Pragmatic trio: China, Russia, North Korea’s triangle of convenience

Shamuratov Shovkat

Sourec Link

Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un aren't as close as they try to portray. Image: X Screengrab

The war in Ukraine and the resulting Western sanctions have dramatically reshaped Moscow’s external priorities.

Facing isolation from European and American markets, Russia has pivoted decisively eastward, rediscovering strategic and economic opportunities with China and North Korea. What has emerged is not a formal alliance but a pragmatic network of survival — a triangle defined less by shared ideology than by mutual necessity and the constraints of sanctions.

Russia’s pivot to the East is not new, but the urgency imposed by sanctions has intensified it. China, Russia’s largest trading partner, provides both a reliable market and a critical supply of energy, technology and manufactured goods. In 2023, China–Russia trade hit a record US$240 billion.

Meanwhile, North Korea – long isolated and dependent on China – has found renewed value in a Russia willing to engage outside formal international frameworks, with an increasing share of its trade — arguably over 90% — flowing through Chinese channels.

For Russia, engagement with Pyongyang is largely pragmatic. Moscow seeks low-cost labor, logistical support and occasionally materiel or munitions —all of which North Korea can supply.

Pyongyang, in turn, gains access to food, fuel and a degree of diplomatic leverage. The result is a network of informal economic arrangements – sometimes referred to as a “gray trade corridor” – that enables both countries to circumvent certain key aspects of international sanctions.