Indian Strategic Studies

22 April 2026

The Geopolitical Importance of India’s Shrinking ‘Red Corridor’

Jagannath Panda

India’s long struggle against Left-Wing Extremism (LWE, or Naxalism) is an internal security challenge, but it is also a larger test. Could the Indian state could govern its own margins while aspiring to global power status?

For decades, the Naxal problem represented more than violence in remote forests. It reflected weak state presence, poor infrastructure, political neglect, uneven development, and the ability of anti-state forces in India to exploit local despair. It also invited external scrutiny and strategic interest from rival powers that understood a divided India would be easier to contain than a cohesive India. That is why the decline of the Red Corridor, previously stretching across 10 states, matters far beyond policing statistics. On April 8, the Ministry of Home Affairs said that “no district in the country falls under the LWE-affected category.”

China Was Once Buying Up Sri Lankan Ports. Now It’s India’s Turn

Kriti Upadhyaya

Nearly 20 years after China stirred fears about “debt trap diplomacy” with its construction and takeover of the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, India is stepping into the fold, acquiring a majority stake in Sri Lanka’s largest commercial shipyard. Last month, Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL), India’s leading defense public-sector undertaking, responsible for the construction and repair of Indian warships, acquired a majority 51 percent stake in Colombo Dockyard PLC (CDPLC). CDPLC is Sri Lanka’s largest commercial shipyard, located inside Colombo Harbor on one of the world’s busiest east-west shipping lanes.

The transaction, valued at $26.8 million, marks the first international acquisition ever made by an Indian shipyard, public or private. It also suggests India’s strategic calculus in its own maritime neighborhood has structurally evolved. CDPLC is not a greenfield project. It is a functioning, 52-year-old commercial yard with four graving drydocks, capacity to handle vessels up to 125,000 deadweight tons, and a client base spanning Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. In November 2025, before the acquisition closed, CDPLC secured the largest shipbuilding contract in its history (valued at $150 million) from France’s Orange Marine for two advanced cable-laying vessels. The yard services more than 200 vessels annually.

Expanding India’s Role in the International Semiconductor Ecosystem

Sujai Shivakumar, Hideki Tomoshige, and Jeffrey D. Bean

India is positioning itself as an increasingly important node in the global semiconductor ecosystem, building on its established strengths in chip design and deep pool of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) talent. Backed by significant government initiatives and growing international partnerships, India is expanding capabilities in manufacturing, advanced packaging, and precompetitive research. These efforts come at a time when global semiconductor supply chains remain highly concentrated, creating opportunities for India to contribute to diversification and resilience.

At the same time, India faces structural challenges—including infrastructure gaps, regulatory complexity, and workforce constraints—that will shape the pace and scale of its progress. If successfully addressed, India could strengthen its domestic electronics sector, reduce reliance on imports, and play a larger strategic role in allied technology ecosystems. Its trajectory will have important implications not only for its own economic growth but also for global semiconductor supply chain resilience and geopolitical stability.

Cyberwar’s New Frontier How AI Agents Will Threaten Global Security

Brianna Rosen

In late 2025, the U.S. artificial intelligence company Anthropic announced it had disrupted a Chinese state-sponsored group that had used the company’s own technology to attack roughly 30 Western technology, finance, government, and critical infrastructure targets—all with minimal human supervision. It was the first reported AI-orchestrated espionage campaign. But it will not be the last. Just a few months later, Anthropic revealed that its latest model, Mythos Preview, had autonomously uncovered critical vulnerabilities in every major operating system and web browser. In the hands of criminal networks, terrorist groups, or countries unconstrained by AI safety concerns, virtually any system

With Hormuz Closed, China Is Wiring the Globe’s Clean Energy Future

David M. Hart

The blockage of the Strait of Hormuz has thrown many nations dependent on Middle East oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) into crisis. Beyond immediate measures to reduce energy consumption, the Iran war is now causing these countries to accelerate longer-term plans to build out solar and wind power, install batteries to balance their grids, and expand the role of electric vehicles (EVs).

An electric vehicle from Chinese company NAT is on display during the International Auto Show, in Pasay City, the Philippines, on April 11, 2026. Daniel Ceng/Anadolu/Getty Images

China is the clear winner. The country dominates all three industries and was already promoting them aggressively in export markets before the war. But this major advantage is only part of the postwar story. Beijing is also winning in other manufacturing sectors and electrical infrastructure writ large, and it is positioning itself to win the next generation of energy technologies. China’s progress may be good for the global climate, but as each day of hostilities passes and energy demands grow, it deepens the United States’ long-run geoeconomic challenge.

The Tech High Ground What It Will Take to Gain the Advantage Over China

Jake Sullivan

The countries that prevail in great-power rivalries are those that adapt. Athens and Sparta and their allies constantly innovated so their navies could outperform one another. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union spent nearly two decades engaged in a space race. Now, technology is the central front in U.S.-Chinese competition and in the broader contest to shape the world, and the United States must adapt again. This rivalry is playing out across frontier sectors including semiconductors, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and clean energy. To prevail, Washington needs a clear definition of success and a clear and consistent strategy for how to achieve it.

For decades, U.S. policy toward China rested on a quiet but powerful assumption: Beijing was essentially running the same race as the United States, just a few steps behind. China was seen as a copycat—adept at imitation, lagging on innovation, and ultimately dependent on access to Western technology. The American lead was assumed to be durable, perhaps even self-sustaining.

How China’s Weapons Transfers to Iran Have Evolved Over Decades

David Pierson

That approach is now drawing renewed attention after U.S. officials said intelligence agencies were assessing whether China may have shipped shoulder-fired missiles to Iran in recent weeks. President Trump has said he would impose an additional 50 percent tariff on Chinese goods if the assessment proves accurate. China has denied the claim, calling it “pure fabrication” and has vowed to “resolutely retaliate” if the Trump administration goes through with tariffs.

The American officials said the information obtained by U.S. intelligence agencies was not definitive. But if proven true, it would be a significant tactical change in the way Beijing supports its closest strategic partner in the Middle East. Chinese arms sales to Iran exploded in the 1980s and have all but vanished in the last decade to comply with a United Nations embargo and U.S. sanctions. Chinese support for Iran in recent years has instead come in the form of components that could be used in both civilian technologies as well as missiles and drones.

How the Iran war made China stronger

Ian Bremmer

The conventional wisdom was that a destabilizing war in the oil-producing heart of the Middle East would badly hurt China, the world's leading oil importer, and its sputtering economy. It hasn’t worked out that way. So far, China is weathering the US-Israeli war with Iran better than many of its neighbors and looks set to emerge relatively stronger.

Unlike Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump, who have launched wars against overmatched opponents only to face unwelcome surprises, President Xi Jinping has avoided unnecessary risks to position his country for long-term strength and stability. We saw Xi’s caution in his responses to both the COVID-19 pandemic and China’s structural economic weaknesses of recent years. We also saw it in Xi’s unwillingness to directly support Russia’s war in Ukraine, or even to recognize Putin’s territorial claims. Now we see it in Xi’s reluctance to criticize Trump’s bombing campaign against his allies in Tehran, or to come to Iran’s direct aid. The invitation for the US president to visit Beijing next month stands.

What the Iran War Means for the “Axis of Resistance”

Hamidreza Azizi

In the final weeks before his death, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei cast the mounting hostility of U.S. President Donald Trump in religious and explicitly Shiite terms. Rejecting calls for capitulation, he invoked the example of Imam Hussein—the third imam, or spiritual leader, of the Shiites—refusing to pledge allegiance to Yazid, the Umayyad ruler widely associated in Shiite memory with tyranny and injustice. Defiance, in this light, was not simply a strategic imperative but a value rooted in history and identity.

Why “Mowing the Grass” Won’t Work in Iran

Mona Yacoubian

At some point—whether sooner or later—major hostilities against Iran will come to an end. When the formal war with Iran concludes, Israel may hope that the United States would agree to pivot to a “mowing the grass” strategy against Iran—periodic attacks to degrade Iran’s missile and drone capabilities and keep Tehran off balance. Yet this approach will not work. Instead, it will lay the foundation for prolonged regional instability and global disruption.

In search of an Iran war off-ramp, President Trump has signaled his desire for an exit strategy—whether through a successful ceasefire negotiation or by some other, yet to be announced, deus ex machina. His claims of regime change, entombed enriched uranium, and a devastated Iranian military set the stage for a near-term U.S. withdrawal from the conflict. Yet, the president has also highlighted the possibility that the United States could return to undertake “spot hits” on Iran as needed. In practice, such a plan could easily evolve into “mowing the grass” in Iran, enduring low-intensity conflict punctuated by more intensive interventions.

Why the Cease-Fire With Iran Will Hold

Gideon Rose

In the wake of agreeing to a two-week cease-fire on April 7, both the United States and Iran are claiming victory in their war. Each says the same thing: We held out and the other guy blinked first. In fact, both decided to call it a draw. And some sort of outcome like this was always likely, because the structure of the game constrained the decision-making of the players—even players as idiosyncratic as U.S. President Donald Trump and the leaders of the Islamic Republic.

Iran War: The Two Powers in the Room

The Iranian delegation that arrived in Islamabad on the night of April 10 came aboard a Pakistani Air Force plane that switched off its transponder over Pakistani airspace. The aircraft disappeared from tracking systems and reappeared on the ground at Nur Khan airbase. Its passengers, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, moved swiftly and without announcement into a secured convoy heading for the Serena Hotel, where 10,000 deployed security personnel had sealed every approach road since dawn. The lockdown had been in place for twenty-four hours. Islamabad’s streets, usually loud with the ordinary friction of traffic and commerce, were quiet in the way cities become quiet when governments are conducting business they cannot name publicly.

Iran’s chief negotiators flew into peace talks inside a plane that could not be seen, in a city that had been prepared for them without their choosing, to negotiate conditions they had rejected three times in the preceding twelve days. That sequence does not describe a sovereign state exercising its options at the diplomatic table. It describes a state that has been told where to show up and is showing up.

Pakistan in the Eye of the Storm

No country in the world is navigating the 2026 Iran war on as many simultaneous fronts as Pakistan. It is a diplomatic broker and a domestic powder keg. An energy crisis victim and an active belligerent on its own eastern front. A nation with a defence pact with Saudi Arabia, a nine-hundred-kilometer border with Iran, a restive Shia minority, an IMF program on life support, and an ongoing war with Afghanistan. To call Pakistan a bystander to the Iran conflict would be a category error. It is one of the conflict’s most consequential characters, threading a needle no other country is even attempting, and doing so without a safety net.

The story of Pakistan in this war cannot be told through a single lens. It requires holding several contradictory truths at once: that Islamabad is simultaneously the most promising diplomatic actor in the conflict and one of its most vulnerable victims; that its army chief is shuttling between Tehran and Washington while Pakistani soldiers die on the Afghan border; that its stock market hit a record high this week while ordinary citizens are rationing fuel. This is not a country at the margins of the Iran war. It is one of the war’s central plots.

America and Iran’s Long Road to Peace

Seyed Hossein Mousavian

It is, at once, a time of great hope and great despair for anyone who wants U.S.-Iranian relations to improve. On the one hand, delegations from each country met in person last weekend for the first time in a decade, and they negotiated through the night in hopes of forging a lasting peace settlement. The leaders for each country’s team were not diplomats but powerful politicians—U.S. Vice President JD Vance and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, speaker of the Iranian parliament—indicating just how seriously the countries are taking negotiations. But on the other hand, tensions between the two countries are extremely high as a result of the six-week U.S.-Israeli bombing campaign. And for all the fanfare, the most recent round of talks failed to produce a deal.

It isn’t hard to see why Tehran and Washington are struggling to reach an agreement despite all the energy they are investing in forging one. There is a proverbial “sea of blood” between the countries that makes compromise extremely challenging. This is largely Washington’s doing. Over the last year, the United States has gone to war against Iran not once but twice. It has killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, dozens of top military commanders, and over a thousand civilians. It does not help that the United States and Iran have both stood by their maximalist positions.

Iran, the Global Economy, and the Case Against Complacency

Michael Froman

Every spring, central bank governors and finance ministers from around the world gather in Washington for the Spring Meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to discuss the state of the global economy, macroeconomic coordination, and financial sector management. The topic dominating discussions this year is the war in Iran—and the ensuing economic fallout.

I sat down with IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva last week for a curtain raiser conversation ahead of the Spring Meetings. We discussed the Fund’s macroeconomic outlook, including its latest analysis on how the war is affecting global growth, inflation, and economic stability. I left with a number of takeaways.

Strategic Spaces of the Sino-Nepali Borderlands: Making and Breaking Trans-Himalayan Trade Relations

Galen Murton

Chinese infrastructure investment and development in Nepal are critical to the territorial integrity of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and strategically extend the power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) into sensitive spaces of South Asia. While trade flows and investment patterns across the China-Nepal borderlands reflect asymmetrical power relations between Beijing and Kathmandu, a grounded, geographic review of the region reveals three key observations: a historical linkage between border resolutions and Chinese-facilitated infrastructure development in Nepal, an ongoing “corridorization” of Nepal that is both real and imagined, and a persistent oscillation of border openings and closings that challenges the mobility practices of local populations and yet also escapes the PRC’s enhanced controls. Attention to the Himalayan region, much like borderlands elsewhere in Asia, reinforces the adage to look to the margins to see the state in new and often overlooked ways, as “borders offer unique vantage points to produce decentered accounts of the state and denaturalized narratives of nationalist projects.”

How to wage economic warfare

Duncan Weldon

By 1806, aside from a relatively brief period of peace following the 1802 Treaty of Amiens, Britain had been at war with revolutionary and then Napoleonic France for a decade and a half. The crushing British naval victory at Trafalgar over the Franco-Spanish fleet in late October 1805, and the equally crushing French victory on land at Austerlitz over the Austrians and the Russians just six or so weeks later, had reinforced the broad strategic parameters of the contest. Britain was utterly dominant at sea and France equally dominant on land in the continent of Europe; the whale faced the elephant. With neither side able to directly strike at the other, both turned increasingly to forms of economic warfare.

For Britain, this meant leaning into the strength of her naval power. The French navy and most of her merchant marine was bottled up in her ports, hemmed in by a tightly maintained close blockade. Vessels carrying French goods were liable to be seized. French overseas trade was choked off. For Napoleon’s France, following the Berlin Decree of 1806, this meant the so-called Continental System, which closed European ports to British vessels and banned all trade in British goods, including those produced in British colonies.

Iran Resisted a Powerful Attacker. Taiwan Can, Too.

Daniel Byman and Seth G. Jones

As the United States’ and Israel’s war with Iran grinds to an uncertain conclusion, observers have been quick to label it a win for China. The war has damaged American prestige around the world and angered countries and their populations whose economies face inflation and disrupted supply chains. But a closer look at Iran’s methods in resisting the United States reveals uncomfortable lessons for China as it weighs whether to follow through on its threats to take Taiwan.

Iran prevented the far more powerful United States from winning a war that, on paper, it should have walked away with. Iran weathered decapitation strikes and continued to counterattack, despite heavy bombing and inferior weapons. Iran’s ability to close the Strait of Hormuz is particularly instructive. Its navy had only dilapidated surface ships, a small number of diesel-powered submarines and numerous small, fast-attack speedboats. Iran’s air force had no advanced attack aircraft and no true bombers.

For Iran, Hormuz Is More a Weakness Than a Weapon

Miad Maleki

On Monday, six weeks into its war with Iran, the United States imposed a naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. According to conventional wisdom, the war has made Tehran realize that its control of the strait constitutes powerful leverage. In this story line, the strait turned out to be Iran’s real nuclear weapon, its potent deterrent. Because Tehran could use this chokepoint to threaten global shipping, it was able to resist pressure from the world’s most powerful air force, reject Washington’s peace demands, and ultimately gain leverage over its nemesis. Iranian leaders have repeatedly touted that

How to End the Iran Crisis

Federica Mogherini

Despite frantic, overnight negotiations, peace talks between Iran and the United States have broken down. The two sides had no shortage of disputes to settle, and so it was always going to be hard for them to forge a permanent settlement to their war. But one issue, above all, appears to be responsible for the failure: Iran’s nuclear energy program. “The meeting went well, most points were agreed to,” U.S. President Donald Trump wrote on social media. “But the only point that really mattered, NUCLEAR, was not.”

Baku Expands Military Cooperation with Neighbors, Worrying Moscow

Paul Goble

Since 1991, the former Soviet republics have developed their own militaries as part of their state-building processes and in many cases formed security ties not only with each other but also with countries beyond the borders of what was once the Soviet Union.

Moscow has sought to retain its dominant position across that region through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Ever more former Soviet republics, however, have broken with it or downgraded its importance relative to other relationships. Few have gone further in this direction than Azerbaijan, which not only has an alliance with Türkiye and security ties with Pakistan and the People’s Republic of China but also ever-closer military links with its neighbors, worrying Moscow because it reflects Russia’s decline.

Bitcoin’s Greatest Mystery

Katrin Bennhold

My mum, a privacy-minded German in her 80s, hates using her credit card. She still carries around wads of cash to pay for everything: a coffee, her weekly supermarket shopping — even a plane ticket to visit me in Wales. She would get along with Satoshi Nakamoto, the legendary inventor of Bitcoin who operates under a pseudonym and created the first cryptocurrency — a form of electronic cash that leaves no digital trace for banks and governments to follow.

Nakamoto is a godlike figure in the crypto community. But who is he really? Countless people have tried to unmask him. My colleague John Carreyrou, an investigative reporter who uncovered the Theranos scandal, thinks he figured it out. I spoke to him about his investigation.

For Iran, Hormuz Is More a Weakness Than a Weapon

Miad Maleki

On Monday, six weeks into its war with Iran, the United States imposed a naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. According to conventional wisdom, the war has made Tehran realize that its control of the strait constitutes powerful leverage. In this story line, the strait turned out to be Iran’s real nuclear weapon, its potent deterrent. Because Tehran could use this chokepoint to threaten global shipping, it was able to resist pressure from the world’s most powerful air force, reject Washington’s peace demands, and ultimately gain leverage over its nemesis.

Aerial Drones Change How Wars Are Fought—Unmanned Ground Vehicles Will Decide Who Wins Them

James Chaney

In Ukraine, the battlefield has become transparent. The sky over the front line is saturated with sensors and strike platforms. Small drones hover constantly above, watching trenches, vehicles, and supply routes in real time. First-person-view drones strike within seconds of detection. The result is a battlefield where movement is exposed and survival increasingly depends on who can see first. Many observers have concluded that whoever dominates the air with drones will dominate the war. They are only half right.

There is no longer any serious debate about whether unmanned aircraft systems have changed warfare. Tactical concealment has become much more difficult. Even moving in a rear area is not without risks. Formations that previously maneuvered beyond direct observation now assume they are always watched from above. In Ukraine, soldiers routinely describe the front line as under constant observation.

U.S. and NATO Need To Learn From Ukraine

Joshua Segal

In the manner of the ancient Greek myth recounting the demise of Icarus due to his hubris—when his wings failed as he flew too close to the sun—the United States and its NATO allies must acknowledge the shortcomings in their strategy, technology, and planning following the initial month of Operation Epic Fury, and open their arms to Ukrainian willingness to assist.

The subpar performance of Western precision weapons in Ukraine’s challenging electronic warfare environment, the absence of immediate options to counter adversary attempts to deplete costly weapons with significantly cheaper attack drones, and repeated failures of NATO troops to perform against Ukrainian red teams in exercises underscore the fact that the United States and its NATO partners are not trained or equipped for the modern battlefield. Consequently, they would likely encounter substantial setbacks in a direct confrontation with China, Russia, and even North Korea, which are rapidly assimilating lessons gleaned from the Ukrainian battlefield. To highlight the development, numerous reports suggest that Iran successfully utilized drones in the Gulf that were deemed too ineffective against Ukrainian defenses.

21 April 2026

An Opportunity or an Illusion? The Iran War and China’s Taiwan Calculus

Allen Zhang

On April 7, the United States and Iran formally agreed to a ceasefire, bringing the nearly seven weeks of fighting in the Middle East to a temporary pause. Still, the path to a more permanent peace remains uncertain, with a round of peace talks ending with no agreement and the U.S. announcing a naval blockade of Iran. Although the tenuous ceasefire continues to hold, it is clear that the United States’ defense posture in the Indo-Pacific is being strained by competing operational demands. The conflict has seen the U.S. burn through billions of dollars in missiles, redeploy a Marine Expeditionary Unit from Japan, and shift 48 THAAD interceptors off the Korean Peninsula.

Replenishing the munitions inventory will certainly take time and money, as will the redeployment of weapons systems back to South Korea. Recognizing that the United States will possess fewer capabilities in the Indo-Pacific over the coming months, some commentators have expressed concern that China might view this as an opportune time to pursue unification with Taiwan. That possibility has raised alarm among some Taiwanese security officials, with one worried that “this is a moment for China to exercise influence.”

China This Week: Strategic Moves and Messaging

Erika Lafrennie

Bottom Line: In a single seven-day window, Beijing advanced a counter-sanctions legal regime, a four-point Gulf security framework, party-to-party political security bindings with Vietnam, a Russia alignment restatement, cross-strait administrative integration measures, and posted Q1 trade numbers that suggest a structural shift away from US dependence is already measurable. Read together, the pattern across domains is more significant than any individual item.

1. China Expands and Operationalizes Its Extraterritorial Counter-Sanctions Architecture

The State Council issued Regulations on Countering Improper Extraterritorial Application of Foreign Laws, establishing an identification mechanism, a Malicious Entity List, and a graduated countermeasures menu targeting foreign organizations and individuals that “promote or participate in” enforcement of foreign extraterritorial jurisdiction measures Beijing deems unlawful. The regulations assert Chinese extraterritorial jurisdiction over conduct with “appropriate connection” to China and prohibit any organization or individual from executing or assisting such foreign measures without State Council approval.

CENTCOM using underwater drones to clear mines in the Strait of Hormuz

ANNA AHRONHEIM

As ceasefire talks hit a stalemate in Pakistan, US Central Command (CENTCOM) has announced that it will be sending underwater drones to help clear the Strait of Hormuz. “Today, we began the process of establishing a new passage, and we will share this safe pathway with the maritime industry soon to encourage the free flow of commerce,” said Adm. Brad Cooper, commander of CENTCOM, as quoted as saying.

The press release added that “The Strait of Hormuz is an international sea passage and an essential trade corridor that supports regional and global economic prosperity. Additional US forces, including underwater drones, will join the clearance effort in the coming days.”

Here’s What the U.S. Blockade of Iran Looks Like

Roque Ruiz

A U.S. blockade of Iranian ports relies on more than 15 warships and potentially thousands of U.S. servicemembers, including possibly Marines and special-operations forces to enforce the operation.

Until now, Iran had been freely shipping its own oil and goods while sharply curtailing vessel traffic from other countries, especially those it deems unfriendly. Now, the U.S. military says it will stop any ship headed to or from an Iranian port, physically boarding it if necessary.

From Rejection to Acceptance: Why Iran Agreed to a Ceasefire

Arsalan Bilal

After more than a month of an intense regional war, a ceasefire between Iran and the U.S. has de-escalated the conflict, at least for some time, as international efforts toward a broader agreement continue. Recent commentary talks about the diplomacy that resulted in the ceasefire, but a critical question remains: why did Iran agree to a ceasefire it initially opposed?

For close to six weeks, Iran suffered significant leadership and material losses amid the U.S and Israel striking key targets, yet it developed meaningful leverage. To this end, it demonstrated its ability to disrupt energy supplies flowing through the region, thereby imposing significant costs on its adversaries that depend on the stability of the global economy. The strategy was the linchpin of Iran’s asymmetric warfare through which it could compensate for its military disadvantage and operational degradation.

How China’s Weapons Transfers to Iran Have Evolved Over Decades

David Pierson

That approach is now drawing renewed attention after U.S. officials said intelligence agencies were assessing whether China may have shipped shoulder-fired missiles to Iran in recent weeks. President Trump has said he would impose an additional 50 percent tariff on Chinese goods if the assessment proves accurate. China has denied the claim, calling it “pure fabrication” and has vowed to “resolutely retaliate” if the Trump administration goes through with tariffs.

The American officials said the information obtained by U.S. intelligence agencies was not definitive. But if proven true, it would be a significant tactical change in the way Beijing supports its closest strategic partner in the Middle East.

Field Observation: The Strait of Hormuz Is Not a Chokepoint

Erika Lafrennie

Foreign Affairs published an assessment of the war yesterday that represents, by both credentials and access, the ceiling of what the American policy establishment can produce on this crisis. The diagnosis is sharp. Iran’s three traditional security pillars have been systematically destroyed: Hamas and Hezbollah decimated, nuclear infrastructure buried, and the missile program degraded. But Iran discovered a fourth instrument more powerful than the other three combined. The analysis names the mechanism precisely: Iran attacked two ships, spooked maritime insurers into pulling coverage, and collapsed commercial transit through the Strait of Hormuz without needing to sustain a military campaign. The piece titles a central section “Battle of the Bridge Trolls,” capturing the toll-collector logic in a single image.

Dozens of ships have paid Iran to transit. The toll system functions simultaneously as a revenue stream and a security guarantee, replacing the deterrence Hezbollah once provided. The United States responded with a counter-blockade that mirrors Iran’s own move. Iran’s systemic domestic problems remain unfixed. The war gave the regime a temporary reprieve it did not earn through governance performance. Coercion has not produced capitulation and likely will not. Both sides are misreading each other. Maximalist positions are reducing the chance of settlement.

For Iran, Hormuz Is More a Weakness Than a Weapon

Miad Maleki

On Monday, six weeks into its war with Iran, the United States imposed a naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. According to conventional wisdom, the war has made Tehran realize that its control of the strait constitutes powerful leverage. In this story line, the strait turned out to be Iran’s real nuclear weapon, its potent deterrent. Because Tehran could use this chokepoint to threaten global shipping, it was able to resist pressure from the world’s most powerful air force, reject Washington’s peace demands, and ultimately gain leverage over its nemesis. Iranian leaders have repeatedly touted that

US Navy leaning on AI to sweep Iran’s Hormuz mines

John Femiani

US military officials said the Navy has begun the process of clearing mines in the Strait of Hormuz, a critical choke point for global shipping. Iranian forces have deployed a small number of mines in the strait. The move gave the Iranians a means, along with missiles and drones, of threatening ships.

The US Navy recently decommissioned the minesweeping vessels that it had operating in the Persian Gulf region. However, it has other ships and aircraft for finding and destroying mines. As a computer scientist who researches how to detect mines, I have been researching how artificial intelligence techniques, such as machine learning, can help navies detect modern sea mines. Here’s what I’ve learned about how the mines work and how they can be neutralized.

What the Iran War Means for the “Axis of Resistance”

Hamidreza Azizi

In the final weeks before his death, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei cast the mounting hostility of U.S. President Donald Trump in religious and explicitly Shiite terms. Rejecting calls for capitulation, he invoked the example of Imam Hussein—the third imam, or spiritual leader, of the Shiites—refusing to pledge allegiance to Yazid, the Umayyad ruler widely associated in Shiite memory with tyranny and injustice. Defiance, in this light, was not simply a strategic imperative but a value rooted in history and identity.

That framing did not disappear with Khamenei’s death. Instead, Shiite political figures, clerics, and communities

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