India and Pakistan Aren’t Talking Enough

Anchal Vohra

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An Indian Border Security Force (BSF) soldier (2R) and a Pakistani Ranger perform during the Beating the Retreat ceremony at the India-Pakistan Wagah border post near Amritsar, India on August 1, 2022.An Indian Border Security Force (BSF) soldier (2R) and a Pakistani Ranger perform during the Beating the Retreat ceremony at the India-Pakistan Wagah border post near Amritsar, India on August 1, 2022. NARINDER NANU/AFP via Getty Images

In the aftermath of the recent fighting between India and Pakistan, an Indian delegation has been traveling the West’s capitals on a mission to build support against what it described as Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. Shashi Tharoor, a senior politician with the opposition Indian National Congress party, led the delegation to the United States, where it met with Vice President J.D. Vance.

Afterward, Tharoor said the U.S. continued to support India and dismissed any chance of talks with Pakistan until it stops supporting Pakistan-based armed groups with a history of attacks against India. New Delhi won’t talk to Pakistan “with a gun pointed to our head,” Tharoor said.

Experts See Risk and Reward to Integrating AI in Nuclear Weapons

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Chinese experts see potential in the ability of cyberattacks enabled by artificial intelligence (AI) to disrupt nuclear infrastructure and increase the pressure to use nuclear weapons in a crisis.

The development of early warning capabilities toward a launch-on-warning posture increases Beijing’s impetus to integrate AI into data processing to inform decisions over nuclear use.

There is significant ongoing debate on the threats AI-enabled conventional threats pose to the People’s Liberation Army’s nuclear forces, the effectiveness of remote-sensing in undersea warfare, and the vulnerabilities of using AI to process early warning data and generate options for decision-makers to respond to nuclear threats.

In April 2025, Zhang Gaosheng (张高胜), a researcher at the China Institute of International Studies, penned an article in The Paper pinpointing several mechanisms in which the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) systems will increase the risk of nuclear escalation (The Paper, April 11). In particular, as AI technologies become increasingly embedded in critical nuclear infrastructure, the potential for miscalculation, system vulnerabilities, and unintended escalation grows more acute. It is, therefore, critical to understand how the PRC plans to integrate AI into its nuclear strategy.

Although Biden and Xi previously agreed on the need to maintain human control over the decision to use nuclear weapons, the decision to integrate AI into nuclear command, control, and communications NC3 is far more complex than the decision to maintain a human-in-the-loop (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 17, 2024). From processing early-warning data to autonomous targeting, there are numerous ways of integrating AI into NC3 while maintaining people within the decision-making process. As the performance of AI models rapidly improves, Chinese experts have identified opportunities to incorporate AI in NC3. They have also discussed the weaknesses of doing so and the risks AI may pose to the survivability of its nuclear forces.

Worldview Weekly #1: 99 Problems and 1 Year in Office

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On May 20, 2025, Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te celebrated a year in office. And while Lai’s speech, marking the milestone at the Presidential Office, presented a vision of cooperation with rival stakeholders, the second year of his presidency is off to a rocky start. If the recall campaign facing legislators of the two main parties – DPP and KMT – comes to fruition, it may be both a display of democratic vibrance, and indicative of volatility in the political corridors of Taipei.

Perhaps Lai’s biggest policymaking hurdle since the beginning of his tenure has been that his party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), failed to achieve a majority in the legislative yuan. Of the 113 parliamentary seats, 52 were won by the DPP’s main opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT), and 51 by the DPP. 8 seats were won by a third party closely aligned with major ideals of the KMT – the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). The remaining two seats went to independent candidates who, again, are believed to be ideologically aligned with the KMT. Subsequently, the KMT has blocked vital steps to secure Taiwan’s internal democratic and legal processes, as well as its defence preparedness.

For example, in December 2024, the KMT pushed amendments to the ‘Act Governing the Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures’. The Act was amended for the first time in 25 years, and its new text restricted the central government’s budgetary decision-making powers, especially in the defence sector. Now, the central government is liable to disburse more funds to local governments, bringing the ratio of the central-to-local tax revenue share from 75:25 to 60:40, the pre-1999 amendment levels. Even the budget cut numbers, which are usually expected to be ~30 billion NTD, now stand at an unprecedented high of ~200 billion NTD.

New Report Shows How China Uses AI to Augment its Online Intelligence Operations

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Artificial intelligence (AI) empowers China to conduct operations that blur the line between collecting sensitive information and influencing public opinion, and a June 10 report by OpenAI explains how.

Chinese intelligence operations are already leveraging online platforms to target government employees, military personnel, and academic researchers to recruit them as intelligence sources. OpenAI’s report shows how commercial AI tools can increase the speed, scale, and possibly the success of these operations.

Chinese Operation Blurs Line Between Influence and Intelligence

One operation captured in the OpenAI report specifically matches a known pattern of behavior from Beijing. As in many other Chinese campaigns, the operators pretended to be geopolitical risk consultants. They used OpenAI models to develop biographies for online personas, generate various types of content, analyze datasets, and translate correspondence.

While Chinese actors have used many of these tactics before, this particular operation is notable because those running it blended elements of intelligence gathering with foreign malign influence. The operators used OpenAI’s models to develop personas on X posing as journalists and geopolitical analysts who OpenAI assessed likely conducted a covert influence operation.

At the same time, the operators used OpenAI’s models to refine and translate unspecified correspondence intended for a U.S. senator about a government nominee. While OpenAI could not confirm whether the operators actually sent the correspondence, it demonstrates the intent to influence a member of Congress or at least gather intelligence from them.

Beijing Likely Uses Contractors to Conduct Espionage and Influence Operations

The prompts the operators used with OpenAI’s models suggest they were likely proxies or contractors rather than members of Beijing’s Ministry of State Security. OpenAI assessed that several prompts related to cyberattacks “suggest[ed] a low level of expertise.” These operators also used OpenAI’s models to create promotional materials aimed at the likely client for their services, the Chinese government.

Is China’s BeiDou a weapon of war?

Sean Gorman

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Over the past year, BeiDou has drawn increasing suspicion from U.S. officials, ranging from members of Congress to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Critics have warned that the global satellite navigation system (GNSS) might enable Beijing to track users, push malware or manipulate navigation data. 

In March 2025, the FCC launched a formal inquiry to assess the potential national security risks associated with the use of foreign satellite navigation systems, including China’s BeiDou.

Skepticism is certainly warranted. But BeiDou isn’t Huawei, and not all threats are created equal. In the case of GNSS, 

many of the concerns reflect theoretical fears rather than engineering realities. Restricting access to BeiDou and other foreign GNSS like GLONASS would undercut the very resilience our positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) systems are supposed to deliver.

Massive Stealth Flying Wing Emerges At Secretive Chinese Base

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In an exclusive development regarding China’s rapidly accelerating next-generation air combat programs, we have just gotten our first glimpse of a very large, low-observable, flying-wing, long-endurance unmanned aircraft.

The image of the previously unseen aircraft sitting outside of an already intriguing hangar complex at an airfield notorious for advanced air combat programs comes to us from the Planet Labs archive. The image was taken on May 14, 2025, and just appeared in the database.

The photo shows China’s secretive test base near Malan in Xinjiang province, which is known to be on the leading edge of the country’s unmanned aircraft development efforts. Specifically, the craft was parked outside of a sprawling new facility that was built very recently to the east of the base, connected to it by a very long taxiway leading to a security gate.PHOTO © 2025 PLANET LABS INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. REPRINTED BY PERMISSION

Construction of the installation began just over two years ago. The high-security site is very densely populated with hangars of various sizes. These include estimated (based on early construction satellite images) 70-meter, 50-meter, 20-meter, and 15-meter bays. The craft in question is sitting outside one of the largest bays. The low-slung, large hangars are reminiscent of the shelters for U.S. B-2 bombers at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri or infrastructure we see at the U.S. Air Force’s Plant 42 in Palmdale, California, associated with flying-wing aircraft. The smaller bays at Malan are a bit more of a puzzle.PHOTO © 2025 PLANET LABS INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. REPRINTED BY PERMISSION

It wasn’t previously apparent what this facility was intended to do, but now it seems clearer that it may be a testing base for China’s next generation air combat ecosystem, which would include aircraft of multiple sizes — from the H-20 stealth bomber, to large stealthy flying wing drones, the tri-engined J-36, to the J-XDS fighter, and of course, smaller tactical drones. It could also be a new test center specifically for next generation unmanned capabilities that will work with these programs. The U.S. Air Force is developing its Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) and Long-Range Strike (LRS) family of systems in a similar manner. This would perfectly explain the puzzling variety of bay sizes for such a compact base and its high-security nature. Still, this is just a guess based on the very small amount of visual evidence available

A New Step in China’s Military Reform

Joel Wuthnow 

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I n April 2024, Xi Jinping announced a new military restructuring focused on improving the ability of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to achieve information dominance and conduct integrated joint operations in wartime. Continuing a process of reform that Xi initiated nearly a decade ago,1 the latest reform included three parts: eliminating the Strategic Support Force (SSF), establishing a new Information Support Force (ISF) responsible for network defense and communications support, 

and placing the ISF and three other support forces under Xi’s direct control.2 This reform constituted the most significant structural overhaul of the PLA in the last 5 years, and the first since Russia’s failed attempt to topple the government in Ukraine signaled to Xi and other Chinese leaders the difficulties of offensive warfare, especially as Russian troops struggled to dominate the information environment and fight effectively as a joint force.3 Joel Wuthnow is a Senior Research Fellow in the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University. Chinese President Xi Jinping inspects Hong Kong Garrison of Chinese People’s Liberation Army at Shek Kong Barracks, in Hong Kong, 

June 30, 2024 (Xinhua/Pictorial Press, Ltd./Alamy) JFQ 117, 2nd Quarter 2025 Wuthnow 5 Xi’s reorganization seeks to continue to improve the PLA so that it can succeed where Russia stalled. A new round of structural improvements has been regarded internally as a positive step in the PLA’s ability to meet its 2027 modernization timeline, which reportedly has a focus on preparations for a Taiwan contingency.4 This article traces the origins of Xi’s latest reform, analyzing each of the three major components in turn. 

It then discusses the implications for the PLA’s operational effectiveness and the challenges that remain. The conclusion is that the reforms could improve the Chinese leadership’s confidence in the PLA’s combat potential and thus shape leadership views on the costs and risks of aggression. Refinements to the U.S. Joint Warfighting Concept should take this revised institutional context into account.

Can China Catch Up on AI?

Ravi Agrawal, the editor in chief of Foreign Policy.

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As details emerge from the trade negotiations between the United States and China this week, one thing seems clear:

 Rare earths were an important part of the discussions. China has a monopoly on the production and processing of the minerals used in the production of high-end magnets and chips. In response to U.S. President Donald Trump’s massive tariffs, Beijing’s new restrictions on critical minerals ended up bringing the two sides back to the table.

The battle over access to rare earths is part of a larger competition between Beijing and Washington on artificial intelligence. Who is best placed to win it, and what will that mean for the world? On the latest episode of FP Live,

 I sat down with the two co-heads of the Goldman Sachs Global Institute, Jared Cohen and George Lee, both of whom follow the geopolitics of AI closely. The full discussion is available on the video box atop this page or on the FP Live podcast. What follows here is a lightly edited and condensed transcript.

Quick Turn: How Did Israel Achieve Air Superiority?

Mike Casey

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The initial 48 hours of Operation Rising Lion have provided a compelling look at how a modern military can neutralize a nation’s air defenses. While I don’t claim expertise in Iranian or Israeli military capabilities specifically, my background in C4ISR analysis offers a unique lens for understanding these operations. Rather than cataloging the 100+ reported targets, a C4ISR-focused approach examines the critical nodes whose destruction created cascading, system-wide effects across Iran’s air defense network.

From this architectural perspective, let’s examine Israel’s Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) campaign—specifically identifying which command, control, communications, and sensor nodes were targeted to achieve disproportionate operational impact (acknowledging that information remains preliminary as events continue to unfold, so bear with me. Kudos to The Institute for the Study of War and The War Zone for their great up-to-date coverage of the conflict).

Orders and Observations is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

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Phase 1: Intelligence & Preparation

The kinetic assault was enabled by sophisticated intelligence groundwork, likely performed with both national and international support. While the U.S. has denied direct military involvement, Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed that Washington provided “exquisite” intelligence to Israel. This likely included data from a constellation of U.S. and NATO ISR assets that persistently monitor the region. Signals intelligence gathered by platforms like the RC-135 Rivet Joint, which were patrolling the periphery of Iranian airspace, would have provided a baseline Electronic Order of Battle (EOB), mapping the locations and frequencies of Iranian radars long before the operation began.

After Attacking Iran, Israel Girds for What’s Next

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At three o’clock on Friday morning, sirens blared across Israel, and my family in Tel Aviv sprang awake. As I shuffled my groggy children to the stairwell of our apartment building, I noticed that a garbage truck outside was carrying on as usual: loading a bin, unloading an empty one, beeping in reverse. Sirens have become so frequent in the past eighteen months that some Israelis have become inured to the threat.

The Lede

Reporting and commentary on what you need to know today.

“Brother!” someone shouted from a nearby window. “It’s Iran!”

The truck driver reconsidered. He stopped in the middle of the street, got out, and ducked inside our building to wait it out.

Across the Persian Gulf, Israel was carrying out a sophisticated attack against Iran’s capacity to build a nuclear weapon. Warplanes struck the Natanz nuclear facility, while other operations killed Iran’s top military general, the leader of its Revolutionary Guards, the head of its Air Force, and at least six nuclear scientists. News images showed apartment buildings in Tehran with smoke billowing from specific rooms, indicating precisely targeted attacks (though Iran said that eighty civilians were also killed). An unnamed security source told Channel 12 that the Mossad intelligence services had recently established bases inside Iran, 

where they kept precision missiles and suicide drones. The news aired grainy black-and-white footage of masked Mossad agents on the ground there, delicately setting down what were reportedly explosive drones, aimed at destroying the country’s air defenses. For twenty years, Israel had threatened to attack Iran’s nuclear program. Seemingly within minutes, it suddenly had. On Israeli television, military reporters warned of “complicated days ahead.” Yonit Levi, the anchorwoman of the leading news network on Channel 12, declared, “We are entering an entirely new situation.”

Operation Rising Lion: Initial Assessment and Implications

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Escalation in the Middle East has reached a new high. Following multiple exchanges between Israel and Iran throughout 2024, Israel has now launched a major military campaign aimed at preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

This post offers initial analytical insights into the Israeli campaign and the Iranian response that is now unfolding. As the operational picture remains incomplete, the focus here is on broader trends and implications rather than detailed operational developments.

Thanks for reading Missile Matters — with Fabian Hoffmann! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.

Between June 12 and 13, Israeli forces launched “Operation Rising Lion”, conducting large-scale airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and related assets in an effort to halt Iranian nuclear proliferation.

The operation targeted over 100 sites, including nuclear facilities at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan, as well as ballistic missile and command centers in multiple cities. Initial battle damage assessments indicate that above-ground nuclear infrastructure, such as the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz, and critical electricity assets, including transformer stations and backup generators, sustained heavy damage. Underground facilities, however, appear to have remained intact after initial strikes.

The strikes also killed several senior Iranian military officials, including IRGC head Hossein Salami, Chief of Staff Mohammad Bagheri, missile program commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh, and six nuclear scientists.

In direct response, Iran initiated “Operation True Promise III”, firing several hundred ballistic missiles in several volleys. Israel’s missile defense system managed to intercept the majority of incoming projectiles, though several ballistic missiles “leaked”, killing at least three civilians and injuring several dozen more.

Army Cyber Corps - A Prehistory

Scott Anderson - Cyber Corps Branch Historian

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On September 1, 2024, the U.S. Army Cyber Corps turned ten years old. Some may chuckle at the thought of this branch still teetering on the verge of adolescence compared to the more grizzled veteran branches like Infantry, Field Artillery, and Signal just to name a few. However, there is more than meets the eye with cyber, and as I communicate to my students at the U.S. Army Cyber and Electromagnetic Warfare School (which also turned ten) at Fort Eisenhower, GA, the Cyber Corps has accomplished much in its first decade. While still a pre-teen so to speak, the rate of change in this domain has always necessitated that Cyber act mature for its age. What follows is the first part of a planned series chronicling the history of the U.S. Army Cyber Corps and its school. This first essay provides a general synopsis of the emergence of cyber and how it became a key focus for the U.S. military, tracing its early connections to information warfare and operations. It also details the origins of cybersecurity, alongside the creation of Army Cyber Command and West Point’s Army Cyber Institute. Finally, a major theme of this essay focuses on the cyberspace areas of concentration developed by the Army Military Intelligence and Signal branches – setting the stage for the eventual adoption of cyber as a standalone career field for Army personnel.

The seeds of this domain germinated in the 1960s as the U.S. military began piecing together computer networks to speed up information sharing and threat detection in the midst of the ever present Soviet nuclear threat. Additionally, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the NSA had hundreds of “internetted” terminals. It was during this environment of early networking capabilities that the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) first came online in 1969. By 1976, “Information War” as it pertained to the information flow between weapons systems and the possible digital disruption of Soviet command and control, was viewed as a worthy pursuit. By 1979, NSA leadership recognized that any computer system could be breached by a knowledgeable user, and ideas about “deep penetration” technical capabilities against U.S. adversaries began to take root. By 1986, and possibly earlier, Special Access Programs overseen by the Joint Chiefs and National Security Agency (NSA) began attempting computer network exploitation. As the opportunities for intrusion into adversary networks widened, the U.S. discovered in 1986 that the Soviets were paying hackers to engage in similar tradecraft against U.S. networks.

Europe must act now to prevent a major war between Israel and Iran

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Israel has launched unprecedented strikes across Iran. On the morning of June 13th, Israeli prime minister Benyamin Netanyahu confirmed that the overnight attack was designed to inflict significant damage on Iran’s military facilities. It has likely scuttled US president Donald Trump’s chance of striking a deal to contain Iran’s nuclear programme. This is the biggest military attack Iran has faced since the conflict with Iraq in the 1980s; and Iran view Israel’s strikes as a declaration of war.

Israel has confirmed that the attack is the first phase of a military campaign which could last weeks. It involved several waves of strikes, with 200 fighter jets targeting 100 different locations including Iranian nuclear facilities. 

The assault also killed several senior Iranian commanders, including the heads of the army and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as well as nuclear scientists. Iranian media reports that civilians have also been killed.

Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has made clear that Iran will retaliate. If Tehran can still mobilise military capabilities despite the Israeli campaign, it is likely to target Israeli military sites—and possible critical infrastructure—directly.

How War Between Iran and Israel Could Escalate—and Drag In the United States

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On the evening of June 12, Israel launched a series of major strikes against Iran. The targets included Iranian nuclear facilities, missile sites, and multiple senior military and political officials. In a televised speech, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared success. Iranian officials, meanwhile, swore revenge. Leaders across the region braced for unrest.

To better understand what Israel’s strikes might mean, Foreign Affairs senior editor Daniel Block spoke with Daniel B. Shapiro. Shapiro served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East until January—charged with, among other things, considering scenarios in which tensions between Israel and Iran escalated into all-out war and preparing U.S. options for responding. Now a Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council, Shapiro has also served as U.S. Ambassador to Israel and Senior Director for the Middle East and North Africa on the National Security Council. Their conversation has been edited for length and clarity.

Just how big a deal are these attacks? How much more serious are they than were the Israeli attacks on Iran in April and October of last year?

The full extent of Israel’s strikes on Iran has not yet been revealed. But they are orders of magnitude beyond what Israel achieved in its April and October 2024 attacks. It is already clear that Israel was able to strike key nuclear sites, such as the Natanz enrichment facility, locations associated with possible weaponization research, ballistic missile launch sites, and numerous senior regime leaders and figures involved in Iran’s nuclear program. That is far more extensive than almost anyone forecast.

Iran is reeling from Israel's unprecedented attack - and it is only the start

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Israel's "Operation Rising Lion", as it calls its attack on Iran, is unprecedented. It is vastly more extensive and ambitious than anything that has come before, including the two missile and drone exchanges it had with Iran last year. For Iran, this is the biggest assault on its territory since the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988.

In the darkest hours before dawn the Israeli Air Force targeted not just sites linked to Iran's nuclear programme but also the country's air defences and ballistic missile bases, thereby reducing Iran's ability to retaliate.

On the ground and in the shadows, the network of operatives working for Mossad, Israel's overseas intelligence agency, reportedly helped to pinpoint the exact location of key figures in both the military command and nuclear scientists.

Those killed overnight include the head of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the guardians of the Islamic Revolution that overthrew the Shah's regime in 1979, as well as the head of the mainstream armed forces and the head of the IRGC air force. Iran says at least six of its scientists have been killed.

Once again, Israel's spy agency is shown to have successfully penetrated the very heart of Iran's security establishment, proving that no one there is safe.

Getty Images

There will be many more potential targets on Israel's hitlist, although some may be beyond its reach

Iran's state TV reported that 78 people were killed and said that civilians, including children, were among the dead. (This is an unofficial figure and has not been independently verified.)

Seven Security Scenarios on Russian War in Ukraine for 2025 - 2026: Implications and Policy Recommendations to Western Partners

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In 2022, GLOBSEC launched a new analytical projection product — Security Scenarios for Europe around the Russian War in Ukraine — as part of its Ukraine and Eastern Europe programme and the activities of the newly established GLOBSEC Kyiv Office. This product aims to provide indicative Scenarios of how the Russia-waged war in Ukraine will evolve over the next two consecutive years and what implications it might have for the security situation in Europe. Since then, GLOBSEC has published two editions of the product — Security Scenarios for 2022-2023 and 2024-2025.

The product has proven to be in high demand among European decision-makers, offering a variety of future options, probabilities for each Scenario, both negative and positive implications for Western partners, along with policy recommendations for all major geopolitical stakeholders in European security. The predictions from the analysis for 2022/23 and 2024/25 have been shown to be accurate and appropriate. The leading Scenario for 2024-2025, “Russian War in Ukraine, Prolonged War of Attrition”, with a probability score of 31,02%, anticipated a prolonged war beyond 2025. As analysis for 2024/25 considered security Scenario when the outcome of the US presidential elections was uncertain, the authors could not have made definite projections and consequently viewed the US factor more conditionally.

This study is a continuation of the previous work done on Scenario building in November 2022 and December 2023 with a foresight analysis of potential short- and medium-term security developments in Ukraine around the Russian war and their further implications for European and global security. In response to high demand for revised Scenario following the election of Donald Trump as President of the US, as well as a clear push for a negotiated settlement, the GLOBSEC team has developed an updated version of the Security Scenarios for 2025/26.

US agencies assessed Chinese telecom hackers likely hit data center and residential internet providers

David DiMolfetta,

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Two U.S. security agencies listed mass media provider Comcast and data center giant Digital Realty among companies likely ensnared by a Chinese hacking group previously found inside major U.S. and global telecom operators, according to three people familiar with the matter.

The National Security Agency made the determination that Comcast had likely been impacted by the group, known as Salt Typhoon, according to two of the people. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency cataloged Digital Realty as being potentially compromised, the third person said. The people spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the matter’s sensitivity.

Salt Typhoon breached major telecom carriers in a global, multi-year espionage campaign uncovered last year. Over time, news trickled out about the scope and scale of the incident, which was first reported by The Wall Street Journal.

The hacking unit is part of a broader syndicate of state-backed groups tied to different military and intelligence arms of China’s central government. The “Typhoon” moniker comes from a Microsoft naming convention for Beijing-linked cyber actors.

Such intrusions, especially into a data center environment, could give the hackers a potentially far deeper foothold into infrastructure supporting the world’s information service providers than previously known. The agencies’ assessments have not been previously reported.

There’s uncertainty among officials about who was impacted by Salt Typhoon. Various agencies across the U.S. government are in possession of lists of confirmed or potential victims, but it’s not clear if the tallies are consistent with each other, adding to confusion about who may have been accessed, targeted or marked for investigation, one of the people said.

Israel Is Going for the Death Blow on Iran

Steven A. Cook, 

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On Oct. 9, 2023, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that Israel would “change the Middle East.” Observers may not have been paying careful attention, or they may have thought it was just rhetoric. But in the nearly 20 months of brutal conflict that has followed, the Israelis have done much to realize this goal. With the recent attack on Iran, which occurred just hours ago, they are seeking to strike a final and fatal blow against the Axis of Resistance.

All the death and destruction in Gaza and the attendant international outcry has obscured a critical Israeli achievement. Israel is in a better strategic position—and thus more secure—than it was on Oct. 7, 2023. There is no longer a military rationale for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank because Hamas is no longer a threat. Most of its leaders in Gaza are dead, and the few that remain have few resources, face a growing opposition of ordinary Gazans outraged at what Hamas has brought upon them, and have been forced to rely on lightly trained fighters. 

The war continues only in service of the annexationist agenda of the far-right politicians in Israel. The dream of taking Gaza and extending Israeli sovereignty in the West Bank has only been made possible by the broader battlefield successes of the IDF, however.

Rising Lion Continues

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Certain Iranian hardliner's spoke bravely, but they didn't know what was about to happen. They are all DEAD now, and it will only get worse! President Trump, 13 June 2025.

The latest phase of the Israel-Iran War is now over 24 hours old. It appears that the Israeli campaign against Iran is only getting started.

In this assessment, I explore what can be gleaned from the past 24 hours of operations, address some of the questions I posed in my previous article on this war, and pose some new questions as well. I will cover ten key topics related to the war (so far):

Israel’s decapitation operations.

The U.S. reaction.

The battle of narratives.

Has Iran learned from Russia?

Have Israel and Ukraine Been Collaborating on Creative Drone Operations?

Lessons for crewed-uncrewed teaming.

Reinforcing the need for national air, drone and missile defence.

How long can Israel sustain operations?

Impact on Ukraine?

Who else might exploit this opportunity?

Israel’s decapitation operations. Israel targeted multiple military and scientific leaders in the first wave of attacks. The New York Times has posted a useful article on who was targeted and where these individuals sat in the Iranian hierarchy. You can read that piece here.

What’s Israel’s Endgame?

Nahal Toosi

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Nahal Toosi is POLITICO’s senior foreign affairs correspondent. She has reported on war, genocide and political chaos in a career that has taken her around the world. Her reported column, Compass, delves into the decision-making of the global national security and foreign policy establishment — and the fallout that comes from it.

Israel’s attack on Iran will no doubt set back Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. But among many Middle East obsessives, there’s a growing sense that the Israeli operation has the potential to lead to something much bigger: toppling Iran’s Islamist government.

Yeah, I’ll say it. Regime change.

It’s a phrase that normally sends shudders through a Washington and a Middle East chastened by the U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. It’s a concept that has long left President Donald Trump extremely wary; his administration has already put out word it played no role in the attack. And the Israeli government hasn’t declared that regime change is its official objective.

Still, as I’ve listened to Israeli comments on the strikes and learned about their scope, including assassinations of top Iranian military officials, I’ve been struck by how they’re not dismissing the possibility of regime change, either. When you put the moves in the context of Israeli military actions since fall 2023 — strikes that have ousted, helped oust or decimated multiple Iran-allied “regimes” in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria — it doesn’t seem that far-fetched.

Ousting, or at the very least severely weakening, Iran’s regime also is something Israel can arguably do on its own; it doesn’t necessarily need American help on the offensive end.

The Expanding Campaign

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First, welcome home to the Ukrainian military personnel who were exchanged in the latest Ukraine-Russia prisoner swap. There were four exchanges this week.

In this edition of The Big Five, I examine the latests developments in Russia’s war against Ukraine, provide updates on the Israel-Iran conflict and explore developments in the Pacific theatre.

As always, I conclude with my top five war and national security reads from the week.

Ukraine

While many will be exclusively focused on the Middle East this weekend, I encourage my readers to not take their eyes off the war in Ukraine. The Ukrainians continue to defend against Russian ground and aerial onslaughts. They require not only weapons from the west to continue their defence, but our attention and moral support as well.

Russian Casualties Hit One Million. This week, Russian casualties in Ukraine hit the one million mark. It comes as Russia continues to press forward with its summer offensives in the north east, east and south of Ukraine. The UK Ministry of Defence this week provided an update on Russian casualties, which was followed by another post on Russia hitting the one million casualties mark.

Understanding Conflict Through Satellite Imagery

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In recent years, high-resolution satellite imagery and geospatial analysis have become increasingly valuable tools in documenting the effects of conflict, including the widespread destruction of infrastructure, property, and lives in Ukraine, Gaza, and Sudan. In January, satellite imagery played a pivotal role in the U.S. Department of State’s determination that members of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and allied militias had committed genocide in their attacks against non-Arab communities in several locations in Sudan. Most recently it has been used to document the damage caused by missile and drone strikes in the ongoing India and Pakistan conflict.

Conducting research on sensitive or contentious issues in fragile and conflict-affected areas where demographic data is flawed, access to remote and insecure areas is challenging, and representative samples prove particularly elusive is a perennial problem. In these terrains, fieldwork is typically limited and skewed by security concerns and the associated costs, and it is often the voices of elites that are the loudest and most prominent. The Farsi phrase “Can hearing ever be like seeing?” reflects the greater weight that should be given to the things we can see for ourselves, compared to what we are told.

To this end, satellite imagery and informed analysis can be usefully deployed to study complex and sensitive issues in fragile and conflict-affected areas and support more effective policy development. While imagery is not a substitute for talking to the people directly impacted by conflict, our research on the outbreak of heavy fighting between Iran and Afghanistan in May 2023 shows that it is a critical tool in developing a better understanding of these complex terrains, where the loudest voices can dominate the media and social landscapes and skew research findings—and, all too often, policy outcomes.

Iran nuclear crisis moves to tragedy

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After at least 15 years of agitating for a kinetic attack on Iran’s nuclear programme, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu finally found his chance. In the early hours of 13 June 2025, the Israeli Air Force and commando units unleashed a multi-pronged attack against the Natanz enrichment facility, the missile production site at Khorramabad, the Parchin military complex, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) headquarters and the living quarters of military leaders and nuclear scientists.

The deeply buried enrichment plant at Fordow was not hit in the first night’s attack. However, it could be targeted in the continuing operation that Netanyahu forecast in a televised address the same morning. It is unknown whether Israel was able to destroy the 604kg uranium enriched to 60% U-235 content that Iran has produced to date. This amount is enough for ten or more nuclear weapons if further enriched to the approximate 90% considered to be weapons-grade. The stockpile is transportable and would have been the first thing to be hidden when Israel’s bombing plans became clear.

Opportune timingUnited States President Donald Trump had asked Netanyahu not to take action while US–Iran talks were in progress. A sixth round of talks had been scheduled for 15 June and is now unlikely to proceed. Netanyahu likely judged that a window of opportunity was closing – last October, Israeli airstrikes knocked out Iran’s air defences, and Iran had been replacing the radars and other equipment.

Netanyahu may also have judged that global circumstances were in Israel’s favour. One factor is that Trump suggested on 11 June that talks were nearing an impasse over Iran’s refusal to meet Washington’s demand that it stop enriching uranium on Iranian soil. Another factor in Israel’s favour was the 12 June resolution by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which censured Iran’s lack of cooperation with the agency. Iran had vowed to respond by expanding its enrichment programme.

Iran’s long arm is not so muscular anymore

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The Iranian commanders who fatefully gathered in a Tehran compound last night or were killed as they slept spent decades building the regional militias, the arsenal of missiles and drones, and the nuclear programme that compelled others to take Tehran seriously. They believed they had found the right formula for the defence of Iran’s regime, territory and critical infrastructure. It was a costly endeavour that alienated many of the country’s neighbours and faraway powers and caused havoc in the Middle East, but it gave its leadership an inflated sense of purpose and power. It took two waves of attacks by Israel to shake the whole edifice. Last October, it took out most of Iran’s advanced air defences, after which Israel became the master of the air and of the clock.

With Donald Trump entering the White House, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu got the acquiescent partner he needed, with an unlimited supply of weapons and intelligence regardless of the horrors he inflicted on Gaza. Early this morning, Israel decapitated much of Iran’s military and scientific leadership and destroyed some nuclear and military facilities.

Notwithstanding its claim that this was a pre-emptive strike, Israel is the clear aggressor in this case. Judging from the subdued western statements this morning, however, this fact no longer seems so meaningful as international law and diplomatic norms erode in plain sight. This attack is about raw power, not about regional stability or better outcomes for everyone.

Israel has embarked on a campaign that will necessitate several waves of attacks, the key constraint being the availability of aircraft and the distance between its air bases and targets in Iran. The critical facility of Natanz has been hit hard, but other installations remain intact, notably the Fordow enrichment plant, buried deep beneath a mountain.

Israel has once again demonstrated undeniable intelligence superiority and operational prowess. If confirmed, the reports that commando units and drone systems pre-positioned inside Iran were key to the first wave that took out senior commanders and weapons systems suggest that Israel has more tricks up its sleeve. It will keep the advantage and could expand the target list to kill Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and destroy or disable its energy installations.

Ungentlemanly Robots: Israel’s Operation Rising Lion and the New Way of War

Benjamin Jensen

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Just after midnight on June 13, 2025, an Israeli operation codenamed Rising Lion unfolded in two distinct but mutually reinforcing acts. First came swarms of small explosive drones that Israeli commandos had reportedly pre-positioned inside Iran months earlier, striking air-defense radars and communications nodes, while decoying attention toward Tehran’s western approaches. Minutes later, over 200 Israeli fighter aircraft—many of them F-35 Adirs carrying standoff munitions—conducted precision strikes against more than 100 nuclear and military targets across Iran, including senior military leaders.

The result was operational dislocation: Iranian early-warning networks were saturated by low-observable drones, senior commanders were killed or forced into hardened shelters, and decisionmaking channels fractured just as long-range penetrating fires arrived. This shock-and-awe approach by Israel explains the limited initial Iranian response, firing only 100 drones compared to the mixture of over 200 drones and ballistic and cruise missiles fired during Operation True Promise in April 2024.

The attack illustrates how combinations of conventional long-range strikes and unconventional operations have a unique role in modern war, reminiscent of the dawn of modern special operations and the “ungentlemanly warriors” of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Advantage in battle, when each side can see the other side using even commercial satellite images, goes to the side more able to generate asymmetries that produce shock and dislocation. That effect requires more than a standoff precision strike: It requires the ability to pair airpower with special operations to generate effects across the depth of the battlespace simultaneously. 

As a result, Operational Rising Lion is a blueprint for future joint campaigns and suggests key investments the U.S. military will need to make to adapt to the changing character of war. These include accelerating efforts to integrate special forces with low-cost drones—similar to the foundational work with Project Replicator—with long-range precision strike campaigns, alongside rethinking defense in depth to protect critical assets.

Secret US agenda behind India-Pakistan ceasefire

Idress Aftab

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The recent revelation aired by Pakistani security analyst Imtiaz Gul renewed attention to the Nur Khan air base near Islamabad.

Gul alleges that this strategically significant facility is under de facto American operational control through a covert arrangement, with US aircraft regularly landing and taking off amid limited transparency.

He further claims that even senior Pakistani military officials are restricted from accessing certain operations at the base. These assertions have gained traction in the aftermath of India’s Operation Sindoor, which targeted terrorist sites and strategic military infrastructure in Pakistan, including the Nur Khan air base.

The incident has reignited concerns over Pakistan’s sovereignty, the extent and nature of America’s military presence and Islamabad’s evolving strategic alignments in the region.

Noor Khan air base holds immense strategic value due to its location near Islamabad and Rawalpindi—Pakistan’s political and military command hubs. Situated close to the Pakistan Army’s General Headquarters (GHQ) and the Strategic Plans Division, which manages the country’s nuclear arsenal, the base serves as the core command for Pakistan’s air mobility operations.

It houses key transport squadrons, including C-130s and CN-235s, and supports VVIP and strategic airlift missions. Its significance is further underscored by the regular presence of US military aircraft, particularly C-17 Globemasters and special operations units.

Reports indicate that certain sections of the base may be designated for exclusive US use, with limited access even for senior Pakistani officials. This consistent American footprint, combined with restricted oversight, lends credibility to Gul’s assertion that the air base could be operating under US oversight for select classified missions.

The Noor Khan air base reportedly became a flashpoint during India’s precision strike in Operation Sindoor, an event that dramatically escalated tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad.

Could China’s J-20 Mighty Dragon Defeat the F-35?

Maya Carlin

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Beijing continues to drop more hints surrounding its upcoming J-36 stealth fighter. Earlier this week, the People’s Republic of China released a new image of the platform, displaying the aircraft’s large main weapons bay. The J-36 has been observed flying around manufacturer Chengdu’s airfield in the last half year, stimulating more speculation surrounding the jet and its potential capabilities. Until the mysterious jet actually enters service with the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), it will be extremely challenging to pinpoint which released images and footage are real. For now, Beijing’s aerial prowess is centered around its Chengdu J-20 “Mighty Dragon” fighter.

Considered to represent the most advanced near-peer to the American-made F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, China’s Mighty Dragon airframe is a fan favorite among aviation buffs and military analysts alike. Chengdu Aircraft Corporation developed the fifth-generation jet as an air superiority fighter for the PLAAF nearly 15 years ago. However, the platform was conceptualized in the J-XX program in the 1990s. Early prototypes of the Chinese jets underwent testing in the 2010s, but the J-20 we recognize today was modified from initial models to incorporate several upgrades. The official J-20 prototype embarked on its maiden flight in 2014 and entered service with the PLAAF in 2017. Within two years, considerable numbers of Mighty Dragons became operational.

The premiere J-20s that flew with the PLAAF were powered by Russian-designed AL-31 engines. Since the engine did not meet the power requirements set forth by the PLAAF, local companies in China began working on a homegrown replacement. The WS-15 was developed to give the J-20 the thrust, supercruise, and power required to make the jet competitive with its fifth-generation foreign counterparts. While Beijing claims the WS-10 is cutting-edge, the extent of the engine’s true capabilities remains highly classified. As detailed by a defense analyst at Jane’s, “There are lingering questions over whether China has managed to achieve the thrust required on the J-20 on current payloads with the locally produced WS-10 engines.” Another expert from the Yuan Wang military think tank in Beijing mirrored this rhetoric and described the F-35’s XA100 engine as far superior to China’s WS-10.

China’s photonic chip debut to power AI, 6G and quantum computing advances, expert says

Zhang Tong

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As China joins the international drive to mass produce high-performance photonic chips, an industry pioneer said the technical performance of its chips will position the country for major advances in artificial intelligence (AI), 6G and quantum computing.

Shanghai Jiao Tong University Chip Hub for Integrated Photonics Xplore (CHIPX) announced on June 5 that it had begun producing 6-inch (15.2cm) wafers for thin-film lithium niobate (TFLN) photonic chips, which rely on light – or photons – rather than electrical signals for information transmission and processing.

While this is China’s first pilot production line for photonic chips, Europe and the US are already established in the field. Dutch company SMART Photonics last year upgraded its line to process 4-inch InP wafers, and California-based PsiQuantum revealed in February that it was adapting a 300mm silicon photonics line.

China’s pilot production line, built on the new TFLN material, may have come later but it is already showing gains in terms of technical performance by overcoming a global limit for high-speed optical links.

TFLN is an emerging high-performance optoelectronic material known for its ultra-fast electro-optic effect, high bandwidth and low power consumption. But its brittle nature has hindered large-scale manufacturing.

“Establishing this stable production line is the result of nearly 15 years of effort,” said Professor Jin Xianmin, director of CHIPX.

“I began working on photonic chips in 2010 and focused on lithium niobate from 2018,” Jin said. “Before this pilot production line, we spent years refining fabrication techniques, building small-scale prototypes, and solving critical issues.

“For instance, achieving efficient coupling between electrodes and the optical chip required a long and technically demanding process from design to tape-out to testing.”

BOOM! LIGHTS OUT

Frederick L. Corcoran III

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Power generation is the center of gravity for space capabilities, and it is vulnerable to the effects of explosive ordnance, for example, drone delivered bombs.

BOOM! And just like that the enemy has made your lights go out and severed the link between your space-enabled device and constellation of supporting satellites orbiting the Earth.

Power generation is the center of gravity for space capabilities, and it is vulnerable to the effects of explosive ordnance, for example, drone delivered bombs. Without electricity, your space or air defense capability is a brick. The more austere the environment, the greater the risk to the power generation infrastructure. This is why Army explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) needs to train with the Space Force and Air Defense Artillery today, long before Golden Dome, comes online.

Like space literacy, there is a requirement for explosive ordnance literacy and the integration of EOD doctrine with space and air defense doctrine. Where stuff lands matters. On a battlefield operating at the speed of light, two hours of downtime can affect the outcome of a battle. Collection of critical intelligence ceases, directly affecting maneuver in the multidomain fight. If you kill the power generation source or degrade the transmission of energy, there is no electricity for your space or space-enabled device.

The U.S. Space Force’s Space Warfighting A Framework for Planners describes offensive counterspace operations as orbital warfare, space link interdiction (electronic/cyber warfare), and terrestrial strike. Physically attacking space capabilities in orbit (orbital warfare) are high risk due to increased space debris affecting all spacefaring nations. In 2025, mutual assured destruction prevents outright explosive ordnance attacks on orbit as everyone is still living with the aftermath of a 2007 People’s Republic of China (PRC) anti-satellite test. This resulted in a hazardous debris ring of more than 30,000 pieces orbiting the Earth. Terrestrial attacks using explosive ordnance is the most likely threat.