with the Taliban

On 15 May 2025, India and the Taliban reached a pivotal moment in their diplomatic relations when External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar engaged in a telephone conversation with Amir Khan Muttaqi, the Acting Foreign Minister of Afghanistan’s Taliban administration.[i] This marked the first Ministerial-level contact between the two since the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021. The conversation took place just days after India and Pakistan agreed to halt their military strikes in the wake of Operation Sindoor,

which followed the Pahalgam terror attack of April 22, which left 26 innocents dead and dozens injured[ii], an incident condemned by the Taliban regime.

India-Taliban Ministerial Talks

India’s Foreign Minister, in a message that was posted on X (formerly Twitter), wrote, “Good conversation with Acting Afghan Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi this evening. Deeply appreciate his condemnation of the Pahalgam terrorist attack.”[iii] During the telephonic conversation,

Dr Jaishankar underlined India’s traditional friendship with the Afghan people and reiterated India’s continued support for their development needs and “welcomed his firm rejection of recent attempts to create distrust between India and Afghanistan through false and baseless reports.”[iv] This appeared to be a response to allegations made by Pakistan’s military spokesperson, Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry,

who claimed during a May 10 press conference that India had “fired missiles at Afghan soil and conducted drone attacks inside Afghanistan.”[v] In reaction, Afghan Defence Ministry spokesperson Enayatullah Khwarazmi dismissed the accusation as baseless[vi].

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How the India-Pakistan Crisis Became a Profitable Spectacle Online

Dr. Fizza Batool is an Assistant Professor at SZABIST University, Karachi, with expertise in South Asian Studies and Comparative Democratization. Connect with her on LinkedIn or read her works on ResearchGate

In late April 2025, a terrorist attack in Pahalgam in Indian-administered Kashmir led to escalating tensions between India and Pakistan. After four days of intense conflict, a ceasefire was agreed on May 10, 2025, following US diplomatic intervention. This conflict wasn’t just fought on diplomatic and strategic fronts—it was fiercely contested in the digital space, where the battle continues even after military tensions have cooled.

The crisis revealed a profound shift in the information hierarchy, with YouTube channels and TikTok accounts often generating more engagement than official government statements or traditional news broadcasts. Piers Morgan’s viral debate featuring social media influencers alongside traditional experts perfectly captures this new reality— individuals who once would have been mere spectators now sit on equal footing with government representatives and veteran journalists in shaping public understanding of international conflicts.

Behind this digital conflict lies a troubling economic reality: content creators on both sides of the border have transformed geopolitical tensions into a profitable business model. While their strategies differ dramatically as per the socio-political context in each country—Pakistani creators predominantly use humor and satire, while Indian counterparts amplify nationalist narratives—both narratives operate within the same attention economy that rewards emotional engagement over factual accuracy.

After The India-Pakistan Crisis, US Should Focus on China

Samir Kalra, and Akhil Ramesh

It is high time that US policy treats India and Pakistan for what they are: an emerging global power on the one hand and a bankrupt Chinese vassal state on the other.

There are few countries in the world that can dial both Beijing and Washington for support. One of them is Pakistan. The country has come to embody the phrase “running with the hare and hunting with the hounds.”

During the Global War on Terror, Pakistan simultaneously provided tacit support to the terrorist forces seeking refuge in its territories, fleeing American forces while at the same time supporting Washington as a non-NATO strategic ally.

Fast-forward to a post-Afghanistan world, Islamabad has maintained ties with both Beijing and Washington to leverage them when needed. This is particularly important during times of crisis like the recent one that arose after Islamist terrorists (likely sponsored by Pakistan) massacred mostly Hindu tourists in India’s Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir.

The terrorist attack by “The Resistance Front,” an offshoot of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a State Department-designated foreign terrorist organization, elicited a military and non-military response from India, including strikes on terrorist infrastructure deep in Pakistani territory. Pakistan subsequently escalated the conflict by launching drone and missile attacks on civilians, places of worship, and military installations in India, drawing a stronger Indian response that destroyed several Pakistani air bases.

For its part, the United States has publicly avoided taking sides between India and Pakistan. As a matter of fact, it has gone so far as to draw false equivalencies between the two countries, angering New Delhi and emboldening Pakistan. Pakistani military and government officials have even gone to the extent of holding celebratory rallies despite clear evidence that India dominated the short military conflict.

Pakistan’s TTP Problem: Why Military Solutions Continue to Fail

Maqbool Shah

The resurgence of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) since the Afghan Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 has exposed fundamental flaws in Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy. Despite decades of military operations, billions in defense spending, and significant tactical successes during operations like Zarb-e-Azb and Radd-ul-Fasaad, Pakistan finds itself confronting an emboldened insurgency that operates with virtual impunity from Afghan territory.

As someone who commanded troops in counterinsurgency operations on contested border regions, I witnessed firsthand how conventional military thinking often proves inadequate against asymmetric threats. The current TTP resurgence demonstrates that Pakistan’s military establishment has learned few lessons from previous campaigns. It continues to pursue tactical solutions to what is fundamentally a strategic and political problem with regional implications extending far beyond Pakistan’s borders.

The Taliban’s Gift to the TTP

The Afghan Taliban’s victory in August 2021 fundamentally altered the strategic landscape for the TTP. Within months of the Taliban takeover, TTP attacks inside Pakistan increased dramatically, with the group claiming responsibility for over 100 attacks in 2022 alone – a significant increase from previous years when the organization appeared weakened and fragmented.

The sanctuary provided by Taliban-controlled Afghanistan has allowed the TTP to rebuild organizational structures, enhance training capabilities, and coordinate operations with a freedom of movement not enjoyed since the peak of the insurgency in 2008-2010. Unlike the fragmented organization that Pakistani forces degraded through sustained military pressure, the current TTP appears more centralized, strategically focused, and tactically sophisticated.

This resurgence is not merely numerical but qualitative. Recent TTP operations demonstrate improved intelligence gathering, coordinated timing of multiple attacks, and selective targeting that maximizes psychological impact while minimizing military risk. The group has shifted from attempting to hold territory – a strategy that proved vulnerable to Pakistani military superiority – to a more sustainable approach focused on undermining state authority through persistent, low-level violence.

Pakistan’s Strategic Contradictions

Pakistan’s counter-TTP strategy suffers from an irreconcilable contradiction at its core: the same Afghan Taliban that Pakistan supported for decades as a strategic asset now provides sanctuary to Pakistan’s primary internal security threat. This relationship, once viewed as a cornerstone of Pakistan’s regional strategy, has become a liability that constrains counterterrorism options.

Having invested enormous political and military capital in ensuring Taliban victory in Afghanistan, Pakistan cannot now effectively pressure them to eliminate TTP sanctuaries without undermining its own broader regional objectives. The Taliban’s public assurances that Afghan soil will not be used against Pakistan carry little practical weight given their limited control over remote border regions and internal pressure from hardline factions sympathetic to the TTP cause.

This strategic bind reflects deeper problems in Pakistan’s approach to regional security. The military establishment’s historical reliance on proxy relationships and militant groups as policy instruments has created a web of connections that now constrains responses to current threats. Former assets can become present dangers, while ongoing relationships with some groups may provide intelligence about others but also create operational limitations.

The Intelligence Gap

Pakistan’s intelligence apparatus, despite its regional reputation for effectiveness, has struggled to penetrate TTP networks operating from Afghanistan. This failure stems partly from the complex relationships between various militant groups and the intelligence community’s historical connections to Taliban-affiliated organizations.

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate’s decades-long cultivation of Afghan Taliban leadership as strategic partners now complicates efforts to gather intelligence on TTP activities in Taliban-controlled territory. The institutional relationships that once provided Pakistan with influence in Afghanistan now create blind spots regarding threats emanating from the same territory.

Pakistan and the Latest Reincarnation of Lashkar-e-Taiba

Kunwar Khuldune Shahid

Indian Army Colonel Sofiya Qureshi speaks as Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri looks on during a press conference regarding Operation Sindoor, May 7, 2025. Behind them, a map shows the locations struck by India, purported “terrorist camps” in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and Pakistan.Credit: Government of India

The clashes between India and Pakistan in May – the closest the two nuclear-armed neighbors have come to a full-blown war since 1999 – hinged over the status of India-bound jihadist groups in Pakistan, led by the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). India struck various sites in Pakistan, which it claimed were training camps of the LeT, the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM). Together, these groups form the jihadist umbrella dedicated to “liberating Kashmir from Indian occupation.”

New Delhi’s strikes came as reaction to last month’s attack in Pahalgam town of Indian-administered Kashmir, claimed by the LeT-allied The Resistance Front, in which 26 civilians, nearly all tourists, were gunned down. Islamabad denies any connection with the militant raid and points to the fact that both Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed are banned in Pakistan.

The LeT was founded by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed in 1990 out of former anti-Soviet jihadists. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the LeT remained aligned with regional jihadist outfits, notably al-Qaida and the Taliban, but dedicated its focus to the Kashmir jihad in the 1990s. The group carried out numerous raids in India with the backing of Pakistan’s security agencies. After being designated as a terror outfit by the U.S. post-9/11, the LeT, along with the JeM, was banned in Pakistan in 2002. However, some of the group’s deadliest maneuvers in India came in the aftermath of the ban, including the Delhi bombings in 2005 and the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

Following the Mumbai attacks, and the global attention they brought, the LeT retracted to the backstage, allowing the Hizbul Mujahideen-led United Jihad Council (UJC) to be the vanguards of Kashmir-bound militancy. With many of its militants gravitating to the UJC and HM, the LeT sustained its organizational network – built on around 300 madrassas, some of which doubled as jihadi training camps across Pakistan – via its charity the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD). While the JuD’s terror-listing by the United Nations and the U.S., along with impending sanctions from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), prompted a crackdown against the charity in Pakistan in 2018, members of the LeT and JuD told me in interviews that the continued backing of the Pakistan Army for these groups was “not hidden from anyone.”

How SE Asia can break China’s rare earth monopoly

Patricio Faundez

Southeast Asia has the resources to challenge China's rare earth element monopoly. Image: Facebook

Last week, Australia’s Lynas Rare Earths produced heavy rare earth elements (HREEs) at a commercial scale in Malaysia, marking the first time this has ever happened outside of China.

This breakthrough, which includes elements like dysprosium and terbium, is no small feat in a market dominated by China, which is responsible for around 60% of global rare earth production and virtually 100% of the world’s HREE supply.

Rare earth elements (REEs) are critical for the US and other advanced economies: they power technologies from electric vehicles to defense systems. The US Department of Defense, for instance, has identified HREEs as vital for missile systems, radar and advanced communications.

Yet, the US itself produces only about 12% of global REEs—and almost none of the heavy types. Without secure access to these materials, Western industries risk supply chain disruptions that could slow the clean energy transition and compromise national security.

Why Turkey Welcomes An Emerging Arab Alliance – Analysis

Dr. Sinem Cengiz

Historically, there have been periods when Turkiye and the Arab states were unable to harmonize their strategies and interests in the region. Political differences often overshadowed potential cooperation, and at times the Arab alliance failed to align with Turkiye’s regional interests. There were also rare moments when Turkish-Arab cooperation proved to be effective and mutually beneficial. However, it appears that a new Arab alliance is emerging in the region among the historic capitals of Damascus, Baghdad, and Beirut. In a parallel shift, Turkish-Arab cooperation is achieving significant momentum with a harmony that serves mutual interests.

The collapse of the Assad regime significantly influenced Syria’s position within the Arab world. Coinciding with this shift, Lebanon has entered a new phase, with the election of a new president and the appointment of a prime minister after a two-year political deadlock. Meanwhile, Iraq, for the first time in years, has been positioning itself as a regional actor, not only mediating disputes but also facilitating economic cooperation.

One common factor in the reemergence of these three countries in the Arab world order is the diminishing influence of Iran, which is particularly favorable for Ankara. Despite Ankara’s ability to compartmentalize its relations with Tehran, Turkiye has been among the regional countries most uncomfortable with Iranian proxies in the region, especially in Iraq and beyond. Therefore, a region free from Iranian control is a strategic win for Turkiye. Moreover, one key element of this era emerging in the region is the intent to integrate Iran through dialogue, not isolation. Thus, containing Iran through diplomacy, not confrontation is an approach that Turkish and Arab perspectives share today.

In Syria, the new government has been building strong political, economic, and defense ties with Ankara, marking a fresh chapter in Turkish-Syrian relations after more than a decade of hostility under the Assad regime. As Syria embarks on an uncertain path toward reintegration into the regional and international fold, there are some similarities with Iraq’s post-Saddam experience. The new Syrian administration is eager to avoid the same instability that Iraq faced after the fall of Saddam, and Turkiye is keen to prevent a repeat of the post-Saddam scenario in Syria.

The lack of a coherent strategy between Ankara and Arab capitals in the past contributed to the rise of Iranian influence in Iraq and the prolonging of the instability caused by this. Today, Syria’s path to stability has become a critical issue that aligns Turkish and Arab interests. Cooperation between Ankara and Arab powers could facilitate Syria’s reconstruction and re-emergence. Moreover, stability in Syria is likely to have a significant impact on neighboring Iraq and Lebanon.

In Iraq, the government led by Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani is shifting the country’s status from being a victim of foreign interference to a platform for regional cooperation. Under Al-Sudani’s leadership, Iraq is transforming its relationship with Turkiye from a security-oriented perspective to an economically integrated relationship. The launch of the “Development Road” initiative in 2023, following a meeting between Al-Sudani and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, marked a significant shift in Turkish-Iraqi relations, which had long been dominated by issues of border security, Turkiye’s conflict with Kurdish militants, and water resource management.

Although Lebanon was not always a central focus in Turkiye’s foreign policy, as Syria and Iraq have been, Turkiye now seems poised to deepen its relations with Lebanon, especially under the new government in Beirut. Turkiye is likely to play a crucial role in helping Lebanon integrate into new regional security and economic alliances.

The United States’ Role In The Recent India-Pakistan Crisis – Analysis

Sandeep Bhardwaj

In early May 2025, triggered by the shocking Pahalgam terrorist attack, India and Pakistan engaged in an intense and wide-ranging four-day conflict. On 10 May 2025, the two sides agreed to a ceasefire that the United States (US) claimed it had brokered. New Delhi denied American role in the ceasefire negotiation.

The back-and-forth between Washington and New Delhi has obscured the strategic implications of the US’ role in the whole crisis. This time, Washington threw away the well-established playbook for managing South Asian crises that successive administrations has developed over decades. The result was confused signalling and ad hoc measures that exacerbated the risks and weakened US ability to intervene in future crises. While thankfully a ceasefire was achieved this time, the long-term dangers for the subcontinent have substantially increased.

Since the 1998 India-Pakistan nuclear tests, one of the central goals of the American policy in South Asia has been to prevent any crisis spiralling out of control. The US has activated its crisis management mode during the 1999 Kargil War, 2001-2002 Twin Peaks Crisis, 2008 Mumbai Terror Attacks, 2016 Indian LoC strike and 2019 Balakot airstrike. Although American crisis diplomacy has had varying degree of influence on different crises, it has always been present. The central challenge for Washington has been to contain escalation while avoiding the moral hazard of encouraging India or Pakistan to engage in risky behaviour by signalling that the US will always step in to defuse the crisis.

Since the President Donald Trump’s first term, the US’ South Asia crisis diplomacy has destabilised because of two contradictory impulses in Washington. On one hand, Trump has signalled his desire to withdraw the US from its traditional role as the guarantor of international order, especially its commitment to maintain stability and security in various parts of the world. On the other hand, the knee-jerk instinct to prevent crisis escalation in South Asia beyond nuclear threshold still persists in the Washington establishment.

This tension in the American policy was evident when Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammed carried out a terror attack on Indian troops in Kashmir. Mike Pompeo, US Secretary of State, and John Bolton, US National Security Adviser, issued statements expressing support for “India’s right to self-defence” and denouncing Pakistan’s support of terrorism but not calling for restraint. Nevertheless, when US officials felt there was a risk of nuclear escalation after India carried out an airstrike in Pakistani territory, Pompeo and Bolton engaged in late-night high-wire diplomacy to de-escalate the situation. Notably, Trump was not briefed about the crisis until the next morning.

In the recent crisis, 14 days passed between the Pahalgam attack and the Indian strikes into Pakistan. In the past, US presidents signalled their involvement at the start of a crisis by issuing statements that they were personally monitoring the situation, they had discussed the issue with their national security teams or calling for restraint. This time Trump dismissed the issue on 25 April 2025 by stating, “[t]hey’ll get it figured out one way or the other”. Contrastingly, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio publicly called for restraint. Unlike previous instances when top US officials personally visited New Delhi and Islamabad to read the mood and cool temperatures, no high-profile visits took place after the Pahalgam attack. In the past, the US had privately pressured Pakistan into offering concessions on terrorism to placate the Indian side. If such pressure was applied this time, it yielded no result.

Washington continued its public posture of aloofness once conflict began on 6 May 2025. “I guess people knew something was gonna happen…I hope it ends very quickly”, Trump reacted to the news of Indian strikes. The conflict was “fundamentally none of our business and has nothing to do with America’s ability to control it”, said US Vice President J D Vance on 9 May 2025.

Fighting Fire with Fire: Texas Rangers, Tactical Innovation, and Counterinsurgency Operations in the Mexico City Campaign, 1847-1848

Nathan Jennings

In the spring of 1847, at the height of the Mexican-American War, the United States Army invaded the heart of Mexico. Not content with limited victories in northern provinces, the American government hoped that a decisive campaign in the interior would compel negotiation and territorial concessions. On April 18, after seizing the Atlantic port of Veracruz and marching inland, an expeditionary force under General Winfield Scott won a convincing victory at the Battle of Cerro Gordo through superior fire and maneuver. This battlefield success shattered President Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna’s last remaining field army and set conditions for a potential march on Mexico City. However, despite the triumph, Scott soon worried from his forward outpost at Jalapa, a town along the road to the Mexican capital, of “bands of exasperated rancheros” resorting to “the guerilla plan.”

Map courtesy of the United State Military Academy’s Digital History Center.

The American commander’s fears proved perilously correct as the Mexican government embraced the timeless strategy of occupied societies: guerrilla warfare. Pedro Maria Anaya, now serving as the substitute president, swiftly recognized that the U. S. Army’s vulnerability lay in the unconventional arena. On April 28 he accordingly decreed the creation of an elite-led program of asymmetric resistance that would employ cavalry elements to attack the invaders along their flanks and rear echelons. Santa Anna confirmed the shift when he stated his intent to organize new forces to “harass the enemy’s rear in a sensible manner.” If Mexico could not expel the invaders through Napoleonic battle, it would isolate and destroy the American army with a decentralized savagery born of nationalistic desperation.

The resulting Mexican plan perfectly exploited the invading force’s geographical and structural weaknesses. The expanding distances between the American army’s logistical base at Veracruz, its interspaced garrisons, and the main body’s advancing line of march provided opportunity to destroy the foreigners in detail. While Scott possessed superior infantry and artillery regiments, he lacked mounted capacity to protect critically logistical and reinforcement columns marching west from Veracruz. The general consequently worried about the cost of diverting his few dragoon companies to convoy security, noting that, “our cavalry is already meager, and, from escorting, becoming daily more so.” With this inability to secure their rear, the Americans faced a growing dilemma: the further they advanced, the more tenuous their position became.

By the fall of 1847 Scott’s occupation challenges had dramatically increased with his inexorable march west and stunning capture of Mexico City. The strained American army of approximately 24,000 men now relied upon an embattled chain of fortified outposts to govern conquered territory, stretching 260 miles from capital to coast. As negotiations failed, Mexican aristocrats along the line of invasion enthusiastically embraced the call for “War without Pity” as the guerrilla resistance transitioned to a wide-spread insurgency. To remedy this untenable scenario, Scott called for the deployment of a specialized counterguerrilla force to compliment his pacification strategy. The general needed cavalry unlike any other, a cadre of irregulars forged in the crucible of frontier combat. For the hard task at hand, he needed Texas Rangers.

This essay explores how federalized Texas Rangers, officially designated the First Regiment of Texas Mounted Volunteers, supported the U.S. Army in Mexico in 1847 and 1848 by providing critically needed counter-guerilla capacity. It investigates the Texans’ contributions to the American governance program, enabled by their singular mastery of repeating firearms and horsemanship, by pursuing two lines of inquiry: How did they achieve consistent tactical superiority over Mexican mounted forces, and how did their kinetic activities both support and undermine American pacification plans? The answers to these questions will reveal the Texan regiment as a controversial, yet overall beneficial, component of American victory in the decisive campaign of the Mexican-American War.

Trump’s space-based Golden Dome will revolutionise warfare

Recently, the United States has fully unveiled a new initiative under President Trump called Golden Dome – a missile defence project of unprecedented scope and ambition. Originally included among Trump’s flurry of Executive Orders in January as an American version of Israel’s Iron Dome, it has since changed names and is envisioned to be much, much bigger. It is intended to provide security for the entirety of the United States homeland, but it will have global coverage – because the US can be targeted by long-range missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, launched from any point on the globe.

Golden Dome is intended to be a family of systems – some, based on the ground – but centred around a space-based architecture. It would deploy interceptors in orbit capable of being fired from space to intercept enemy missiles during their intra-atmospheric course. These are essentially airborne targets. But once the principle is established that you can target an airborne threat from orbit, a Pandora’s Box opens: why not strike a ground-based target, or a naval target, from space?

This is the beginning of a new era in space warfare. For the first time, the United States has made it its policy to place weapons in space that can conduct space-to-Earth strike – effectively, and eventually, bombardment from orbit. To channel President Trump’s inimitable style, this is HUGE. It is going to be a major departure for US space policy – an expensive programme, with massive industrial and strategic repercussions.

Golden Dome also raises foundational questions for international security. The principle of the “peaceful use of outer space” has long been front and centre in international space diplomacy and agreements since the first US-Soviet Space Race in the 1960s. But the legal framework is narrower than many assume. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 prohibits weapons of mass destruction – namely nuclear weapons – in orbit. It does not prohibit conventional weapons. During the Cold War, there were numerous tests of conventional weapons for space intercept and other offensive military operations. In recent years, China, Russia, and India have all conducted direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missile tests from the ground. So the taboo against space weaponisation has always been more normative than strictly legal.

The longstanding fear has been that once someone starts deploying weapons in orbit, especially weapons which could strike targets on Earth, it would represent a very destabilising step – one that could impact strategic stability and lead to a potential arms race in space. That concern, together with the sheer financial cost attached, has been strong enough to keep major powers from going down that road. But the strategic environment has changed, and technology has advanced, making old ideas finally more feasible. Geopolitics, especially, have shifted massively. The behaviour of adversaries – especially China and Russia – has become far more concerning.

Welcome to the long war: Why a Ukraine deal was never realistic

Brian Whitmore

This war will be decided on the battlefield.

Four months of chaotic shuttle diplomacy aimed at reaching a cease-fire in Ukraine, multiple phone calls between US President Donald Trump and Kremlin leader Vladimir Putin, repeated US attempts to pressure, browbeat, and bully Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy into concessions, have all yielded exactly nothing.

Which is not in the least bit surprising. Because there is no deal to be had with Russia on Ukraine. There never has been, and there never will be.

There is simply no magic formula, no concession, and no grand bargain that would satisfy the Kremlin’s maximalist and eliminationist goals. Moscow wants to end Ukraine’s sovereignty, nationhood, and statehood. Ukraine wants to continue to exist as an independent sovereign state. Given this, no compromise is possible. Any Kabuki negotiations or Potemkin cease-fire would be meaningless and treated by the Kremlin as nothing more than a strategic pause and an opportunity for sanctions relief.

“Russian imperialism will not be neutralized by negotiations, compromises, or concessions,” Andreas Umland, an analyst at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies and an associate professor at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, wrote on May 22.

Following his latest call with Trump, Putin said he wanted any settlement to address what he called the “root causes of the crisis.” That choice of phrase was no accident. The Kremlin leader used a similar formulation when addressing the issue of ending the war during a joint press conference with Belarusian strongman Alyaksandr Lukashenka in March.

Putin’s repeated use of the term “root cause” is a tell. For the Kremlin leader, the root cause of the war is the very existence of Ukraine as a sovereign state, which he has long seen as anathema. At the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest, Putin made this clear when he told then US President George W. Bush that “Ukraine is not even a state.” Putin has also repeatedly referred to Ukraine as “little Russia,” a Tsarist-era term to describe Ukrainian lands.

For Putin and the Kremlin elite, Russian colonial dominance of Ukraine is an ideological issue that is not subject to negotiation. The Kremlin cannot be persuaded, it can only be defeated.

Russia’s game: decouple the war from relations with Washington

If anyone doubts Russia’s intentions, then recent remarks by Vladimir Medinsky, one of Putin’s court ideologists and the Kremlin’s chief representative at recent talks in Istanbul, should put them to rest. “Russia,” Medinsky told the Ukrainian delegation, “is prepared to fight forever.” He added, in reference to the Northern War of 1700-1721, which elevated Russia to the status of an empire, “we fought Sweden for twenty-one years. How long are you ready to fight?”

Army 2.0: UK cyber hackers to fight drones on the battlefield in new era for warfare

Cyber experts will be deployed on the battlefield alongside the regular Armed Forces as part of a major modernisation of the British military to prepare for drone warfare, The i Paper can reveal.

A new “digital warfighting group” with skills in hacking and cyber operations will work alongside infantry soldiers to scramble enemy drone signals, take down drone “swarms” and launch counter-attacks, if the UK is engaged in another war.

The plans, to be unveiled in the long-awaited Strategic Defence Review (SDR) on Monday, mark a new era for military capabilities and are in response to the war in Ukraine, where more soldiers have been killed by drones than traditional weapons and artillery.

Figures revealed by Western officials earlier this year showed that 80 per cent of battlefield casualties in Ukraine were due to drones, often deployed at short range.

The new digital warfighting unit will consist of personnel with basic military training but they will not be traditional soldiers, and will be employed instead for their cyber expertise.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) is expected to fast-track recruitment of cyber experts to create the unit ready for the front line if Britain ever goes to war again.

The plans, which are being recommended by the SDR but have been endorsed by the Government, are part of enabling the British military to “adapt to a new style of warfare”, a Whitehall source said.

Sir Keir Starmer and Defence Secretary John Healey will launch the SDR on Monday, which has been authored by former Nato secretary-general Lord Robertson, General Sir Richard Barrons, former head of the Joint Forces Command, and Fiona Hill, part of Donald Trump’s national security team during his first term.

The authors have made several recommendations based on evidence taken from the front line in Ukraine’s three-year war with Russia.

Their work found that drone warfare has now become the key challenge for modern-day militaries.

While armed drones have been in use for decades, their use in the Ukraine war has become commonplace. UK Defence Intelligence, part of the MoD, estimates that last year Ukraine had to defend against attacks from more than 18,000 drones.

While the MoD already has an existing Cyber Command, its personnel are currently based at military headquarters.

In the event that Britain goes to war, the digital warfighting unit would see these personnel deployed to the front line for the first time.A Ukrainian soldier prepares to launch a drone for an aerial reconnaissance mission in the Zaporizhzhia region of Ukraine (Photo: Ukrinform/Getty)

The MoD has already developed new invisible radio wave weapons which can knock out drone swarms at short range.

A trial at a weapons range in West Wales earlier this year saw the largest counter-drone swarm exercise the British Army has conducted to date.

This weapon system is a type of Radiofrequency Directed Energy Weapon (RF DEW) which can neutralise multiple targets simultaneously with near-instant effect.

It uses high frequency radio waves to disrupt or damage critical electronic components inside drones, causing them to crash or malfunction, with ranges up to 1km and costs around 10p per shot fired.

They are effective against threats which cannot be jammed using electronic warfare.

The SDR is expected to announce around £1bn of dedicated funding for the MoD’s cyber warfare preparations.

UK critical infrastructure security set to be boosted to defend against Russian hybrid warfare

The security of Britain’s critical infrastructure is expected to be beefed up as part of the Government’s plans to defend the country against “grey zone” activity waged by Russia.

The Strategic Defence Review will recommend a “new deal” between Whitehall and the private sector to encourage investment in the protection of undersea cables and critical sites like airports and energy plants, The i Paper understands.

The review will call for closer working between the government and private companies to defend critical infrastructure, after a series of attempts to undermine property and sites on land and under the sea.

A Whitehall source said: “The world is no longer black and white, we are seeing increasing grey zone activity.”

“Grey zone” or hybrid warfare, as distinct from traditional states of hot, kinetic conflicts or the impasse of the cold war, involves enemy states carrying out cyber attacks, interference of telecommunication cables or disinformation campaigns.

Russia is believed to be behind a number of attacks on undersea cables in the North Sea and Baltic Sea over the past few years.

The SDR is expected to call for greater resilience of critical infrastructure, with interested parties, such as internet companies and energy and aviation firms, asked to do more to help protect them.

Israel’s Iron Beam Laser Air Defense System Has Downed Enemy Drones

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Israel has used a new air defense laser to shoot down Hezbollah drones in the current conflict in the Middle East, it has been confirmed. What is described as an adapted version of the Iron Beam system made its combat debut last October, and the definitive version should be fielded by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) later this year, joining an already formidable, layered air defense network, something you can read about in more detail here.The purported demise of a Hezbollah drone, targeted by the interim version of the Iron Beam last October. Rafael screenshot

The use of the Iron Beam — also known by its Hebrew name Magen Or — was announced by the IDF, Israeli Air Force (IAF), and defense contractor Rafael, in a joint statement. These three organizations, it is said, “executed an accelerated development program to deploy revolutionary interception systems,” as part of an effort that also involved Israel’s Directorate of Defense Research and Development.

Spheres of Influence Are Not the Answer

Sarang Shidore

the director of the Quincy Institute’s Global South Program.An illustration shows Trump from above and behind walking away with six views of the globe behind him.Foreign Policy illustration/Getty Images

The Oval Office clash between U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky before a full-court media, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stating that Ukraine is “not our war,” and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s acquiescence to any U.S. annexation of Greenland have increased speculation on whether the United States is jettisoning the decades-old model based on allies and partners and adopting a spheres-of-influence approach in its grand strategy. These signals have been buttressed by Trump’s recent speech in Saudi Arabia, in which the president rejected what he saw as previous U.S. presidents’ tendencies to “look into the souls of foreign leaders and use U.S. policy to dispense justice for their sins.”

The big promise with spheres of influence is the reduction, if not elimination, of the risk of world war. As great powers carve up the world, limit their defined interests, and respect one another’s backyards, they have less disputes and less reasons to engage in conflict. Or so goes the claim.

Sarang Shidore is the director of the Quincy Institute’s Global South Program. He focuses on the geopolitics of the global south, Asia, and climate change. X: @globalsarang

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Russia’s Hybrid Warfare Tactics Target the Baltics

Eitvydas Bajarūnas

We are publishing this piece because Ambassador Eitvydas Bajarūnas has a wide range of governmental experiences that give him unique insight into modern political warfare. Among his many overseas postings, Ambassador Bajarūnas served as the Ambassador of Lithuania to Russia and as Deputy Ambassador of Lithuania’s delegation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). He previously served as Ambassador-at-Large for Hybrid Threats and regularly provides analysis on Russian informational warfare against the Baltics. In 2016, when he finished his posting as the Lithuanian Ambassador to Sweden, the then-Minister for Foreign Affairs nominated him as Ambassador-at-Large for Hybrid Threats. His main tasks were, first, to serve as the focal point within the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on this topic, and second, to promote understanding of hybrid threats and the need to counter them among EU and NATO allies.

Ambassador Bajarūnas participated in various EU and NATO working groups and initiatives (e.g., the NATO-Ukraine Hybrid Platform, the EU Working Group on Countering Hybrid Threats). He also negotiated and signed the memorandum establishing the European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats on behalf of Lithuania. Additionally, Bajarūnas took part in numerous seminars and working meetings, wrote numerous articles, and gave interviews to promote understanding of this phenomenon. Ambassador Bajarūnas’s piece helps place these developments into a larger context and explains why Russian political warfare is a decisive threat to frontline states. This essay builds upon Beniamino Irdi’s previous Perspectives article “Hybrid Threats and Modern Political Warfare: The Architecture of Cross-Domain Conflict,” highlighting the themes of dispersion across domains and gradualness in timing.

Executive Summary:Hybrid threats describe a complex strategy combining military tools with unconventional methods. Addressing hybrid threats in the Baltics is a continuous, never-ending process centered around developing resilience at the societal, national, European, and trans-Atlantic levels.

With Russia’s frontline in Ukraine nearly stagnant, Moscow’s efforts yielding limited results despite enormous casualty rates and physical destruction, and peace efforts so far have made no progress, the prospects of a prolonged conflict have become apparent.

The Kremlin is now preparing for a long battle both on the frontline and beyond. Consequently, Russia’s use of hybrid strategies, alongside military ones, has become more evident.

The Baltic States have effectively countered Russia’s continuously escalating hybrid threats through resilience and strategic cooperation with the European Union and NATO. Their ability to withstand pressure highlights their strength in defending democracy and resisting foreign interference.

United States wondered how China had made such progress in the field of microchips. Huawei and Xiaomi are the answer, with massive development.

The United States has long dominated the semiconductor market, putting China under pressure with trade restrictions on companies such as Huawei and Xiaomi. But in just a few years, Beijing has made a spectacular comeback.

The embargo that triggered the offensive

Since 2019, sanctions imposed by Washington on Chinese tech giants have prohibited Huawei, among other things, from accessing advanced components from US companies such as Qualcomm or Intel. The aim: to curb China’s technological expansion and preserve its strategic lead in the semiconductor sector.

But far from paralysing the sector, these restrictions have accelerated China’s investment in its electronics industry. The government has injected billions of yuan into research, training and, above all, the local manufacture of chips, even if they are technically less advanced than the 3 or 5 nanometre chips produced in Taiwan or Korea.

Huawei and Xiaomi: the bridgeheads

Huawei’s return with its in-house Kirin 9000S processor – integrated into the Mate 60 Pro – has caused surprise, if not concern, in Washington. This system-on-a-chip, produced in SMIC factories, is tangible proof that China can produce advanced chips locally, despite embargoes. Xiaomi followed suit with the development of its own semiconductors, notably for cameras and energy management.

Even if these chips do not yet fully rival the latest generations from Qualcomm or Apple, they mark a strategic turning point: the end of China’s total dependence on foreign technologies. The industry is also reorganising around national standards and alternative architectures such as RISC-V, which are open and less subject to Western control than ARM or x86 architecture

Hegseth Outlines U.S. Vision for Indo-Pacific, Addresses China Threat

Matthew Olay

While delivering plenary remarks at a Singaporean security summit today, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth outlined to numerous Asian ally countries DOD's vision for the Indo-Pacific region, while also addressing the strategic threat posed by China.

Speaking at the International Institute for Strategic Studies Shangri-La Dialogue, Hegseth began his remarks by underscoring the Defense Department's priorities of achieving peace through strength by focusing on restoring the warrior ethos, rebuilding the military and reestablishing deterrence.

The secretary then used the topic of deterrence — noting, specifically, that our allies around the world are beginning to invest more in their self-defense — to segue into speaking about the Indo-Pacific region.

"As our allies share the burden, we can increase our focus on the Indo-Pacific: our priority theater," Hegseth said.

Stating the futures of the U.S. and its Indo-Pacific allies are "bound together," Hegseth said the security and prosperity of Americans are linked to the security and prosperity of U.S. ally countries' citizens.

"We share your vision of peace and stability, of prosperity and security and we are here to stay," he said.

The future vision for the Indo-Pacific is one "grounded in common sense and national interests," Hegseth said, where the U.S. and its allies work together while respecting their mutual self-interests and engaging on the basis of sovereignty and commerce, as opposed to war.

The secretary pointed out, as President Donald J. Trump continues to lead European allies to step up in their self-defense, the U.S. can then focus more resources on the Indo-Pacific region.

"This enables all of us to benefit from the peace and stability that comes with a lasting and strong American presence here in the Indo-Pacific," Hegseth said.

"These benefits, they only multiply when our allies and partners are also strong," he added.

Regarding American influence in the region, Hegseth said the U.S. isn't interested in the approach to foreign policy of the past.

Asia Is Getting Dangerously Unbalanced

Stephen M. Walt

a columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.Donald Trump looks up as he sits beside China's President Xi Jinping during a tour of the Forbidden City in Beijing on Nov. 8, 2017.Donald Trump looks up as he sits beside China's President Xi Jinping during a tour of the Forbidden City in Beijing on Nov. 8, 2017. JIM WATSON/AFP via Getty Images

April 1, 2025, 4:42 AM

With all the chaos currently engulfing U.S. foreign policy, it’s easy to lose sight of some more fundamental aspects of global politics. We’ve all been distracted by Signalgate, the Russia-Ukraine negotiations, the Trump administration’s increasingly obvious animus toward Europe, a looming trade war, the self-inflicted wound of a deteriorating U.S.-Canada relationship, and the systematic assault on democratic institutions inside the United States. If you’re having trouble keeping up with all this mishigas, you’re not alone.

Let me pull you away from the headlines for a moment and invite you to focus on a big issue with long-term implications: the future of U.S. alliances in Asia. U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth is taking a break from using an insecure app to text his colleagues (and a journalist) about attack plans in Yemen and is off trying to reassure U.S. allies in Asia. I wish him luck because the combination of Hegseth’s inexperience and the administration’s policies to date won’t make that easy.

Stephen M. Walt is a columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. Bluesky

The 20th Century’s Lessons for Our New Era of War

Hal Brands

a professor of global affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.A black-and-white photo shows soldiers carrying guns and wearing helmets, seen from behind as they head toward something burning on the horizon. Plumes of smoke billow into the sky.Soviet infantry in combat during the Battle of Kursk in 1943. Laski Diffusion/Getty Images

America must “pay the price for peace,” said President Harry Truman in 1948, or it would “pay the price of war.” The ghastliest moments of the 20th century came when autocratic aggressors ruptured the Eurasian balance of power. Standards of morality went by the wayside in conquered regions. Autocratic spheres of influence became platforms for further predation. Countervailing coalitions, thrown together under dire circumstances, had to claw their way back into hostile continents at horrid cost. This is why Truman’s America, having paid the price of war twice in a quarter century, chose to continuously bolster the peace after 1945.

There was nothing simple about this. Preventing global war was arduous, morally troubling work. It required learning the apocalyptic absurdities of nuclear deterrence. It involved fighting bloody “limited” conflicts, going to the brink over Cuba and Berlin, and preparing incessantly for a confrontation the United States and its allies hoped never to fight. The long great-power peace of the postwar era didn’t just happen; it was the payoff of a decades-long effort to make the military balance favor the free world. An important lesson, then, is that a cold war is the reward for deterring a hot one.

Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger distinguished professor of global affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and the author, most recently, of The Eurasian Century: Hot Wars, Cold Wars, and the Making of the Modern World. X

The Electromagnetic Spectrum for Golden Dome To Succeed

Robert Peters

There is a huge debate going on right now in Washington regarding the electromagnetic spectrum.

The crux of the debate centers around whether the Federal government should auction additional portions of the electromagnetic spectrum to private industry, or if it should refrain from doing so in the name of national security.

The portions of the electromagnetic spectrum in question are those that fall between 3.1 to 3.45 gigahertz (GHz) and 7 and 8 GHz. Telecommunication companies for years have utilized parts of the electromagnetic spectrum to deliver faster internet speeds, more reliable connectivity, and breakthroughs in artificial intelligence.

By auctioning off additional parts of the electromagnetic spectrum, as the House Energy and Commerce Committee approved to do earlier this month, the government could not only reap billions of dollars in tax revenues, but also enable advances in wireless technology in the private sector that could support the development of driverless cars, more reliable remote surgeries, or other types of technological breakthroughs.

President Trump indicated in a May 20 post that the U.S. government should auction off large chunks of the spectrum in order to ensure that the United States can remain a world-leader in 6G technologies and WiFi accessibility. These are critically important goals, and President Trump is correct that America must remain a leader in these technology areas.

Such an auction, however, could come with a significant cost if certain parts of the spectrum were not fenced off for national security reasons.

In particular, the 3.1 to 3.45 GHz band of the spectrum that may be auctioned off is currently reserved for military applications and are critical to missile defenses such as the Navy’s Aegis system. These systems are central to defending against ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles—all of which are required if the United States is going to build the Golden Dome for America missile defense architecture.

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