The analysis of battlefield debris from missiles and uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) can reveal the origins of their components, providing insights into the strengths and weaknesses of international efforts to prevent unauthorised recipients from accessing lethal technologies. This IISS research report is based partly on field investigations conducted by Conflict Armament Research. It examines the technological make-up of Russian, Iranian and North Korean missile and UAV debris in Ukraine since 2022, traces the international procurement routes of foreign components, and discusses the failures of multilateral efforts to prevent such procurement. The report concludes by proposing a new framework for strengthening end-use controls to address the weaknesses of the current technology-control regime.
Despite international sanctions on Russian, Iranian and North Korean missile and UAV programmes, analysis of debris in Ukraine shows these weapons have relied heavily on foreign commercial components, including in the recent past. The report explains how this foreign technology found its way into the weapons programmes of these heavily sanctioned governments. Procurement networks exploited the complexity of global, distributor-centric supply chains and used intermediaries in countries with weak or absent enforcement. It is likely that many components were initially sold through legitimate channels before being diverted.
Geopolitical competition, the widespread use of dual-use and commercial/uncontrolled technologies, and the adaptability of procurement networks are all factors that undermine the effectiveness of traditional multilateral control regimes. The Missile Technology Control Regime has, by its very design, a limited scope. The Common High Priority List (CHPL) has improved commercial due diligence and government oversight for goods that have historically not been considered sensitive yet are crucial for the production of missiles and UAVs. However, the CHPL cannot meet all the challenges posed by globalised supply chains. Sanctions have disrupted some supply channels but also redirected procurement towards markets outside the Global Export Control Coalition. As a result, enforcement gaps remain. Strengthening end-use controls, enhancing distributor accountability and improving industry due diligence could mitigate future technological diversion.
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