Mark F. Cancian and Chris H. Park
This commentary was updated on Monday, October 27 with an extended discussion of latest U.S. military activities.
The Trump administration announced that the Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group (CSG) will deploy to the Caribbean to help “dismantle Transnational Criminal Organizations and counter narco-terrorism in defense of the Homeland.” The CSG had been in the Mediterranean for exercises with allies and to respond to potential hostilities around Israel, Gaza, and the Red Sea.
An earlier update on the Caribbean from CSIS wondered whether the forces in the region would decline, stay even, or increase. For a while it looked like they were staying even, as new arrivals replaced departing ships. Now, it looks like the naval presence is expanding.
Moving such a major element of U.S. combat power is highly significant because of the strategic trade-off it represents. The Navy has only 11 aircraft carriers. In general, only three are at sea at any one time because of the need for maintenance and training. All the regional commanders want them. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command always wants one—as a supplement to the carrier permanently stationed in Japan to counter the Chinese navy and conduct exercises with regional allies and partners. Central Command wants one for the Indian Ocean for use against Iran and the Houthis or in the Eastern Mediterranean to provide air defense for Israel. European Command wants one for operations around Europe to deter Russia. By contrast, the Caribbean has been a low-visibility region for decades, with carriers rarely visiting.
The administration attributes the aircraft carrier’s deployment to the counterdrug mission, and a few of its wide range of capabilities can help with ongoing operations. Overall, however, carriers are poorly suited for the surveillance tasks entailed with stopping drug smugglers. On the other hand, they are superbly suited for conducting air attacks and supporting amphibious landings.
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