Indian Strategic Studies: 01/05/26

5 January 2026

China’s Quad counter centers on building an anti-India arc

Maqbool Shah

India faces the growing risk of Chinese encirclement. Image: X Screengrab

As the Quad — the US, Japan, India and Australia — seeks to constrain Beijing’s ambitions, China is quietly building a counterarchitecture aimed not at the Quad as a whole, but at its most exposed member: India. Through patient investments, military partnerships and political leverage across South Asia, Beijing is turning India’s geography from asset into vulnerability.

From “String of Pearls” to encirclement

Early talk of a Chinese “String of Pearls” focused on port access from the South China Sea to the Persian Gulf. That has since evolved into a denser network of economic corridors, dual-use ports and political influence capable of generating simultaneous pressure on nearly every Indian frontier.

The logic resembles Cold War containment, but with 21st-century tools. Where Washington once built formal alliances around the Soviet Union, Beijing is weaving trade, infrastructure finance and security ties with India’s neighbors to ensure that every land border and maritime approach is contested.

Pakistan: the hard-power cornerstone

Pakistan remains the central pillar of this architecture. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, whose announced value has risen to about $62 billion, gives China a direct route from Xinjiang to the Arabian Sea via Gwadar, easing the Malacca Strait chokepoint and locking in a long-term presence on India’s western flank.

Militarily, the relationship has deepened. China supplies the bulk of Pakistan’s major arms, including JF-17 fighters and Type 054A frigates, and has assisted sensitive missile and nuclear-related capacities designed to offset India’s conventional superiority.

Talk of “CPEC 2.0,” focused on industrial zones and deeper economic integration, underlines how far Islamabad has become a quasi-strategic tributary: economically dependent, militarily intertwined and diplomatically aligned with Beijing against New Delhi.

‘Respectful Responder’: How India Is Reshaping Regional Security Partnership

Shreya Upadhyay

The Indian Air Force provides disaster relief to Sri Lanka during Operation Sagar Bandhu following Cyclone Ditwah, Nov. 28, 2025.Credit: Indian Air Force

In the last week of December, India announced a $450 million “reconstruction package” for Sri Lanka to help the island nation recover from the devastating impact of Cyclone Ditwah. The cyclone battered Sri Lanka in late 2025 and the Indian Navy undertook comprehensive humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations under Operation Sagar Bandhu. Indian naval ships INS Vikrant and INS Udaygiri, which were present in Colombo as part of the 75th Anniversary International Fleet Review (IFR-2025) of the Sri Lanka Navy, were tasked at short notice to provide immediate relief based on emerging requirements ashore. Ship-borne helicopters were deployed for aerial reconnaissance of the affected areas and augmented ongoing search and rescue efforts. INS Sukanya was also deployed, carrying critical relief supplies.

Why Israel and Trump Should Be Cautious About Pakistani Troops in Gaza

Anna Mahjar-Barducci

Pakistan does not officially recognize Israel, and has never designated Hamas as a terrorist organization. It may well have an interest in making sure that Hamas can continue its "resistance" -- meaning terrorism.

These examples demonstrate how freely Hamas operatives function within Pakistan. Allowing Pakistani troops into Gaza would therefore pose serious infiltration and counterintelligence risks. Unlike a genuinely neutral peacekeeping force, Pakistani soldiers may be unwilling — or ideologically disinclined — to confront Hamas. In a worst-case scenario, some elements could covertly assist Hamas fighters in evading disarmament.

Pakistani media have reported that Islamabad does not wish to be perceived as a "B-team of the Israeli military focused solely on disarming Hamas." Such statements underscore the likelihood of operational friction and divided loyalties on the ground.

Europe’s Taiwan Dilemma Lessons from a Tabletop Exercise

TOMASZ SZATKOWSKI, OCTAVIAN MANEA, LUIS SIMÓN AND GIULIA TERCOVICH

This trajectory produced the exercise’s central strategic insight: Europe’s main contribution to a Taiwan war is not expeditionary combat power, but industrial sustainment and logistical depth. Europe increasingly functions as the “arsenal and artery” of a US-led coalition fighting in the decisive theatre, while shouldering primary responsibility for deterrence in its own theatre. This logic crystallised in the “Atlantic Corridor” concept: a two-way transatlantic logistics and industrial lifeline enabling Europe to supply US and Indo-Pacific forces while ensuring that Europe itself remains defensible if Russia escalates.

Over time, the corridor becomes more than a supply route – it becomes a mechanism of progressive economic and strategic entanglement, binding the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres into an interdependent industrial and operational ecosystem. In this respect, the exercise revealed a historical parallel with the Lend-Lease relationship of 1941/42: indirect support, followed by deep industrial integration and, ultimately, unavoidable strategic involvement. As in that earlier period, Europe initially seeks insulation from direct belligerence but is gradually drawn into the systemic logic of great power war by the very act of sustaining the frontline.

The TTX therefore demonstrates that Europe cannot remain a distant observer in a Taiwan conflict. Even without deploying major combat forces to East Asia, Europe becomes a central strategic actor through production, logistics, economic warfare and the defence of the Atlantic lifeline. The exercise shows that indirect involvement is not a form of neutrality – it is a pathway to structured belligerence.

Beijing Is Facing a Population Bust | Opinion

Ilan Berman

When it comes to a nation’s potential, few factors matter more than demographics. The pace of a country’s population determines a great many things, from the vibrancy of its society to its global competitiveness.

That’s what makes the case of Russia so striking. Despite the ambitious neo-imperial agenda that has been charted by Vladimir Putin in recent years, the country is locked in a pattern of massive, protracted demographic decline that has the potential to fundamentally alter the complexion of the state. I have written on this subject for publications like The National Interest and The Moscow Times, and most extensively in my 2013 book Implosion: The End of Russia and What It Means for America.

An aged Chinese couple walk by several rows of lanterns in Beijing, China. (Getty Images)

What is less well understood is that China is facing an equally ominous demographic profile. Just how significant of a problem this is for the People's Republic of China (PRC) is reflected in the most recent data update from the U.S. Census Bureau. That information projects that, in the years ahead, China’s current population of 1.4 billion will face marked decline, and could fall by more than half by 2100. These projections, moreover, are broadly consistent with those of institutions like the World Bank, which project a population plateau in the near future, followed by deepening decline in subsequent decades.

This trajectory is due to multiple causes, most prominently the ruinous long-term effects of Beijing’s now rescinded “one-child policy.” That policy, launched in 1979 and formally ended in 2015, helped lock the country into one of the world’s lowest fertility rates. The effects are profound: births in China are now at historically low levels, even as life expectancy has continued to rise and the share of the country’s elderly is swelling. Moreover, things are only projected to get worse in the years ahead.

Why China Is Not Betting on Its Relationship With the Kuomintang

Zhenlin Cui

On December 29, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China announced the commencement of a large-scale military exercise around Taiwan. While the specific motives remain unclear, it is widely believed within Taiwan that this may be a response to the diplomatic tensions between China and Japan caused by Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae’s remarks about Taiwan in November, as well as the recently approved U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. However, the timing of this exercise is still somewhat surprising, especially considering the Shanghai-Taipei City Forum had been held just one day prior.

Because Beijing has consistently refused direct dialogue with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), in power since 2016, the city-to-city forum, a political legacy of Ma Ying-jeou’s administration, has become the de facto highest-level regular exchange mechanism between mainland China and Taiwan. Although the forum has been used by the DPP as a pretext to criticize the KMT, Taipei Mayor Chiang Wan-an still visited Shanghai despite the pressure. This sudden military exercise, starting so soon after his trip, undoubtedly represents a heavy blow to the KMT’s image.

The Trial of Abe’s Assassin Is a Test of Takaichi’s Appetite for Political Reform

Peter Chai and Charles Crabtree

The Yamagami Tetsuya trial, which began in October after he admitting to killing former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo in 2022, has increased anxieties about political corruption and the Liberal Democratic Party’s ties to religious groups. The proceedings raise questions about current Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae’s commitment to confronting these deep-rooted relationships, with the answers very much important to the ongoing controversy over the balance between religious freedoms and public welfare.

Taken together, Yamagami’s testimony and social media accounts suggest a childhood marred by family tragedy and financial ruin caused by his mother’s devotion to the Unification Church. His story calls attention to and symbolically represents several enduring national concerns: coercive religious environments, unclear political fundraising, and the intersection of religion and political power. While Takaichi has not been in office long enough to fully address these issues, it remains unclear whether and to what extent she might.

The Demographic Decline of China

Philip Huffman

Over the past half century, China has experienced massive growth—from the world’s 10th largest economy in 1980 to the number two spot today. It boasts a massive and expanding military, advanced technology, and a wide range of natural resources. Perhaps though, the greatest Chinese asset is the Chinese people, 1.4 billion of them to be exact. While the U.S. is still ahead of China as the world’s economic power and its military continues to have an edge, its population of 340 million is dwarfed by the behemoth of the Chinese population of 1.4 billion. That’s at least 4 Chinese people for every American. China’s population has been key to its strength: the economic output of a Chinese citizen per year is $12,600, which is far below the U.S. average of $82,700, but since there are 1.4 billion Chinese people, the total economic output of the country is around $18 trillion and that’s much closer to the U.S. total which is at around $29 trillion. If China had America’s civilian to active military ratio (0.4%) then it would have an active military of 5.4 million—giving it the potential to overpower the U.S. active military which stands at 1.4 million. With such a large population, it’s no wonder that China has made incredible strides in AI and quantum computing with its incredible supply of human capital. The country is still seen as the world’s factory as it has an overabundance of cheap labor, and it remains one of the world’s largest markets. However, although China has benefited massively from its large population, its demographic future is in danger.

China warns satellites from Elon Musk’s Starlink are ‘safety and security’ risk

China has warned that the rapid expansion of internet satellite constellations such as SpaceX’s Starlink presented “pronounced safety and security challenges”.

Addressing an informal United Nations Security Council event initiated by Russia on Monday, Beijing’s representative cited several incidents, including near collisions between Starlink satellites and the Chinese space station in 2021, and a satellite that disintegrated in December.

The representative also pointed to the disregard of countries’ airspace and laws by “certain low Earth orbit constellations”, including their use for military reconnaissance and by terrorist and separatist groups.

The comments were made shortly after a senior Starlink executive said there had been a near miss between one of the firm’s satellites and a newly launched Chinese satellite, accusing the Chinese side of not coordinating with other satellites.

“In recent years, humanity has made new progress in the exploration and use of outer space,” the representative said, according to a statement by Beijing’s UN mission that did not name the diplomat involved.

MERICS Top China Risks 2026

Europe faces a demanding year in 2026. President Donald Trump’s impulsiveness and transactional approach to foreign policy make transatlantic relations hard to predict. Washington and Beijing’s focus on bilateral negotiations will marginalize Europe. Worse, Europe’s declining relevance in Beijing’s foreign-policy thinking means Brussels should prepare for a China unwilling to offer meaningful concessions.

To help European actors anticipate what 2026 might bring, MERICS has developed a foresight effort to identify key China risks, especially those with the biggest impact on European interests and security. To identify these, we hosted two separate, off-the-record foresight workshops with officials and experts from across Europe. They assessed China’s likely trajectory over the next five years, and which trends might have the deepest impact on Europe-China relations. We then held a further, internal workshop with analysts from MERICS’ research teams to refine our selection of risks.

The Arab Spring’s Painful Lessons

Alexander Langlois

Fifteen years after the Middle East’s largest pro-democracy movement, the West still has not learned that supporting autocracy is no longer sustainable.

The Arab Spring carries multiple meanings for the many millions of people across the Middle East and North Africa, let alone the world. The widespread calls for civil liberties and democracy across the region certainly were divisive, with some defining the uprisings as imperialist plots while others viewed them as a long-anticipated moment for freedom fighters and democrats who had long suffered under some of the most autocratic rulers of the 20th century. But what did this moment of national and regional upheaval truly mean for the region, its autocrats, and the people stuck under their boots, and what does that mean for the future?

On December 17, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi’s act of self-immolation in protest against the brutal Tunisian regime of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali unknowingly kicked off the region’s largest democracy wave since decolonization. Within a series of months, protests spread against autocratic regimes in Yemen, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, and Syria, shocking a world long accustomed to and benefitting from repression in that part of the world. Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak regime, for example, was long viewed as a bulwark against the Arab street and the forces of Arab and Islamic nationalism that, for many in the West, posed a threat to their regional interests—namely energy flows, Israeli security, and fighting violent extremism.

Yet, ironically enough, it was this very autocracy that proved to be the undoing of the Western-friendly equation underpinning assumptions about regional stability. As governments across the Middle East and North Africa tightened their police state models around unsustainable corruption, mismanagement, and political repression, the people of the region, particularly unemployed youth, started to question the systems repressing them for the benefit of foreign powers and a small circle of elites.

Thus, the rapid spread of revolutionary movements across the region in the early days of the Arab Spring resulted from the outdated and unsustainable structures of the past. Yet, tragically, those same structures proved resilient, including the Arab Gulf monarchies that ultimately drove counterrevolutionary forces against successful uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere.

The Syndrome of Trembling Pens

In the labyrinthine, often dimly lit corridors of Iran’s newsrooms, a sound resonates louder than the headlines of the daily press: the heavy, suffocating sound of silence, a silence not born of a scarcity of subjects or a lack of events; the country is a land of unfinished crises, accumulated tragedies, and naked social contradictions.

Rather, this silence is the product of a complex, multilayered, and deeply institutionalized process wherein the journalist, before even pressing a finger to the keyboard, convenes a summary court in his or her own mind—acting simultaneously as the accused, the defense, and the judge—and ultimately issues a verdict of condemnation by deleting their own words.

We are witnessing a phenomenon that can be termed the “Syndrome of Trembling Pens,” a condition in which writers cease to be narrators of reality and transform into their own ruthless, vigilant censor, with the government using a combination of strict laws, arrests, physical intimidation, and extensive internet filtering to control the flow of information

Lessons from the Ukraine War

Alec Soltes

As the Ukraine war approaches its fourth year, the geopolitical consequences of Russia’s invasion continue to reverberate. Global stability, trade networks, and the prevailing liberal democratic order have been shaken. While the system holds, its future depends on whether or not it can adapt to the challenges thrust upon it by the war. The war presents several lessons at the onset of 2026: the limits of offensive realism as a theory, the fragility of shallow interdependence, the importance of an increasingly assertive Global South, and the pressing need for evolution and adaptation.

Strengths and Limits of Offensive Realism

Offensive realism is a theory in international relations that posits that the global international order is anarchic, that states are rational actors, and that states pursue a maximalist approach to secure what they consider to be their core national interests. In other words, the nature of the international system forces states to do whatever they can to ensure security, hence the ‘offensive’ qualifier, where defensive realism makes theoretical space for balancing and other status quo-maintaining behaviors.

The theory predicts the outcome of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in part. Russia’s policy toward Europe has perennially sought to expand westward and anchor itself in defensible borders. Russia’s current western border is virtually impossible to defend effectively. The Soviet Union needed Ukraine’s anchoring of the Carpathian Mountains in the west as well as a military presence in Belarus and modern-day Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea to maximize its security. After both Belarus and Ukraine became independent, Moscow was faced with a serious geographic vulnerability. It sought to address this vulnerability specifically with Ukraine first by annexing Crimea and supporting separatist groups in the Donbas in 2014.

'I hid from a wall of heat': Eyewitnesses describe escape from Swiss bar inferno

This story contains details some readers may find upsetting.

"I thought my little brother was inside so I came and tried to break the window to help people to exit, and after that I went in."

The 18-year-old man, who did not want to give his name, was speaking to the BBC after a huge fire at a New Year's Eve party in the Swiss resort of Crans-Montana rapidly turned what was an evening of celebration into a nightmare.

Police say around 40 people died when the blaze broke out in a bar called Le Constellation at around 01:30 local time (00:30 GMT) on Thursday. A further 115 more were injured, mainly with severe burns.

Can Crisis Preparedness Information Move Taiwanese From Awareness to Action?

Kuan-chen Lee

A scene from Taipei’s 2025 Urban Resilience Exercise, the civil defense portion of the Han Kuang exercise, July 17, 2025.Credit: Office of the President, ROC (Taiwan)

Taiwan’s government has in recent years stepped up efforts to strengthen national defense, societal resilience, and risk communication amid growing security and disaster risks. As part of this push, an updated civil defense handbook – “In Case of Crisis: Taiwan’s National Public Safety Guide” – was released to provide citizens with practical guidance on emergency preparedness. In an unprecedented initiative, the Taiwanese government has begun distributing copies of the guide to households across the island, making it one of the most wide-ranging public preparedness campaigns in Taiwan’s history.

The logic behind this approach is straightforward. In a crisis, the gap between official plans and household readiness can quickly become a strategic vulnerability. A guidebook cannot replace training, stockpiles, or institutional coordination, but it can signal priorities, standardize basic steps, and give citizens a clearer sense of what preparedness looks like in practice.

Central Asia’s Mounting Debt Burden: Risks and Policy Implications

Sobir Kurbanov and Vlad Paddack

Central Asia is entering a period of heightened fiscal vulnerability as public debt continues to rise across much of the region. The World Bank’s latest International Debt Report (IDR) underscored that rapid debt accumulation is not inherently problematic if borrowing is channeled into productive investment. However, when returns are weak, creditor exposure is concentrated, and transparency is limited, debt dynamics can quickly become destabilizing. These risks are increasingly evident in Central Asia, where amortization pressures are growing, fiscal buffers remain thin, and revenue bases are narrow.

The IDR emphasized the need for clearer borrowing strategies, stronger project selection, improved debt transparency, and systematic assessment of long-term fiscal risks before governments commit to new external loans. It also stressed that public investment should prioritize sectors with strong economic payoffs, such as export-oriented industries, energy efficiency, agriculture modernization, and digitalization, while limiting politically motivated or low-yield infrastructure projects. These recommendations are particularly relevant for Central Asian economies now facing rising debt-service obligations.

Mainland Southeast Asia: What to Watch in 2026

Sebastian Strangio

On December 27, the governments of Thailand and Cambodia agreed to end nearly three weeks of heavy fighting along their 817-kilometer land border. The conflict, which killed at least 100 people and displaced nearly a million on both sides of the border, has inflamed public opinion in both nations, pushing relations to their lowest point in years – perhaps decades.

Under the ceasefire, the two nations have agreed to freeze the front lines in their current positions, refrain from reinforcing their positions, and allow displaced civilians to return home as soon as possible. Thailand also released 18 Cambodian soldiers that it captured shortly in late July, and during talks hosted this week in Yunnan by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, both sides reaffirmed their commitment to the ceasefire by working to build “mutual confidence” and restore “peace, security and stability.”

The dispute over the border dates back to border treaties signed between French Indochina and the Kingdom of Siam in 1904 and 1907, and has surfaced periodically in the years since. The tensions built steadily across the first half of 2025, beginning with an incident in February in which a group of Cambodian women sang patriotic songs at a disputed Angkorian temple along the border. This culminated in five days of fighting along the border in late July.

10 Conflicts to Watch in 2026

Comfort Ero

Over the last year, fighting raged on in Ukraine, Sudan, Myanmar, and the Sahel, as did gang turf battles in Haiti. The war in Gaza wound down, but only after Israel, having resumed its assault in March, razed much of what was left of the strip. Israel and Iran traded blows, with the United States eventually joining in. Thailand and Cambodia clashed along their disputed border. So, too, did Afghanistan and Pakistan. An exchange of fire between India and Pakistan was their worst in decades. Through rebel proxies, Rwandan President Paul Kagame has, in effect, annexed the North and South Kivu provinces in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Thanks to Trump's 'Peace' Plan, Hamas Even Has Time to Hold Elections

Khaled Abu Toameh

[T]he Iran-backed Palestinian terror group Hamas is planning to elect a new leader for its political bureau and replace many of its members who were killed during the fighting with Israel. Hamas's goal: to show the world that it is not going anywhere; that it now, because it holds an internal election, should be considered a legitimate, respectable government, and that it solidly intends to maintain its control of the Gaza Strip, in violation of US President Donald J. Trump's 20-point peace plan.

The terror group has simply exploited Trump's ceasefire plan to rearm, regroup and consolidate its civilian and military control in areas of the Gaza Strip in which Israeli forces are not present since the ceasefire agreement took effect. For Hamas, Trump's plan is just another temporary ceasefire that allows it to entrench its position and restock its military capabilities.

10 Biggest Flashpoints Of 2026: New Reports Warn Of Grinding Wars, High-Tech Battles From Middle East To Americas

Prakash Nanda

What key military lessons from 2025 are still going to matter or stay relevant heading into 2026? This question can be addressed in two parts.

One part may address the likelihood of the current wars continuing and the possibility of new wars arising during the year. The second part could explore the types of arms and weapons that will predominate in the wars, on the one hand, and the domains of the wars, ranging from traditional land, sea, and air to include space and cyberspace, on the other.

According to the Brussels-based International Crisis Group, an independent organization that works toward preventing wars, there are 10 conflicts to watch in 2026.

These include the United States-Venezuela; Russia-Ukraine; the involvement of Middle Eastern countries and Turkey in Sudan’s civil war; Ethiopia-Eritrea; Mali-Burkina Faso; Syria-Israel-ISIS; Israel-Palestine; Israel and the United States vs. Iran and the Houthis; the civil war in Myanmar; and Afghanistan-Pakistan.

There is also an assessment from the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations’ 2026 Preventive Priorities Survey, which highlights a highly fragmented landscape with several overlapping flashpoints worldwide. It has graded them in the following manner:

The Hamas-Israel War: An Early Assessment

Robert Satloff

Three months after Israel and Hamas agreed to a U.S.-brokered ceasefire, the strategic outcome of the war remains uncertain. Both sides can point to meaningful achievements, but neither can claim decisive victory. Whereas Israel gained the release of its remaining hostages and a Gaza buffer zone to prevent future attacks, Hamas still controls nearly half the territory while its longtime patrons, Qatar and Turkey, have attained unprecedented standing in Washington. Uncertainty now looms as President Trump prepares to announce the transition to “phase two” of the ceasefire, which will see a raft of hopeful initiatives crash into the reality of a Gaza divided between Israeli and Hamas zones of control, without any agreed path toward disarming the terrorist group—the necessary precondition for any real progress toward full implementation of the ceasefire.

In this timely and provocative Policy Note, Washington Institute Executive Director Robert Satloff explains that several factors could shake up the status quo in Gaza. These include President Trump’s impatience for results, discontent from the Qatari and Turkish ceasefire guarantors, and Israeli unease at its enemy’s stubborn survival. While outlining the potential for a total breakdown of the ceasefire and return to full-scale hostilities, Satloff also argues that Jerusalem has a powerful interest in preventing a situation in which the White House is forced to choose between Israel and the ceasefire’s guarantors—and offers ways to avoid that deeply problematic scenario.

Handbook on the Role of Non-State Actors in Russian Hybrid Threats

Russia's employment of non-state actors (NSA) is a staple of its approach to hybrid threat operations. This handbook provides an overarching assessment of Russia's approach to working with and through various NSAs across different operational domains, mapping both the empirical depth and breadth of the phenomenon. It establishes a much-needed baseline for understanding the logic behind Russia's use of NSAs and lays the groundwork for determining appropriate measures and countermeasures at a time when operations below and above the threshold of war are on the rise.

The handbook includes two chapters written by the Centre for Finance and Security (CFS) at RUSI Research Fellow Eliza Lockhart.

The first chapter examines how the Russian state leverages a network of economic and financial NSAs to generate revenue, maintain economic resilience under sanctions, and wield financial and political influence abroad.

The Invisible Frontline: How encrypted networks and AI are rewiring Britain’s security

Hamzeh Abu Nowar

Encrypted networks and artificial intelligence are enabling new forms of decentralized mobilization. Britain’s institutions must learn to track behavior, not just words. When a Telegram channel created only hours before a protest swelled from a few dozen members to thousands—sharing maps, live videos and minute-by-minute instructions—the unrest that followed looked less like a spontaneous gathering and more like an operation rehearsed in secret. This kind of rapid escalation reflects a shift in mobilization logic, where encrypted platforms enable fast-forming coordination that prioritizes speed, anonymity, and adaptability over formal organization or leadership.

Incidents like this have become increasingly common across Britain’s towns and cities in 2025, reflecting a broader pattern of digital mobilization that is testing how the country anticipates and responds to disorder. I call this pattern Digital Insurgency—a hybrid mode of mobilization that blends insurgent tradecraft, online anonymity and rapid coordination across encrypted platforms. It is not an organization but a behavior: fast-forming, decentralized coordination that can serve any cause or crime. The same coordination logic is used by activists, criminals and extremists alike—decentralized organization, disciplined migration between platforms and rapid amplification.

How Emerging Technologies Are Redefining the Future of Warfare

Ahmad Ibrahim

The impact of emerging technologies on the character of war and operational art must be understood with conceptual distinction. Carl Von Clausewitz has defined the nature of war as “an act of [violent] force to compel our enemy to do our [political] will.” The nature of war remains the same: it’s a political instrument rooted in violence and showcases reciprocity characteristics. In contrast, the character of war is dynamic, and as advocated by Collin S. Gray, “the nature, unlike the character, of war cannot be transformed. If the nature of war is transformed, then war ceases to be war…and instead becomes something entirely different.” Antulio J. Echevarria II has explicitly warned about confusing technological change with changes in war’s nature by arguing that “the nature of war refers to its essence and inherent features; the character of war refers to the particular forms war takes at any given time.” Therefore, what we are witnessing in contemporary times is not an alteration of war’s nature but a significant transformation in the character of war. Emerging technologies are accelerating this change at such a pace that it is challenging the traditional military thought process and the subsequent operational adaptability.

A year in review: How Big Tech redefined governance and the economy in 2025

Sara Goudarzi

If it hadn’t already been apparent, Big Tech’s influence on, and integration with, governmental bodies and other sectors of society became abundantly clear this year. From Elon Musk’s DOGE team, which gained access to government databases that stored personal information of millions of people, to AI-assisted surveillance programs, to ambitions of overhauling the Federal Aviation Administration using Silicon Valley’s “move fast and break things” ethos, large technology corporations with enormous power and influence have permeated nearly every crevice of contemporary life.

In July, Forbes reported that with its $4 trillion market capitalization, the AI chip maker NVIDIA, a “less than 40,000-person company is now worth more than 97% of the world’s economies and all of the world’s military spending.” The total value of companies like Apple and Microsoft also exceed the GDP of many countries. The facts are concerning, but they also give citizens and leaders a chance to develop better policies and guardrails to protect societal and democratic values. Here are several pieces that explore, from various angles, the artificial intelligence revolution and the expanding influence of powerful technology companies.

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