Seven brand new' planes were shot down during India-Pakistan war: Trump

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'Seven brand new' planes were shot down during India-Pakistan war: Trump

US President Donald Trump said that "seven brand new" planes were shot down during the India-Pakistan conflict without specifying to which country they belonged, while once again claiming to resolve the war between the "two big nuclear powers."

While speaking at a reception and dinner with business leaders in Tokyo on Tuesday, Trump said, "Seven planes were shot down, seven brand new, beautiful planes were shot down, and they were going at it .. two big nuclear powers."

The US President reiterated that he used trade to resolve the war between India and Pakistan.

"I said to Prime Minister Modi, and I said to the prime minister, a very nice man, a very good man, and the Field Marshal over in Pakistan, I said, Look, we're not going to do any trade if you're going to be fighting," Trump said.

Trump said that India and Pakistan argued that war has nothing to do with trade with the US.

"(They said)one thing has nothing to do with the other. I said this, it has a lot to do with the other ...two nuclear powers...we get that nuclear dust all over the place. All of you are affected, right? And we said, No, we're not doing any deals if you're going to fight. And within about 24 hours, that was the end of that. It was amazing, actually," the US President said.

Since May 10, when Trump announced on social media that India and Pakistan had agreed to a "full and immediate" ceasefire after a "long night" of talks mediated by Washington, he has repeated his claim dozens of times that he "helped settle" the conflict between India and Pakistan.

India has consistently maintained that the understanding on cessation of hostilities with Pakistan was reached following direct talks between the Directors General of Military Operations (DGMOs) of the two militaries.

India launched Operation Sindoor on May 7, targeting terror infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir in retaliation for the April 22 Pahalgam attack that killed 26 civilians.

India and Pakistan reached an understanding on May 10 to end the conflict after four days of intense cross-border drone and missile strikes.

Losing the Swing States Washington Is Driving the BRICS to Become an Anti-American Bloc

Richard Fontaine and Gibbs McKinley

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Leaders of the BRICS countries at a summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, July 2025 Pilar Olivares / Reuters

RICHARD FONTAINE is CEO of the Center for a New American Security. He has worked at the U.S. Department of State, on the National Security Council, and as a foreign policy adviser to U.S. Senator John McCain.

GIBBS MCKINLEY is Research Associate to the CEO at the Center for a New American Security. She previously worked at the International Republican Institute on the Countering Foreign Authoritarian Influence program.More by Richard Fontaine

More by Gibbs McKinley

In the battle to shape the global order, the BRICS—a ten-country group, which is named for its first five members (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa)—has become increasingly important. The bloc represents roughly a third of global GDP and nearly half the world’s population. It exists to give countries that belong to the so-called global South more sway on the world stage.

That might make the BRICS seem like an inherently anti-Western group. It was, after all, founded in part by Beijing and Moscow. But for most of its 16-year history, the BRICS has not positioned

Uzbekistan Strengthens Energy Partnership With Afghanistan

Syed Fazl-e-Haider

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On October 6, Uzbekistan signed a 25-year, $100 million-per-year contract with Afghanistan to explore and develop Afghan oil and gas resources, expanding economic cooperation and processing extracted gas in Uzbekistan for mutual benefit.

Kabul and Tashkent have strengthened energy ties through major infrastructure projects, including new transmission lines and substations, with agreements totaling over $1.15 billion to expand electricity generation and connectivity.

Uzbekistan’s growing role in Afghanistan’s energy sector supports regional integration, stability, and its strategic goal of accessing seaports via Afghanistan, despite ongoing geopolitical challenges and Russian influence in the region.

On October 6, Uzbekistan Energy Minister Jurabek Mirzamakhmudov revealed that Uzbekistan had signed a 25-year contract with Afghanistan for the exploration and development of oil and gas resources in Afghanistan. In September, Uzbek company Eriell KAM started exploration work at the Tuti-Maidan gas field in Afghanistan (Kursiv.uz, October 6). Mirzamakhmudov stated that this initiative will bring mutual economic benefits to both Uzbekistan and Afghanistan (Kun.uz, October 6). Under the deal, Uzbekistan agreed to invest around $100 million per year over the next 10 years. Afghanistan’s Toti-Maidan gas field contains nearly 30 wells, and extracted gas will be processed in Uzbekistan (The Diplomatic Insight, October 9). Uzbekistan is increasing its stake in Afghanistan’s energy sector as part of its strategy to deepen regional energy partnerships and create mutually beneficial economic opportunities (see EDM, May 21).

Don't Let Chinese Fears of a U.S. Decapitation Strike Lead to Nuclear War

Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga

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Chinese President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Qiang, Politburo Standing Committee members Zhao Leji, Wang Huning, Cai Qi, Li Xi and Vice President Han Zheng arrive for the National Day reception on the eve of the 75th founding anniversary of the People's Republic of China, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, September 30, 2024

This commentary was originally published by Foreign Policy on October 7, 2025.

When Chinese military planners, and probably even the Chinese leadership itself, think about a hypothetical future war with the United States, they are very likely worried that the U.S. military will attempt to decapitate the Chinese leadership. This may sound far-fetched to Americans, but there is very strong evidence that Beijing really does worry about U.S. decapitation strikes—and that these fears mean a U.S.-China conflict runs higher escalation risks than previously understood.

The escalation risk comes not just from actual U.S. decapitation strikes but from any U.S. actions that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership view as attempts, or even preparations, for decapitation. Chinese misinterpretation of U.S. actions could lead to an escalation spiral, including Chinese nuclear first use. While it is unlikely that the United States can fully allay Chinese fears, there are steps the U.S. military can take to reduce the risks. These include being particularly cautious about any strikes around Beijing during a potential conflict, evaluating the impact of potential U.S. acquisitions on Chinese perceptions, and clearly communicating that any strike on mainland China would be for stopping an invasion of Taiwan, not decapitation.

The Chinese military has long studied its U.S. counterpart, not only to track the general evolution of warfare but also to specifically redesign itself in preparation for a potential conflict with the United States. One of the key takeaways for Chinese military planners has been that the U.S. way of war includes leadership decapitation strikes, especially at the outset of a conflict. For example, an official Chinese military book from 2020 explains: “The U.S. military, at the start of several recent local [limited] wars, always selected the enemy's military and government heads, command organs, and TV and radio stations as important strike objectives.”

Chinese officials are very clear about the threat posed by the United States to their capital. An official 2013 PLA book notes that a “large-scale strategic raid” is one of China's greatest foreign security threats. Moreover, PLA researchers likely responsible for Beijing's air defense wrote in a 2019 article that their main mission in the future would be defending against U.S. “high-intensity continuous airstrikes.” While these writings may reflect typical military worst-case planning, the threat perception and assessment of U.S. intent are still revealing.

Why Any Deal at the Trump-Xi Summit Is Unlikely to Last

Charlie Campbell

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Trump rebukes Putin over Russia's nuclear-powered missile test, SNAP benefits set to run out, and more

It was with a red carpet jig that Donald Trump touched down in the Malaysian capital on Sunday morning to be greeted by Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim ahead of the 47th ASEAN Summit. But the question remains whether the U.S. President will still be in dancing mood upon the culmination of his six-day Asian tour and especially after Thursday’s pivotal meeting with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping.

Simmering trade tensions between the superpowers boiled over earlier this month with Beijing ramping up export restrictions on rare earth minerals and permanent magnets—materials vital for myriad industrial processes—prompting Washington to hike tariffs on Chinese exports to 130% from Nov. 1.

In Kuala Lumpur, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said a “framework” agreement for the leaders to “consummate” has been reached for a tariff truce, including a revival of Chinese purchases of American soybeans, a year-long pause on rare earth restrictions, as well as a “final deal” on the sale of social media platform TikTok in the U.S.

In turn, China’s top trade negotiator, Li Chenggang, said the two sides reached a “preliminary consensus” that must now be ratified by each side’s internal approval processes. Certainly, China desperately needs some reprieve from the tariffs as it battles myriad economic challenges, including slowing growth, entrenched deflation, record youth unemployment, and a depressed real estate sector.

“We know China-U.S. relations cannot go back to the past, but we need stability, a soft landing, for the Chinese economy, American economy, and also for the world economy,” says Wang Yiwei, director of the Institute of International Affairs at Renmin University in Beijing.

Still, while much of the world holds out hope that its top two economies with $45 trillion combined output can thrash out a meaningful deal, there is no guarantee. “Bessent’s comments … suggest leaders Xi and Trump will have no formal U.S.-PRC trade agreement to announce on Thursday in Korea,” says Sean King, senior vice president focusing on Asia for consulting firm Park Strategies. “Rather, it seems the two sides have merely come up with yet another framework that just enables them to keep talking.”

The ‘Sleeper Issue’ at the Heart of Trump’s Trade War on China

Alexandra Stevenson 

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Concern is increasing throughout Southeast Asia as U.S. officials, intent on slowing China, have yet to say how they will define the origin country of imports.

While the origin of this electric vehicle on a Chinese assembly line may be clear, global supply chains make the origin of many products difficult to determine, especially in Southeast Asia. Credit...Gilles Sabrié for The New York Times

Alexandra Stevenson, who has traveled throughout Southeast Asia this year covering trade, reported from Hong Kong.

For months, companies and officials throughout Asia have been waiting for President Trump to address a question that cuts to the heart of his disruptive plans for global trade.

How do you decide the origin of goods in a world where virtually all the things we buy, from computers and phones to sofas and cars, contain parts that come from different countries?

The answer is central to Mr. Trump’s aim to reduce China’s dominant role as the starting point for many of the world’s manufactured goods.

“It’s a sleeper issue,” said Wendy Cutler, a senior vice president at the Asia Society Policy Institute, a think tank. “People are trying to convince themselves that it is just technical, but if you take a step back, it’s all going to rest on this.”

No other region is more exposed to Mr. Trump’s crackdown than Southeast Asia. Billions of dollars a year in raw materials, machinery and finished goods flow from China through Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia and other countries across the region.

Ahead of Mr. Trump visit to Asia this week, his trade officials have met with negotiators for other countries to try to reach agreements. But whether any prospective deals will contain details that address how Mr. Trump wants to define the nationality of goods is still up in the air.

The determination that the Trump administration makes on the so-called rule of origin could blow up laboriously negotiated agreements. That is because if a product is shipped from one country but does not meet the origin criteria, it will be hit with a hefty special tariff, which Mr. Trump has warned will be 40 percent.

This summer, Mr. Trump, pulling back on his opening salvo of sky-high tariffs in Asia, announced frameworks for most Southeast Asia countries with across-the-board tariffs that settled at 19 or 20 percent.

A pet food factory in Bangkok. Billions of dollars in Chinese products flow through Thailand and other countries in the region every year.Credit...Rebecca Conway for The New York Times

Mr. Trump’s trade legacy in his first term was to force companies to set up factories outside China. Now, he is trying to cut China out of supply chains. China has moved goods through Southeast Asia to circumvent American tariffs and has been the source of a swell of exports to the region, much of those in machinery and raw materials that regional factories depend on.

Many of the components in the things that are made around the world come from China, from the screws and glue that hold metal and wood together to the minerals in smartphone batteries.

Yet even in Malaysia, where signing a deal with Mr. Trump would be seen as a positive development, there is some hesitancy about the unilateral way that the United States is going about setting new rules for global trade.

Malaysia’s biggest trading partner is China, but one of its biggest industries, semiconductors, depends heavily on the American market, and its exports are at risk with the possibility of separate sector tariffs.

“All we can do is express our concerns — hopefully, they are listening to the confusion,” said Siobhan Das, chief executive of AmCham Malaysia, which represents American companies in Malaysia. “With this trade agreement, what we’re hoping for is that there is clarity and a guideline for how supply chains need to move.”

Water geopolitics of disputed river basins in the Levant

Noor Hammad

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The Middle East is the world’s most water-stressed region, making it a prime battleground for control of scarce water resources.

Middle Eastern states account for 16 of the 25 most water-stressed countries in the world. As a scarce, and therefore strategic, natural resource, shared waters are susceptible to monopolistic practices and inter-state disputes.

Water rights in shared river basins are contested across the region, with Iraq and Syria particularly affected in the Levant. Both countries are downstream states, making them vulnerable to unilateral changes in water supply from upstream states that may divert river water to prioritise domestic needs. Despite the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria and decreasing tensions between Iraq and Turkiye, the resolution of long-standing water disputes in the Levant is proceeding at an uncertain pace.

The Levant’s disputed river basins

A 1987 agreement allocated water rights between Turkiye and Syria as well as, indirectly, Iraq through a subsequent Syrian–Iraqi treaty ratified in 1990. A 2009 memorandum of understanding supplemented this, providing for technical cooperation between the three riparian states.

Despite these agreements, Turkiye has altered river flows and built dams to the detriment of its downstream neighbours. For example, Turkiye’s Southeastern Anatolia Project, aimed at generating hydroelectric energy and irrigating over one million hectares of farmland in the southeast, comprises over 22 dams across the Tigris and Euphrates, both of which are key sources of water for Syria and Iraq. As a result, Iraqi and Syrian water flows have become heavily restricted. Iraq’s water supply from the two rivers has fallen by 30–40% since Turkiye began its dam-building projects in 1975; Syrian water flow has decreased by 40%. To make matters worse for Iraq, Iran has diverted water from the Little Zab (where water levels have dropped by 80% due to Iran’s Kolsa Dam) and Diyala rivers for its domestic agricultural and drinking water use.

Concrete action from Iraq on this issue has been stymied by internal discord. In 2021, Iraqi officials from the Ministry of Water Resources announced that they were prepared to sue Iran at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) over its water policies, pending a decision from Iraq’s foreign ministry and central government. The case never reached the ICJ’s docket, however, likely due to Iranian influence over Iraqi politics, both through its funding of Iraqi militias and its status as a key supplier of natural gas to Iraq.

The Kurdistan Regional Government has taken matters into its own hands, building dams (nine since 2019) to generate electricity within Kurdish territories to the detriment of Iraq’s other provinces. During disputes with the central government, Kurdish officials have withheld water flows, further highlighting Iraq’s political fragmentation. Frustration over Turkish military operations against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party in Iraq, and Turkish–Kurdish oil agreements excluding the Iraqi government, have also complicated water cooperation between the two states.

Under the Turkiye-backed administration of President Ahmed al-Sharaa, Syria may also find it challenging to press Turkiye on water security. Syria’s deputy energy minister, Osama Abu Zaid, recently complained of Turkish failures to release Iraqi and Syrian shares of the Euphrates. Water cooperation is complicated by the fact that key rivers, notably the Euphrates and the Khabur, pass through the Kurdish-held northeastern region of Syria, which Turkiye views as a strategic threat. Turkiye has bombed the Tishrin Dam near Aleppo, which was held under the control of the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), multiple times this year.

Military training lessons from Ukraine

Mick Ryan

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Ukraine has transformed its military training regime in the

midst of war. There is much to learn from its experiences.

Ukrainian soldiers training as part of Operation KUDU, Australia’s participation in the UK-led Operation INTERFLEX. (Defence Imagery)

The study of how Ukrainian forces have adapted, learned, and transformed their training regimes is a vital but under-examined element of this war, and war more generally. Ukraine’s military training system is foundational to its military capability. Studying it offers not only a window into Ukraine’s overall military capacity but also valuable lessons for Western nations that may need to expand their forces in the coming years.

The frame of reference for Western instructors is often Iraq and Afghanistan, which does not provide the foundational behaviours required for combat in eastern Ukraine.

Challenges

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukraine has faced multiple challenges to its training approach.

First, it has had to manage time constraints. The Russian military, vastly larger than Ukraine’s, drove the need for rapid expansion of the pre-war force. Limited time meant many important trade-offs had to be made in the quality of training. For a long period, basic recruit training was restricted to about one month, which often did not produce the resilient and capable soldiers required on the front line without additional training in their units.

Second, Ukraine has had to balance the key cultures that drive its military affairs: legacy Soviet systems and practices (especially intolerance of reporting failure, and centralised command methods); newer NATO methods and doctrines; and Ukraine’s own culture, both military and national. These often exist in tension and influence every element of Ukrainian military affairs, including its training systems.

Third, it has had to endure, to the present day, Russian attacks on its training institutions. These attacks are designed to kill soldiers in training and the experts that train them. The attacks are designed to have a psychological impact too, particularly in dissuading Ukrainians from joining their military.

Finally, the ability to learn and adapt at the speed of need has been a major challenge. In all my interactions with Ukrainian training staff, I have posed the question: how do you learn and adapt the training system? Their responses have consistently improved over time. However, learning and adaptation is a challenge for any training system, not just one that is at war.

Ukrainian Responses

In response, Ukraine has evolved its approach to training. This has involved a multitude of large and small initiatives over the past three years, all with the goal of ensuring that soldiers are provided with the training that allows them to be as resilient and combat capable as possible when they present to their combat units. Five important institutional responses stand out:

Russia–North Korea Partnership Boosted by New Bridge

Frontelligence Insight

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Russia’s faltering early phase of the invasion of Ukraine has put the Kremlin in a difficult position: it faced a choice between accepting the outcomes and attempting to backtrack, or continuing the fight despite mounting international sanctions, economic strain, demographic pressures, and other risks. The Kremlin chose to press ahead with mobilization and continue the war despite the costs, believing it could turn the battlefield in its favor. As Ukraine received increasingly sophisticated Western weaponry, from Javelin anti-tank missiles to modern MLRS and artillery systems in growing numbers, Moscow sought new partners to support its military efforts.

North Korea - a heavily sanctioned, cash-strapped state with a shared border and large stockpiles of compatible 152-millimeter artillery ammunition, emerged as a natural partner for Moscow. As North Korea increased shell deliveries to Russia, both countries started to face constraints: such as weak infrastructure which limited the efficiency of military shipments, and, more critically, remained inadequate for expanding economic cooperation.

At present, Russia has no direct road connections with North Korea. The only existing land link is the Korea–Russia Friendship Railroad Bridge, opened in the late 1950s, which remains the sole fixed crossing between the two countries. Beyond that, bilateral transport relies on limited air connections, via Pyongyang International Airport, and maritime routes such as the North Korean port of Rajin. The port has gained renewed importance in recent years, serving as a logistics hub for shipments of artillery, mortars, and other ammunition supplied to Russia.

On June 19, 2024, the Kremlin announced an agreement with North Korea to build a road bridge across the Tumen River, a project long entertained since Soviet times but never brought to fruition, in part due to Chinese objections. Our team at Frontelligence Insight has analyzed project documentation, satellite imagery, and related materials to assess the potential impacts and strategic significance of the new bridge. This report presents the key findings and essential figures derived from our analysis.

Does the US military need a Cyber Force?

Experts say the U.S. military is at risk of being outgunned and outmanned in cyber warfare.

David Roza

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The U.S. military is hemorrhaging talent in cyber warfare, which national security experts warn could lead to America being outgunned and outsmarted by adversaries such as China, Russia, or Iran, who could use cyber weapons to wreak havoc on American military and civilian infrastructure.

The only way to fix it may be to start a seventh branch of the military: a Cyber Force.

There are currently about 225,000 service members, civilians, and contractors who work in cyber fields across the Defense Department. Most of them build, operate, patch, maintain, and do routine security for the 4 million computers and 34 billion IP addresses that make up the larger Department of Defense Information Network.

Each of the military services manages its own information networks and defends them against run-of–the-mill cybersecurity threats. They also recruit and train cyber troops and present them to U.S. Cyber Command, a combatant command that provides cyber support to troops conducting real-world operations.

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There is some overlap here between what Cyber Command, or CYBERCOM, does and what the services do, but generally, if it’s offensive operations, or if the threat being defended against is really heavy-duty, that is usually CYBERCOM’s business.

But the services have not coordinated how they train cyber troops. That means service members come to CYBERCOM with different training for the same job, using different terms to refer to the same thing, and bringing their service-specific approaches to cyberspace.

That’s bad because CYBERCOM’s Cyber Mission Force — the 6,000 or so people who actually perform cyberspace operations — is designed to be modular, where teams from different services can swap in and do the same job. That’s according to Aden Magee, a retired Army cyber officer who wrote about this for War on the Rocks in September.

CYBERCOM is often compared with U.S. Special Operations Command, or SOCOM, which oversees real-world special operations and is the only other combatant command also charged with guiding how the services train units for it.

Alan Turing institute launches new mission to protect UK from cyber-attacks

Programme is designed to defend energy, transport and utilities amid concern over vulnerability to internet outages

Robert Booth 

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Britain’s leading AI institute has announced a new mission to help protect the nation from cyber-attacks on infrastructure, including energy, transport and utilities, after it was embroiled in allegations of toxic work culture and the chief executive resigned amid ministerial pressure.

The Alan Turing Institute will “carry out a programme of science and innovation designed to protect the UK from hostile threats”, it announced on Tuesday as part of changes following the resignation last month of Jean Innes, its chief executive, after a staff revolt and government calls for a strategic overhaul of the state-funded body.

The mission comes amid growing concern over Britain’s vulnerability to internet outages and cyber-attacks after this month’s incident affecting Amazon’s cloud computing globally and recent cyber-attacks crippling production at Jaguar Land Rover factories, and supply chains at Marks & Spencer and the Co-op.

Blythe Crawford, the former commander of the UK’s air and space warfare centre , will report back next month on how the government-funded institute “can best support the scale of government AI ambitions in defence, national security and intelligence”.

Could the internet go offline? Inside the fragile system holding the modern world together

The chair, former Amazon UK boss Doug Gurr, said 78 different research projects at the 440-staff institute have been closed, spun out or completed because they do not align with the new direction.

The institute has been beset by internal strife since last year as staff protested against changes, culminating in a group of employees filing a whistleblower complaint to the Charity Commission.

Gurr said in an interview with the BBC that the whistleblower claims were “independently investigated” by a third party that found them to have “no substance”.

The institute was named after the mathematical genius who helped crack the Enigma code during the second world war and outlined key concepts of AI. He also invented the eponymous test to determine if a computer can show human intelligence.

It will also focus on deploying AI for the environment and health. The institute will develop ways to use the fast-advancing technology to more rapidly and accurately forec

For ASEAN Members, Trump’s Bilateral Trade Deals May Be the Least

Barbara Weisel

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Many face pressure to quickly reach agreements, even as they’re re-evaluating their expectations and long-term interests of the United States.

Emissary harnesses Carnegie’s global scholarship to deliver incisive, nuanced analysis on the most pressing international affairs challenges.Learn More

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On Sunday, as leaders gathered in Kuala Lumpur for the ASEAN summit, U.S. President Donald Trump announced trade deals with Malaysia and Cambodia, as well as framework agreements with Vietnam and Thailand that will be finalized in the coming weeks.

Trump said that he was in Kuala Lumpur on “a mission of friendship and goodwill” and to “promote strongly stability, prosperity, and peace” among the ASEAN members “and beyond.” He said the United States “intends to be a strong partner and friend for many generations to come.”

Despite these assurances, the ASEAN countries are likely skeptical. The Trump administration’s imposition of “reciprocal” and other national security–related tariffs, promotion of reshoring, and elimination of foreign aid deeply shook their trust in the United States as a reliable partner. They saw ASEAN as a key player in the evolving regional trade and investment landscape and expected economic ties to continue to grow as U.S. frictions with China intensified. But the tariffs served as a wake-up call for ASEAN countries, leading them to reevaluate their expectations for the relationship and rethink their long-term economic interests.

Nonetheless, other Southeast Asian countries will be under pressure to quickly reach agreements—which will likely mirror Malaysia’s and Cambodia’s—to avoid putting their economies at a competitive disadvantage.

What’s in the Agreements

The U.S. agreements with Malaysia and Cambodia are generally similar, although the two deals include bespoke elements to address issues specific to each country. Cambodia agreed to eliminate tariffs on U.S. goods once the agreement goes into effect. Malaysia agreed to eliminate or reduce tariffs on some U.S. goods and reduce them by set percentages on others. In return, rather than corresponding cuts to eliminate import tariffs, the United States agreed to maintain a tariff rate on Malaysian and Cambodian goods of no higher than the 19 percent, thouh certain goods will be exempted from the higher tariffs.

Neither agreement includes rules of origin, which determine if a product can obtain benefits such as lower tariffs under the trade agreement, but both include rules to prevent third countries or third-party nationals (such as China) from benefitting from the agreement. The Malaysia agreement includes an intentionally blank section on rules of origin, suggesting that rules to limit inputs from China and possibly also from Chinese-invested companies in Malaysia will be forthcoming.

Although not as detailed as U.S. free trade agreements, both agreements include meaningful obligations on a broad range of trade rules, such as nontariff barriers, industrial and agricultural standards, services, intellectual property, labor, environment, digital trade, and competition by state-owned enterprises. They also address barriers to access to these markets that U.S. manufacturing, agricultural, and other businesses have long pressed the U.S. government to tackle.

New features in these agreements are commitments on economic security issues, which are clearly—though not explicitly—aimed at China. These provisions may be perceived as subcontracting or subordinating Malaysian and Cambodian economic and national security interests to those of the United States for potentially ephemeral gains. Malaysia and Cambodia agreed to take actions to align their export control and sanctions regimes with the United States’. They also agreed to impose restrictions on imports of third-country goods or services similar to the United States’. In addition, they agreed to implement measures to address unfair practices of companies owned or controlled by third countries operating in their jurisdictions that could hurt U.S. trade interests.

To address their trade deficits, both countries agreed to purchase U.S. goods, including aircraft. Malaysia also agreed to buy security equipment, liquified natural gas, semiconductors, aerospace equipment, data center equipment, coal, and telecommunications goods and services. In addition, Malaysia committed to potential investments in the United States of $66 million and facilitation of $70 billion in investments in the United States over the next ten years.

Neither agreement includes traditional dispute settlement provisions establishing processes for amicably resolving disputes, and the texts are drafted in a way that allows the United States to retain significant leverage over its trading partners in the future. The provisions permit a party to take action without consultation if it believes the other party has not complied with the agreement. The Malaysia text allows either party to impose additional tariffs “to remedy unfair trade practices, to address import surges, to protect its economic or national security, or for other similar reasons consistent with its domestic law,” but it is unlikely that the Malaysian government would risk U.S. ire by taking such an action.

What the Agreements Signal

For now, many Southeast Asian countries see bilateral agreements with the United States as the least-worst option. As in the classic prisoner’s dilemma, fear that one country would capitulate to try to gain a regional competitive advantage prevented them from coordinating on collective red lines for negotiations with the United States. That left each of them exposed and alone to try to cut the best deal they could to maintain their access to the U.S. market.

The U.S. commitment to maintain Malaysian and Cambodian tariffs at 19 percent will provide them at least some temporary relief. They believe the agreements will allow them to avoid immediate economic stress while creating opportunities for cooperation. One such area is critical minerals, a sector Malaysia and Thailand seek to develop, and on which they signed memorandums of understanding with the United States. Moreover, the deals buy them time to diversify their trading relationships away from the United States, as many Asian countries are urgently seeking to do.

Trump’s China Deal May Avert a Crisis of His Own Making

Ana Swanson

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The Trump administration is hailing a potential deal that may return the U.S.-China relationship to where it was before the president began a trade war against Beijing.

The U.S. and China have been in negotiations about tariffs. Credit...Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

Ana Swanson covers international trade and reported from Washington.

Trump administration officials have hailed the makings of a potential trade deal that could have China buy American soybeans and pause the introduction of its new licensing system on rare earth minerals, while the United States pauses or removes some of its tariffs.

It remains to be seen what might be agreed when President Trump meets the Chinese leader Xi Jinping this week. But those and the other measures that U.S. officials have mentioned appear to largely restore the relationship to a status quo from earlier this year, before Mr. Trump began his latest trade war with Beijing.

The United States and China have shown their willingness to repeatedly escalate trade tensions and hurt companies that do business across the Pacific, before walking back measures and striking a truce. But the truces have quickly crumbled, calling into question how durable a new agreement would be.

Speaking on ABC News on Sunday, Scott Bessent, the Treasury secretary, said American and Chinese negotiators who met in Malaysia over the weekend had “reached a substantial framework” for the two leaders to discuss when they meet in South Korea on Thursday.

He said that a 100 percent increase in United States tariffs on Chinese exports scheduled for Nov. 1 had been averted, and that China had agreed to delay a rare earths licensing system “for a year while they re-examine it.” The Chinese also agreed to help the United States stop the flow of chemical ingredients used to make illicit fentanyl, and make “substantial agriculture purchases for U.S. farmers,” Mr. Bessent said.

On social media, Brooke Rollins, the secretary of agriculture, praised the planned soybean purchases as “big news.” She added, “China’s commitment to make substantial purchases of U.S. soybeans brings the market BACK into balance and secures years of prosperity for American producers.”

Rebuilding Gaza—from Camps to Communities

Displaced Palestinians live in tents near destroyed buildings in Gaza City, October 19, 2025

Shelly Culbertson, Kobi Ruthenberg, Robert Lane

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This commentary was originally published by Newsweek on October 22, 2025.

In the wake of the fragile ceasefire, thousands of Gazans have trekked home to find ruin. This highlights an unavoidable question: After all the destruction, where can Gazans live? The 20-point proposal to end to the war in Gaza brokered by the White House put it succinctly: “No one will be forced to leave Gaza, and those who wish to leave will be free to do so and free to return. We will encourage people to stay and offer them the opportunity to build a better Gaza.”

Yet sustaining 2.2 million people within Gaza's 140 square miles while rebuilding faces many challenges. The wreckage is almost incomprehensible: At least 62 percent of housing is gone or beyond repair, and more is damaged. There are some 51 million tons of rubble laced with thousands of unexploded bombs.

Within this context, housing the Gazans will require a radical new approach to post-war reconstruction. But it is possible. We developed a comprehensive plan for post-conflict housing in Gaza. It is possible to immediately shelter the displaced Palestinians while also laying the groundwork for permanent, well-planned communities.

It is possible to immediately shelter the displaced Palestinians while also laying the groundwork for permanent, well-planned communities.

The first thing that needs rethinking is the role and location of camps, where most Gazans will need to reside in the near term. Although camps are a suboptimal solution, the scale of the destruction in Gaza and numbers of people involved mean they are inevitable. In theory, camps are temporary, but they often become permanent, evolving into urban slums as residents construct buildings where their tents once stood.

Beyond Minerals: A National Electronics Strategy to Power Defense

Jim Will

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As the U.S. races to unearth domestic supplies of minerals critical for its defense systems, it’s equally urgent to transform those minerals into capability through the development of a comprehensive national strategy to boost domestic electronics manufacturing.

Electronics are the endgame, and scaling up mineral capacity without doing the same for electronics will lead to failure.

Critical minerals, which include rare earth minerals, are vital to electronics production because of their unique magnetic, electrical and luminescent properties. While the U.S. developed much of the modern science to extract and purify these minerals, refining and processing capacity has migrated overseas.

China now dominates nearly all stages of critical mineral production, giving the country unchecked control on supply and pricing. Even if the U.S. is successful with its current efforts to secure non-Chinese mineral supply chains, the materials still need to be sent to China for processing.

China also dominates the electronics ecosystem, leading a handful of Asian countries that collectively are responsible for approximately 75% of worldwide production. More than 40% of the semiconductor components that sustain U.S. weapons systems and associated infrastructure are now sourced from China alone. For some electronics, it’s nearly domination. China is the predominant supplier of liquid crystal displays (LCDs), upon which more than 90% of U.S. military systems rely.

U.S. capability is eroding

While China presses forward with its national strategy to dominate critical minerals and the electronics that underpin defense and commercial systems, the U.S. continues to see its electronics manufacturing capability and capacity erode to critical levels.

There is no large-scale domestic production of ultra-high-density interconnect (UHDI) printed circuit boards (PCBs), which are used in defense applications to meet the critical need for smaller, lighter and more powerful electronic systems. Advanced packaging capacity is limited, and U.S. chip manufacturing accounts for only 12% of global output.

This domestic deficit, combined with Asian-centric production of critical minerals and electronics, puts the U.S. at significant risk militarily and economically. With U.S. officials warning that China aims to be ready to take Taiwan by 2027, an Indo-Pacific conflict would jam supply lines and contested logistics could make resupply from Asia difficult, if not impossible.

Electronics power every weapon system, aircraft, ship and communications platform, and they enable the tools used to manufacture these critical defense systems. The war in Ukraine is a canary in the coal mine, showing the massive electronics requirements needed to maintain battle readiness.

The Illusion of "Unprecedented"

Tanner Port

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Robert Lovett and the Perils of Transitions

“You, more than any other man, have saved Western civilization.” – Winston Churchill

On the eve of the 1952 Presidential election, it had be six years and 244 days had passed since the British Bulldog spoke those words to the 33rd President of the United States at Westminster College’s Iron Curtain summit. If Churchill’s praise had been an indicator of smoother seas ahead for Truman to navigate, it could not have been more wrong. Truman’s troubles were only just beginning. In rapid succession, the administration found itself subject to a proven maxim of leadership that Abraham Lincoln once lamented:

“I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me.”

Globally, Truman’s tenure as president carried the weight of containing communism, launching the Marshall Plan, and reorganizing the nation’s defense apparatus under the National Security Act of 1947, creating the CIA and NSC. By 1949, the administration saw the Soviets become an atomic power, and the hydrogen age loomed. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 shifted the Cold War from a contest of ideology to a kinetic fight resulting in over 30,000 American service members killed by the election of 1952.

Domestically, Truman arguably faced even greater challenges. Executive Order 9981 in 1948 desegregated the armed forces and prompted a Dixiecrat revolt, while FDR’s former Vice President, Henry Wallace, broke away to create a national Progressive Party. By 1950, McCarthyism dominated politics, compounded by Truman’s loyalty program, which obligated federal employees to undergo loyalty tests. The Korean War spurred the creation of the Office of Price Stabilization and the Wage Stabilization Board in 1951, while 1952 brought a constitutional crisis when Truman attempted to seize management of the nation’s steel mills. The Supreme Court struck down the action in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, a landmark decision limiting presidential power.

As the election approached, the country’s polarization was unmistakable. As America prepared to test the hydrogen bomb, General Dwight D. Eisenhower stood before 22,000 supporters at Madison Square Garden, warning that the opposition was fighting him “as the Nazis fought.” On election night, as Truman reviewed the secret memorandum that would lay the foundation for the National Security Agency, his approval rating had sunk below 30 percent. November 4, 1952, brought the highest voter turnout in American history up to that point, as Americans elected Eisenhower with 55 percent of the vote.

What the West could learn from Israel

Brendan O'Neill

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Hostages Square in Tel Aviv is quiet now. The paraphernalia of hope remains. Yellow ribbons dance in the breeze. The flap of a hundred Israel flags breaks the silence. There’s still the burnt-out car that was recovered from the ‘road of death’ in the south, where Hamas slaughtered fleeing families on 7 October 2023. I look inside at its blackened remains, the squelched leather, the warped metal, and wince at the thought of what suffering must have unfolded in this suffocating space. In one corner of the square is an unsteady pile of placards featuring the faces of the 251 Israelis seized two years ago: the retired equipment of a moral movement no longer needed.

For the hostages are home now. The living ones at least – Israel still awaits the return of the remains of some of the stolen. It was in this urban throughway outside the Tel Aviv Museum of Art that Israelis gathered these past two years to pray for the abducted. It was christened Hostages Square, and I expect that’s how it will always be known. Even Google Maps calls it that now. Its most striking feature is a mock Hamas tunnel, a 30-metre concrete bunker designed to simulate the experience of being a hostage in Gaza. I crouch and enter. After two minutes, claustrophobia kicks in. There are men who spent two years like this, and Israel wants to make sure the world never forgets.

Much of it already has, though. As I peruse a vast wall of stickers showing the smiling faces of the men and women who were stolen – some of whom made it home, some of whom did not – I feel a sudden flush of anger. Anger that Israel was left almost entirely alone to agitate for the precious lives and liberty of these abducted Jews. Anger that there were not similar Hostages Squares in London, New York, Berlin. Anger that the same yellow ribbons that flutter so lovingly here were violently torn down on the streets where I live by medieval mobs eaten up by a demented hatred for the Jewish State.

And anger that hardly anyone in Europe knows the name Alon Ohel. A gleaming piano has pride of place in Hostages Square. It has Alon’s photo on it alongside huge yellow lettering that says: ‘You are not alone.’ Alon, 24, is an accomplished pianist who was taken from the Nova music festival and held for 738 days with shrapnel in his right eye. He’s free now, and his sight is slowly improving. We all went to see the Roman Polanski film about a Jewish pianist ghettoised by the fascists of the 1940s – who will tell the story of this Jewish pianist held underground by the fascists of the 2020s? The hope is that when he recovers from his long, black captivity, he will come to Hostages Square and play this piano. The sweet music of defiance.

President Trump, alongside the leaders of Malaysia, Thailand and Cambodia, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Stephen Bryen

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Cambodia and Thailand on Sunday agreed to move toward resolving longstanding hostilities over their shared border, as President Trump took credit for mediating the decades-old dispute and sought once again to burnish his peacemaking credentials.

Mr. Trump and the prime minister of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim, helped broker a cease-fire between Cambodia and Thailand in July, ending a deadly five-day conflict. On Sunday they witnessed Prime Minister Hun Manet of Cambodia and his Thai counterpart, Anutin Charnvirakul, sign an agreement in Kuala Lumpur, the Malaysian capital.

It was the one of the most high-profile commitments toward peace between the two sides. Mr. Trump termed the deal “the Kuala Lumpur peace accords” and called it “historic.”

But there are significant obstacles for lasting peace: the neighbors have not agreed how to define the border and have to manage nationalistic emotions over the issue. The official text of the agreement described it not as a peace deal but a joint declaration by the prime ministers of both Cambodia and Thailand “on the outcomes of their meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.”

Still, a key part of the deal was a commitment by the two sides to withdraw heavy weapons from the border, moves that will be monitored by observers from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Another breakthrough was the announcement that Thailand would repatriate 18 prisoners of war to Cambodia.

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The agreement on Sunday, signed during an ASEAN summit, was also remarkable because Thailand has consistently said it rejects third-party mediation in the dispute. Thailand’s foreign minister, Sihasak Phuangketkeow, told reporters that the United States helped in facilitating the talks but that the negotiations were bilateral.

At least 40 people were killed after the latest iteration of the border dispute erupted into war on July 24. Hundreds of thousands were displaced. Mr. Trump intervened on the third day of fighting, calling the leaders of both Thailand and Cambodia to say he was not going to continue tariff negotiations if they did not end the conflict.

Putin and Gerasimov Clash Over Air Defenses and Drones

A video released on October 25 reveals a remarkable and harsh meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of Russia’s armed forces. Putin demanded to know why Russia’s air defenses have failed to stop Ukraine’s use of cheap commercial drones playing havoc with Russia’s critical infrastructure and military installations. Putin made clear that this failure was costly to Russia, lowered its prestige, and indicated inexplicable failures that must be fixed.

Putin rejected virtually all of Gerasimov’s arguments defending Russia’s air defenses.

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Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, left, looks on as Russian President Vladimir Putin shakes hands with Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov [File: Alexei Nikolsky/Sputnik via EPA-EFE]

Gerasimov asked for three months to fix the various issues impacting air defenses. Putin demanded a solution in one month.

I believe the leaked account is accurate and not Ukrainian, US or NATO propaganda, although that cannot be ruled out.

Putin asked how it was that despite the billions of rubles invested, the system could not detect cheap drones and destroy them. He pointed to big systems such as the S-300 and S-400, and mobile systems such as the Pantsir.

Below is the You tube video, in Russian. Viewers can select subtitles in various languages by going to the system settings.

I have sensed for some time growing frustration in Russia’s civilian leadership with the overall performance of the Russian armed forces. This reported explosion by Putin exposes only one of the many problems, but this one is of the greatest immediate political importance. Russia’s entire defense capability rests on its air defense system.

Russian air defenses were not designed to go after hard to track small drones. Instead it was designed to counter western aircraft, especially bombers, and to deal with threats from standoff missiles, particularly Tomahawks.

Under Trump’s Aegis, Cambodia and Thailand Agree to Resolve Border Dispute

Sui-Lee WeeChoe Sang-HunJavier C. Hernández and David Pierson

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From Kuala Lumpur to Gyeongju, President Trump is casting himself as a deal-maker and peace negotiator, while a wary region looks for tariff relief and steadier ties.

A five-day tour of Asia, starting this weekend, is President Trump’s first trip to the region during his second term.Credit...Haiyun Jiang/The New York Times

From Kuala Lumpur to Gyeongju, President Trump is casting himself as a deal-maker and peace negotiator, while a wary region looks for tariff relief and steadier ties.

A five-day tour of Asia, starting this weekend, is President Trump’s first trip to the region during his second term.Credit...Haiyun Jiang/The New York Times

Listen to this article · 7:14 min Learn moreOct. 25, 2025

President Trump is embarking on a nearly weeklong tour of Asia, his first trip to the region during his second term, with stops in Malaysia, Japan and South Korea, capped by a meeting with Xi Jinping, China’s top leader.

He may tout a new trade deal, push for credit for negotiating peace between Thailand and Cambodia, and show that Washington still has sway in Southeast Asia, a region where Beijing has growing clout.

Across Asia, governments are looking to stabilize ties with the United States after months of tariff disputes, yet mindful of how Mr. Trump’s diplomacy can shift overnight. Many nations will be trying to find a way to balance their relationship with Washington against an increasingly assertive China.

“I hear real expressions of concern and unease about what the U.S. approach to the region will be over the long run, and concerns primarily for how China will respond,” said Daniel Kritenbrink, a partner at the Asia Group and a former U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs.

“They will start calculating their national interest and start balancing against China in ways that don’t involve the United States,” Mr. Kritenbrink said.

Here’s what the region expects from the visit:

Southeast Asia: A Wary Audience

Mr. Trump’s first official trip to Southeast Asia since 2019 will take him to the Malaysian capital, Kuala Lumpur, on Sunday. He hopes to sign a trade agreement with Malaysia and witness a peace agreement between Thailand and Cambodia that he has personally taken credit for brokering.

He will also meet with at least 10 of the leaders of regional nations who are gathered for a summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

For the United States, Southeast Asia is valuable not only for the size of its market, but also for its strategic importance as a bulwark against China. The region is also an important supply chain hub for many American companies that have moved out of China.

A denim factory in Dong Nai Province, Vietnam, this year.Credit...Linh Pham for The New York Times

For Southeast Asia, the United States represents an important market. The United States is the top export destination for Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand and Cambodia. Many are looking to the possible Malaysia trade deal for clues on what their agreements will look like.

But Mr. Trump will find a region that is now increasingly skeptical of the United States. Countries are still reeling from his policy on tariffs, which many governments feel were indiscriminate. Most countries in Southeast Asia were hit with tariffs of about 19 to 20 percent, a blow to many of their economies.

Under Trump’s Aegis, Cambodia and Thailand Agree to Resolve Border Dispute

It remains unclear whether the two nations can achieve lasting peace, but that did not deter President Trump from brandishing himself as a peacemaker.

As US inks trade deals with 4 ASEAN states, Trump pledges America’s 100% commitment to Southeast Asia

A flurry of deals on trade and critical minerals was signed by the United States with Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam on Sunday (Oct 26).

Amir Yusof

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KUALA LUMPUR: As he inked trade deals with four Southeast Asian countries, visiting United States President Donald Trump told leaders of the region that they can look to the US for its full support and friendship for years to come.

“Our message to the nations of Southeast Asia is that the US is with you 100 per cent and we intend to be a strong partner and friend for many generations to come,” Trump told leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on Sunday (Oct 26).

Making his opening remarks at the US-ASEAN Summit held in Kuala Lumpur, he added that this was a “golden age of America” and that the US is “committed to a free and open and thriving Indo-Pacific”.

“One year ago, we were in a different position, but now we're in the best position we've ever been. I say it's … the golden age of the United States,” he added in a rare and highly-anticipated visit to the region.

“Together, we'll create incredible prosperity for the nations on both sides of the Pacific Ocean and seize new opportunities for all of our people,” said Trump.

Speaking at the summit as ASEAN's rotating chairman, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim said ties between the 11-member bloc and the US are grounded in a shared aim for peace and prosperity and have “deepened into a comprehensive strategic partnership”.

“The vibrant, tremendous economies of the US and Southeast Asia have the potential to create a golden age for all our nations,” he added, noting that two-way trade reached a record of US$453 billion last year, supporting jobs and businesses on both sides.

US President Donald Trump (centre) poses for a group photo with (from left) Singapore's Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, Timor-Leste's Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao, Vietnam's Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, Cambodia's Prime Minister Hun… Manet, Malaysia's Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, Philippines' President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, Sultan of Brunei Hassanal Bolkiah, Indonesia's President Prabowo Subianto, and Laos' Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone at the US-ASEAN Summit on Oct 26, 2025. (Photo: AFP/Vincent Thian/POOL)

Trump’s visit to Kuala Lumpur is the first time a US president has visited Malaysia in a decade, the last being Barack Obama in 2015.

It’s also a rare appearance for Trump at an ASEAN summit, having only attended the 2017 gathering in the Philippines during his first term in office but skipped subsequent meets, raising questions about his administration’s commitment to the region.

On Sunday, Trump told ASEAN leaders that he is happy to be back in Southeast Asia, “home of some of America's most important allies and countries and partners”.

DEALS WITH 4 ASEAN COUNTRIES

Earlier on Sunday, Trump signed reciprocal trade agreements with his Thai, Malaysian, Cambodian and Vietnamese counterparts that will see the countries work to address tariff and non-tariff barriers.

The US would maintain a tariff rate of 19 per cent on most exports from Malaysia, Thailand and Cambodia under the deals, according to joint statements released by the White House.

Where Trump Is Headed in Asia, and What Each Country Wants From Him

From Kuala Lumpur to Gyeongju, President Trump is casting himself as a deal-maker and peace negotiator, while a wary region looks for tariff relief and steadier ties.