Michael Clarke
Much attention has been paid to the symbolism of China’s September 3 parade in Beijing to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the end of the “War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression.” Some see the parade as evidence of the solidification of an “axis of upheaval” given the attendance of the leaders of Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Others have highlighted the parade’s role in the Chinese Communist Party’s ongoing efforts to appropriate the history of China’s World War II experience to both burnish both its nationalist credentials and its agenda to de-center the United States’ role in the waging of the war and the settlement that followed.
What has not received as much attention, however, is what the display of military hardware in Tiananmen Square may tell us not only about the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the types of missions and conflicts that Beijing expects it to fight, but also its current threat perceptions.
In the first instance, as the Science of Military Strategy (SMS) – a compendium of the “views of many of the PLA’s leading strategists” on military strategy and doctrine – noted, such a “general display of military power” is a means of deterrence signaling as it demonstrates to potential adversaries that “we have advanced defense and counterattack methods” with which to retaliate.
More specifically, the hardware displayed and the official commentary around it suggest three areas of emphasis for the PLA: a continuing focus on development of capabilities to mount multidomain joint operations, adaptation to the age of drones and autonomous systems, and enhancement of conventional and nuclear deterrence.
It has been apparent for some time that the PLA envisions future conflict to encompass “multiple battlespace domains” characterized by “information-centric warfare.” The PLA’s current operational construct of “informationized warfare” thus entails the development of the PLA into a “force enabled by the widespread and streamlined use of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, data analysis, and robotics.” This was underscored by appearance at the parade of contingents of the PLA’s Space Force, Cyber Force, Information Support Force, and Logistics Support Force. These contingents displayed a range of capabilities including “electronic countermeasure equipment” capable of “disconnecting enemy networks and breaking digital chains” and “vehicles of cloud computing, digital intelligence, air-ground networks, and integrated information” that “can quickly establish new types of cyber systems to support joint operations.”
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