Robert S. Burrell
The recent U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 and resulting takeover of governance by the Taliban has caused significant doubt in America’s ability to conduct long-lasting and effective counterinsurgency operations. However, a historical analysis into America’s small wars (or dirty wars) over the past two centuries offers an indispensable perspective. The United States has been at war for about 226 of its 245 years, the vast majority of these conflicts have been prosecuted short of traditional war, and many came as a result of great power competition. During this same period, the United States has developed its own unique methods of addressing insurgency. This essay illuminates the evolution and adoption of America’s double-edged reward and punishment approach to addressing insurgency, from the Plains Indian Wars through the Vietnam War, the lessons of which are essential to consider before embarking upon tomorrow’s conflict.
The Plains Indian Wars, 1830 – 1880
Native American Indian Sioux Tribe on Horses[1]
The United States remained in a nearly perpetual state of violence with its Native American inhabitants from its inception though around 1890. The contests with each tribal nation are distinctive, but perhaps the greatest lessons for the U.S. government and its army derived from the conquest of the Great Plains tribes, generally fought between the 1830s and the 1870s. The most famous of these Plains Indians included the Apache, Arapaho, Cheyenne, Comanche, Kiowa, Navajo, and Sioux, who inhabited what was previously known as French Louisiana, which the United States had purchased from France in 1803.
Through their cataclysmic encounters with rapid technological development and European colonial expansion, these tribes evolved into nomadic horse cultures in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries – dependent on the huge Buffalo herds migrating between the Mississippi River and the Rocky Mountains. Pressured by their forced migration, they established sophisticated methods of resistance, adaptation, and survival. Competition with other Plains’ tribes further sharpened their abilities to conduct efficient forms of mobile warfare. These tribes, in fact, were so formidable that the United States primarily attempted dialog and peace overtures for decades following the Louisiana Purchase. It was not until after the Mexican American War, and the acquisition of California in 1848, that the United States made serious attempts to pacify the Plains Indians, who posed a threat to settlers traveling along the Oregon and Santa Fe Trails to California, as well as a danger to lines of communication between the East and West coasts of the United States.
With a hub and spoke strategy, the U.S. Army erected a number of Forts along the eastern boundaries of Indian Country (generally the Mississippi River), and eventually a few in interior locations, the most famous being Fort Laramie in modern day Wyoming. From these defensive forts, the U.S. Cavalry escorted travelers, as well as military and commercial goods, across the Great Plains. Veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan in the Twentieth Century would recognize this approach of constructing fortified bases connected by convoys. Meanwhile, the mobilized Indian tribes remained a significant threat. The U.S. Government preferred addressing them through mediation and negotiations, but conflict between the settlers and the Indians over lands and resources inevitably led to open hostilities.[2]
From a military perspective, the Indians appeared nearly unassailable, as they “had no home base, no line of operations or defense, no strategic points to defend and no important storage facilities for ammunition or provisions.”[3] Or perhaps best explained by U.S. soldiers of the era, “living off the country, without impediments of any description, and with no lines of retreat to cover, he [the Indian] is enabled to withhold himself from combat, unless he finds himself very superior in number and position.”[4] Further, the tribes had excellent leadership, possessing military architects like Crazy Horse, Sitting Bull, Geronimo, and a seemingly inexhaustible source of others.
One American officer with unique experience in the Civil War, General William T. Sherman, promptly identified the tribes’ greatest weakness, stating that “the quickest way to compel the Indians to settle down to civilized life was to send ten regiments of soldiers to the plains, with orders to shoot buffaloes until they became too scarce to support the redskins.”[5] Simultaneously, Sherman recognized that established land routes, like the Union Pacific and Kansas Pacific railroads, would give the U.S. Army ready access to the vast Plains and “seal the fate of the aboriginal inhabitants.”[6]
The virtual extermination of American buffalo (a colossal endeavor prosecuted over decades), combined with new access provided by railways over the great plains, were instrumental in subduing the American Indians and bringing them to the negotiating table. In exchange for land, native populations received recognition of sovereignty as nation states and often access to education, health care, and a common rule of law. These pacification tools (backed up by the threat of force) proved generally effective in keeping the peace, shaping the U.S. Government’s approach in later conflicts.[7]
Historians like Russell F. Weigly argued that the Indian campaigns demonstrated the evolution of a “total victory” development in American warfare. However, the Plains Indians War’s also produced a distinctive approach to counterinsurgency, one that used brute force primarily but increasingly introduced what many progressive Americans perceived as incentives. The creation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (headed by its first Native American in 1869) demonstrates another persuasion tactic in addressing resistance. This approach emulated the prevailing and contrasting moods of the American population – some of whom viewed the Indians as a nuisance to be eradicated and others who admired them.[8] The fact that the United States created national treaties with indigenous populations at all is rather unique (with Canada and New Zealand comprising the other notable exceptions), demonstrating an American preference for arbitration with resistance movements and the use of governmental programs to address their grievances if possible.
The Philippine Insurrection, 1898 – 1913
A Burden That Cannot Be Honorably Disposed at Present[9]
In a speedy and globally prosecuted three-month war, the United States decisively defeated Spain in 1898, liberating Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines. However, to complicate the situation, the Filipinos had already started a revolution for independence from Spain and had established its own national congress and national army. When Spain surrendered, the United States decided the Philippines was not yet capable of self-rule and needed further development as a U.S. territory. Such concerns were particularly relevant as the vast majority of Asia remained colonized by England, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, in addition to the growing Japanese threat.[10] The Philippine National Congress disagreed with the “wait and see” promise of independence and violence erupted. What the United States called the Philippine Insurrection lasted from 1898 to 1913 and added more traditions to an evolving American approach to counterinsurgency.
The Philippines consisted of thousands of inhabited islands, populated by dozens of ethnic groups and native inhabitants, all of whom were fiercely independent. On the northern island of Southern Luzon, the Tagalog had established themselves as the economic and political powerbrokers of the islands’ peoples. Concurrently, the Tagalog also took the lead on the struggle for national autonomy. Accordingly, a national congress and national army had already been established in revolution prior to the United States entry into war with Spain.
The United States quickly defeated the national army under General Emilio Aguinaldo, at which point the Filipinos turned to extensive guerilla warfare (which they were particularly good at). Many insurgent leaders on Luzon, like General Miguel Malvar continued to resist the United States until 1902. Other insurgents throughout the Visayans and Mindanao (such as the Muslim Filipinos in the south referred to as Moros) fought the United States until around 1913. It remains difficult to assess when resistance to the United States actually ended as the vast majority of Philippine Islands remained virtually independent of occupation.
As in the Plains Indian Wars, the Army continued its use of the hub and spoke method of remote fortresses connected by land or sea lines of supply – using ships or pack mules. To address the unruly hinterlands, the U.S. Army utilized long-range patrols and raids, but maintained centralized garrisons of at least battalion-sized strength because small outposts could be quickly overwhelmed. The Army also issued domestic identification for locals and implemented checkpoints on roadways in order to control the movement of suspected insurgents between townships.
Like the Great Plains, the Philippine Islands proved far too vast to occupy and completely control. However, control of the maritime domain limited the mobility of insurgents between islands while simultaneously hampering their illicit trade and income. For many of those in the rebellion, cooperation with the Americans simply proved easier in the long run than opposing them, and a blanket amnesty for those who surrendered made it a simple matter of reintegrating with society. Additionally, most of the islands returned to their normalized state of autonomy, with little interference from the capital in Manila and the United States.
During this time period, the United States moderately increased the rewards versus punishments approach in addressing resistance. One of the most important methods utilized in pacifying the Philippines resulted from infrastructure, employment, medical, and education programs. The United States sponsored a number of road building programs, which positively impacted local populations with part-time jobs and increased access to commerce. Additionally, it established a health organization to assist with medical care, sanitation, and vaccinations programs, not only in Manila, but in the many barrios throughout the major islands.[11] Perhaps the most impactful was the establishment of a Philippines education system, which addressed the entire population – including elementary, secondary, and university opportunities. After a comprehensive effort, the literacy rate in the Colonial Philippines rose dramatically, only outdone by Japan throughout the entirety of Asia prior to World War II.[12] Of additional benefit, Filipinos used hundreds of languages, and English grew into a common form of cross-communication and eventually the national language.[13] As a result of these efforts to improve the general welfare of the Filipino population, the United States created considerable good will and a friendship which has remained between the two nations for a hundred years.
The Banana Wars, 1898-1934
Theodore Roosevelt and his Big Stick in the Caribbean[14]
Simultaneous with the Spanish American War, the United States entered a new phase of frequent interventions into Latin America which lasted until 1934. The U.S. executed these “small wars” under the executive authority of the President and without a declaration of war from Congress. As such, the primary instrument in carrying out these conflicts involved the U.S. Marine Corps, which operated in coordination with the State Department.[15] One could certainly argue that these long-term activities altruistically supported stabilization of the region and simultaneously limiting interventions from European powers. Meanwhile, critics (like decorated military veteran of these activities – Smedley Butler), would question the motives of the U.S. government as too heavily influenced by large American corporations seeking higher profits – a practice called “dollar diplomacy.”[16]
Between 1898 to 1934. the United States invaded and then directed governmental functions in Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua, Haiti, Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua, some of these lasting two decades in duration. Each of these interventions had their own unique histories but the occupation in Haiti from 1915 to 1934 provides a good example. Between 1911 and 1915, this small Caribbean country on Hispaniola experienced an astonishing seven violent deaths or overthrows of its President. In the face of an active indigenous insurgency and anarchy left in the absence of rule of law, President Woodrow Wilson sent in a Marine occupation force in 1915 and established a U.S. military-led government. The United States controlled the treasury, ensured the election of a pro-American President, and stood up a constabulary made up of local soldiers and police supervised by Marines.[17] The Marines finally withdrew in 1934, but strong diplomatic and economic relations between the two nations have remained.
The U.S. Marines codified their lessons of the Banana Wars in their 1940 small wars manual.[18] What stands out straight away is the emphasis on the indigenous population. Firstly, it recommends training and equipping an indigenous constabulary to reestablish rule of law. The tactics and equipment of the constabulary should support the native customs (not simply mirror those of U.S. forces). One caveat, however, was that the constabulary should remain non-partisan to enhance its legitimacy within all segments of the population. Secondly, after establishment of the partner force, combined operations with the Marines would neutralize or destroy armed opposition. Once the insurgency had been quelled, democratic and free elections should be held. And, after a new government had been installed, the Marines would leave.
Vietnam, 1946-1975
Stick ‘Em Up![19]
The United States supported a counterinsurgency in Vietnam from 1946 through 1975, and it remains the foremost U.S. case study for stabilization efforts heavily influenced by strategic competition (in this case with USSR and China). Despite its objections to European colonialism, American supported France’s ambitions to reestablish control over Indochina in 1946. Initially, one of these reasons grew out of fear that internal strife within France might result in a communist government and loss of an important ally.[20] Later, until their defeat in 1954, the United States fully accepted the “domino theory” and provided direct funding to France to curb communism, after which America supported the newly created Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) from 1955 through 1975. The United States even crafted an international coalition to support its nation-building effort – the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (including Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, and United Kingdom).
The scale of support to governance and combat in South Vietnam dwarfed all previous small wars involving the United States. In large part, Vietnam became the greater battlefield for the United States and the Soviet Union and China to counter each other’s ambitions for a new world order – one communist and the other free. Consequently, many U.S. programs to improve the Republic of Vietnam mirrored the values and systems of America and not necessarily those familiar to and prized by Vietnamese. Despite enormous investments in the legitimacy and defense of South Vietnam, as well as the broad and extensive application of direct U.S. military power, the communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam prevailed, toppling the capital of Saigon in 1975.
The Vietnam War has gone under robust scrutiny and debate by American academics for decades but has recently taken on new significance following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. The immediate question (as demonstrated by the caricature of a guerilla fighter defeating the world’s greatest superpower above) is: how could the United States be defeated by a lesser equipped and grossly inferior communist force? Such a question causes more heartbreaking reflection when considering the great promise shown in South Vietnam. One common complaint by militarists has do with the constraints placed on the use of American forces, making the defeat North Vietnam in military terms rather impossible (American politicians essentially placed the United States and its allies in a defensive stance). In contrast, others blame senior generals who attempted to fight a conventional war with mass and technology when a population-centric and irregular approach was required. In the end, the war was lost, despite not a single major U.S. military defeat. On the home front, the American population lost faith in the reasons for the fighting and the pervasive horror in its brutal prosecution.[21] Indeed, the requirement to maintain popular support, as well as the need for a consistent policy spanning over multiple U.S. administrations, made counterinsurgency and nation-building in Vietnam a particularly difficult enterprise.
Parallels
Have Patience – There are a number of commonalities to counterinsurgency, which the United States experienced during these two centuries. One lesson informs that traditional wars typically have short life spans, consisting of months or years, while irregular wars can last for decades. The Plains Indian Wars lasted for five decades, the Philippine Insurrection for two decades (with another two decades of nation building following), the Banana Wars for four decades, and supporting counterinsurgency in Vietnam for three decades. In the U.S. experience, counterinsurgency and stability activities take a very long time to bring about lasting change. Two decades of dedicated nation-building in South Vietnam proved too few to secure peace and establish legitimacy. Consequently, when the United States enters upon this type of irregular warfare in the future, it should expect four or five decades of effort. Colin Powell’s cautionary advice regarding President George W. Bush’s planned invasion of Iraq that “if you break it, you fix it” indicates his foreshadowing that subduing and rebuilding a nation will most likely comprise a long, complex, and violent struggle, a prediction which proved accurate.[22]
Fight Honorably – As a result of the Civil War, the United States Army adopted General Order No. 100 (often called the Lieber Code) to establish lawful rules concerning the laws and customs of war, including the treatment of enemy prisoners (this important code would later inform international law and the Geneva Convention). It also affected how the U.S. Army treated future enemies, including insurgents, starting off with the latter stage of the Plains Indians War and then onward.[23] Although Small Wars remained brutal contests performed amidst the civilian population, the tenants of General Order No. 100 have remained the guiding principle in the legal prosecution of irregular warfare and self-imposed constraints on violence. In other words, adherence to what would later be termed “the law of warfare” has remained a steadfast component to American counterinsurgency operations.
Expect Dirty Fighting – In contrast to adherence to the law of armed conflict, atrocities and war crimes are frequent occurrences in long wars of insurgency. These acts are often a result of frustrated combatants implementing unfamiliar strategies on illusive opponents. During the Plains Indian Wars, the killing of women and children occurred on both sides, causing great outrage to Native Indian and American populations. In the Philippine Insurgency, the “water cure” as a form of torture to illicit information grew the ire of the U.S. Congress, as did the many other acts of excessive brutality executed by members of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. Vietnam saw a host of criminal violence from the use of execution squads to the massacre at My Lai. These acts of unlawful violence can protract the conflict by inspiring rebellion and also reducing U.S. popular support for continued intervention. Consequently, commanders must maintain constant vigilance on the means in which counterinsurgency is executed in accordance with international law, as well as prepared mitigation plans for when these illegal or unethical incidences occur.
Use Indigenous Partners – Starting with the Indian Scouts, the U.S. armed forces increasingly employed indigenous partners to quell insurgency. Indians served U.S. militias since the Revolutionary War, but the Army Reorganization Act of 1866 authorized their direct enlistment.[24] The Army utilized these soldiers in proximity to where they were recruited to best leverage their knowledge of the terrain and tribal relationships. In the Philippines, the U.S. Army recruited 7,000 Philippine Scouts to perform combat actions, but also police functions.[25] Recruiting Filipinos paid huge dividends in countering the insurgency, as it coopted the population and legitimized U.S. rule. In Haiti, the United States established the Haitian Gendarmerie, which quickly became the foundation of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts, growing to about 3,460 personnel.[26] Again, in South Vietnam the United States made a comprehensive effort to train, arm, and equip local warfighters – from irregular forces, to police, to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). The ARVN in particular was widely assessed as quite competent and effective, carrying on the brunt of the fighting against the communist at the cost of over 250,000 killed-in-action between 1960 and 1974.[27] Use of indigenous forces to fight insurgency remains a key American tradition and has proven quite successful.
Prioritize Nation Building – A prevailing and fairly unique theme of the U.S. approach to counterinsurgency derives from nation-building programs which assisted with governmental obligations regarding human security – like employment, medical care, education, and infrastructure improvement. These domestic programs undertaken during counterinsurgency have taken on more significance as the United States matured its stabilization processes. In these case studies, improving human security and governance was heavily influenced by progressive ideology. On the one hand, progressive idealism should be tempered with what the partner wants versus what good-intending Americans perceive it needs. On the other hand, stabilization and reconstruction efforts can certainly produce long-term positive effects decades after the major violence subsided. Despite the lasting resentment from armed violence in these irregular conflicts, the U.S. government maintains affable relations with Native American Indians, the Philippines, Haiti, and even Vietnam. The basis for this good will certainly derives from the incentives the United States used in pacifying rebellion and not the forms of punishment executed against armed insurgents.
Unfortunately, one of the lessons many military leaders learned from America’s loss in Vietnam was to avoid counterinsurgency. Nonetheless, the United States will need to continue fighting exactly these types of small wars, even after our withdrawal from Afghanistan, particularly in great power competition. Prior to its recent irregular wars in Middle East, the United States developed a unique approach to counterinsurgency and nation building over two centuries of conflict – a methodology with a mixed track record, but also one with proven successes when applied properly. The tenants of this approach include: (1) having strategic patience and plans for a protracted struggle; (2) treating the indigenous population (including insurgents) honorably; (3) constantly seeking to prevent but expecting incidents of excessive force and controversy; (4) building up indigenous partner capacity; and (5) prioritizing incentive approaches and activities which enhance human security and indigenous governance. Understanding the lessons of the past and America’s unique advantages in counterinsurgency can help win tomorrow’s dirty war.
[1] Photo by Edward Curtis. Public domain.
[2] For a good synopsis on how the United States entered into the Plains Indian Wars see Russell F. Weigly, The American Way of War: The History of the United States Military Strategy and Policy, (Indiana University Press, 1973), 67-72
[3] David D. Smits, “The Frontier Army and the Destruction of the Buffalo: 1865-1883,” The Western Historical Quarterly 25, no. 3 (1994), pp. 313–338, 317.
[4] Edward S. Farrow, Mountain Scouting: A Handbook for Officers and Soldiers on the Frontier, (New York, 1981), 239.
[5] Smits, 317.
[6] Smits, 314.
[7] Modern scholars argue that tools like education were imposed on the Indians (as well as the inducements for farming and adopting Christianity). In fact, after 1890, the Bureau of Indian Affairs introduced a program of assimilation. Such tools have been described as “cultural genocide” – a system used to minimize native belief systems and replace them with those of the dominant culture. These academic arguments have great validity, yet simultaneously do not negate their possible contributions toward pacification. Indeed, they appear quite similar to many used by Western powers in recent counterinsurgency campaigns in the Middle East.
[8] As one U.S. soldier put it, “in studying the Indian's character, we will find much to incite admiration, while many of his traits and customs can only serve to shock and disgust.” See Farrow, 213. Another great example of how divided Americans remained regarding Indian policy is exemplified by the debate in Congress over the Indian Removal Act of 1830, which narrowly passed the U.S. House of Representatives by a vote of 102 to 97.
[9] Berryman Political Cartoon Collection. National Archives Identifier: 6010332.
[10] Comparing maps of the IndoPacific in 1898 and those in 1939 indicate that the region became even more colonized than previously, with Thailand the only major exception as independent.
[11] Warwick Anderson, “Immunization and Hygiene in the Colonial Philippines,” Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences, Volume 62, Issue 1, January 2007, pp. 1–20.
[12] Literacy dramatically rose under American Colonialism. In 1903, the United States determined the literacy rate as 20 percent. By 1923, literacy in the general population had risen to 37 percent. See Census of the Philippine Islands: Volume II, (United States Bureau of the Census: Washington DC, 1905), p.76. Also see, Annual Report of the Governor General Philippine Islands, 1923, (Washington Government Printing Office, 1925), p.10.
[13] For more information, see Napoleon J. Casambre, “The Impact of American Education in the Philippines,” Educational Perspectives, Volume 21, 1982, pp 7-14.
[14] Portrait by William Allen Rogers in 1904. Public domain.
[15] The explanation of the Banana Wars is made from the definition proposed in the Small Wars Manual. Small Wars Manual: United States Marine Corps, 1940, (Government Printing Office: Washington, 1940), 1.
[16] For more information on Smedley Butler, see his short book War is a Racket, (Round Table Press, 1935). For more on dollar diplomacy, see Ivan Musicant, The Banana Wars: A History of United States Military Intervention in Latin America from the Spanish-American War to the Invasion of Panama, (Macmillan: New York, 1990), 3.
[17] Judson Jefferies, “The United States and Haiti: An Exercise in Intervention.” Caribbean Quarterly 47 (4), 2011, pp. 71–94. Also see, Donald B. Cooper, “The Withdrawal of the United States from Haiti, 1928-1934.” Journal of Inter-American Studies, vol. 5, no. 1, (1963), pp. 83–101. As well, see “U.S. Invasion and Occupation of Haiti, 1915-34,” U.S. Department of State Archive, found at https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwi/88275.htm.
[18] Ronald Schaffer, Small Wars Manual: United States Marine Corps, 1940, (Sunflower Univ. Press, 1972).
[19] Caricature by Edmund Valtman in Hartford Times on 9 June 1964. Library of Congress Identifier: LC-DIG-ppmsca-38558.
[20] In 1947, the communist party in France secured 28.5% of the vote and shared control of the French National Assembly with the two other major parties. See, Martin Evans and Emmanuel Godwin, “The Great Fear of 1947: Could France Have Gone Communist?” History Today, Jan. 2005, 21-27. Initially, U.S. financial aid through the Marshall Plan to France did not directly support the French Indochina War, but it indirectly allowed the French to use their own limited resources to prosecute the war. Later, the United States would directly fund the French war effort.
[21] There are a great many sources on the Vietnam War and too many to cite here. For one good analysis of the lessons learned, see David Fromkin and James Chace, “What Are the Lessons of Vietnam?” Foreign Affairs 63, no. 4 (1985): 722–46.
[22] William Safire, “If You Break it…,” New York Times, 17 October 2004. Found online at < https://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/17/magazine/if-you-break-it.html>
[23] For General Order 100’s use in the Philippine Insurgency, see John Scott Reed, The US Volunteers in the Southern Philippines: Counterinsurgency, Pacification, and Collaboration, 1899–1901, (University of Kansas Press, 2020), p. 64.
[24] Trebor K. Plante, “Lead the Way: Researching U.S. Army Indian Scouts, 1866–1914,” Prologue Magazine, Summer 2009, Vol. 41, No. 2. Found online at https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2009/summer/indian.html.
[25] Clayton D. Laurie, “The Philippine Scouts: America's Colonial Army, 1899-1913,” Philippine Studies, vol. 37 (1989): pp. 174-191, 174-175.
[26] Peter L. Bunce, Foundations on Sand: An Analysis of the First US Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, (Institute of Haitian Studies: University of Kansas, 2003), 79.
[27] Jeffrey J. Clarke, United States Army in Vietnam: Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965–1973, (Washington, D.C: Center of Military History, 1988), 275.
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