Andrew Davidson
European capitals and NATO partners are getting serious about a “drone wall” for Europe’s eastern flank. Public pressure and a series of recent incursions by small unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in multiple European states have pushed air defense onto national agendas. While drones can be used as weapons themselves (and often are in war zones), European governments today are focused on other UAS-related threats. Indeed, drones can serve as persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, and can carry jammers, spoofers or electronic decoys that interfere with air defense systems. Europe’s political commitment to a barrier against this threat is real, but the operational foundations beneath the rhetoric remain uncertain simply because there is no common understanding of what a wall would entail.
Cheap, long-range drones have become a cost-effective way of needling an adversary. A $30,000 one-way drone can force a defending nation to spend 10 times more on interception. Unless this gap narrows, perimeter deployments could become financially unsustainable over time. Low-altitude flight and near-border launch zones reduce reaction time, demanding dense sensor networks that expand costs and require continuous energy input and coordination few states can sustain alone.
Electronic warfare is a powerful but limited counter. Its reach depends on power, geometry and logistics: Small jammers cover only a few kilometers, while even large fixed emitters rarely exceed 70-100 kilometers (about 40-60 miles) under ideal conditions. That limited reach matters because much of Europe’s industrial and energy base lies close to its eastern borders. The absence of deep geographic buffers – and the presence of open air corridors such as the narrow Baltic passage near Kaliningrad – makes detection and response complex. Europe’s geography thus underscores that mobility, coordination and energy resilience should be central to its counter-drone strategy.
Logistics
Defending against long-range and loitering drones is first a problem of physics and logistics, not just technology. Effective jamming is ultimately a power contest: the jammer must overwhelm the drone’s control signal by transmitting a stronger interfering signal – known as achieving a favorable jammer-to-signal ratio – requiring antenna alignment, cooling and constant energy. Maintaining that margin requires continuous power supply and operational flexibility to sustain detection and response across European airspace. A comprehensive defense also depends on shared command structures and compatible procedures between states to manage the wider network and prevent gaps in coverage.
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