Indian Strategic Studies

11 December 2025

Hybridization of the Terror Threat in India

Rueben Dass

India suffered two terrorist incidents in a span of a few days, one of which was successful and the other thwarted in time. On November 10, a car packed with explosives was detonated by a suicide bomber near the Red Fort in Delhi during the evening rush hour. The blast killed 15 and injured 28 people.

The attack was perpetrated by a cell of medical doctors dubbed the “white collar terror module,” allegedly linked to Pakistan-based terror group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind, a group affiliated with al-Qaida. The suicide bomber was identified as Umar un-Nabi, a doctor working at Al-Falah University in Faridabad. Other co-conspirators include Nabi’s colleagues at the university, namely Muzammil Shakeel Ganai, Adeel Ahmed Rather, Muzaffar Ahmed Rather, and Dr. Shaheen Shahid, the alleged financier of the Delhi cell and senior member of JeM’s women’s wing.

A day before the Delhi blasts, Gujarat counterterrorism officials arrested another medical doctor identified as Dr. Ahmed Mohiyuddin Saiyed from Telangana and two other individuals who were allegedly plotting to carry out a bio-terror attack using ricin. The cell was uncovered during a routine stop of Saiyed’s car, in which police found a cache of firearms, ammunition, and castor bean cake, a precursor for the manufacture of ricin.

Modi Courts Putin With An Eye On Trump’s Disapproval

Dr. Shanthie Mariet D Souza

It may be no more than an annual ritual: the Indian Prime Minister and the Russian President meeting each other alternately in either country. However, the current geopolitical churn creates a special interest in Vladimir Putin’s impending visit to India, tentatively planned for the first week of December 2025, to attend the 23rd India-Russia Summit.

He is expected to devote a large part of his meeting with Narendra Modi to finding ways to keep the strategic relationship alive amid New Delhi’s continuing attempts to arrive at a compromise trade deal with Donald Trump’s America.

Unlike Putin’s India visit in 2021, which was a quieter affair, New Delhi is now laying out the trappings to greet the Russian President. Although the visit may not witness the grand optics mostly reserved for US leaders, a slew of preparatory visits by senior officials from either side are underway to make Putin’s official trip appear out of the ordinary.

Pakistan Might Be on the Brink of a Civil War

Brandon J. Weichert

Imran Khan is a lightning-rod figure in Pakistani politics. A celebrity-turned-politician, he rode a populist wave to power in 2018, only to lose power four years later in a very Pakistani fashion—a putsch by a coalition of his opponents, including both civilian and military leaders. Today, one of Khan’s leading opponents, Shehbaz Sharif, leads the government as prime minister, with the all-important backing of the Pakistan Army and its Svengali-esque chief of staff Asim Munir.

After the coup, Khan was arrested and imprisoned, and his ultimate fate has been a constant question on the minds not only of his supporters but also on the minds of concerned observers the world over. Because of Khan’s personal celebrity as a successful cricketer playing for the Pakistani national team, he has legions of supporters around the world. And even non-cricketers can see that Pakistani politics today resembles an elaborate morality play, in which the jailed former leader has the support of the people and a shadowy cabal of his enemies is working to exclude him and his allies from power.

Where Is The Working Class In 24’s Movement And Its Transition In Bangladesh?

Dr. N N Tarun Chakravorty

Much has been said about the events of August 5, 2024. Some describe it as a revolution, while others call it a people’s uprising. Regardless of how it is labeled, the aftermath saw the emergence of a new military-backed government, formed by the protestors and their chosen representatives, aiming to implement profound changes in the state machinery.

A revolution is not merely about reforming the state; it is about completely transforming its very structure. True revolution seeks to build a political system where the working class— who are often marginalized in comparison to the wealthy, influential, and elite families— holds power at the center.

While reforms can bring changes in the state’s laws, they cannot alone sustain lasting progress. Without a genuine transformation in people’s mindsets, the old system is bound to return. Only through a deep, collective shift in attitudes and values can society permanently reject corrupt politics and establish a just order

Five Months to Save the First Island Chain from China

Ryan Fedasiuk, and Kareem Rifai

President Donald Trump must take decisive steps toward bolstering US alliances in the Indo-Pacific before talks with Xi Jinping in April.

China is testing the Trump administration’s resolve in the Indo-Pacific, probing for cracks in America’s alliance architecture while calibrating how far it can push before Trump’s state visit next April. The administration’s efforts to build a more stable relationship with China have created tactical space for diplomacy on core American interests—but recent weeks have seen Beijing interpret American restraint as permission to escalate grey-zone coercion against Tokyo and Taipei.

The coming months present a narrow window to shore up alliance credibility, signal clear limits to Chinese adventurism, and proceed with US-China diplomacy from a position of alliance cohesion and American strength.

Tokyo’s increasingly explicit warnings that a Taiwan contingency threatens Japanese survival are an accurate accounting of its security environment. Prime Minister Takaichi’s November 7 statement—that PLA use of force against Taiwan could qualify as a “situation threatening Japan’s survival” under the 2015 Peace and Security Legislation—constitutes the most direct Japanese commitment to Taiwan’s defense in modern history.

The Real Problem with Cozying Up to the Saudis

Benjamin H. Friedman and Rosemary Kelanic

The U.S.-Saudi romance is back. That’s at least the story in most reports about the visit of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS) to the White House, and the one the White House is selling: where Trump set aside concerns about Saudi Arabia’s human rights record, especially the murder of Saudi journalist and dissident Jamal Khashoggi, and put U.S. interests first to get a series of lucrative cooperative deals with the Saudis.

But the new deal with Saudi Arabia is essentially the old one, and MBS is a sideshow. The new initiatives are mostly press releases lacking substance. They reinforce the old, bipartisan set-up with the Saudis—one resting on a myth that U.S. energy security requires buying Saudi goodwill. The U.S. should distance itself from the Saudis instead of cozying up, not because MBS is a thug but because it’s in our interest to do so.

Trump’s Ukraine Peace Plan Means More War

NINA L. KHRUSHCHEVA

When US President Donald Trump shared his 28-point peace plan last month, he immediately began putting pressure on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to “sign by Thanksgiving.” Basing the timeline on a US holiday, which has no resonance in either Ukraine or Russia, was telling: the plan was always and exclusively about Trump.

As the New School’s Nina L. Khrushcheva observes, Trump has little interest in “ensuring a durable peace.” He merely wants to distract the US electorate from his “association with the convicted pedophile Jeffrey Epstein,” with a “quick foreign-policy ‘victory.’” The idea was that he would secure Russia’s agreement by offering a plan “skewed heavily” in its favor, while using a high-level corruption scandal within Zelensky’s government to “force unacceptable peace terms on Ukrainians.”

Donald Trump’s National Security Strategy Takes Aim at Europe

Marek Magierowski

President Donald Trump, undeniably, has a soft spot for strong leaders. Oftentimes, one gets the impression this is the sole yardstick he applies to foreign heads of state when evaluating their political status and their usefulness to America’s key international goals, regardless of actual clout or diplomatic skills of a particular interlocutor.

Thus, Argentina’s president, Javier Milei, and El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele get special treatment from the White House. The US president gets along well with Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. Likewise, Benjamin Netanyahu and Viktor Orbán can also bank on Donald Trump’s sympathy and understanding. Ahmed al-Shara, the new Syrian ruler and a former terrorist, was received in the White House a few weeks ago, heaped with praise and characterized as a “tough guy.” Even Kim Jong-un, the North Korean tyrant, was rewarded with some warm comments from Trump himself: “I had a very good relationship with Kim.”

Let’s move the spotlight to Europe now: any strongmen, tough leaders, apart from the above-mentioned prime minister of Hungary? Ursula von der Leyen and Kaja Kallas certainly do not meet the criteria. Does France’s Emmanuel Macron? Well, he is just a “nice guy.” Does chancellor Friedrich Merz of Germany? Not necessarily. The Italian premier Giorgia Meloni is closest to this perception, however, probably not authoritarian enough for Trump’s taste. The Finnish president Alexander Stubb has been in the headlines lately as the only European politician who has the command of the US president’s psyche. Still, he is just “another nice guy,” and, additionally, a fine golfer.

The Escalating Stakes of Proxy Wars

Maj. Juan J. Quiroz

Although the United States is competing and preparing for conflict against near-peer adversaries, proxy wars will be the most likely venue for great powers to advance their interests without incurring the costs of direct conflict against each other.1 However, future proxy wars will also look vastly different from their Cold War antecedents, resembling the destructive conventional wars that great powers previously sought to avoid.2 The Russo-Ukrainian war is emblematic of this new dynamic, with sponsors overtly supporting their favored belligerent and the escalating use of high-end weaponry.3 In other conflicts as well, sponsors are forgoing deniability in favor of achieving objectives by fighting side-by-side with proxies or deploying conventional forces like Saudi Arabia in Yemen.4

This trend toward escalation is driven by strategic factors that favor direct conflict on the part of sponsors.5 Identifying these factors is crucial for U.S. Army leaders because the Army is responsible for shaping operational environments to the United States’ advantage, preventing conflict through credible deterrence, prevailing in large-scale ground combat when deterrence fails, and consolidating gains to make operational successes enduring.6 As the global order continues to fragment, proxy wars will abound. The Army will be charged with deterring revisionist states from escalating proxy wars into conventional interstate conflicts that would be even more destabilizing and costly to U.S. interests. This will require adaptations in information sharing and employment of forward-stationed forces, such as Army special operations forces (ARSOF) and security force assistance brigades (SFABs), and theater armies that manage force tailoring and command the Army component during the initial stages of crises that include escalation from low-level proxy wars into direct conflict.7

The Common-Sense Realism of the National Security Strategy

Greg R. Lawson

The Trump administration has rightly reoriented US foreign policy toward domestic renewal, more balanced alliances, and hemispheric protection.

For nearly a decade, a small but growing group of analysts has argued that American foreign policy needs a massive course correction. With the unveiling of President Donald Trump’s National Security Strategy yesterday, that broad-based course correction is at hand and clearly articulated.

While the United States cannot, and should not, retreat into isolationism, it has desperately needed a reorientation toward the world as it actually is. For too long, Western intellectuals, policy wonks, and political leaders bought into the “End of History” and “Unipolar Moment” framing of how the world would operate after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Instead of continuing to act as if the United States could perennially play the role of Atlas holding up the world, a consistent theme emerged in realist policy analysis: the United States could no longer afford a foreign policy driven by ideological aspiration, institutional inertia, or the comforting illusions of unipolarity. The United States needed a realism fit for a new competitive age—not the caricature of realism that pretends America can withdraw behind its oceans, but a realism grounded in material strength, strategic triage, and an unsentimental view of how great-power politics actually works.

Only Europe can save Ukraine from Putin and Trump – but will it?

Timothy Garton Ash

Europe, you have been warned. President Vladimir Putin has waged a full-scale war against Ukraine for nearly four years and this week threatened that Russia was “ready right now” for war with Europe if need be. President Donald Trump has demonstrated that the US is ready to sell out Ukraine for the sake of a dirty deal with Putin’s Russia. His new US National Security Strategy prescribes “cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations”. How much more clarity do you need?

Now it’s up to us Europeans to enable Ukraine to survive armed assault from Moscow and diplomatic betrayal from Washington. In doing so, we also defend ourselves. For a year now, people have been telling me that Trump will eventually get tough on Russia. It’s been the geopolitical version of Waiting for Godot. Then his personal real-estate emissaries come up with a 28-point “peace plan” that is a Russian-American imperial and commercial deal at the expense of both Ukraine and Europe.

The Common-Sense Realism of the National Security Strategy

Greg R. Lawson

The Trump administration has rightly reoriented US foreign policy toward domestic renewal, more balanced alliances, and hemispheric protection.

For nearly a decade, a small but growing group of analysts has argued that American foreign policy needs a massive course correction. With the unveiling of President Donald Trump’s National Security Strategy yesterday, that broad-based course correction is at hand and clearly articulated.

While the United States cannot, and should not, retreat into isolationism, it has desperately needed a reorientation toward the world as it actually is. For too long, Western intellectuals, policy wonks, and political leaders bought into the “End of History” and “Unipolar Moment” framing of how the world would operate after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Instead of continuing to act as if the United States could perennially play the role of Atlas holding up the world, a consistent theme emerged in realist policy analysis: the United States could no longer afford a foreign policy driven by ideological aspiration, institutional inertia, or the comforting illusions of unipolarity. The United States needed a realism fit for a new competitive age—not the caricature of realism that pretends America can withdraw behind its oceans, but a realism grounded in material strength, strategic triage, and an unsentimental view of how great-power politics actually works.

National Security Strategy of the United States of America

But here is my initial assessment comparing the two:

The Gold Standard: NSDD 32 is a concise top secret directive that tells the system what to do. It states global and regional objectives, identifies threats, lays out roles for allies, sets priorities among theaters, and directs force development, nuclear policy, general purpose forces, security assistance, and mobilization. It is written to guide planning, programming, and operations across the instruments of power.

2025 NSS: The 2025 strategy is a long public narrative. It devotes heavy space to critique of post Cold War elites, defines what “we want,” lists American strengths, lays out principles, and then describes regional approaches, especially for the Western Hemisphere and Asia-Indo-Pacific.

Reagan issues a short operational directive. POTUS issues a long political manifesto that contains strategy.

Comparison: NSDD 32 is tighter as an executable strategy. The 2025 document is richer on philosophy and domestic agenda but looser as guidance for campaign plans (always my focus).

Reagan defines clear global objectives. Deterring and defeating Soviet attack. Containing and reversing Soviet expansion and military presence. Increasing the costs of Soviet support to proxy, terrorist, and subversive forces. Neutralizing Soviet use of diplomacy, arms transfers, economic pressure, political action, propaganda, and disinformation. Limiting Soviet capabilities through US military strength, arms control, and denial of key technology. Ensuring access to markets, energy, minerals, sea and space. Supporting Third World development and a well functioning international economic system.

The New US National Security Strategy

Phillips P. OBrien

In case you missed it, the US government has just released its new National Security Strategy. Here is a link so you can download a copy for yourself. As such I wanted to write a few words about what is said in it specifically about Europe—as these are the most fascinating and frightening parts.

One thing that stands out (and we can see it in other recent moves such as the Trump administration weakening its already pathetic sanctions on Russia, cozying up to China, sandbagging Ukraine and Europe, and weakening its commitment to NATO) is that the administration is being more and more open about its intentions. This new strategy is a return to JD Vance’s speech in Munich which was delivered not long after the administration came to power. This speech, if you remember, caused consternation amongst some Europeans who had not yet grasped what the administration believed. You can watch the whole speech here if you really want to.

In Munich, Trump called for more support for the populist right in Europe—think Viktor Orban in Hungary, the AFD in Germany, National Front in France and Reform in the UK. And in the new National Security Strategy, the US is has come right back to pushing for exactly this. The major point is that European culture is under threat (the continent is becoming “non-European” and as such, even NATO is as always with Trump being questioned as a viable institution.

Ukraine Military Situation: Russian Military Intensifies Offensive Pressure, Making Meaningful Battlefield Gains

Hudson Institute, Can Kasapoğlu

Fighting raged at a high operational tempo across the Ukrainian battle space last week, with some days seeing between two and three hundred tactical engagements.

This pronounced increase in combat activity highlights the mounting pressure Russian forces are placing on Ukraine. Some sources report that Russia seized about 90 percent more Ukrainian territory in November than in October. In a worrying trend for Kyiv, Russian formations are now targeting the anti-drone infrastructure Ukraine has built along critical logistical routes.

The Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka fronts bore the brunt of Moscow’s assault. The Russian Ministry of Defense announced that its forces had successfully captured Pokrovsk. While Kyiv has not officially confirmed the city’s fall, the situation there appears all but irreversible. Heavy fog and harsh winter conditions have allowed Russian small-infantry assault teams to penetrate Ukrainian defenses. Russian units have also surrounded the nearby city of Myrnohrad, which may soon fall as well.

Other flashpoints also bear monitoring. In recent weeks the Russian military has been pushing hard and gaining ground in Zaporizhzhia and in the direction of Lyman. In Kupiansk, where this report detected prior Russian infiltrations, the Ukrainian General Staff has focused on detecting breaching Russian assault groups as it sweeps the city and its outskirts.

U.S. Army Adaptivity and Agility

Dean G. Popps

Earlier this month, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth took on an issue that has long evaded Pentagon officials in both Democratic and Republican Administrations: acquisition reform. Secretary Hegseth laid out a bold strategy for addressing the development, procurement, and fielding of defense assets, with a much-needed focus on “speed to capability.”

The move should be fully embraced by policymakers, the acquisition community, and private sector contractors, alike.

Secretary Hegseth’s vision rightly reflects that the myriad threats facing the U.S. homeland and forward-deployed resources demand a rejection of the “business as usual” approach at the Pentagon. Given the urgent priorities outlined by the Trump Administration – be it Golden Dome or the defense of Guam – there is no better time to focus on both increased flexibility and efficiency.

The U.S. Army will be front and center during this effort, particularly in its integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) portfolio. Lt. Gen. Sean A. Gainey, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, has said, “The U.S. Army AMD force is undergoing the most significant modernization in our history.”

This initiative is far from a luxury in 2025. As the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have demonstrated over the last couple of years, air and missile defenses are essential if we are to protect our troops and allies abroad.

Ukraine Is Fighting NATO’s War

Reuben Johnson

A French air force Dassault Rafale refuels from a U.S. Air Force KC-10 Extender from the 908th Expeditionary Air Refueling Squadron before conducting an aerial refuel during a Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve mission March 20, 2017. The KC-10 provides aerial refueling capabilities for U.S. and coalition aircraft as they support Iraqi Security Forces and partnered forces as they work to liberate territory under the control of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Joshua A. Hoskins)

Key Points and Summary – NATO must stop treating Ukraine’s struggle as someone else’s war and support Kyiv as a de facto future member until it formally joins the alliance.

-Ukrainian accession once seemed inevitable, only to be derailed by Vladimir Putin’s hard turn at the 2007 Munich Security Conference and Europe’s fear of escalation.

-What is needed is sustained weapons flows via NATO mechanisms, solving financing for major air buys, and closing political rifts inside the alliance—and echoes Garry Kasparov’s warning: NATO must return to its core mission of deterring Russian aggression, or face endless war.

Can NATO Support Ukraine Until the Day It Becomes an Alliance Member?

What should the United States and NATO do about Ukraine? This question is a sore subject for those of us who lived in the country, lost everything when the Russians invaded, and had to leave as war refugees.

Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Services

Andrew S. Bowen

Russia has an extensive foreign intelligence system composed of several overlapping agencies that compete for bureaucratic, political, and often economic influence within the Russian government. Russia’s foreign intelligence agencies play a key role in advising and influencing Russia’s leadership, as well as in implementing its foreign policy.

Congress has previously imposed sanctions on Russia’s foreign intelligence agencies, and some in Congress have expressed concern about these agencies’ activities. Members of Congress may be interested in assessing the structure of Russia’s foreign intelligence services and the continued challenges they pose to U.S. and allied interests. Over the last decade, Russia’s foreign intelligence services have been linked to election interference, assassinations, cyber operations, espionage, and sabotage operations globally.

Central Bank Digital Currencies

Rebecca M. Nelson

Policymakers have debated whether the Federal Reserve (Fed) should create a central bank digital currency (CBDC)—a “digital dollar.” A CBDC would share some of the features of cryptocurrencies (crypto)—that is, private digital currencies, such as Bitcoin, which are unsupported by any government authority. This In Focus describes how foreign central banks, the Administration, Congress, and the Fed are approaching the issue and discusses policy issues. For more detail, see CRS Report R46850,

Contrary to some of its creators’ expectations, crypto has not become widely adopted for payments—its value has been too volatile to serve as an effective means of payment, transaction costs are too high, and it is neither legal tender nor backed by the “full faith and credit” of a government. Stablecoins, a type of cryptocurrency intended to keep a constant value, were introduced to overcome the volatility issue but have also not been widely adopted for retail payments. (P.L. 119-27 was recently enacted to encourage further adoption of stablecoins.) A CBDC, proponents believe, could overcome these barriers while taking advantage of the technology pioneered by crypto to create a more efficient, central-bank-backed digital payment system.

Washington’s Gamble On Ahmed Al-Sharaa Could Push Syria Toward A New Authoritarian Era

Fair Observer, Halmat Palan

On September 22, 2025, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, a man once hunted by the United States and its allies, walked onto the stage of the Concordia Annual Summit in New York City. Waiting to interview him was retired US General David Petraeus, the same commander once tasked with pursuing him as the head of the Al Qaeda-affiliated Nusra Front during the height of the Iraq and Syria Jihadi insurgency. Petraeus, once CIA director, praised al-Sharaa’s vision and barely concealed the surreal nature of the moment.

Only weeks later, al-Sharaa sat in the White House with President Donald Trump, who suspended sanctions on Syria for 180 days and hailed him as a major advocate for peace. What was unimaginable a few years ago is now official US policy.

This rebranding of al-Sharaa is a dangerous gamble. He didn’t stumble into power through democratic reform or national consensus. He built his position through the Nusra Front, which later became the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS). According to the United Nationsand Human Rights Watch, this group engaged in suicide bombing, massacres, torture, unlawful killings, war crimes and coercive rule during the Syrian Civil War. West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center has shown that HTS’s rebranding didn’t change either its core jihadist ideology or methods.

Making sense of the AI revolution

Iskander Rehman

In 1961, the Brookings Institution produced an advisory report for NASA, which pondered, among other things, the societal ramifications of the discovery of intelligent extraterrestrial life. The announcement of such a dramatic discovery, the report suggested, could have hugely unpredictable effects on human civilisation, and – in extenso – on US national security. While ‘the knowledge that life existed in other parts of the universe might lead to a greater unity of men on Earth, based on the “oneness” of man or on the age-old assumption that any stranger is threatening’, such an earth-shattering revelation could also have dramatic societal consequences, the Brookings team suggested. People might find their entire religious belief systems upended almost overnight, and, of all groups, ‘scientists and engineers might be the most devastated by the discovery of superior creatures’, as their ‘advanced understanding of nature might vitiate all our theories’.

The advent of an Artificial Superintelligence (ASI) or Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) – i.e., an advanced form of AI that surpasses human capabilities in almost every cognitive field of endeavour – is perhaps the closest analogue to the public discovery of an advanced alien intelligence. It is also far more likely to occur over the course of our lifetimes, with many titans of industry and lead forecasting platforms now predicting its materialisation within the next five to ten years.

Why human creativity matters in the age of AI

James Marriottre

In Roald Dahl’s short story ‘The Great Automatic Grammatizator’, an inventor named Adolph Knipe constructs a novel-writing machine. Knipe’s fantastical and perhaps excessively gothic contraption can be manipulated by various pedals, levers and organ stops to produce detective stories, historical fiction, Westerns, tales of the sea and so on – in the style of Hemingway, Faulkner, Joyce or whoever you like. The Grammatizator’s owners plot to supplant the world’s novelists – ‘squeeze ’em out’, ‘exactly like Rockefeller did with his oil companies’, one of them enthuses. This being a Dahl story – and therefore dark and cynical – the plan is a virtually unqualified success. Dahl writes that in ‘the first full year of the machine’s operation it was estimated that at least one half of all the novels and stories published in the English language were produced by Adolph Knipe upon the Great Automatic Grammatizator’.

The Grammatizator is not quite here. But new generative artificial intelligence technologies, such as ChatGPT, are capable of producing plausible essays and pastiches of poems. Writers are understandably alarmed. In Hollywood, screenwriters have gone on strike against studio plans to use large language models to write television scripts. Upsettingly, for those in my profession, AI already writes competent (if not always accurate) journalism. Some experts predict that a machine will be capable of writing a bestselling novel within decades or years.

Focusing on AI and electronic warfare, IDF restructures computer service directorate

Emanuel Fabian

The military on Tuesday completed a reorganization of its C4I and Cyber Defense Directorate, with a new artificial intelligence unit and an expanded electronic warfare array that will further enhance Israel’s defensive cyber capabilities, including countering drone attacks.

The directorate, headed by Maj. Gen. Aviad Dagan, is responsible for building and maintaining the military’s networking and computer systems, as well as defensive cyberspace capabilities and the management of the electromagnetic spectrum, or radio waves.

The restructuring will establish two new divisions, consolidating several smaller departments and forming new units. In total, the directorate will now have five divisions, each headed by a brigadier general.

Addressing the Risks that Civilian AI Poses to International Peace and Security: The Role of Responsible Innovation

Dr Vincent Boulanin, Jules Palayer and Charles Ovink

For years, the discussion around artificial intelligence (AI) and international peace and security has centred almost exclusively on military applications, such as autonomous weapons systems. However, advances in civilian AI could also undermine international peace and security in many ways. This report explores the risks that advances in AI in the civilian domain could present to international peace and security, and how such risks can be addressed through responsible innovation.

The report builds on desk research and insights gathered from a series of activities that the authors organized between 2022 and 2025 as part of a joint initiative by SIPRI and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs on promoting responsible innovation in AI for international peace and security, which was funded by a decision of the Council of the European Union .

Combatting Cybercrime against Mobile Devices

Joseph Jarnecki

This paper examines cybercrime against consumer mobile devices and their users in the UK. It draws on an expert roundtable convened on 17 July 2025 by RUSI’s Cyber and Tech research group and supported by Google. Unless otherwise noted, statements made in this paper are based on points raised by participants at the roundtable.

Mobile cybersecurity is underrepresented in policy debates and research, especially when considering the societal significance of smartphones for individuals and organisations. Mobile devices are targeted by cybercriminals for profit, costing the UK economy billions annually. Playing an increasingly salient role in economic and national security, mobile devices are also targeted by hostile state actors as part of intelligence operations and in kinetic conflict.

Analysis presented in this paper explores a handful of the threats targeting mobile devices, drivers of mobile devices’ vulnerability and how competition policy interacts with mobile device cybersecurity. The overarching focus is on cybercrime; however, there is broader relevance to other areas of mobile security.

10 December 2025

How AI Can Repair US-India Relations

Bill Drexel

In the wake of trade convulsions, an incendiary H-1B visa debate, and bitter diplomatic ruptures following lethal hostilities between India and Pakistan last spring, the United States and India are finally poised to turn over a new leaf in the coming weeks as a trade deal solidifies, reopening the door to much broader cooperation that both nations have sought for many years. But the basis of a rapprochement between the two behemoths is anything but clear, as two of the traditional pillars of closer US-India collaboration are beginning to look wobbly: high-skilled Indian immigration is increasingly under fire in the United States, and offshoring cheap manufacturing to Asia looks more unsustainable than ever before.

Finding new areas of robust cooperation for India and America is a daunting but necessary task as the two nations grapple with their strategic interdependence in the shadow of China’s growing heft and belligerence. Artificial intelligence looms large as the most obvious solution.

Momentum favors it. Recent trade agreements—including Technology Prosperity Deals signed with Japan, South Korea, and the UK this fall—have featured strong AI components, emphasizing coordination on AI exports, standards, and infrastructure development. India brings its own unique AI complementarities to the United States: a hunger to adapt and iterate on American breakthroughs for cost-effective applications, a massive talent pool, and a pressing need to attract greater American computing capabilities.

Pakistan’s “SMASH” Missile Might Be Hypersonic. Does It Matter?

Brandon J. Weichert

Hypersonic weapons are alarming on their own—but there is little evidence that Pakistan has built the underlying technology that makes them truly lethal.

In November of this year, the Pakistani Navy staged what it called a “first at-sea launch” of its newest toy: the P-282 SMASH, a ship-launched anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) said to be able to strike targets at Mach 8. According to Islamabad, the system rides a “quasi-ballistic” trajectory—climbing into the sky, then plunging like a manmade meteor toward enemy ships while executing high-G terminal maneuvers.

The implication is obvious: Pakistan wants the world to believe it has entered the elite club of nations wielding hypersonic maritime killers. On paper, the SMASH missile adds a vertical “burst-strike” option to Pakistan’s naval arsenal—very different from the low-flying cruise missiles that dominate the region today. Pakistan claims the tested variant carries a range of roughly 350 kilometers and can attack both moving sea targets and fixed land sites.

If true, that would place a major new threat inside India’s maritime neighborhood.

But that’s the key word here—if. Because for all the noise around SMASH, almost none of Pakistan’s more sensational claims currently stand on independently verifiable ground.

Foreign Aid With Chinese Characteristics

Alicia R. Chen

Earlier this year, after U.S. President Donald Trump effectively shut down the U.S. Agency for International Development, the world’s largest bilateral aid program, many observers raised fears that China would step in to fill the geopolitical vacuum. USAID, after all, had served as a key tool of U.S. diplomacy for more than six decades, and the American retreat has created an opportunity for China to expand its economic statecraft and win influence in many parts of the world.

Over the last two decades, China has vastly expanded the amount and types of foreign aid it administers. Between 2000 and 2023, only 17 countries in the world did not receive a loan or grant from the Chinese government or a Chinese state-owned institution. The Belt and Road Initiative, which was launched by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, has accounted for more than $1 trillion in total spending. This increasingly global footprint has piqued Western policymakers’ concerns about Beijing’s ambitions, but many observers still don’t fully comprehend Beijing’s strategy.

Japan Has Changed How the World Must Think About Taiwan

Mr. Singleton

A single word can crack the facade of a great power’s confidence.

That’s what happened last month when Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi of Japan told lawmakers in Tokyo that a Chinese attack or blockade against Taiwan would constitute a threat to Japan’s “survival,” a term that, under Japanese law, would permit the country to deploy its military overseas.

Ms. Takaichi merely said aloud what has long been understood — that a crisis involving Taiwan would threaten Japan’s national security. But her comments were among the clearest public signals yet that Tokyo could help defend Taiwan from potential Chinese aggression.

Beijing reacted as if Ms. Takaichi, a conservative politician, had declared war. Chinese state media has portrayed her as reviving the militarist rhetoric used to justify Japan’s aggression during World War II, and a senior Chinese envoy posted what amounted to an online threat to behead Ms. Takaichi. China has halted some Japanese imports, discouraged Chinese tourism to Japan and stepped up coast guard patrols around islands claimed by both countries.

Beijing routinely lashes out at Tokyo because of lingering resentment over Japan’s wartime past, which included a brutal invasion and occupation of China. This time, however, the fury is rooted in something more dangerous: China’s growing anxiety that one of its bedrock goals — isolating Taiwan and forcing it to submit to unification on Chinese terms — is slipping away.

Chain of Command, American Values Guide US Military Profession

Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik,

Lately, there’s been talk about soldiers not being bound to follow illegal orders. The talk mostly is among some academicians, media personalities and political leaders. It’s usually associated with one side of the political aisle trying to score points against the other. I don’t want to use this essay to engage in that kind of partisan political discussion. Rather, I’d like to point out two of the enduring and foundational aspects of our profession that are relevant to the current discussion.

First, military commanders in the chain of command, with advice from staff judge advocates, are responsible for ensuring their orders are legal. Putting the primary focus on soldiers, or any other service members for that matter, misses this essential point. Those lower along the chain of command must be able to trust that those at higher levels have done their jobs. And “higher levels” is a relative term. To some, “higher” may mean a company, battalion or brigade commander. To others, a division, corps or joint task force commander. And to still others, “higher levels” may mean a geographic combatant or service component commander.

Inherent Responsibility

Commanders at each level have inherent responsibilities for those they command. Some of these responsibilities are tactical and operational—to place their units, and the men and women in them, in the best position relative to the enemy to increase the probability of success. Other responsibilities are logistical—to ensure the arms, ammunition, supplies and equipment needed for mission success either are on hand or within supporting distance to units in the fight. Still others are protective—to make certain both the battle and campaign areas, as well as lines of communication, are protected from enemy interference.

How To Break China’s Grip on the Batteries Powering Our Military

Samm Gillard & Drew Ronneberg

It’s tough medicine but Congress must use the pending defense policy bill to bar the Department of War from using lithium-ion cells in its weapon systems that are supplied by Beijing.

When China temporarily halted the supply of lithium-ion battery cells to Pentagon drone maker Skydio last year, co-founder and CEO Adam Bry called it “a clarifying moment.”

“If there was ever any doubt, this action makes clear that the Chinese government will use supply chains as a weapon to advance their interests over ours,” he remarked at the time.

The company was forced to take the “drastic step” of rationing batteries from three to one per drone, while it is still searching for alternative suppliers.

Yet this unique vulnerability is far greater than many realize or are willing to admit. Countless other specialized U.S. military systems, including handheld radios, autonomous submersibles, and next generation platforms like directed energy weapons, rely on lithium-ion batteries and related materials.

As the Department of Defense warned in its landmark Lithium Battery Strategy, it is similarly dependent on a variety of Chinese battery components and materials like graphite anodes, electrolyte salts, as well as other key ingredients such as the metals nickel and cobalt.

The Limits of U.S. Export Controls on China

Daniel Bob

In an era defined by a Trump trade regime marked by the highest tariffs in decades—and the greatest policy volatility in modern history—the Supreme Court is poised to rule on the legality of those tariffs. That decision will shape the future of American trade authority. It also presents an opportunity to take a broader, overdue look at U.S. trade policy as a whole. Any such reassessment must include a clear-eyed evaluation of export controls, which now span the globe but fall most heavily on China. Beijing’s technological, industrial, and military progress—combined with its expanding economic weight—poses the most comprehensive challenge to U.S. power since the United States emerged from World War II as the dominant global actor.

Washington’s reflexive answer to China’s rise has been export controls targeting chips, software, next-generation tools, and other cutting-edge technologies that underpin U.S. strategic and economic advantages. The impulse is understandable: safeguarding technological leadership is central to both national security and long-term prosperity. Yet instinct is not strategy. Broad, blunt restrictions on U.S. firms selling to China risk imposing costs that exceed their benefits. A more calibrated and adaptive approach is needed—one that protects critical advantages without undermining the innovative ecosystem on which American power ultimately depends.

The India Trump Made

James Crabtree and Rudra Chaudhuri

Over the last decade, India has drawn ever closer to the United States, tentatively aligning itself with Washington as it continues to eschew formal alliances. This approach has paid off, securing U.S. investment, defense cooperation, and technological exchange, as well as the sense that the friendship between the world’s two largest democracies would only grow. Indian policymakers were mostly untroubled when Donald Trump returned to the White House this year. They assumed that Washington valued the partnership and that ties would only grow stronger, not least because of the apparent chemistry between Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during the president’s first term.

But now, India must reassess its American gamble. Since the summer, Trump has departed from the policy of recent U.S. administrations and sought to pressure India. He increased tariffs to 50 percent on India in August, ostensibly as a penalty for its ongoing purchases of Russian oil. And he agreed to a raft of deals with India’s neighbor and rival, Pakistan, irking Indian officials. In apparent response, Modi attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Tianjin in September 2025, where he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping; his presence made it seem as if India were aligning with U.S. competitors. Putin will be visiting New Delhi this week, where his meeting with Modi risks giving the same impression.

Three Months, Two Thousand Meters: A Snapshot of the War in Ukraine

Gil Barndollar

After the global success of his 2023 film 20 Days in Mariupol, Ukrainian filmmaker Mstyslav Chernov returned to his country’s front lines to tell a new story. As Ukraine began its heavily telegraphed 2023 counteroffensive, Chernov’s roaming eye alighted on a single platoon from 3rd Assault Brigade, which had been tasked with liberating the ruined village of Andriivka.

To the poor bloody infantry tasked with executing their piece of a much larger operation, the mission was simple: Take ground. Ground is what Chernov gives his viewers from the opening frame, as a high-explosive shell lands just yards from a pair of soldiers in a trench, showering the camera lens in dirt. Their comrades pile in and out of armored personnel carriers, then advance on foot through shell-churned mud one minute, dense brush the next. Though fighting on his native soil, one Ukrainian soldier says, “It’s like landing on a planet where everything is trying to kill you.”

Unmanned systems provide some of the most stunning visuals in the film. A vast cemetery, flags flying over every grave, shifts to a forest of spectral trees, filmed from a drone’s thermal camera. Early on, slow-scrolling drone footage of the forested battlefield lays it out as a green carpet to the objective. Choppier drone videos from later in the battle show only stumps and shell holes, and the soldiers crawling between them.

Why I Declined Brigade Command

Matt Jamison

Last year I published an article in which I studied what I referred to as the “Battalion Command Crisis within the U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery.” I completed my own battalion command in June 2023 and loved it. The job was the highlight of my career, and my departure was truly bittersweet. To this day, I can honestly say that I would happily do it all over again. After successfully completing what was then known as the Colonel’s Command Assessment Program (CCAP) last year, I deferred competing for brigade command. This year I declined entirely. In this article, I will explain why.

When I decided to make the Army a career, my general vision of what success looked like was twenty years of service and a successful battalion command. As I approached battalion command, I never thought about retiring at its conclusion. My career had been a success by any measure and battalion command was no different. I was a first-time select for Senior Service College and knew that I wanted to get my family back to the Washington, D.C. area and take a specific job that would be available at the Pentagon. I had never been certain that I would enjoy brigade command – the transition to organizational leadership might remove much of what I enjoyed as a direct leader – but I had always taken the next hard job.

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