20 January 2026

Exclusive satellite imagery shows China's rapid infra-push in Shaksgam Valley

Ankit Kumar

Commercial satellite imagery exclusively sourced by India Today's OSINT team indicates China's claims over the disputed Shaksgam Valley may not be limited to political messaging. Beijing is rapidly extending its road network across the valley, supported by multiple construction and logistics sites which appear to have scaled up significantly over the last two years.

The latest high-resolution imagery from November 2025 shows new road alignments, construction support sites, possible cement production units, and ongoing tunnelling activity deep inside the valley.

Several of these new sites sit uncomfortably close to India's Siachen Glacier sector, prompting fresh concerns in Delhi. Earlier this week, China publicly reaffirmed its claims over the Shaksgam Valley shortly after India raised objections

What Do Chinese Analysts Say About the Thaw With India?

Namrata Hasija

Just over a year ago, India and China reached an agreement on patrolling arrangements along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), covering legacy friction points in Depsang and Demchok. The deal effectively brought an end to years of military tensions on the border, which flared to life after a Chinese military operation in eastern Ladakh in 2020.

For Beijing, the recent diplomatic thaw with New Delhi – evidenced by the late 2024 border agreements and subsequent high-level dialogue – is not a sign of softened strategic intent, but rather a pragmatic, tactical maneuver designed to navigate a period of acute geopolitical stress. From a Chinese domestic perspective, the decision to manage the India relationship is largely viewed through the lens of China-U.S. strategic competition and economic interests. Within China, the discourse frames the current outreach not as genuine friendship, but as a cautious and conditional rebalancing aimed at preventing India from becoming an irreversible strategic partner of the United States while leveraging economic opportunities.

‘Not Your Father’s Afghanistan’: Is The West Tak­ing Its Eye Off The Al-Qae­da Ball? – Analysis

Graham Aikin

On 19th September 2025, the US National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) released an unclassified intelligence product warning of the threat posed by Al-Qaeda. This is the first time such a threat assessment has been disseminated by the US intelligence community since the withdrawal of Western forces from Afghanistan in 2021 and highlights, along with other recent coverage detailed below, the risks posed by a resurgent al-Qaeda and other transnational jihadi terrorist groups. This piece will address Afghanistan’s role as a permissive safe haven and sanctuary for these groups, highlight some of the recent intelligence on their operational capabilities, and discuss diplomatic efforts and other initiatives that may offer some cause for optimism amongst observers of al-Qaeda’s re-emerging threat.
Background

Following the Afghan Taliban’s return to power 2021, Western intelligence services have suffered from a significant human intelligence (HUMINT) collection vacuum in Afghanistan and a limited ability to engage with in-country HUMINT sources. Operational limitations, and the fact that sources felt abandoned by the US and its coalition partners, has limited cooperation with Western ‘3-letter’ intelligence agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, aka MI6), who have had to rely on their regional liaison partners, such as the Jordanians, for in-country HUMINT collection.

Xi’s Taiwan Scorecard: Why 2026 Is Not the Year

Joe Keary

A Chinese attempt at blockading or invading Taiwan in 2026 is unlikely. Instead, Beijing is likely to persist with its toolkit of coercive actions to erode Taiwan’s will and narrow its strategic options.

President Xi Jinping’s decision on whether to attempt to take control of the island democracy is driven by his own assessment of risk. While China’s military capabilities advanced rapidly in 2025, domestic and international considerations likely continue to complicate the case for using force against Taiwan.

The Quiet War With China

Paul F. Renda

When most of us think of war, we picture bombs, soldiers, and fighter jets. The biggest fear in many people’s minds, especially during election seasons, is a nuclear war. But there is another kind of war happening right now, one that doesn’t use missiles but is just as important. It’s an economic war. In today’s world, the country that controls the global economy is the most powerful. And right now, the United States is in a serious long-term struggle with China for that top spot.

To understand this competition, we need to look at history. China has a civilization that goes back over 5,000 years. The United States, in comparison, is a young nation—only about 250 years old. America has been an incredible experiment in democracy and freedom. However, China’s long history has taught its people some hard lessons. Over thousands of years, China has been both the richest empire in the world and the poorest. That experience taught them how to survive when times are tough, how to be patient, and how to plan for the long term. It’s like the difference between a kid who grows up with every advantage and a kid who has to work hard for everything. The one who struggles often learns more about how the world really works.

China-Venezuela Fact Sheet: A Short Primer on the Relationship


Venezuela has been one of China’s closest partners in Latin America. China’s relationship with Venezuela grew rapidly after Hugo Chavez was elected in 1998. In 2023, the two countries elevated their relationship to an “all-weather strategic partnership,” a high-level diplomatic designation that signals long-term cooperation across politics, trade, energy, and other areas.

Beijing has developed deep economic ties with Venezuela over the past two decades. Chinese policy banks loaned more to Venezuela than any other Latin American country; at least $10 billion in Chinese bank loans is outstanding. China also purchases most of Venezuela’s oil, which accounts for over half of Venezuela’s fiscal revenue, despite U.S. sanctions.

Why did Venezuela’s air defence fail in US’ Caracas raid?

John Hill

The Russian-made air defence systems which Nicolas Maduro, the captured Venezuelan President, touted in October last year proved ineffective against US Special Forces on the night of the 3 January 2026.

There are widespread reports and analysis assessing the total failure of the Venezuelan military’s anti-air capability – which leans on the legacy S-300VM air defence system – to shoot down low-flying MH-47 Chinook helicopters.

However, American operational success must not encourage complacency among Nato, warned Dr Tom Withington, an associate fellow of the Royal United Services Institute in London and a senior non-resident fellow at the Nato defence college in Rome.

Strategic Snapshot: Russia–PRC Technology and Hybrid Operations


Technological innovation is reshaping the modern battlefield. Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are combining conventional warfare with electromagnetic disruption, cyber attacks, digital influence campaigns, and unmanned and autonomous systems to target U.S. partners and allies. The frontline states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are under mounting pressure from these new technological threats. Russian violations of Polish, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Romanian airspace, as well as GPS spoofing and sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, particularly fiber-optic cables, in the Baltic and Arctic regions, illustrate the expanding scope of targeting technology and its use for subversive means. These activities reflect a broader shift toward multi-domain warfare, where ambiguity and deniability are key assets.

Drone warfare is now a central feature of this evolving technological domain. Ukraine has become a world-leading drone producer and pioneer of maritime and autonomous systems since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in 2022. The PRC has also recently unveiled new unmanned systems capabilities for use in a Taiwan contingency, signaling its intent to operationalize lessons from Russia’s war in Ukraine.

How Venezuela turned massive oil wealth into economic ruin

John P Ruehl

Following the dramatic seizure of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro on January 3, 2026, Trump’s comments about taking control of Venezuela’s oil industry quickly triggered accusations of “neo-imperialism.”

Critics argued that pledges to share profits with Venezuela were little more than cover to protect the interests of America’s major oil companies. Yet despite the allure of Venezuela’s reserves, many of those major oil firms have been notably cautious, citing uncertainty over the country’s political trajectory and the durability of legal and financial protections.

The united West is dead

Mark Leonard

The international liberal order is ending. In fact, it may already be dead. White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller said as much last week as he gloated over the U.S. intervention in Venezuela and the capture of dictator Nicolás Maduro: “We live in a world … that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power … These are the iron laws of the world.”

But America’s 47th president is equally responsible for another death — that of the united West.

And while Europe’s leaders have fallen over themselves to sugarcoat U.S. President Donald Trump’s illegal military operation in Venezuela and ignore his brazen demands on Greenland, Europeans themselves have already realized Washington is more foe than friend.

The Greenland Expedition

Mick Ryan

The following is a fictional narrative about an American expedition to Greenland in the coming year. It is written from the first-person perspectives of a military officer and civilian policy official in the Pentagon.

Eschewing the style of think tank papers, I have instead sought to provide a readable and more accessible account of what a very worst-case scenario for an American takeover of Greenland might look like. Indeed, any kind of military action should be considered worst case.

Like most others, I hope and expect that this troubling situation will be resolved in the coming months well short of military operations. But the world is an uncertain place, and there is no guarantee of that.

Trump Declares Anything Less Than U.S. Control of Greenland Is ‘Unacceptable’

Olivia-Anne Cleary

President Donald Trump doubled down on his insistence that the U.S. annexes Greenland, arguing that any other alternative is simply “unacceptable.”

Repeating his stance that the annexation of the territory is needed for “national security” purposes, Trump on Wednesday morning insisted that NATO “should be leading the way for us to get it” claiming that “NATO becomes far more formidable and effective” with Greenland under the jurisdiction of the U.S.

Trump’s comments came hours before the Danish and Greenland foreign ministers, Lars Løkke Rasmussen and Vivian Motzfeldt, were set to engage in a high-stakes meeting with U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the Eisenhower Executive Office Building next to the White House.

How Much More Oil from Venezuela—and How Soon?

Clayton Seigle

Venezuelan oil production could rebound under adequate political, legal, fiscal, and operating conditions.

The multi-decade history of Venezuelan oil production illustrates the collapse in productive capacity from its high point around 3.4 million barrels per day in the 1970s to less than 1 million barrels per day in the 2020s; this was caused by oil sector expropriations, chronic government mismanagement and underinvestment, and crippling sanctions.

In a modest growth scenario that assumes adequate political, legal, fiscal, and operating conditions, Venezuelan oil output could rebound to approximately 1.5 million barrels per day by 2028 as sanctions ease and damaged existing oil wells are refurbished.

Trump’s Greenland Ambition Is About U.S. Power, Not Alliances

Sir Robin Niblett

Danish and other European governments are struggling to decide how to manage President Donald Trump’s latest demands that Greenland become part of the United States. This week, foreign ministers from Denmark and Greenland are making the case in Washington to Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Vice President JD Vance that Greenland’s security from Russian and Chinese encroachment would best be enhanced through joint investments by the United States and its European allies under the framework of NATO and the 1951 bilateral treaty between the Danish and U.S. governments. European leaders have recently suggested building a new NATO mission, “Arctic Sentry,” modelled on the ongoing “Baltic Sentry” mission.

Minerals at War: Strategic Resources and the Foundations of the U.S. Defense Industrial Base

Gracelin Baskaran and Samantha Dady

Across major conflicts, the United States has repeatedly mobilized extraordinary state intervention—stockpiles, price controls, public financing, and foreign procurement—to overcome minerals supply shocks, only to dismantle these systems during periods of perceived stability. The historical record reveals recurring failures: overreliance on stockpiles absent industrial capacity, neglect of processing and refining, erosion of domestic expertise, and complacent assumptions about markets and allies. The post–Cold War drawdown marked the most severe rupture, hollowing out U.S. 

Minerals capabilities and amplifying dependence on foreign, and eventually adversarial, supply chains. This paper traces the evolution of U.S. critical minerals policy in twentieth-century military industrialization, illustrating how a position of resource dominance gave way to economic and national security vulnerabilities. The central lesson is clear: Critical minerals security is a permanent national security challenge that requires continuous stewardship, integrated industrial policy, and durable engagement with allies, not episodic crisis response or faith in market self-correction.

U.S. Cyber Capabilities to Deter and Disrupt Malign Foreign Activity Targeting the Homeland

Emily Harding

Washington has failed to establish deterrence in the cyber domain, and our adversaries control the escalation ladder. Historically, U.S. foreign policy has rested on deterrence, with implied escalation dominance in any domain. But that foundation has failed in the context of cyber. U.S. responses to cyberattacks have been muted, and escalation dominance does not exist.

The U.S.’s offensive cyber capabilities are strong, perhaps unmatched. U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) has repeatedly proven its capability to disrupt adversary activity, when given the chance. This demonstrated skill, coupled with overall U.S. strength, makes deterrence in the cyber domain possible.

The two Americas

Damian Valdez

Cuba in 1959 was both festive and sombre. Jubilation greeted the flight of the dictator Fulgencio Batista, who left the island as Che Guevara and Fidel Castro were poised to enter the capital, Havana. Soon after this, special tribunals in an old colonial fortress ran the juicios sumarios, short trials of former regime officials, which often ended with a death sentence and a firing squad. That year, my Mexican grandfather went to Cuba with a skilled cameraman to make a documentary about the Cuban Revolution. 

He met Raúl Castro, the leader’s brother and hardliner, among others. One day, he was on an internal flight over the island, which happened to be transporting batistianos, or members of the old regime, whose fate, no doubt, was not going to be merciful. Suddenly, they overpowered their revolutionary guards, known as barbudos (bearded ones), and grabbed their weapons. They then ordered the pilot to fly to the Dominican Republic, hoping that the country’s friendly dictator, Rafael Trujillo, might welcome them with open arms. The barbudo pilot told the batistianos: ‘I will land wherever you like on the island but not beyond.’ When the gun-wielding batistiano insisted, the pilot lifted his hands from the controls and said, llévatelo tú! (you fly it!). As the plane began to dive, the old regime hijackers had no answer and were check-mated. They landed in Cuba, to my grandfather’s relief.

Venezuela Uncovers the Limits of China’s Security Promise in Latin America

Emma Belmonte and Paulína Ovečková

In recent months, the X account of the Venezuelan media outlet Polianalítica, followed by over 63,000 users, published a series of posts portraying Beijing as a steadfast political and security backer of Caracas. On November 24, a post claimed that “China announced it will provide military help to Venezuela if it faces foreign invasion.” Other X users flagged the claim as false, yet the post was reshared more than a thousand times. It generated a large number of mocking responses, as users quickly identified the announcement as ludicrous.

This episode proved both telling and ironic – less than six weeks later, Venezuela’s president was captured in a U.S. military operation. The Polianalítica post was a prime example of the distorted and often exaggerated perception of China’s role as a security actor in Latin America.

In Defense of the Aircraft Carrier

Wilson Beaver, and Robert Peters

It has become fashionable to argue that aircraft carriers are becoming obsolete. Critics question their value in an era of technological advancement, when new capabilities such as advanced autonomous systems and hypersonic missiles increasingly render the US Navy’s biggest and most prominent ships “too large and too slow” to evade missiles and drones.

They point to the Ukrainian sinking of the Russian missile cruiser Moskva to claim that American carriers would stand little chance of survival during a conflict with China. The US Navy, they insist, should instead invest in various experimental drones and autonomous surface vessels.

These critics, however, are comparing apples to oranges. They’re drawing conclusions far beyond the lessons of the war in Ukraine—conclusions that have no bearing on US military requirements in a potential conflict with China in the Pacific.

Russia Continues To Equip Shahed Drones With Aerial Missiles, Suggesting Could Soon Target Commercial Or Military Aircraft – Analysis

Can Kasapoğlu

Last week Russian and Ukrainian forces waged an average of one to two hundred tactical engagements per day, a slower operational tempo than in recent weeks. Still, increased aerial attacks from the Russian Aerospace Forces tested Ukraine’s defenses. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned that the increase in Russian air activity could presage even larger salvos in the coming weeks. Amid harsh winter conditions, Ukraine struggled to repair its energy infrastructure and electrical grid to contend with Russia’s onslaught.

The front lines remained dangerous but largely static. Both Russian and Ukrainian drone warfare formations deployed low-cost robotic weapons 60 to 80 miles behind lines of contact, attacking tactical depth. As this report has previously noted, the Russian military’s specialized Rubicon drone unit is ramping up the operational tempo of its long-range strikes.


Ukraine’s Military Mobilization Challenge

Andreas Umland, and Jakob Hedenskog

During the first months of Russia’s full-scale invasion that started in February 2022, many Ukrainian volunteers—male and female—joined the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), including the Territorial Defense Forces, in order to rescue their fatherland. The AFU’s initial aptitude to push back the much larger Russian army surprised the outside world. Equally astonishing has been Ukraine’s ability to hold the frontline against Russia. Few other European nations would have been able to do so.

Nevertheless, since 2023, the recruitment of additional Ukrainian men and women for military service has become increasingly challenging for Kyiv. There is a growing gap between those who serve and those who have been able to evade mobilization. This injustice is demoralizing and creates growing problems for Ukrainian social-political cohesion.


Confronted with thorny problems, Trump turns to the military

Jack Detsch and Paul McLeary

President Donald Trump threatened to unleash a familiar tool this week when he sought to stop protests against immigration agents in Minnesota: the military. His warning to send federal troops into the state came as administration officials debated whether to order Pentagon strikes against Iran and use troops to seize Greenland from Denmark. Faced with a domestic or international problem this term that he can’t resolve with traditional diplomacy or politicking, Trump has increasingly turned to the armed forces as an initial option rather than a last resort.


When Venezuela’s leader wouldn’t step aside, he sent special forces into the country to grab him. When he thought negotiating with Iran over its nuclear program wasn’t working, he ordered U.S. missiles to destroy their development facilities. And when he wanted to lower crime rates in Democratic cities, he deployed the National Guard.

Mark Carney in China positions Canada for ‘the world as it is, not as we wish it’

Amy Hawkins and Leyland Cecco

Mark Carney’s trip to Beijing this week secured what he described as a “preliminary but landmark” trade deal and a recognition – welcomed by Beijing – that countries are operating in a “new world order”. Carney’s visit is the first time in nearly a decade that a Canadian prime minister has been welcomed in Beijing. It comes after years of a deep freeze in the relationship between Ottawa and Beijing that Carney wants to thaw, in order to reduce his country’s precarious reliance on the United States.


Guy Saint-Jacques, a former Canadian ambassador to China, said: “The main goal of trying to reset or recalibrate the relationship with China has been achieved during this trip.” That recalibration comes at a delicate moment for geopolitical alliances between North American countries and China. “Mr Carney is driven by a sense of urgency. And this urgency comes from the difficulties that we have with our neighbour to the south,” Saint-Jacques said.

America’s Special Forces Are Caught Up in the AI Craze

Stavros Atlamazoglou

Special Operations Command hopes that AI can help during night raids—when it can quickly process information extracted from target sites, allowing for faster subsequent raids. US special operators are trying to use artificial intelligence to process data faster and improve the targeting process.

How AI Could Help Special Forces During “Sensitive Site Exploitation”

According to a special notice issued by the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM), US special operators are seeking industry information on facial recognition, speaker identification, and DNA profiling capabilities. Sensitive site exploitation is the process of gathering and processing intelligence gathered on the target to further the targeting process. Information can be gathered from both human and non-human sources.

“Virtual Reality” Training Could Be a Godsend for the US Army

Peter Suciu

The Army has already begun some “virtual reality” training—using VR headsets to prepare soldiers to operate vehicles without needing them to be physically present at those vehicles’ location. Logistics are a perpetual pain for the United States military. Moving large numbers of military personnel across continents for exercises, or even for routine training, is a costly and time-consuming operation that usually reduces the time troops can spend for more useful purposes. To address this issue, the US Army announced this month it would begin to “train differently,” increasingly employing virtual and augmented reality (VR/AR).

How VR and AR Can Help Train US Troops

The new technology could further reduce temporary duty assignments (TDY), or short-term moves, which can last from days to months. AR/VR will allow training to be conducted at a soldier’s home station, explained Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George during a virtual town hall at Fort Drum, New York. According to a report from Task & Purpose, AR/VR could be used in classroom lessons to provide detailed insight into weapon systems and battlefield tactics. It could be employed at all levels of the service, from enlisted personnel to general officers.


19 January 2026

China Won’t Save Iran’s Regime – But Chinese Surveillance Technology Might

William Figueroa

The outbreak of mass protests in Iran amid economic disaster and ongoing foreign aggression poses a serious challenge to the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran. While the unrest raised serious questions about the survival of the regime, even among those who are normally skeptical of such claims, the brutal and technologically sophisticated crackdown that followed was as effective as it was ruthless. The protests have slowed under violent repression, and despite Trump’s reckless claims that “help is on the way,” the United States does not seem to be gearing up for another military campaign. Caught between American bombs and Iranian bullets, ordinary Iranians are the ones who suffer the most.

Given the dramatic events that have unfolded, the cautious and relatively muted response of China, arguably Iran’s most significant economic and political partner, took many observers by surprise. Mao Ning, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, struck an initially cautious tone when she called for the Iranian government and people to “overcome the current difficulties and uphold stability.” Foreign Minister Wang Yi condemned U.S. threats to intervene as a return to the “law of the jungle,” and juxtaposed American aggression with China’s offer to play a “constructive role” to help the Iranian people and the government “stand united.” Other than these statements, no concrete actions have been taken.

Taiwan’s Probable Risk Scenario Shifts to Potential Blitzkrieg

Jens Kastner

Although the bulk of Taiwan observers wargaming Beijing’s takeover of Taiwan tend to see a naval blockade choking it into negotiations for annexation as the most probable course, the latest developments in Latin America are raising the odds for a more violent approach even though Chinese success is not certain, a survey and online research by Asia Sentinel suggests.

The US’s capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on January 3 triggered a flood of commentary on Chinese social media calling for the China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to replicate the same kind of military operation against what officials regard as a renegade province and arrest the political leadership to quickly solve Beijing’s self-perceived Taiwan problem.

War, diplomacy, or revolt: What comes next in Iran?

Nadeen Ebrahim

After a week of the largest nationwide demonstrations in years, the streets of Iran have once again fallen silent, subdued by force. One resident of Tehran compared the mood in the capital to the days around Nowruz, the Iranian New Year, when many leave the city and shops close early. But there’s no festive cheer, only eerie quiet, they said. Life carries on in the shadow of a deadly crackdown on protesters and under the specter of a potential new military faceoff with the United States. The Islamic Republic hopes to celebrate the 47th anniversary of the revolution that brought it to power next month. It will bring out crowds and blast revolutionary tunes. Yet the mood in the halls of power in Tehran is likely to be far less celebratory, as the regime faces the biggest threat to its survival yet.

It may have been able to crush the latest wave of protests using its tried-and-tested playbook of repression. But the fundamental grievances animating protesters haven’t gone away.
How did we get here?

US paralysis on Iran crisis owes to Navy capacity gaps

Julian McBride

The ongoing Iranian protests and the Islamic Republic’s brutal repression have led to widespread massacres nationwide, with far-reaching regional and geopolitical implications. Amid the crackdown, both the US and Israeli governments have prepared numerous contingencies should the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Basij militia’s murderous repression continue to escalate.

This week, US President Donald Trump told Iran’s anti-regime protesters US “help is on the way” and that he had canceled US meetings with Iranian officials “until the senseless killings stop.” On January 2, he said the US was “locked and loaded” and ready to “rescue” protesters if Iran used lethal force against them.

Thinking Carefully About Iran at a Dangerous Moment


A few days ago, I got a message from a West Point classmate. He knows my background, knows where I’ve spent most of my adult life—Special Forces, the Pentagon, the intelligence community—and he didn’t dress it up. He asked me straight out: “Are you tracking what’s happening in Iran, and what do you think we should do?”

That question stuck with me.

Not because I don’t have views on Iran—I’ve had them for decades—but because it forced me to stop reacting to headlines and start thinking through the problem the way we were trained to: clearly, sequentially, and without comforting illusions. Iran is dangerous. The protesters are brave. U.S. rhetoric is escalating. And the margin for error is shrinking.

If We Want to Help the Iranians, We Should Disrupt the IRGC

Gary Anderson

President Trump is considering military intervention to protect Iran’s legitimate protesters from the regime. I am not necessarily recommending intervention, but if we do, I have some thoughts on how it should be done. Unlike Venezuela, where targeting President Maduro was seen as a critical first step to modifying the government, the center of gravity of the Iranian regime is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). It is the glue that holds the rotting edifice together. The frightened old men who constitute the Grand Ayatollah and his Guardian Council are nothing without them, nor are the various ministries that comprise the executive branch of the government; they are technocrats and bureaucrats who have no real power outside their narrow responsibilities.

The IRGC is more powerful than the regular armed forces or the police. If it is nullified, the regime collapses under pressure from the mob. Unlike the Taliban and ISIS, the IRGC is very vulnerable to both air and cyber attack. In contrast to the Iranian nuclear program, the IRGC’s internal security forces have to operate in the open from fixed bases to intimidate the general public. We know where their key facilities are. They are not well hardened underground. Their Quds Force special operators are primarily geared toward supporting overseas terrorist groups; they may be relatively covert, but that limits their usefulness against civilian demonstrators.

Is Iran Headed Towards a Persian Spring?

Gordon Gray

Synopsis and Key Points: Former U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia Gordon Gray draws striking parallels between the current 2026 protests in Iran and the 2011 Arab Spring.

-Following the collapse of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, Gray argues that Tehran faces a similar existential crisis driven by economic ruin and a loss of dignity. While the regime has survived five uprisings since 2009 due to the loyalty of the IRGC, Gray warns that “brittle” autocracies eventually shatter.

How Trump’s Foreign Policy Gambits Are Reshaping the World

Brian Bennett and Nik Popli

Four weeks before the beginning of his second term as President, Donald Trump abruptly floated the idea of taking back the Panama Canal. It had been a quarter-century since the U.S. formally ceded to Panama ownership of the channel connecting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. With one social media post, Trump threw a seemingly stable relationship off-kilter, accusing Panama of overcharging U.S. ships for passage and recklessly permitting China too much influence in the canal’s operations.

Looking back, it was an early sign of how America’s relationship with the rest of the world was about to be shaken to its core. Trump’s maximalist threat sent his foreign policy advisers scrambling. Within days of his Inauguration, military planners started work on options for taking the canal by force, according to a former Trump Administration official. “We’re going to take it back, or something very powerful is going to happen,” Trump warned. Ultimately, no military operation was necessary. Panama’s President José Raúl Mulino quickly and quietly agreed to a number of concessions, including re-examining Chinese investment in the country.

Trump Is Making China Great Again

Catherine Rampell

SOMEONE ALERT the Norwegian Nobel Committee: Against the odds, Donald Trump has succeeded in peacefully uniting the world. Unfortunately, the world has been united against us. 
This Pax (Ex) Americana era was illustrated Friday, as Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney wrapped up a trip to China. This wasn’t just any old visit, either: It marked the first time a Canadian PM had been to the world’s second-largest economy since 2017—and based on the glamorous video Carney’s team released, it was a smashing success for Beijing.

Carney and Chinese President Xi Jinping unveiled a “new strategic partnership” between the two countries. Among the key planks of this agreement, China will reduce tariffs on Canadian canola seed, peas, and lobsters. It will also allow visa-free travel for Canadians, who are apparently eager for new tourism destinations.1 Canada, in turn, will allow 49,000 Chinese electric vehicles into its market at lower tariff rates.

The Stain of American Timidity

Mike Nelson
Source Link

In the summer of 2003, I was a newly promoted captain in the 82nd Airborne trying to convince an Iraqi Shiite university professor to take more of a leadership role in the emerging district council we were establishing in Rashid, the southern portion of Baghdad. While U.S. forces had taken control of the Iraqi capital to celebrations and the toppling of statues, there was still an air of uncertainty about the future. Saddam Hussein had not been captured yet, and there was a fear he would return to power if America lost interest in transforming Iraq. Those we were asking to stand up and stick their necks out had questions—namely, could they count on Americans to help them rebuild Iraqi governance?

As we sat in the sweltering heat, the professor recounted to me that his father and older brother had risen up against Saddam in 1991 when asked to by President George H.W. Bush—part of a larger uprising by Shias and Kurds in the aftermath of the Gulf War—only to have those populations suffer massive casualties in a brutal crackdown by the Ba’athist government, while the U.S. largely sat idly by and observed. Eventually, these led to Operations Provide Comfort, Northern Watch, and Southern Watch to enforce no-fly zones and provide humanitarian aid—but the damage was done. Tens of thousands of civilians lay dead. This professor went on to say we had done the same thing to the Czechs in 1968 and the Hungarians in 1956.

Trump and the Special Operations Panacea Reflections on the aftermath of the raid to capture Nicolas Maduro

Tim Ball

US Air Force crew chiefs watch as F-35A Lightning II’s taxi following military actions in Venezuela in support of Operation Absolute Resolve, Jan. 3, 2026. (US Airforce)

The recent raid to capture Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro appears to have been a nearly flawlessly executed special operation. Conducted by the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) with interagency support, the raid demonstrated the professionalism and expertise of America’s special operations community and will likely be used as a case study in the training of future special operators. While the raid’s tactical success is unquestioned, its aftermath raises the same historical issues with not only the use of special operations forces, but US-sponsored regime change as well. Even in the hands of disciplined civilian policymakers, competent special operations forces can appear as a tempting panacea, available to solve national security woes without the full commitment of the US military.

Trump’s Threats to Greenland Raise Serious Questions for NATO

Lara Jakes

Over the past year, President Trump has pushed NATO with threats and coercion to make divisive changes. Now he is threatening to seize control of Greenland, potentially with military force, which has heightened concerns that he will destroy the trans-Atlantic security alliance.

Leaders in Europe and Canada, which have depended on the United States for nearly 77 years as the alliance’s largest partner, are determined to not let that happen. Greenland is a semiautonomous territory of Denmark, which is a founding member of NATO. Top diplomats from Greenland and Denmark will defend the territory from Mr. Trump’s ambitions at the White House on Wednesday.

Trump Renews Threat on Greenland Before Meeting at White House

Amelia Nierenberg

The foreign ministers of Denmark and Greenland are expected to meet on Wednesday with Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the White House, with tensions rising over President Trump’s push to buy or take over Greenland.

It will be the first such meeting between the three governments over Greenland, a semiautonomous Danish territory. Apparently emboldened by the success of the U.S. military operation that led to the capture of Venezuela’s leader on Jan. 3, Mr. Trump said last week that he was “going to do something on Greenland, whether they like it or not.”

Information Advantage in the Indo-Pacific to Fight Digital Guerrilla Warfare and State-Sponsored Disinformation

Priya Batchu

The 1st Theater Information Advantage Detachment (TIAD) originated at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, on November 7, 2025. The 65-soldier Unit reflects the Army’s aggressive play for a tactical edge to fight digital guerrilla warfare in the Pacific’s gray-zone environments.

The 1st TIAD is a theater-level Army formation that supports U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. Army Pacific, Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC), and other units of INDOPACOM. Special operations is one of the most information-sensitive elements in the U.S. military, so the 1st TIAD is in a unique position to support SOF.

Strategic Disruption from Orbit: Space-Based Capabilities for Irregular Warfare in the Indo-Pacific

Trent Keipour

During World War II, U.S. forces in the Pacific faced a vast and challenging expanse. Islands were isolated, supply lines were stretched thin, and intelligence was limited to the speed of ships, aircraft, or radios. Today, although the geography and the challenges that come with it remain unchanged, technological capabilities have advanced significantly. Warfighters now look beyond the horizon for an advantage; in fact, they look to orbit, where space has become the ultimate high ground. From that vantage point, modern forces gain essential capabilities in communication, navigation, intelligence, and targeting—capabilities that increasingly influence outcomes in conflict and require new strategic approaches for future operations.

This technological evolution is unfolding as the character of competition in the Indo-Pacific continues to shift. The region is increasingly shaped by irregular forms of competition including coercive infrastructure development through China’s Belt and Road Initiative, illegal fishing, gray-zone maritime pressure from state-affiliated militias, and malign operations designed to undermine democratic institutions. Yet many frontline partners, small island states, and midsized regional powers lack the surveillance, communication, and intelligence infrastructure to compete in this space.

The Balance of Nuclear Deterrence in Europe after the Cold War

Chick Edmond

Cold War-era nuclear deterrence is arguably the most complicated and challenging security concept faced by European states. With the rise of multipolar world order, the ways in which modern European states apply deterrence have evolved dramatically due to ongoing tensions in Ukraine and rapid advancements in technology.

To safeguard sovereignty, states continue to utilize all instruments of national security, and in many cases, acquiring or upgrading nuclear weapons. Such as how the United States and the Soviet Union amassed enormous nuclear arsenals to promote national security domestically and internationally in response to rising tensions and competition for global influence during the Cold War.

Maneuver to Victory: The Ideal Post-Operation Venezuela – Breaking the Cycle of Failed Interventions, Before the Mid-terms

Donald Vandergriff

The perfect post-3 January scenario for Operation Absolute Resolve (often referred to in strategic discussions as Operation Venezuela), from my perspective as a longtime advocate of mission command, maneuver warfare, and the generations of war framework, would represent a decisive break from the failed attrition-based approaches and prolonged occupations seen in past U.S. interventions.

The January 3, 2026, operation—codenamed Operation Absolute Resolve—captured Nicolás Maduro and his inner circle in a precision coup de main, blending 3rd Generation maneuver (rapid, decentralized exploitation) with 5th Generation enablers (information dominance, cyber-shaping, and non-kinetic isolation of the regime). This avoided the quagmires of 2nd Generation firepower-heavy occupations seen in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Did A Mysterious “Sonic Weapon” Really Aid Delta Force In Capturing Maduro?

Joseph Trevithick

Aviral and as-yet totally unsubstantiated claim that U.S. forces used a mysterious “sonic weapon” that left security forces bleeding and stunned during the recent operation to capture Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro has been getting a ton of attention. The allegation – amplified, but not expressly confirmed by the White House – does add to years now of persistent rumors of weapons very loosely similar to this description being in use globally, with separate news on that front having broken just today. When it comes to the United States, this has been further fueled by decades of known work on directed energy weapons, including ones intended to produce novel auditory and less-than-lethal effects.

The sonic weapon claim looks to originate with a video posted on TikTok on January 9 by an individual who goes by Varela News (and who uses the handle @franklinvarela09). The Spanish-language clip is a purported interview with a member of the Venezuelan security forces who was involved in the response to the U.S. operation in Caracas just over a week ago. The contents of the clip gained wider traction online after Mike Netter shared an English transcription in a post on X that same day. Netter is a political commentator and advocate who describes himself as the “main proponent” of the failed 2021 effort to recall California Governor Gavin Newsom. He is now Vice Chair of an organization called Rebuild California and hosts a radio show on KABC, a Cumulus Media station that broadcasts in the Greater Los Angeles area.

AI Applied to Tackle Energy Conundrums For Modern Battlefields

Josh Luckenbaugh

The United States is determined to be the global leader in artificial intelligence, and just as important as the models themselves is having the computing power to run them. Both government and private sector entities are pursuing AI solutions that would work in the energy-constrained environment of the modern battlefield.

The Trump administration is looking to expand the country’s AI infrastructure. The Energy Department in July 2025 selected four sites — Idaho National Laboratory, Oak Ridge Reservation, Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant and Savannah River Site — where it will look to house AI data centers and energy generation projects.

The Trump Doctrine

Seth Cropsey

The U.S. attack on Venezuela, much like its attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities last summer, was an operational masterstroke that undermines China, Russia, and Iran. It may undermine deterrence. America’s adversary’s may conclude that the Trump Doctrine, which has now been employed twice, means the U.S. acts with decision only when the United States faces a sufficiently vulnerable enemy, and only if it can fulfill specific operational criteria. China, in particular, may assume it can simply present too thorny a target for American power to crack. The solution is for the Trump administration to move beyond tailored strikes, and to wage a large-scale effort against America’s enemies through economic, intelligence, and alliance means.

The raid that captured Venezuelan narco-terrorist-in-chief Maduro was an instance of spectacular planning. Only the United States could have conducted Operation ABSOLUTE RESOLVE. The U.S. used technical means and high-end human intelligence sources from a clandestine team inserted into Venezuela months before the strikes to build a detailed picture of Maduro’s daily habits. It combined this with a likely offensive cyber effort that disabled Venezuelan electricity just as the operation began. In turn, U.S. carrier aviation and aircraft deployed from the American homeland simultaneously jammed and attacked Venezuelan radars and air defense systems, creating a corridor for U.S. Delta Force operators to insert into Caracas, capture Maduro and his wife, and extract him within 30 minutes. Some luck was involved, of course, with one helicopter taking damage from low-level anti-air fire. But any threat that Venezuelan defenses posed was mitigated to the greatest possible extent.

The Guardian view on Europe’s crisis of self-confidence: a new mindset needed for new times


Another week, another set of dilemmas for Europe’s beleaguered political class to deal with. On Wednesday Brussels is due to outline the terms of the €90bn loan it has promised to Ukraine, amid internal tensions over whether Kyiv can use the money to buy US as well as EU weapons. On the same day, the US secretary of state, Marco Rubio, is due to meet ministers from Denmark and Greenland, as Donald Trump continues to insist that the US will take ownership of the latter “one way or another”. And as the body count of protesters rises in Iran, the EU is under mounting pressure to do more than merely “monitor” the situation, as the European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, somewhat feebly put it over the weekend.

Beyond the crisis management, a deeper reckoning is overdue after a tumultuous beginning to 2026. It has long been a truism that there is a profound mismatch between the EU’s economic heft and its geopolitical clout. But only a year into Mr Trump’s second term, the disjunction looks unsustainable in the “America first” era.

The Trouble With Regime Change What History Teaches About When and How to Pursue It

Richard Haassuary 

For at least a decade, the conventional wisdom has been that direct attempts at regime change by the United States have ended in disaster. And for good reason. In Afghanistan, the very same Taliban that was dislodged in 2001 returned to power in 2021 after two decades of futile U.S. efforts. In Iraq, U.S. forces succeeded in permanently ending Saddam Hussein’s regime, but in no way was the result commensurate with the human, economic, strategic, and political costs. Then, in Libya, a U.S.-led NATO intervention intended to prevent the dictator Muammar

A massive Arctic military buildup will center on Greenland

Caroline Kennedy-Pipe

Donald Trump is clearly in a hurry to dominate the political narrative in his second term of office. He began 2026 with strikes in Syria against Islamic State groups, the kidnapping of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro, threats to intervene in Iran and the declaration that the US would take control of Greenland – by hook or by crook. Of all these the plan to add Greenland to the US either by negotiation or by force is easily the most controversial as it could lead to the break-up of the NATO alliance.

Greenland, the world’s largest island and a part of the kingdom of Denmark, has an abundance of critical minerals offering wealth and business opportunities. But the US president is also making a big deal out of the need to secure Greenland for US national security. He has repeatedly spoken of danger from Russia and China, whose ships, he says, stalk the island’s waters, most recently on Wednesday.

The Army Built an AI Talent Pipeline—But It’s Filled with Career-Killing Roadblocks - Modern War Institute

Nathaniel Fairbank

The Army is losing exactly the kind of artificial intelligence talent it insists it needs to win the next war. Only four of the seven Army Artificial Intelligence Scholars recently considered for on-time promotion to major were selected. That sub-60 percent promotion rate stands in sharp contrast to a population in which more than 80 percent of captains normally promote on time, with additional officers selected early. Not one of these scholars, nor any of the thirteen in the year group immediately behind them, was selected early. The three officers the Army declined to promote were not marginal performers: Collectively educated at West Point, Princeton, MIT, and Carnegie Mellon, one was among only three officers selected in 2021 for the program’s most technically rigorous track.

In practical terms, the Army chose not to promote officers—barely three years after finishing graduate school—in whom it had invested more than $350,000 each (counting tuition and the cost of pay and benefits while in school). In its first measurable test, the Army’s flagship AI talent pipeline produced worse promotion outcomes than the force at large, despite drawing some of the service’s most academically and technically competitive officers.

Grok is in, ethics are out in Pentagon’s new AI-acceleration strategy

Patrick Tucker

Seven projects are to lead the charge to embed artificial intelligence ever more deeply in military affairs.n The Pentagon’s third AI-acceleration strategy in four years sets up seven “pace-setting projects” that will “unlock critical foundational enablers” for other U.S. military efforts, the department announced Monday.

The six-page document also directs the department’s many components to fulfil a four-year goal to make their data centrally available for AI training and analysis. It omits any mention of ethical use of AI and casts suspicion on the concept of AI responsibility while banning the use of models that incorporate DEI-related “ideological ‘tuning.’”

18 January 2026

Russia and India Formalize Arctic Partnership

John C. K. Daly

During Russian President Vladimir Putin’s December 2025 visit to New Delhi, Russia formalized Indian military access to Arctic naval ports, training in polar operations, and logistics support under a five-year agreement, deepening Russia–India military cooperation in the Arctic.

The two countries also committed to developing key transport routes, including the Northern Sea Route, the International North–South Transport Corridor, and the Chennai–Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor, aiming to shorten shipping distances between Europe and Asia.

Canada’s China Gambit: Strategic Fantasy Meets Geopolitical Reality

Stephen Nagy

Here’s the reality: diversifying economic relationships is prudent policy, but the notion Canada could meaningfully balance American pressure through Chinese partnership is strategically questionable and empirically unsound. In fact, Canada’s relationship with its southern neighbor runs far too deep, China presents an unreliable alternative, and Canada’s capacity for broader global engagement is limited.

A Relationship Greater than any Single Government

The scale and depth of the Canada-US bilateral relationship defy comparison. Over $900 billion in annual trade flows across the world’s longest undefended border. Integrated continental defense architecture—formalized through NORAD and deepened through decades of intelligence sharing—forged irreplicable institutional bonds. What’s more, hundreds of thousands of informal connections between businesses, universities, civil society organizations, and families transcend any single government’s policy preferences.

Managed Rivalry or Strategic Reset Between China and the U.S.?

James Durso

In December 2025, Wu Xinbo, Dean, Institute of International Studies, Fudan University and advisor to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, used the pages of Foreign Affairs, to propose a “grand bargain” between China and America.

Wu argues that U.S.–China relations have reached a pivotal moment that requires a comprehensive reset to prevent long?term confrontation. He proposes starting with economic cooperation—easing U.S. technology restrictions and increasing Chinese market access—while managing geopolitical tensions in Asia and exercising mutual restraint over Taiwan. He believes both countries must clarify their roles in the international order and accept coexistence to stabilize the relationship.

PLA Justice Mission 2025 Further Rehearses Taiwan Invasion Operations

K. Tristan Tang

The PLA launched another military exercise in late December 2025, with force scale and deployment locations broadly similar to previous drills.

The exercise nonetheless signaled an effort by the Eastern Theater Command to sustain year-round readiness, likely in response to Xi Jinping’s directive to achieve the capability to conduct operations against Taiwan by 2027.

Compared with earlier exercises, this drill advanced invasion-related rehearsals, including scenarios involving the seizure of the Penghu Islands and parts of eastern Taiwan.

Xi Projects Confidence in Shorter New Year’s Speech

Arran Hope

Exuding confidence, Xi’s new year’s eve speech heralded the start of a new five-year plan, praised advances in artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies, and declared that the country’s comprehensive national power had reached a new stage.

Military matters were unusually prominent in the speech, with the September 2025 military parade in Beijing eulogized near the beginning of his remarks. He also used this section to praise the establishment of “Taiwan Retrocession Memorial Day.”

The Iranian Regime Could Fall But a U.S. Strike Would Prop It Up

Jamsheed K. Choksy and Carol E. B. Choksy

Many thousands of Iranians are again risking their lives to protest their authoritarian, theocratic regime. And as it has done during previous protests, the regime is responding by cutting off the country’s Internet access, unleashing violence on its citizens, and blaming foreign scapegoats. The protests’ death toll is rising: Iran Human Rights, a Norway-based nongovernmental organization, estimates that over 600 demonstrators have been killed nationwide since late December.

Perhaps emboldened by his recent ouster of Nicolás Maduro, the Venezuelan leader, U.S. President Donald Trump has repeatedly vowed to launch military strikes if Tehran continues to repress protest. The United States “will start shooting too,” he warned on January 6, if Iranian protesters keep getting killed. Tehran’s heavily armed troops and militias have brutally suppressed previous demonstrations, and there is a genuine need to prevent a larger massacre. Moreover, the Islamic Republic appears more fragile than ever after last June’s 12-day war. The regime seems incapable of addressing the root causes of the economic crisis that has driven its people to the streets; protests have spread from Tehran to every corner of the country, revealing Iranians’ widespread lack of faith that their current leaders can set the country on a better course.

Navigating with StarLink-Signals in GPS-Denied Environments: Part 1

Benjamin Cook

These days, for weirdos like me, it’s really hard to figure out where to look as first. In Ukraine, the Russians have secured Sviatohirsk and are meanwhile infiltrating towards the last ‘big’ and ‘constructed’ Ukrainian defence line south of Zaporizhzhya (those who meanwhile understand how this war ‘works’, know of what ‘importance’ are such ‘field fortifications’).

In Iran… or around it: the king/majesty Dumpf of the USA seems to be setting up ‘help’ for protesters AFTER these have been massacred en masse by the IRGC-regime - to the degree where the protesting all but ceased - while at the same time ICE-ing protesters at home. And Israel is so horny to prompt him into an all-out attack on Iran - in order to distract from its continued genocide on Palestinians - that Netanyahu can’t care less if Dumpf is regularly dinning with Holocaust-deniers, and his aides are already openly considering a similar ‘turkey shot’ like when Israel has bombed all of Syria AFTER the fall of the Assadist regime.

War Spending Accelerating Russian Infrastructure Collapse

Paul Goble

Most of the Russian Federation is situated in the Far North—permafrost underlies 60 percent of its territory. Cold weather during winters puts a strain on infrastructure, including flight and road delays and breakdowns in the delivery of heat, electricity, and even water to many homes, schools, hospitals, and other facilities. Russians have learned to expect this, although in the past they sometimes have bitterly joked that it is hard to believe the Kremlin’s promises that it is ready to cope with a nuclear war, something that has never happened, when it cannot deal with winter, something that occurs every year (Window on Eurasia, January 7). This year, these problems have become much more serious as a result of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine. 

Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian targets have destroyed key portions of Russian infrastructure (Sibir.Realii, January 6). Moscow has diverted most of the funding it had provided to reinforce and repair Russian infrastructure to its war efforts (The Moscow Times, January 4; Govorit Nemoskva, January 10). As a result, developments this year have become a political issue, sparking small but widespread protests by those most immediately affected (see EDM, December 22, 2025). Commentators and even Duma politicians have criticized the Kremlin, warning that because of the war and Putin’s policies, Russia faces not only temporary problems but is on the way to an infrastructure collapse that will likely take decades to recover (see EDM, October 16, 2025; The Saratoga Foundation, January 1; Dialog.ua; Charter97, January 6).