Franz-Stefan Gady
Imagine China launching an invasion of Taiwan, and the United States decides to come to the island’s defense. Following the Pentagon’s doctrine and operational concepts for fighting such a war, the U.S. Navy and Air Force launch thousands of long-range missiles against Chinese ships, command centers, and logistics hubs. In the opening strikes alone, more than 33,000 precision-guided munitions target over 8,500 locations. Cyberattacks decimate Chinese military networks and paralyze the leadership. Beijing is forced to retreat or face defeat in what appears to be a swift, decisive U.S. success. Few U.S. lives are lost in this rapid, technology-driven triumph.
The book cover for How the United States Would Fight China
This article has been adapted from How the United States Would Fight China: The Risks of Pursuing a Rapid Victory by Franz-Stefan Gady (Oxford University Press, 256 pp., $34.99, November 2025).
If this seems like the ideal scenario to you, you’d be wrong. For as precision strikes destroy Chinese missile launchers, command centers, and communications networks, Beijing’s military leaders face cascading military failures even as they are isolated by degraded communications. In a moment of panic about the rapid success of their adversary, the Chinese leadership may well consider vertical escalation—the use of nuclear weapons—before its remaining capabilities are eliminated. Beijing might authorize a demonstration nuclear strike over open waters as a signal of resolve and as an attempt to halt U.S. operations. It is then unclear whether Washington will interpret such a demonstration as justification for preemptive nuclear strikes against remaining Chinese capabilities.
It is not China’s nuclear doctrine per se that creates this dangerous escalation dynamic, but rather the United States’ preferred warfighting approach. Unlike Russia and the United States, with their much larger nuclear arsenals, Beijing may not yet believe that it can withstand a U.S. nuclear first strike and still have the ability to strike back—the critical deterrent against a nuclear first strike to begin with. China’s nuclear arsenal is rapidly expanding, but it is still small relative to that of the United States. (China had approximately 600 operational warheads as of 2024 compared to the United States’ estimated 3,700.) This vulnerability could compel Chinese leaders to use nuclear weapons early in a conflict rather than risk losing them to continued U.S. strikes.
The escalation risk is amplified by a particular aspect of Chinese armament: Its military possesses dual-capable missile systems and facilities that can launch both conventional and nuclear warheads. U.S. strikes against conventional DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile sites or DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile launchers and their command centers could be interpreted by Beijing as attacks on its nuclear deterrent, potentially triggering Chinese nuclear retaliation.
The DF-26 presents a particularly acute entanglement problem. These launchers come with conventional and nuclear warheads, which are often located on the same military bases. Brigades practice drills launching conventional attacks before reloading the launchers with nuclear warheads. If the United States targets these missile sites to prevent conventional strikes on U.S. forces, the Chinese leadership may interpret the attacks as aimed against the Chinese nuclear deterrent and as preparation for a U.S. nuclear first strike. In the heat of battle, this is a dangerous ambiguity that could inadvertently trigger nuclear escalation.
U.S. military planners are caught in an impossible dilemma. By continuing to focus on the kind of war they’ve always planned for—a rapid, decisive military campaign to paralyze Chinese forces and their leadership—they are increasing the risk of that leadership seeing no way out but escalation. At the same time, resource constraints make these U.S. warfighting plans unlikely to succeed in the first place.
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