Hao Tan
Today, China has built vast production and export capacity in clean energy and the upstream materials that support it, supplying over 80 percent of global solar panels and 70 percent of batteries and EVs. This dominance has sparked a growing number of headlines in major media outlets recently warning about a looming “clean energy race” or “battle” with China. These concerns have also filtered into policy across Western capitals: the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act, the EU’s de-risking strategy, and other national industrial policies all reflect deep anxiety about China’s dominance.
At the heart of this anxiety lies a core assumption: that China might leverage its clean energy advantage to advance diplomatic and geostrategic interests – even to coerce.
To some extent, this concern is understandable. China has actively promoted its clean energy leadership as a form of soft power, funding green projects abroad and championing decarbonization through platforms like the Belt and Road Initiative. But whether China would – or even could – turn its clean energy dominance into a coercive tool of statecraft remains an open and far more complex question.
Most current debates reflect Western threat perceptions, emphasizing the geopolitical risks of China’s dominance and the challenges of decoupling. However, few analyses examine the prospect of weaponizing clean energy from the Chinese perspective. Yet viewed from within China, turning clean energy dominance into a geopolitical weapon would be extremely difficult, likely unwise, and perhaps self-defeating.
A Double-Edged Sword
From the standpoint of mutual interdependence, China’s reliance on others for materials, markets, and technology is as significant as others’ reliance on Chinese exports.
China’s industrial might in clean energy depends heavily on overseas resources and technologies, including from Western countries. The production of clean energy technologies requires a stable supply of a wide range of critical minerals and bulk commodities – many of which China imports. On the technology side, high-end semiconductors and industrial software – essential for keeping China’s EVs globally competitive – still come primarily from the West. If China were to weaponize its exports, it could disrupt the very supply chains its own industries rely on.
No comments:
Post a Comment