Lt. Gen. Gregory K. Anderson
Editor’s Note: This article was adapted from LTG Anderson’s Command Note #7 — Enduring Training Guidance Supplemental. Although it was written for XVIII Airborne Corps Soldiers, LTG Anderson provides valuable insights that can benefit all Infantry leaders as they plan and execute training.
The XVIII Airborne Corps will be called to fight, with little advance warning, to a conflict and an enemy for which we do not yet know. Presently, we do not have the clarity, precision, or detail in war plans and contingency plans to know specifically what tasks to train for or what conditions to train against. As such, our Corps needs to possess strong teams, leaders that can think, a mastery of basic skills, and excellence in night fighting to hedge against the uncertainty and full spectrum of what we could (and will) be called to execute. This article is meant to help you visualize the types of skills we need to develop at the tactical level as part of the hedge against uncertainty. THIS IS NOT TRAINING GUIDANCE FOR FIRE TEAMS, SQUADS, and PLATOONS. It is based on my experience and thus has a strong light infantry flavor to it, but if we are going to fight in small units, decentralized, and potentially isolated, then it applies across the entire formation. As we look to fix training management at echelon, I encourage you to develop your visualization of what you want your formation to train towards. Be it artillery tables, forward arming and refueling point (FARP) operations at night, expeditionary logistics, military police (MP) security missions, chemical decontamination, or unmanned breaching operations, commanders must be able to visualize and then describe the training end state to subordinates for them to have a shared reference point as they plan and execute training. After you read this supplemental, ask yourself if it helped you visualize what our training outcomes should look like to be ready for combat. This is “my” description of what I want our formations who might engage in close fighting to be able to achieve, be it infantry, engineers, logistics convoys, or while defending a perimeter in the Corps rear area. Again, this is not guidance; it is a supplemental reference for your consideration as you set out to train your units for uncertainty.